JXK & Anor v The Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [2026] EWHC 608 (KB)

[2026] EWHC 608 (KB)Case No KB-2024-MAN-000379
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 10 April 2026
Before
His Honour Judge Bird sitting as a Judge of this Court
Between
JXKClaimantsNATALIE BAMFORDClaimantTHE CHIEF CONSTABLE OF GREATER MANCHESTER POLICEDefendant
George Murray (instructed by Irvings Law) for ClaimantsRobert Talalay (instructed by the Legal Services Department of the Greater Manchester Police) for Decfendant.Hearing Hearing dates: 29 September 2025
Approved JUDGMENTThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 10 April 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.
[1]Whilst serving as a police officer, Richard Proctor accessed and misused personal data relating to the Claimants and disclosed data belonging to third parties to the second Claimant. The Claimants plead that these facts establish breaches of the then in force data protection legislation and misfeasance in public office.[2]Mr Proctor was convicted (on a guilty plea) of 31 offences under Data Protection and Computer Misuse legislation. Each offence related to the matters pleaded by the Claimants in the claim.[3]The Defendant has not submitted a Defence but instead seeks an order that the claim be struck out on the ground that it discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim. In the alternative he seeks summary judgment on the claim because there is no reasonable prospect of success. The basis of each application is that he is not vicariously liable for the acts of Mr Proctor.[4]The pleaded case sets out the following: i) The relevant data was held by the Police and only accessible by Mr Proctor because of his position as a police officer (paragraph 3 and 4) ii) Mr Proctor’s actions were unauthorised, and he knew that was the case (paragraph 42) iii) The convictions are pleaded at paragraph 28. iv) The dismissal is pleaded at paragraph 1.[5]The Defendant acknowledges that the allegations raised in the pleaded case are very serious and accepts that the Claimants have suffered terribly at the hands of Mr Proctor. Because a police constable is not “employed” by the Chief Constable, vicarious responsibility does not arise through employment. If there is any vicarious responsibility, it would arise under section 88 of the Police Act 1996. Section 88 provides that, in summary, the Defendant is responsible for wrings committed by Mr Proctor in the “performance or purported performance of [his] functionsin like manner as a master is liable in respect of [any unlawful conduct of] his servants in the course of their employment…”[6]There was no dispute about the applicable procedural principles. The Defendant submits that the power to strike out arises because the Particulars of Claim fail to set out reasonable grounds for bringing the claim. I accept that I am concerned only with the content of the pleading and that I must take the pleaded case at its highest. In considering summary judgment, I am entitled to take account of extrinsic evidence but must take care not to conduct a mini-trial.[7]In summary, the Defendant’s case is that Mr Proctor acted at all times in a manner that was directly contrary to his training and to specific direction from the Defendant and that he was on a frolic of his own.[8]The evidence advanced in support of the summary judgment application is not disputed. It summarises training on the use of police data given to Mr Proctor and with the warnings presented to Mr Proctor whenever he accessed police data through the Defendant’s OPUS system. In short, Mr Proctor was instructed and repeatedly warned that he would be acting outside his duties and contrary to law and policy if he misused a person’s data or processed it for unauthorised reasons. Further, as set out in the statement of DC Brien dated 14 September 2021 and the statement of Paul Glover dated 8 October 2021:
“….every time Mr Proctor used a computer to access the relevant data on police systems, he logged in via a page that warned him plainly and obviously that his actions were audited, that he could only use OPUS and the data contained therein for authorised purposes, and that it was his personal responsibility to ensure compliance with data protection legislation. That warning was repeated every time Mr Proctor access the relevant system.”
[9]It is accepted that some of the data shared by Mr Proctor was data he lawfully accessed. In the case of such data his processing of the data (by disseminating it) was not authorised.[10]The Defendant relies on the decisions of Richard Spearman KC sitting as a Deputy High Curt Judge in Ali v Luton [2022] EWHC 132 (QB) as an accurate summary of the law. In that case, an employee of the Defendant had accessed and shared confidential information kept on systems maintained by the Defendant. Whilst the facts Ali might be distinguishable I accept that the principles there set out are of general application.[11]In my view the following principles emerge from the decided cases (and are accurately summarised in Ali): i) There must be a close connection between the wrongful conduct and the acts the employee was authorised to do. The close connection must be such that the wrongful conduct may “fairly and properly” (having regard to guidance provided in decided cases) be regarded as having been done in the course of employment (see paragraph 18) ii) The mere fact that the wrongdoer’s employment gave him the opportunity to commit the wrongful act would not be enough to meet the close connection test (paragraph 21) iii) Closely connected to the above, the mere performance of acts “of the class which [the wrongdoer] was authorised or employed to do may so clearly depart from the scope of his employment that his [employer] will not be liable for his wrongful acts” (paragraph 21) iv) The wrongdoer must be acting in “the course of his employment.” If he is not engaged in that way but rather is “pursuing his own interests” (or on a frolic of his own) no vicarious liability arises (paragraph 22).[12]Applying these principles to the facts of this case I have come to the clear view that the Claimant’s case has no reasonable prospects of success and that in consequence it is right to enter judgment in favour of the Defendant and dismiss the claim. Approaching the matter as if Mr Proctor was employed, there is no relevant “close connection” between Mr Proctor’s wrongs in respect of misfeasance or otherwise, and his duties as a police constable, sufficient to give rise to vicarious liability on the part of the Defendant.[13]I reach that clear view for the following reasons: i) The relevant acts (either the wrongful accessing and dissemination of information or the wrongful dissemination of information that had been lawfully accessed) were expressly forbidden by the Defendant with obvious good reason. The data was sensitive, obviously private and collected for very limited and specific police-related purposes. To access and disseminate the data in these circumstances (or simply to disseminate data that had been lawfully accessed) was a pursuit of Mr Proctor’s own “interests” and wholly and obviously divorced from the course of his employment. ii) The only arguable connection between the wrongdoing and Mr Proctor’s “employment” is that the employment afforded Mr Proctor the means to do the wrong. Such a connection is not “close.” iii) To put it in a different way: the actions which gave rise to the claim (accessing data and disseminating it) may, if a broad view is taken, be taken as within “the class” (or type) of actions the wrongdoer was authorised or employed to do. But the actions “so clearly depart from the scope of his employment” that the Defendant cannot, on any sensible view be held responsible. iv) The extent of departure from the scope of authorised activity could not be clearer. The actions were criminal, contrary to policy and would plainly be seen by any impartial observer as wholly divorced from the functions of a constable. The second Claimant’s pleaded case is that Mr Proctor’s intention was to “manipulate and intimidate.” The first Claimant’s pleaded case is that her personal data was accessed and used to create a forged letter purporting to come from the first Claimant.[14]The same reasoning applies in my judgment to all of the pleaded claims including misfeasance in public office. Whilst I accept (as establishedin Racz v The Home Office [1994] 2 AC 45) that there are circumstances in which vicarious liability may attach to deliberate wrongdoing, the core requirement remains one of close connection. I am satisfied for the reasons I have set out, that the unauthorised acts of Mr Proctor were (see Lord Jauncey in Racz at page 53 F) “so unconnected with [his] authorised duties as to be quite independent of and outside those duties”.[15]The Claimants had made an application for an extension of time under section 33 of the Limitaiton Act 1980 in respect of their personal injury claims. Because the claim has come to an end, I need not deal with that application.[16]The claim was issued in the Media and Communications list of the King’s Bench Division out of central office, the Royal Courts of Justice. It was transferred to the Manchester District Registry by order of Master Thornett on 1 October 2024. There is no Media and Communications List (“MCL”)outside the RCJ. The transfer was then plainly to the general King’s Bench list. By CPR53.1 it appears that the claim (because it includes a claim a “claim in data protection law”) had to be issued in the MCL. As the claim was transferred to this court, it seems to me this court has plainly acquired jurisdiction to deal with it. There may be an issue about the power of the Master to transfer a MCL case out of the MCL (see CPR 30.5, CPR53.2 for the definition of an MCL Judge and CPR PD 53A para.4 which suggests that only a MCL judge may transfer a MCL case out of the MCL). However, no such issue has been raised, and the matter has come to the Manchester Registry by reason of a judicial order. In those circumstances no issue has been raised that the matter should be dealt with in the MCL. In any event, the issues I have dealt with are not in substance MCL issues.[17]I am grateful to both counsel for their submissions and for the clear and helpful way in which the arguments were presented.