Yaa Foriwaa Appiah & Anor v Leeds and York Partnership NHS Foundation Trust [2026] EWHC 2135 (KB)

[2026] EWHC 2135 (KB)Case No QB-2021-003683
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
Venue Royal Courts of JusticeDate 12 th August 2026
Strand
London
WC2A 2LL
TOM LITTLE KC(sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court)
LEEDS AND YORK PARTNERSHIPDefendantNHS FOUNDATION TRUSTDefendant
The Claimants appeared in person. for in personJamie Mathieson (instructed by Capsticks LLP) for DefendantHearing Hearing dates: 19 th, 20 th and 21 st May 2026
APPROVED JUDGMENTThis judgment was handed down at 2pm on 12 th August 2026 in Courtand by release to The National Archives.

Tom Little KC:

[1]This judgment arises from a claim for damages relating to the detention of the First Claimant under section 3 of the Mental Health Act 1983 [“MHA”]. That detention took place as long ago as 2019 and specifically between 26th April 2019 and 23rd August 2019. The real issues for me to determine are whether that detention was lawful (in whole or in part), what did and did not take place during that period of detention and whether the Defendant is liable in any way for any or all of those matters.[2]Liability and quantum are in dispute. The case was listed for a three day trial before me. The evidence finished at the end of the court day on the third day of the trial. Therefore I ordered the service of written closing submissions. These were provided sequentially (and which I address below at paragraph 132).[3]The judgment is divided into the following sections:(a) (A) The parties Paragraphs 4 – 6(b) (B) Trial documentation Paragraphs 7 – 8(c) (C) The factual and procedural background Paragraphs 9 – 64(d) (D) Legal framework Paragraphs 65 - 72(e) (E) Preliminary decisions Paragraphs 73 – 86(f) (F) Evidence at trial Paragraphs 87 – 131(g) (G) Post trial Paragraph 132(h) (H) Analysis Paragraphs 133 – 188(i) (I) Conclusion Paragraph 189

The parties:

[4]The First Claimant was born on 13th September 1965. The Second Claimant was born on 2nd November 1964. The Claimants were both born in Ghana. They married in 1996. The Second Claimant came to the United Kingdom first in 1998 having obtained a student visa and enrolled at the University of Leeds as a PHD student. The First Claimant and their eldest child and the First Claimant’s daughter from a previous relationship, entered the United Kingdom in 1999. The Claimants had two further children once they were both in the United Kingdom. They have both therefore lived in the United Kingdom for many years.[5]The Defendant is the Leeds and York Partnership NHS Foundation Trust.[6]Originally the Defendant was the Second Defendant. The claim was also issued against Leeds City Council. They were originally the First Defendant. Section 139 of the MHA requires the leave of the High Court before proceedings could be brought against Leeds City Council. On 14th July 2022 Mrs Justice Yip refused to grant leave to the Claimants to bring these proceedings against Leeds City Council.. I will refer to the Second Defendant throughout therefore as the Defendant and to Leeds City Council as the Original First Defendant.

Trial documentation:

[7]The documentation served in this claim was voluminous. It is contained in a principal Hearing Bundle that is 873 pages in length with further bundles of Home Office deportation documentation, Prison records and medical records. The medical records included the Defendant’s Patient Administration and Recording Information System notes known by the acronym PARIS. The Claimants also served an additional bundle which was 125 pages in length and which contained a number of documents, some (but not all) of which were in the Hearing Bundle.[8]I have considered all of the documentation in the principal Hearing Bundle trial including all of the witness statements and reports and the Claimants’ additional Bundle as well as all of the other documents that I was taken to during the trial. Both parties referred me to a number of authorities which I have also read. The fact that I do not refer to every piece of evidence or every authority in this judgment does not mean that I have not considered it carefully. This judgment would be even longer than it is if I were to refer to everything that I have read and considered.

The factual and procedural background (largely by reference to contemporaneous documentation):

[9]Somewhat unusually the factual and procedural background to, and of, this claim are linked. Indeed the Claimants allege procedural breaches of the MHA. Therefore I will address them together at this stage. The chronology is lengthy and rather tortuous. Not all of it requires to be summarised but some of it is relevant to the issues in the claim as well as to a number of the Claimants’ applications that I had to determine at the commencement of the trial and which I address below (see paragraphs 73 – 86).[10]In 2011 a decision was made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department that the Claimants could no longer remain in the United Kingdom. There had been earlier immigration proceedings but their history is not germane to this claim. Appeals by the Claimants, against the 2011 decisions that they were not allowed to remain in the United Kingdom, were initially dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal in 2012. The Claimants appealed and the Upper Tribunal allowed their appeals on Article 8 ECHR [“European Convention on Human Rights”] grounds.[11]In 2017 the First Claimant was convicted of offences of assaulting a police officer, harassment and criminal damage in the Leeds Magistrates’ Court. She was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment. Following that conviction the First Claimant was detained under the Immigration Act 1971, pending her deportation on 16th November 2017. The deportation order was dated 15th December 2017. She was held at HMP New Hall. Whilst at HMP New Hall medical staff made a referral to the Defendant due to concern about the First Claimant’s mental health including that she was exhibiting psychotic symptoms.[12]In August 2018 the First Claimant was placed on enhanced observations at HMP New Hall.[13]On 23rd October 2018 Dr Nishant Bhagat (a Consultant Psychiatrist) referred the First Claimant for assessment in light of what he regarded as her bizarre presentation. Dr Bhagat had assessed the First Claimant on 16th October 2018 and was concerned that the First Claimant’s denial of any mental health problems was at odds with a number of concerning aspects of presentation. He concluded that there was evidence of the First Claimant expressing persecutory delusions of her having been kept in prison so that officers were getting her money. He also considered that the First Claimant had delusions about being a millionaire and having houses across the country. His opinion at that time was that it was most likely that the First Claimant suffered from a psychotic illness and, if so, most likely paranoid schizophrenia.[14]On 7th November 2018 the First Claimant was seen by Dr Jonathan King and his team at HMP New Hall in order to consider Dr Baghat’s proposed referral. Dr Jonathan King is a Consultant Psychiatrist and Forensic Service Clinical Lead. The First Claimant refused to leave her cell and sat in her wheelchair. The conversation had to be held through the cell door. She said that she had been brought into prison so that her assets could be misappropriated by the Government and then used to provide money and accommodation for release to prisoners. It was noted at that point that the First Claimant was presenting from a mental disorder characterised by grandiose delusions and inappropriate effect.[15]Following his assessment, Dr Jonathan King’s letter of 12th November 2018 sets out his findings and reasons for transferring the First Claimant to a low secure facility. It states “….. I believe Ms Appiah fulfils criteria for detention under the Mental Health Act 1983”. That letter also addresses the basis for the First Claimant’s detention at that stage and states “To confuse the picture still further, the probation file I reviewed seemed to contain a very official document on letter headed paper that suggested that a Tribunal had declared that Ms Appiah’s detention was unlawful and against her human rights. There was also a letter from her supposed husband, threatening judicial review if she was not immediately released …. Despite this official looking letter being in her file, when the probation office rang the Home Office/Immigration for clarification, they stated that Ms Appiah was legally detained in prison.”[16]On 13th December 2018 the First Claimant was transferred pursuant to section 48 and/or 49 of the MHA to the Newsam Centre (Ward 2) at Seacroft Hospital and which was operated by the Defendant. The Defendant’s PARIS records following her arrival at the Newsam Centre record: “She said that she is mentally and physically well... she said that the reason why she was brought to us was because she was protesting in prison, not washing, isolating herself being mute... she said that whilst in prison... she was put in there so that they can have her money to fund the prisoners. She has said that she has been chosen to do this mission job. She said that she will not give us any personal information and does not want anything to be recorded and has been very adamant. She has kept repeating this and says that her being in a mental health facility will discredit her status to her ‘job’”.[17]On 14th December 2018 Dr Jonathan King reviewed the First Claimant in the Newsam Ward. He concluded that his initial impressions were consistent with what he had thought about her in prison, namely that she presented as psychotic and with no insight. A further review was undertaken by Dr Jonathan King on 18th December 2018. He concluded that she presented with grandiose delusional thinking, remaining completely insightless and being likely to refuse antipsychotic medication. Dr Jonathan King prescribed oral aripiprazole (an antipsychotic).[18]On 21st December 2018 the First Claimant was given aripiprazole by injection along with Lorazepam because of her agitation.[19]On 31st December 2018 Dr Jonathan King reviewed the First Claimant again. He prescribed Aripiprazole intramuscular injection medication following which the First Claimant was verbally abusive, threatening and aggressive.[20]On 2nd January 2019 it was decided that the First Claimant should be given aripiprazole by depot. This is a method of slow-release of an injection that creates a storage pool of a drug in the body.[21]On 11th March 2019 Dr Soliman saw the Claimant, acting as the second opinion approved Doctor. He provided a T3 certificate dated 25th March 2019 which stated “The current presentation and the history as documented in the clinical notes are consistent with the diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia.”[22]On 12th April 2019 the Defendant was notified that the section 48/49 MHA detention of the First Claimant would cease on 26th April 2019. It was therefore incumbent on the Defendant to conduct an assessment of the First Claimant’s mental health in order to ascertain what should happen next.[23]On 24th April 2019 the Second Claimant was identified as being the nearest relative and was consulted by Mr Christopher Lee, an Approved Mental Health Professional [“AMHP”] employed by the original First Defendant.[24]On 24th April 2019 an MHA assessment was conducted by Mr Christopher Lee as well as by Dr Jonathan King and Dr Andrew Cobb. Dr Jonathan King and Dr Andrew Cobb were both approved psychiatrists in accordance with section 12 of the MHA. Dr Andrew Cobb was not employed by the Defendant.[25]Dr Jonathan King’s handwritten notes of his 24th April 2019 assessment state:
“Miss Yaa Appiah presents with paranoid delusions and disturbed affect. She has no insight into being mentally ill and refuses all treatment. She will not accept treatment or hospital admissions willingly and would leave hospital if she could. She believes that she has property and wealth that is being misappropriated by the government. Such ideas have caused her distress and have led to hostile and aggressive behaviour. Treatment is at an early stage, can only be delivered in depot form and needs to continue. She will not stay in hospital unless detained and treatment cannot be delivered in the community as she will disengage and not accept it.”
[26]Dr Jonathan King’s opinion was that the First Claimant should be detained pursuant to section 3 MHA. His opinion was that that First Claimant had made minor improvements but he still had significant concerns about her presentation and considered she would deteriorate on discharge.[27]Dr Andrew Cobb’s handwritten notes of his 24th April 2019 assessment state:
“Yaa suffers from a psychosis not presently fully described, though likely to be a persistent encapsulated delusional disorder. Following prison assessments - she has committed a series of minor offences - she has been transferred to a forensic facility within which she continues to express her long held unusual beliefs, though perhaps with lesser force, at a time she is unwillingly certainly having antipsychotic depot medication. Staff report her as ‘guarded’, and she is essentially separate from those around her. She has objected - once violently - to such medication though is otherwise nonconfrontational. When seen, from the outset she made it clear even from her gestures that there was no question of her experiencing any mental illness, and that we were mistaken and/or liars for stating this. She dismissed the notion of others exploiting her financially - I thought in the past tense, and no longer talked of owning multiple properties. I judge her incapacitious regarding the location and nature of her required care in that she cannot ‘weigh in the balance’ any complex decisions relating to her care. Community based care would fail, at present, as she would inevitably immediately disengage. Only hospital based care will provide the safe and expertly [illegible] she requires, to which she cannot give consent, it therefore must be imposed. This still represent least restriction.”
[28]In light of those assessments, on 25th April 2019 an application was made by the original First Defendant for an interim order to displace the Second Claimant as the First Claimant’s nearest relative to enable an application to detain the First Claimant under section 3 MHA. On 26th April 2019 His Honour Judge Gosnell sitting in the Leeds County Court made an interim order in proceedings under section 29C of the MHA that the Second Claimant be displaced as nearest relative of the First Claimant and that the functions of the nearest relative would be exercised by the Director of Adult Services of Leeds City Council [“the displacement proceedings”]. This was necessary because the Second Claimant would not consent to the First Claimant’s detention under section 3 of the MHA.[29]On 26th April 2019 at about 9.11am a Form H1 was completed by Dr Jonathan King to detain the First Claimant pending the outcome of the section 3 MHA assessment. Dr Jonathan King stated in that document “Yaa Appiah is psychotic and is subject to various delusions but she has no insight into her disorder and therefore refuses hospital admission and treatment. A section 3 is being applied for but the nearest relative needs to be displaced. The Home Office will rescind her section 48/49 this morning, hence a holding power is needed. Detention is necessary for her health and protection of others”.[30]On the morning of the same day, 26th April 2019, the Secretary of State for the Home Department revoked the deportation order in respect of the First Claimant and issued a release order. However, the First Claimant could not be released because of the holding power under section 5 of MHA.[31]Following an assessment at about 1.50pm on 26th April 2019 the First Claimant was detained under section 3 of MHA. She remained detained pursuant to that power for the next 119 days.[32]On 15th May 2019 a directions hearing took place in the displacement proceedings.[33]On 31st May 2019 Dr Jonathan King completed a Certificate as to Capacity in respect of the First Claimant. That document is signed by him and has a statement of truth attached to it. It records that he had acted as practitioner for the person concerned since 13th December 2018 and had last assessed her on 31st May 2019. His opinion was that she lacked capacity and “suffers from a psychotic disorder about which she has no insight” and that whilst it was difficult to be precise his opinion was that it had lasted since at least 2018.[34]On 1st June 2019 the First Claimant wrote a handwritten single page document entitled ‘5 Points to Note’. This avers that she had capacity and was not mentally unwell. It also made clear that she wanted the Second Claimant to be her nearest relative.[35]A handwritten letter dated 6th June 2019 was sent to the Manager of the Newsam Centre. It was signed in the name of the First Claimant. The relevant part of the letter stated:
“I am writing this letter to lodge a complaint about the way I am dehumanly treated forcing medication on me by injection every two weeks. Usually between 7 to 10 staff come around me and if I resisted violently throw me to the floor flat from my wheelchair in a degrading way and inject me with medication by throwing the syringe at me with my hands held back in a dehumanising manner after which they disappear and I have to crawl back to my wheelchair in pain and sorrow (with no one to help me) in a degrading way. I suffer from the side effects of the medication such as feeling jittery, regular shaking of both hands, liquid flowing from mouth and dizziness (symptoms I did not have before). I ask that you investigate this matter with the help of CCTV footage that covers the incident. I also ask that you give me a copy of the CCTV footage as soon as possible. I did not complain about the incidents to you from the beginning because I thought by telling those people by word of mouth that I did not like the way the (sic) handled and treated me they would stop but they haven't so I am now making this complaint for investigation.”
[36]On 12th June 2019 Mrs Justice O'Farrell heard an appeal against the interim order of His Honour Judge Gosnell in the displacement proceedings. She refused the application for permission to appeal.[37]On 15th July 2019 further directions were given in relation to the displacement of the First Claimant as nearest relative.[38]On 24th July 2019 Dr Srikanth Nimmagadda (instructed by the Second Claimant and by the Official Solicitor on behalf of the First Claimant) interviewed the First Claimant. His opinion was that the First Claimant was suffering a mental disorder namely a delusional disorder which has a propensity to cause an impairment or disturbance in the functioning of the mind or brain. His opinion was that as a result of receiving the depot antipsychotic medication for the treatment of her mental disorder it appeared that the First Claimant’s symptoms had responded reasonably well over the last few months. His opinion was that despite that the First Claimant was still suffering from a mental disorder but that she did have capacity. Paragraph 17.5 of Dr Nimmagadda’s report stated (with emphasis added): “In my opinion, Mrs Appiah is suffering from a mental disorder, of a nature at the current time which makes it appropriate for her to be detained in the hospital for further medical treatment in the hospital for her own health and safety and safety of others …… Mrs Appiah lacks insight into the nature of her mental health disorder, and it is unlikely she would comply with any treatment offered to her as an informal patient and therefore her current detention is justified as a result. I believe appropriate treatment is available at the Newsam Centre for the treatment of her condition. Mrs Appiah needs to be offered psychoeducation in order to improve her insight into her mental disorder and the need for taking psychotropic medication to manage her symptoms of delusional disorder”.[39]On 26th July 2019 the First Claimant was transferred to the Becklin Centre, and was still detained pursuant to section 3 of the MHA. The Becklin Centre is an NHS psychiatric hospital in Leeds run by the Defendant.[40]On 2nd August 2019 a letter addressed to the First Claimant was sent care of her home address. This attached a consent form to be completed and signed by the First Claimant. On the following day, 3rd August 2019, that consent form was signed. It purports to be signed by the First Claimant. Given that the First Claimant was detained at that point the ability for that document to have been signed by return raises a question as to whether it was in fact completed by the Second Claimant. However, as this issue was not the subject of any form of cross-examination I will ignore any such a possibility.[41]On 12th August 2019 a Multi Professional Care Programme Approach [“CPA”] meeting was held at which the Claimants and other were present. The notes of that meeting include the following “Nicky said that as per CCTV footage there is no direct evidence of Yaa assaulting anyone.” The notes record that Nicky being a care coordinator. The notes were completed by Sharmistha Ghosh and not by ‘Nicky’.[42]On 23rd August 2019 the First-tier Tribunal (Health, Education and Social Care Chamber) Mental Health [“the Tribunal”] sat at the Becklin Centre. They decided that the First Claimant could be discharged immediately. The Tribunal heard evidence from the Claimants. Dr B McHarg, Nurse E Nugent, Ms E Thomas and Ms J Poxton. The First Claimant’s witness statement made similar allegations to those in her letter of complaint and also alleged that Dr Jonathan King had written false things about her. There was written evidence from Dr Jonathan King, Nurse Brewer and Ms N Askew. The decision was announced at the end of the hearing. Written reasons followed later. The relevant part is as follows:
“We heard in medical and nursing evidence that there has been no sign of grandiosity or delusional beliefs since transfer but that she remains guarded, suspicious and lacking in insight. She is said to have made ‘considerable improvement’ as a result of anti-psychotic depot medication. Although there remains uncertainty about diagnosis, we were told that the patient probably has a schizo-affective disorder or schizophrenia. It is feared that if discharged the patient would not accept treatment and her symptoms would return, with risks of deterioration and self-neglect to herself and of aggression towards others, although the RC conceded that there is no evidence to link past aggressive behaviour to the patient’s perceived mental disorder. The RC also conceded that in the absence of a significant medical history it is not possible to predict how quickly the patient would relapse. She did accept that, since the patient is currently receiving depot medication, anti-psychotic medication would stay in her system for some time, even if she were to be discharged and become non-compliant. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the fact that she does not rely upon the degree of the patient’s mental disorder for detention, the RC, supported by the other professional witnesses, suggested that the patient needs to stay in hospital until a suitable discharge plan has been devised and arrangements made for the engagement of the community team. We heard that the Intensive Support Service could in fact be engaged with the patient’s care in the community within 24 hours of discharge, although it was conceded that this may be to little avail if, as is clearly the case, the patient has no intention of accepting such support. It was also accepted that such arrangements would need to be revised if the patient moves to London in the next few days, as she has said she will. Although there was some discussion of a CTO, it was accepted that this too would serve little purpose if the patient did not agree to its terms. The patient and her husband, the nearest relative, told us very clearly and coherently that the patient has never suffered from a mental disorder and has no need of medication or other treatment. They made no attempt to pretend that the patient would engage with mental health services or accept medication in future, but instead maintained their position that the patient does not have a mental disorder and so does not need any such interventions. They also offered explanations for what had been interpreted in the medical evidence as delusional beliefs and bizarre behaviour: it was, for example, explained that when the patient talked about the government taking away her most valuable possessions she was referring to the fact that her four children had in the past been taken into care; or, for example, when she flooded her cell it was because she had been secluded in unbearably hot conditions and simply needed to cool down. The patient’s husband told us that the patient is not habitually an aggressive person and that her detention in prison and then in hospital has been a terrible burden upon the family. He also told us, in agreement with the patient, that if discharged she would initially stay in Leeds for a few days with their son who is a student there, and after that she would return to London to be with her husband and live with her extended family. We heard that since the patient’s immigration status has now been resolved she will be entitled to receive welfare benefits and will in any event be in a much more secure position. In the light of the available evidence, we are not at all convinced that the case for mental disorder has been satisfactorily made out. Between 2013 and 2017 the patient had three mental health assessments, none of which elicited findings of mental disorder. The grounds for the patient’s current detention are stated to be grandiosity and incongruous affect, yet we heard from the patient and the nearest relative plausible, and indeed persuasive, alternative explanations for what had been taken to be grandiose beliefs and ‘bizarre behaviour’. We are also acutely conscious of the severely stressful circumstances in which the patient found herself when in prison, facing deportation after residence in the UK for so many years. Since the patient’s deportation notice has been rescinded she is reported to have shown signs of considerable improvement and to be less guarded, whilst, perhaps not surprisingly given the recent circumstances, remaining somewhat circumspect in the presence of medical and nursing staff. Whilst the medical evidence links that improvement to acceptance of anti-psychotic medication, it seems just as likely that the change in the patient’s circumstances has also played a significant part in her improvement. Indeed aspects of her reportedly bizarre behaviour, lack of insight and guarded presentation are as consistent with an understandable reaction of the patient’s adverse circumstances as with mental disorder. We note that even now there is no settled diagnosis of the patient’s putative mental disorder and since admission to the Becklin Centre there have been no signs whatsoever of psychotic symptoms, to the extent that the RC does not rely on degree and is understandably uncertain about the chronicity of the patient’s past presentation and its future prognosis. We are also mindful of the patient’s calm assurance that she has never had a mental disorder and of her husband’s spirited reinforcement of that view. In any event, it is accepted by the RC that if the patient does have a mental disorder it is responsive to treatment, that the patient is currently in remission and that it is entirely uncertain how quickly she will relapse, if at all, especially since her depot medication will remain in her system for some time. The RC is also unable firmly to associate the patient’s formerly aggressive behaviour with any form of mental disorder, and we note that most, if not all, such incidents have arisen in circumstances where the patient has been in conflict with restraining staff members or with the police: there is nothing to suggest that she is habitually aggressive when ‘unwell’ or indeed that her behaviour is subjectively or objectively ‘bizarre’ when judged against her social circumstances. We do not therefore find that the case is made out that the patient currently has a mental disorder whose nature or degree makes it appropriate for her to be liable to detention under s.3 MHA 1981. Furthermore, even if mental disorder, and its nature, were made out, we do not find that detention is in any event necessary in the interests of the patient’s own health and safety or for the protection of others. The patient has lived in the community for most of her adult life without apparent incident. On three occasions over a period of several years she has been found not to be suffering from mental disorder. There is considerable uncertainty about possible diagnosis and prognosis. There is no firm connection between the patient’s limited forensic history and any supposed mental disorder. The patient’s husband is impressive in his support and attests to the wider family support of the patient in the community. We do not as a result find that there is convincing evidence to uphold the view that there would be significant risk to the patient’s own health and safety or to the interests of others if she were to be discharged. Finally, since we cannot find that mental disorder, its nature or its degree are made out, it follows that we do not consider that the treatment which is available in the form of anti-psychotic medication and nursing care is ‘appropriate’ or indeed necessary.”
[43]On 28th August 2019, in light of the decision of the Tribunal, a notice of discontinuance was served on the Leeds County Court in respect of the displacement proceedings by the original First Defendant.[44]The Claim that I am determining was issued on 23rd September 2021 against both the original First Defendant and the Defendant. The value of the claim was pleaded as being £1,500,000. The original Schedule of Special Damages sought an award of £1,355,098 for Special Damages which was only pleaded in the most general terms, with an additional sum of £144,902 claimed for general damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenity including distress and loss of sleep due to medication administered.[45]The claim was served on the Defendant on 3rd December 2021.[46]In fact the claim had been lodged with the Court in April 2020 but by reason of the pandemic it was not dealt with promptly. The only real relevance of this is to the issue of limitation and the claims under the Human Rights Act 1998. Whilst this issue was raised by the Defendant on their unsuccessful application to strike out and/or for summary judgment (see paragraph 57 below) and it is pleaded in their Defence, the Defendant made no reference to it during the hearing before me or in closing written submissions at all. I proceed on the basis that no limitation point is now taken in this case.[47]The Schedule of Special Damages was amended to provide some specificity and to change the sums sought between Special Damages and General Damages but with the total claimed still amounting to exactly £1,500,000. That was broken down as follows: Special Damages totalling £1,101,292 i. £98 for purchase of rollator ii. £480 for travel expenses incurred by the Second Claimant visiting First Claimant iii. £100,098 for mental health disorder medications administered when they should not have been iv. £352,620 for financial compensation for 119 days of false imprisonment v. £210,000 compensatory damages for deprivation of the First Claimant’s privacy vi. £300,000 damages for deprivation of the First Claimant’s liberty, for deprivation of the First and Second Claimants’ family life and damages for deprivation of the First Claimant’s right not to be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment. vii. £37,776 for damages associated with the stigma of mental health disorders and incapacity viii. £35,000 for procedural breaches in making an application from the First Claimant’s nearest relative ix. £48,000 for procedural breaches in the improper application for admission for treatment and no application for admission for assessment x. £17,220 for procedural breaches in failing to inform and help the First Claimant as soon as practicable to make an application to discharge. General damages – Totalling £398,708 i. £49,902 for mental health medications administered causing sleep loss ii. £50,000 lower limb pain and suffering and loss of amenities iii. £45,000 distress for mistreatment iv. £253,806 for the stigma of having been associated with mental health disorders[48]By amended Particulars of Claim dated 5th October 2021 the Claimants averred that the First Claimant’s detention had been unlawful. In addition to the Human Rights Act claim the Claimants now claimed damages for false imprisonment and for procedural breaches relating to the hospital admission of the First Claimant.[49]On 14th July 2022 Mrs Justice Yip refused, in accordance with 139 of the MHA, to grant leave to the Claimants to bring proceedings against the original First Defendant. Paragraph 36 of her judgment stated:
“The claimants place heavy reliance on the tribunal judgment. It is right to say that the tribunal found that the statutory criteria were not made out in August. It is also right to note that, historically, other assessments had found that the first claimant was not suffering from mental disorder. However, the tribunal were considering a different issue, namely whether the first claimant’s continuing detention could be authorised. No finding that the detention to date had been unlawful was or could have been made by the tribunal. The first claimant had, by then, received treatment and it is the first defendant’s case that she had improved as a result. Whether that is right or not is not a matter that needs to be determined at this stage.”
[50]Attempts by the Claimants to appeal the decision of Mrs Justice Yip failed.[51]On 22nd March 2024 a CCMC took place before Master Stevens at which case management directions were made. They included dates for the service of both witness statements of fact and expert evidence. A trial window of 9th June 202526th September 2025, with a time estimate of three days, was given. In due course a trial date of 23rd June 2025 was fixed by the Court.[52]On 15th November 2024 the Defendant filed and served an application notice to strike out the claim and/or for summary judgment.[53]At a hearing before Deputy Master Marzec on 31st January 2025 a number of variations were made to the directions of Master Stevens of 22nd March 2024, including giving the Claimants an extension of time until 28th March 2025 for the service of expert evidence on the issue of liability. No provision was made for any amendment of the Claimants’ Particulars of Claim in that order or any subsequent order of the Court.[54]The Claimants served and filed a document entitled “Amended Notice of Non-Reliance on Expert Reports” dated 23rd March 2025 which stated:
“Take notice that the claimants do not wish to rely on expert evidence for their claim. The claimants explain that the claim has never been a personal injury case and are not required to file and serve a personal injury expert evidence. The claimant also explained that they no longer wish to rely on clinical negligence claim due to time constraint, given the strict deadline within which to file and serve the expert psychiatric report by 28th March 2025 and the court may not agree to further extension of date for filing and serving the expert evidence. This means that the claimants claim will now proceed only with the breach of Human Rights Act 1998 and European Convention on human rights relying on articles 5, 3 and 8 and false imprisonment under the MHA 1983, procedural breaches of hospital admission, stigma of being associated with mental disorder, and mental incapacity under the MCA 2005”
[55]On 3rd April 2025 the Claimants served an ‘Updated Schedule of Damage and Loss’ which was not signed with a statement of truth. This claimed the following:(a) (A) £352,620 for false imprisonment (totalling 2856 hours)(b) (B) Exemplary damages totalling £7.200(c) (C) Compensatory damages and losses i. £100,000 for loss of family life during the detention ii. £210,000 for loss of First Claimant’s privacy iii. £100,000 for loss of First Claimant’s right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment iv. £37,776 for stigma and mental incapacity v. £576 for expenses (£98 for a rollator and £480 for travel expenses of the Second Claimant)(d) (D) Procedural breaches damages totalling £125,720. This was broken down as follows: i. £48,000 for no application for admission for assessment ii. £48,000 for no written report to manages of the hospital before the holding power iii. £17,220 for failing to inform and help the First Claimant to make an application for her discharge iv.

(E) Aggravated Damages of £7,200

[56]On 1st May 2025 the Defendant filed and served a Counter Schedule of Loss which was signed with a statement of truth. No sum claimed was admitted by the Defendant.[57]On 9th May 2025 Deputy Master Marzec heard the Defendant’s application to strike out the claim and/or for summary judgment. Judgment was reserved and handed down on 19th June 2025. The applications were refused. In conjunction with the handing down of the judgment, the Court made an order on 19th June 2025 that was sealed the following day vacating the trial date of 23rd June 2025. A new trial window from 14 April to 29 May 2026 was fixed with a time estimate of 2 days. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Order of 19th June 2025 provided as follows: (3) By 4pm on 21 July 2025 the second defendant is to serve a witness statement giving reasons for not engaging with the ADR mediation proposed by the Claimants on 7 May and 4 June 2024. Such witness statement must not be shown to the trial judge until questions of costs arise. (4) By 4pm on 18 August 2025 the Second Defendant shall write to the Claimants confirming the position as to CCTV at the Becklin Centre and the Newsom centre in the period April to August 2019 and explaining the reference made to CCTV in the Second Defendant’s records from 12 August 2019.[58]By way of an application notice dated 26th June 2025, issued by the Court on 26th June 2025, the Defendant made an application for relief from sanction to rely on the report of Dr James Briscoe (a Consultant Psychiatrist) dated September 2024 and to have permission to rely on the supplemental report of Dr James Briscoe.[59]The Defendant served a hearsay notice in respect of Dr Jonathan King dated 17th September 2025. This relates to his witness statement dated 21st May 2019. The Defendant also served a hearsay notice in respect of Christopher Lee, the AMHP, dated 17th September 2025. This relates to his witness statement dated 28th May 2019. Both statements are signed with a statement of truth.[60]In a letter dated 18th August 2025 the Defendant’s solicitors purported to comply with the order of Deputy Master Marzec of 19th June 2025 and wrote to the Claimants stating:
“As previously advised, there is no CCTV footage at either the Becklin Centre or Newsam Centre and there is, therefore, no CCTV footage to be disclosed. On behalf of the Trust, we have previously confirmed there is no CCTV on any of their wards. There has never been CCTV on the wards at Becklin Centre or Newsam Centre. Following the Order made by Deputy Master Marzec we have gone back to the Trust and they have confirmed again that this is the case. We note the reference in the notes from 12 August 2019 to CCTV footage. In the record from 12 August 2019 it says, “Nicky said that as per CCTV footage there is no direct evidence of Yaa assaulting anyone”
. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to identify who ‘Nicky’ is. As the entry relates to six years ago, it is not expected they would be able to provide any more evidence into what this entry relates to. There is nothing in the record to say this entry related to CCTV footage at the Trust and based on the Trust’s confirmation there are no CCTV cameras on the wards, the comment must be referring to CCTV footage prior to Mrs Appiah’s admission to the Trust.”[61]Following a hearing that took place on 18th March 2026 Deputy Master Marzec made an Order. One of the recitals to that Order records that the Claimants had agreed to disclose the First Claimant’s GP records and all of the First Claimant’s Prison Records from HMP New Hall from 1st August 2018 until her transfer to the Defendant’s Hospital (the Newsam Centre) on 13th December 2018. This is important for reasons that will become apparent in so far as one of the applications that was made by the Claimants is concerned (see paragraphs 74 – 78 below). The relevant parts of the Order were 1. In relation to Defendant’s application dated 26 June 20025, sealed by the Court on 26 June 2025a. The Defendant be granted relief from sanctions and has permission rely (sic) on the expert report of Dr Briscoe dated September 2024, such report having been served on 21 July 2025b. The Defendant has permission to rely on the supplemental report of Dr Briscoe dated 28 October 2025 that had been served on 12November 2025 ….. d. Pursuant to CPR 31.12 by 1 April 2026 the Claimants must disclose to the Defendant i. A full and complete copy of the First Claimant's GP records to the Defendant as are in the Claimants’ possession ii. A full and complete copy of the First Claimant’s prison records from HMP New Hall from 1 August 201813 December 2018 to the Defendant, as are within the Claimant's possession ……. 3. In relation to the Claimants’ application dated 25 July 2025, sealed by the Court on 13 August 2025: I. The Claimants’ Application is refused and no permission is given for the Claimants to bring the two new claims against the Defendant, as set out in the Application Notice 4. In relation to the Claimant’s Application dated 27 February 2026, sealed by the Court on 9 March 2026 a. the Defendant do further confirm in writing the comments of ‘Nicky’ in relation to CCTV footage in the Defendant’s records from 12th August 2019 in the following way. The Defendant shall: i. Send to Nicky a copy of the comments she made in relation to CCTV ii. Ask her to explain what was meant by these comments and specifically whether they refer to there being CCTV cameras as asserted to exist by the Claimants. b. The Defendant shall then by letter: i. Identify ‘Niky’ ii. Set out when the Defendant determined the identity of Nicky iii. What Nicky said in response to the Defendant’s questions iv. Confirm whether any of those matters alter the position in relation to the existence or otherwise of CCTV v. Append to that letter as an exhibit the email correspondence referred to at paragraph 44a (sic) above[62]On 22nd April 2026 the Defendant complied with the direction relating to CCTV and ‘Nicky’. They wrote to the Claimants and attached an email chain involving comments from ‘Nikki Askew’ who is the Nicky referred to above (albeit with a first name that is spelt differently from the notes).

(a) ii of the Order referred to at paragraph 61 above:

“I’ve read the entry that suggests I stated these things. It would seem this was typed by Dr. Das on the ward at the time. There is no entry written by me (sic) suggested I said there was any CCTV cameras at the Becklin Centre. This has either been misheard or mistyped by the Doctor writing those notes at the time. It’s not something I would ever say as there are no CCTV cameras at the Becklin centre. I cannot recall the exact event as it was many years ago, but I do recall the patient and their spouse being highly dissatisfied with being detained under the MHA on the ward. In response of the second part of paragraph 4(a)(ii) of that Order they were: 63. I have no idea. I suspect any conversation would have been a reassuring one to try and de-escalate the situation, but I would certainly never have lied about such a thing. I hope this helps to clarify the matter.”

In response of the second part of paragraph 4(a)(ii) of that Order they were:

[63]The letter itself addressed the matters set out in the order of Deputy Master Marzec and stated “there has never been CCTV on the wards at the Becklin Centre or Newsam Centre. There is no CCTV footage to be disclosed”. In respect of when they became aware of who ‘Nicky/Nikki’ was the letter stated “Following recent (sic) of your Application Notice dated 27 February 2026, sealed by the Court on 9 March 2026, a copy of which we received on 10 March 2026, we went back to the Trust with your comments that ‘Nicky’, as referred to in the record from 12 August 2019, is Nicola Askew. We emailed the Trust’s legal services team on 12 March 2026 about this. The Trust legal services team then responded on 17 March 2026, to advise that they had spoken to Nicola Askew and that she was the ‘Nicky’ referred to in the record. We determined the identity of ‘Nicky’, therefore, on 17 March 2026, which was the day before the Application hearing.”[64]The Claimants’ application notice dated 25th July 2025 and which the Judge refused at the hearing on 18th March 2026 was to add two new claims. The first was a claim in respect of the Defendant failing to ensure requisite care for the First Claimant’s hips and pelvis whilst she was detained. The second was a generic claim in respect of two entries made by Dr Jonathan King in the First Claimant’s notes in respect of the Second Claimant’s mental health, which it is alleged show a motive and/or bad faith against the Claimants.

Legal framework:

[65]The First Claimant was detained for a total of 120 days between 26th April 2019 and 23rd August 2019. That detention (which followed earlier detention under different provisions which are not relevant to this claim) was made pursuant to section 3 of the MHA. This section provides as follows: 3 Admission for treatment.(1) A patient may be admitted to a hospital and detained there for the period allowed by the following provisions of this Act in pursuance of an application (in this Act referred to as “an application for admission for treatment”) made in accordance with this section.(2) An application for admission for treatment may be made in respect of a patient on the grounds that— (a) he is suffering from mental disorder of a nature or degree which makes it appropriate for him to receive medical treatment in a hospital; and ….. (c) it is necessary for the health or safety of the patient or for the protection of other persons that he should receive such treatment and it cannot be provided unless he is detained under this sectionand (d) appropriate medical treatment is available for him. (3)An application for admission for treatment shall be founded on the written recommendations in the prescribed form of two registered medical practitioners, including in each case a statement that in the opinion of the practitioner the conditions set out in subsection (2) above are complied with; and each such recommendation shall include— (a)such particulars as may be prescribed of the grounds for that opinion so far as it relates to the conditions set out in paragraphs (a) and (d) of that subsection; and (b) a statement of the reasons for that opinion so far as it relates to the conditions set out in paragraph (c) of that subsection, specifying whether other methods of dealing with the patient are available and, if so, why they are not appropriate. (4) In this Act, references to appropriate medical treatment, in relation to a person suffering from mental disorder, are references to medical treatment which is appropriate in his case, taking into account the nature and degree of the mental disorder and all other circumstances of his case.[66]Section 5 of the MHA provides so far as is relevant as follows: 5 Application in respect of patient already in hospital.(1) An application for the admission of a patient to a hospital may be made under this Part of this Act notwithstanding that the patient is already an in-patient in that hospital or, in the case of an application for admission for treatment that the patient is for the time being liable to be detained in the hospital in pursuance of an application for admission for assessment; and where an application is so made the patient shall be treated for the purposes of this Part of this Act as if he had been admitted to the hospital at the time when that application was received by the managers.(2) If, in the case of a patient who is an in-patient in a hospital, it appears to the registered medical practitioner or approved clinician in charge of the treatment of the patient that an application ought to be made under this Part of this Act for the admission of the patient to hospital, he may furnish to the managers a report in writing to that effect; and in any such case the patient may be detained in the hospital for a period of 72 hours from the time when the report is so furnished.(3) The registered medical practitioner or approved clinician in charge of the treatment of a patient in a hospital may nominate one (but not more than one) person to act for him under subsection (2) above in his absence. (3A) For the purposes of subsection (3) above— the registered medical practitioner may nominate another registered medical practitioner, or an approved clinician, on the staff of the hospital; and the approved clinician may nominate another approved clinician, or a registered medical practitioner, on the staff of the hospital.[67]Section 2 of the MHA provides: 2 Admission for assessment.(1) A patient may be admitted to a hospital and detained there for the period allowed by subsection (4) below in pursuance of an application (in this Act referred to as “an application for admission for assessment”) made in accordance with subsections (2) and (3) below.(2) An application for admission for assessment may be made in respect of a patient on the grounds that— (a) he is suffering from mental disorder of a nature or degree which warrants the detention of the patient in a hospital for assessment (or for assessment followed by medical treatment) for at least a limited period; and (b) he ought to be so detained in the interests of his own health or safety or with a view to the protection of other persons.(3) An application for admission for assessment shall be founded on the written recommendations in the prescribed form of two registered medical practitioners, including in each case a statement that in the opinion of the practitioner the conditions set out in subsection (2) above are complied with.(4) Subject to the provisions of section 29(4) below, a patient admitted to hospital in pursuance of an application for admission for assessment may be detained for a period not exceeding 28 days beginning with the day on which he is admitted, but shall not be detained after the expiration of that period unless before it has expired he has become liable to be detained by virtue of a subsequent application, order or direction under the following provisions of this Act.[68]Section 132 of the MHA provides: 132 Duty of managers of hospitals to give information to detained patients. (1) The managers of a hospital or registered establishmentin which a patient is detained under this Act shall take such steps as are practicable to ensure that the patient understands— (a) under which of the provisions of this Act he is for the time being detained and the effect of that provision; and (b) what rights of applying to a tribunal are available to him in respect of his detention under that provision; and those steps shall be taken as soon as practicable after the commencement of the patient’s detention under the provision in question.[69]There is a Code of Practice for the MHA which outlines the approach to be taken when determining whether or not a patient has a mental disorder. Paragraph 2.4 of the Code of Practice states: “Mental disorder is defined for the purposes of the Act as ‘any disorder or disability of the mind’. Relevant professionals should determine whether a patient has a disorder or disability of the mind in accordance with good clinical practice and accepted standards of what constitutes such a disorder or disability”.[70]Paragraphs 2.5 - 2.8 of the Code of Practice make clear that the fact that someone has a mental disorder is never sufficient grounds of itself for any compulsory measure to be taken under the MHA. Care must always be taken to avoid diagnosing, or failing to diagnose, mental disorder on the basis of preconceptions about people or failure to appreciate cultural and social differences and that difference should not be confused with disorder. The Code of Practice also sets out the meaning of the least restrictive option and maximising independence.[71]The medical examination by the Doctors as part of the MHA assessment is outlined at paragraphs 14.71 - 14.76 of the Code of Practice as follows: 14.71 A medical examination must involve: direct personal examination of the patient and their mental state, and consideration of all available relevant clinical information, including that in the possession of others, professional or non- professional. 14.72 If direct physical access to the patient is not immediately possible and it is not desirable to postpone the examination in order to negotiate access, consideration should be given to requesting that an AMHP apply for a warrant under section 135 of the Act (see paragraph 14.55 and chapter 16). 14.73 Where practicable, at least one of the medical recommendations must be provided by a doctor with previous acquaintance with the patient. Preferably, this should be a doctor who has personally treated the patient. It is sufficient for the doctor to have had some previous knowledge of the patient’s case. 14.74 It is preferable that a doctor who does not have previous acquaintance with the patient be approved under section 12 of the Act. The Act requires that at least one of the doctors must be so approved. 14.75 Doctors must give reasons for the opinions stated in their recommendations. When giving a clinical description of the patient’s mental disorder as part of these reasons, doctors should include a description of the patient’s symptoms and behaviour, not merely a diagnostic classification. 14.76 When making recommendations for detention under section 3, doctors are required to state that appropriate medical treatment is available for the patient (see chapter 23). Preferably, they should know in advance of making the recommendation the name of the hospital to which the patient is to be admitted. If that is not possible, their recommendation may state that appropriate medical treatment will be available if the patient is admitted to one or more specific hospitals (or units within a hospital).[72]Articles 3, 5, and 8 of the ECHR provide so far as is relevant as follows: ARTICLE 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. ARTICLE 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: ….. (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; ARTICLE 8 Right to respect for family and private life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

Preliminary decisions:

[73]In the weeks before the trial the Claimants issued a raft of applications. I dealt with them at the outset of the trial and indicated that I would give my reasons for determining those applications in this judgment. Most of the applications had not been sealed by the Court by the time of the trial. However, the Defendant rightly did not contend that I should not go on and deal with these applications.[74]The first application that it was necessary for me to address was an application to adjourn the trial. The basis for the application was that the Claimants had lodged an appeal against aspects of the order of Deputy Master Marzec of 18th March 2026. The Appellant’s Notice is dated 26th March 2026 and was sealed by the Court on 7th April 2026. Section 5 of the Appellant’s Notice set out the following orders that the Claimants wished to appeal against:(1) Deputy Master Marzec’s Order dated (sic) granting granting (sic) second defendant permission to file Dr James Briscoe’s main and supplementary psychiatric reports(2) Deputy Master Marzec’s Order asking first and second claimant to release the first claimant’s prison and medical records to the second defendant(3) Deputy Master Marzec’s Order dismissing the claimants’ application dated 25 July 2025 [to add two additional claims to proceedings][75]The application notice in respect of the application to adjourn the trial was dated 11th May 2026 and was sealed on 18th May 2026 (therefore the day before the three day trial was fixed).[76]As a Deputy High Court Judge I am not able to hear an appeal of a decision of a Master/Deputy Master. However, I plainly can hear an application to adjourn a trial listed before me. CPR 3.1(2)(b) provides me with the power to adjourn a trial. The applicable principles to apply are not controversial and are accurately summarised in the notes to the White Book at 3.1.3. Neither party referred me to any authority. The starting point must be to consider the application by reference to whether the Claimants can have a fair trial and in doing so to consider and apply the overriding objective in the CPR. It is tolerably clear that an adjournment of a 3 day High Court multi-track trial is a remedy of last resort and that in doing so I can consider the overall interests of justice.[77]Having applied the overriding objective focussed to the issues in this claim (rather than mechanistically) I concluded that the application to adjourn should be refused. In my judgement, I must have regard to the need to act in a way which saves expense and is proportionate to the amount of money involved and allocates to this claim an appropriate share of the court’s resources. This claim has been fixed for trial previously albeit that it was adjourned before the day that it was listed. I can and do have regard to this procedural history and the impact that adjourning this case would have on other cases. In addition it seems to me that I must be entitled to consider the merits of the underlying appeal and by reference to the fairness of the trial before me if the adjournment is or is not granted. I have concluded that the proposed appeal had no prospect of success.[78]Each of the three bases for the appeal relate to case management decisions made by a Deputy Master who had previously case managed the claim. She was conspicuously well placed to make the decisions that she did. The decision in relation to Dr James Briscoe’s evidence is one that was plainly reasonably open to the Deputy Master. In order to ensure that the Claimants had a fair trial I allowed extensive cross-examination of Dr James Briscoe on the third day of the trial. The decision in respect of the GP and prison records is one which the Claimants had agreed to (as recorded in the recital). But even if they had not so agreed the documentation is plainly germane to these proceedings and that was an order that the Deputy Master was entitled to make. In relation to the last of the matters upon which the Claimants wish to appeal, namely the refusal to be allowed to amend the claim to add two additional claims, this is a claim that was filed at Court more than 6 years ago. The proposed amendments would have represented a change to the basis of the claim many years too late and would almost inevitably have led to the breaking of the trial date. Again this was a decision, in my judgement, that the Deputy Master was entitled to make.[79]I will deal with the remaining application notices in the order in which they are dated. 2nd March 2026[80]By way of an application notice dated 2nd March 2026 the Claimants applied for an order that the Defendant should apply for relief from sanction in failing to comply with Deputy Master Marzec’s order of 19th June 2025 in respect of mediation. The Defendant is not at present in breach of any form of unless order in that regard and hence the application now for an unless order. However, I was being asked to consider this at the start of the trial and by when, in my judgement, it is far too late. The question of why mediation was not taken up and the Defendant’s approach to that issue and any lack of a response will be a matter ultimately to be considered on the question of costs in due course. Given my conclusion in respect of not adjourning the trial in respect of the case management appeal it would have made no sense for me to require the Defendant to provide me with any justification as to their stance in that regard before the start of the trial and potentially to delay the trial further. I also note that this application pre-dates the hearing before Deputy Master Marzec but forms no part of her order. The appropriate time to have raised that issue was, in reality before her rather than me and by when it was simply too late. I therefore refused this application. However, in light of the various directions that have been made about meditation I will want to hear an explanation for the Defendant’s position in relation to mediation at the consequentials hearing when judgment is handed down. 5th March 2026[81]By way of an application notice dated 5th March 2026 the Claimants sought an order requiring the Second Defendant to disclose from the probation file “a very official document on letter headed paper that suggested a Tribunal had declared Mrs Appiah’s detention was unlawful and against her human rights: and the same be subject to disclose (sic) court order dated 06 June 2019 referred to in para 23 of the Defence of Second Defendant by Nichola Sanderson dated 25/01/22 as these are relevant to the claim.” This is a document which Dr Jonathan King refers to in his letter dated 12th November 2018 (see above). It is not a document that the Defendant has possession of. It also has no relevance in the proceedings before me because the legality of the First Claimant’s detention before 26th April 2019 is irrelevant to my determinations. Accordingly I refused this application. 6th March 2026[82]By way of an application notice dated 6th March 2026 the Claimants applied to amend their witness evidence by way of amended statements that were served and were respectively dated 10th March 2026 and 11th March 2026. The amendments were not fundamental and also in part addressed matters that had developed since the witness statements had been filed. No objection was taken to this application by the Defendant and I therefore allowed that application. 9th March 2026[83]By way of an application notice dated 9th March 2026 the Claimants applied to amend the updated Schedule of Damages and Loss dated 5th March 2026. Again this is far too late. The Claimants have already amended/updated their Schedule on a number of occasions and it would have been entirely contrary to the overriding objective to have permitted an amendment as late as the morning of the trial. I therefore dismissed this application. 11th March 2026[84]By way of an application notice dated 11th March 2026 the Claimants sought an order that the Defendant “explain to the court and the Claimants why Forms H3 and A6 referred to in Dr Christian Hosker’s witness statement dated 4th September 2025 did not exist in the lifespan of the case and when it was running through the course from 26 April to 23 August 2019 as the bundle indexes at the time did not contain any such document and the same was never served on the Claimants or their legal representatives.” I dismissed this application. There was and is no need for me to make any order as far as this is concerned. The Claimants are entitled to rely on that fact during the trial, if it is relevant. The trial process is robust enough for any issues about that document to be determined. I was not going to delay the trial for these matters to be the subject of written explanation. 23rd April 2026[85]By way of an application notice dated 23rd April 2026 the Claimants applied for a witness summons for Nicky Askew. The basis for the application was that the Claimants were “not clear about the information on CCTV footage” and “feel Nicky or Nikki is being pressured or influenced by the Second defendant’s legal team on what to say.” This was an application that was made to me on the first day of trial and therefore less than 7 days before trial. The Court’s permission is required as a result (see CPR 34.3(2)(a)). I refused the application but made clear that I would keep the position under review during trial. The basis for my refusal at the outset was that the potential witness had made clear what her position was namely that “I cannot recall the exact event as as (sic) it was many years ago”. I took judicial notice of the fact that CCTV is not retained for many years because it is not possible to store such a large amount of CCTV footage. Therefore if, contrary to the Defendant’s position, there had been CCTV cameras in the ward at the material time that footage itself would most likely no longer exist and there was nothing further this witness could say that she has not already said. On that basis and given that Nikki Askew did not make the note relied upon by the Claimants and there was no application to witness summons the person who had made the note then the issuing of witness summons was, in my judgement, not necessary for me fairly to determine the issues in the claim and indeed it would have been inconsistent with the overriding objective.[86]However, I made clear to the Claimants that I would keep that matter under review during the trial and if I deemed that it was necessary then I would grant the application. I kept the matter under review throughout the trial and at no stage did I regard it as necessary to issue the witness summons. I further considered the issue after the trial and in advance of drafting this judgment. Had I deemed that it was necessary then I would have relisted the trial so that the witness could be called. However, that did not eventuate.

Evidence at trial:

[87]In advance of trial I had considered the documentation in the principal hearing bundle as well as the Skeleton Arguments filed by the parties and the respective authorities that they had asked me to consider.[88]I heard evidence from four witnesses. They were the First Claimant, the Second Claimant, Dr Christian Hosker and Dr James Briscoe. There is also the written evidence of Dr Jonathan King and Mr Christopher Lee.

The First Claimant

[89]The First Claimant relied on four witness statements. They are dated 11th July 2024, 25th June 2025, 28th August 2025 and 10th March 2026. Her written evidence stated that she has never been mentally unwell and that she was in paid employment before and after her detention. The most recent statement stated that she remembered Dr Abed the visiting psychiatrist at HMP New Hall assessing her in November 2017 and stating that there was no evidence that she was psychotic or had mood disorder or anxiety. The First Claimant said that she found it difficult following her discharge and that she attributed this to the anti-psychotic depot medication which was injected into her body by force. Her written evidence alleges that she was regularly surrounded by between 7 – 10 hospital staff and then violently thrown to the floor where she was restrained and then a syringe was thrown at her. She stated that she “resisted being injected” because she was not mentally unwell but that it was forced on her in a degrading and inhuman manner and that CCTV footage would show this. The First Claimant maintained a similar complaint that there was CCTV footage of the matters that led to her conviction in 2017 and which had been played in her trial and that would reveal her innocence of those crimes.[90]In cross-examination the First Claimant was taken to the report of Dr Nimmagadda who had been instructed jointly by the Second Claimant and the Official Solicitor on behalf of the First Claimant. She was asked about a number of aspects of his report which supported her having a mental disorder at the material time. She agreed that Dr Nimmagadda was independent and that his report had been produced shortly before the hearing before the Tribunal in August 2019. However, the First Claimant suggested that this expert had not considered earlier evidence and that he only asked her questions. The First Claimant said in that respect that in 2018 and in 2019 the Home Office were determined to send her home. She clarified that by this she meant that the Home Office were determined to deport her. It was clear that on a number of occasions during her evidence rather than answer the question she was asked she implied that there was a Home Office driven conspiracy, involving a number of Doctors and others not employed by the Home Office, to deport her and that her mental health was used as the means to do that.[91]The First Claimant was then taken to the report of Dr Bhagat of 23rd October 2018. She denied that she was guarded and stated that she was in fact open with Dr Bhagat. She claimed that she was only asked a few questions and that she was told simply to say just “Yes” or “No”. She did not accept that she was acting in a bizarre manner at that time and as Dr Bhagat had suggested. Dr Bhagat had recorded that the First Claimant had said she was a millionaire. She claimed that this was “fabricated” and that she had not said that. Similarly she said that the reference to investments was a fabrication. She stated that Dr Baghat’s impression/assessment that she suffered from a psychotic illness, most likely paranoid schizophrenia, was also a fabrication.[92]The First Claimant was asked about her assessments by Dr Jonathan King. In particular she was asked about the fact that he recorded when he first met her that she had claimed to have lots of money and many homes, yet in February 2015 when assessed at the Magistrates’ Court, she said that she had been homeless since 2012. She denied that she had said to Dr Jonathan King that she had lots of money and homes. On a number of occasions she alleged fabrication in respect of his notes and documentation and stated that “they have done this for many years”. This was again a suggestion of fabrication.[93]The First Claimant was then asked about Dr Andrew Cobb’s report and she said that “they were standing together” and that he and Dr Jonathan King were working together as “they were determined to send me home”. Given her earlier answers that I had clarified with her, it was clear that this was a reference to the Home Office and deportation.[94]The First Claimant was taken to notes which indicated that she had been told that she had a right to appeal under the MHA. In particular to a note of 14th December 2018 made by Nurse Asha Brewer which referred to “her 132 rights” which is a reference to section 132 of the MHA. That note states in relation to those rights “I asked her if she unnderstood (sic) them and she stated yes”. In addition she was asked about a note of 26th April 2019 made by Dr Jonathan King. This stated “Heard from Home Office via e-mail that s48/49 was rescinded this morning and so s5(2) completed. Informed Ms Appiah of this and that a s3 is being applied for and that Mr Appiah is to be removed as nearest relative if the court agreed. I also made her aware of her right to appeal to a manager's hearing and/or tribunal. She simply stated that was not necessary as she does not have mental illness”. The fact that this conversation took place is supported by further note from a nurse later that day. Indeed later notes that day reveal that on 26th April 2019 she was reminded of her rights and “she closed her eyes and chose to ignore” them. At first the First Claimant denied that she had been given this advice. However, later in her evidence, having been taken to these further contemporaneous notes and another one from 29th April 2019 and one from 1st May 2019, she stated that she may have been informed of her rights but that she ignored it.[95]The First Claimant was asked about her transfer summary when transferred to the Becklin Ward and specifically to paragraph 1.5 of the summary. She was asked why she had refused medication for physical matters. She said that she did not have any problems and that her only problems were with the Home Office. She accepted that she did refuse medication for her ear and hips but accepted medication later. That paragraph of the transfer summary noted “This along with other evidence is suggestive that she is responding to antipsychotic treatment.” To similar effect paragraph 1.13 stated “Although it is difficult to determine if prescribed antipsychotic mediation (sic) is working by talking to Ms Appiah about her mental state, given that she will not engage, there are signs that it is. She now accepts non psychotropic medication whereas before she would not. She is seen in communal areas of the ward more and isolates herself less than she did. She's partaking in ward activities and watched television whereas before she isolated herself to her room. She has smiled at staff at times and being warmer toward them. She has accepted help from a solicitor in the past but is not currently thinking that it has no value for her, whereas initially she seemed frightened to attend.” She was asked about this and she said “I did not have a mental problem. I was scared. They would say who would do it. I would say I don’t have a mental problems. They said if I do not cooperate I would be there for ever – that is why I was more involved in ward activities and watching TV. I did smile more. I had to show that I was a normal person”. She did not agree that she was getting better because she was never mentally unwell.[96]The First Claimant was taken to her letter of complaint of 6th June 2019. She said that she stood by the words “degrading” and “dehumanising”. She stated that it occurred each time as she had described it in her letter. She was asked whether the syringe was thrown at her like a dart at a dartboard, and she said “Yes”. She said that every time there was 7 to 10 staff and the staff then vanished and would leave her to crawl back to wheelchair. She was taken to a note of 3rd May 2019 which referred to a conversation between nurses and the First Claimant that stated “Yaa was approached by SN Brewer and SN Parker to discuss her having her depot in a bedroom. Yaa was informed that regardless she would be having her depot that it would be better for her if it was just two staff and not having a team to restrain her. Yaa continued to say that she does not need the injection …. Staff took Yaa prone onto the beanbag where she she (sic) held using forearm holds though Yaa did not present as challenging just defeated. As soon as the depot was given which was on her left side buttock Yaa allowed staff to support her to get back in her wheelchair.” This was obviously inconsistent in a number of respects with her evidence and her letter of complaint. She said that she agreed that on this occasion she was not thrown. Further she agreed that the note as a whole was accurate. She was then taken to a similar note from 17th May 2019 which referred to the depot being given in bed and to her being restrained by her arms only. She said they were using force whether she liked it or not. She was then taken to a note from 31st May 2019. The importance of this is that it is just a few days before her letter of complaint. This note stated “Yaa became upset and said she would not have her depot if she did not need it. She told staff she is not mentally ill therefore not needing her depot. Staff needed to go in and use PMVA techniques to stand Yaa and lay her on her bed to administer her depot. Yaa did not fight staff. There were two members of staff using figure of four holds, HSW Bissett on her left arm and HSW Garrity on her right arm though the holds were loose and she was prone on her bed whilst having her injection.... she declined support from staff to be assisted back up”. The First Claimant agreed that she was not thrown to the floor on this occasion and that this note is accurate. When it was pointed out that this was just days before the letter of complaint she stated that the behaviour was getting worse.[97]The First Claimant was then taken to a note dated 27th July 2019 which stated “Yaa was approached in her bed area- was laying looking towards the door awake in bed on right side advised by SN Debbie who entered her bedroom with HSW Progress and HSW Rosemary that depot was due and was to be administered today Yaa was advised to remain as she was in the position she was in, Yaa didn't resist and didn't speak with staff however didn't move and no PMVA technique was required- depot administered on left side.” Her answer to this note was the staff were using force.[98]The First Claimant was asked about a contemporaneous note made on 14th August 2019 which stated “Has declined medication throughout her admission – felt that there is cultural pressure for Yaa not to admit that she has a mental health problem or to take any prescribed treatment for this. As such Yaa has required the use of restraint to administer medication. During which Yaa has often been violent, threatening and abusive to staff.” She stated “I didn’t have mental problems that is not right.”[99]It was suggested to her that the use of depot medication was necessary and proportionate. She said that sometimes the conduct was more than in the letter of 6th June 2019 and sometimes it was how she had described it in the letter. She said that they left her naked and they had pressed her neck on the floor.[100]In re-examination the First Claimant stated that she made the staff aware of her hip pain. She said that she initially refused medication for hip pain because she was concerned that she was being tricked about medication. It was clear that she was implying that she thought that she was being tricked to be given medication for mental symptoms but being told they were pain killers. She was asked about her relationship with Dr Jonathan King. She said that it was not good and that he never listened to her. She kept repeating herself. She said that she was not happy with him at all and did not want to speak to him at all. She said that Dr Jonathan King did not show her evidence of delusions or proof of her problems. Similarly that Dr Bhagat did not show her proof of her problems. The Second Claimant then tried to ask the First Claimant questions about CCTV. I did not permit this as it did not arise out of cross-examination.

The Second Claimant

[101]The Second Claimant relied on four witness statements. They are dated 11th July 2024, 25th June 2025, 29th August 2025 and 12th March 2026. This stated that the First Claimant has always been of sound mind and has not been mentally unwell at any stage. Further that she had difficulty sleeping following her discharge from the Becklin Centre which he believed was due to anti-psychotic depot injection. His witness statements duplicate a number of matters raised by the First Claimant and they also seek to argue their position in relation to procedural breaches of the MHA such as the question of the interplay between section 5(2) and 3 of the MHA.[102]As he was not present for the assessments he was only asked a limited amount of questions in cross-examination and essentially to establish the fact that he was not present when his wife was assessed by Dr Bhagat, Dr King, Dr Cobb, Dr Solomon and Dr Nimmagadda. Similarly he was not present when the First Claimant was administered with anti-psychotic medication. His evidence is therefore of limited assistance to me on the key issues.

Dr Christian Hosker

[103]Dr Christian Hosker gave evidence. His witness statement is dated 4th September 2025. He has been a Consultant Psychiatrist since 2008. His evidence was focussed on addressing questions of procedure relating to detention under the MHA. He was not directly involved in the First Claimant’s care whilst she was detained but is employed by the Defendant. Paragraphs 14 – 21 of this statement set out accurately the procedural history to the detention of the First Claimant under section 3 of the MHA and was consistent with the contemporaneous documentation. It should be noted that on receipt of the section 3 MHA paperwork the Defendant’s legal team check the documentation to confirm the requirements for detention are satisfied. Although this is not a statutory requirement the Defendant’s own internal processes require that a Consultant, not involved in the MHA Assessment, scrutinise the medical recommendations for the adequacy of the rationale. Dr Peter Trigwell was the Consultant Psychiatrist who provided that confirmation in this case.[104]Whilst ultimately a matter for me paragraphs 30 - 33 of the statement of Dr Christian Hosker state:
“The MHT made a decision on 23 August 2019 that the First Claimant should be discharged immediately. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the statutory criteria for her detention were met at that time. The First Claimant was therefore discharged on 23 August 2019. The finding of the Tribunal on 23 August 2019 was not that her detention prior to this date had been unlawful it was an assessment that at that time detention was no longer required and the First Claimant was discharged accordingly. The Tribunal discharged the First Claimant on 23 August 2019 as her detention under section 3 was no longer deemed necessary by the MHT. Prior to that date, however, and from 26 April 2019 she had been detained lawfully at the trust pursuant to S.3 of the MHA. The paperwork and documentation shows there were no procedural breaches of the MHA. The First Claimant was lawfully detained under S3 MHA from 26 April 2019 until her discharge on 23 August 2019.”
[105]In cross-examination by the Second Claimant it was suggested that Dr Jonathan King and Dr Andrew Cobb did not follow the correct procedure in that they should have made an application. Dr Hosker maintained that he did not agree with that suggestion. His evidence was that what was required was referral to the Local Authority and that is what took place in this case. The suggestion being made was that it was mandatory for there to be a section 2 assessment in this case before section 3 of the MHA could be considered. After that suggestion had been made on a number of occasions I made it clear that this ultimately was a matter for me to decide and that it was not necessary to put any further questions on that issue.[106]The witness was then taken to section 5(2) of the MHA and it was suggested that the First Claimant should have been detained for 72 hours rather than making a decision under section 3 of the MHA earlier than that. The witness did not agree and referred on a number of occasions to the Code of Practice.[107]A further suggested procedural breach was that there were not regular reviews conducted. Dr Hosker did not agree with that suggestion and stated that regular reviews had taken place.[108]It was then suggested that there was a bad relationship between the First Claimant and Dr Jonathan King. The witness said that he was not aware of that. It was suggested that a new clinician should have been brought in instead of Dr Jonathan King. The witness stated that sometimes that happens. However, in this case the witness did not think that it was inappropriate for Dr Jonathan King to carry on.[109]It was suggested that the period of time that Dr Andrew Cobb assessed the Claimant for, of 20 minutes, was insufficient. The witness stated that that is not a matter of concern for him and that it all depends on the situation. 20 minutes may be sufficient.

Dr James Briscoe

[110]Dr James Briscoe produced two reports that were relied upon by the Defendant. The first dated September 2024 and the second dated 28th October 2025. He gave evidence. Aside from a couple of typographical errors which were corrected at the beginning of his evidence Dr James Briscoe confirmed that he believed the content of his reports to be true. His conclusions as set out in his first report in respect of a number of questions that he was asked to address and which are relevant to the pleaded issues between the parties were as follows:(a) (A) Was the detention of the First Claimant lawful? Yes, in relation to the two medical recommendations.(b) (B) Was the detention of the First Claimant appropriate in all the circumstances? Yes, in relation to the two medical recommendations.(c) (C) Was the administration of antipsychotic medication, against the First Claimant’s will, appropriate and lawful in all the circumstances? Was the basis upon which this treatment was provided reasonable? Yes to both.(d) (D) Should the First Claimant’s detention have come to an end any sooner? If yes, by when should the First Claimant’s detention have ended? Was it a breach of duty to fail to release the First Claimant any sooner? No to both.(e) (E) Are the allegations appropriately directed at the Trust? Who is responsible for the detention of the First Claimant under the MHA? This is outside my expertise. However, my understanding is that an AMHP makes an application to a hospital for detention and the AMHP’s employer is liable for acts or omissions by the AMHP. The designated hospital is presumably not obliged to accept an application made by an AMHP (but invariably does so as for a Section 3 admission the AMHP must identify the hospital to which the patient will be admitted) and the hospital managers have a right to discharge the patient off a section. The hospital managers are responsible for the operation of the Mental Health Act in the hospital. They must receive and scrutinise the statutory documents to ensure that they are lawful. The responsibility for lawfully applying a Section 5(2) lies with the detaining doctor. The receiving hospital trust is responsible for the care provided to a detained patient during an admission under the Mental Health Act.(f) (F) Do you believe the administration of antipsychotic medication via injection, against the First Claimant’s will, was reasonable given her refusal to take medication orally and in light of her mental health disorder? Yes.[111]In Dr James Briscoe’s Second Report his conclusions and which were the subject of detailed justification in that Report were as follows:(a) (A) There were no procedural breaches of the MHA that meant the First Claimant’s detention was at any point unlawful;(b) (B) The First Claimant had a mental disorder that warranted detention under s.3 MHA on the date that she was detained.[112]Dr James Briscoe was cross-examined at length. Whilst I had on occasions to ensure that cross-examination was not repetitive and that it was focussed on the issues I allowed the Second Claimant to cross-examine for the best part of a day. At the end of his cross-examination the Second Claimant accepted that he had put everything that he had wanted to Dr James Briscoe.[113]Dr James Briscoe was asked about flupentixol which was administered to the First Claimant. Dr James Briscoe said that many patients suffer from insomnia in Hospital and it is not necessarily caused by medication. It was suggested to him that on a balance of probabilities flupentixol by depot was the cause of the First Claimant’s insomnia and sedation. He said “I think that it would be a reasonable cause of insomnia and sedation”. He accepted that it could in this case be the main cause but he did not say that it was the main cause.[114]Dr James Briscoe was asked if there was a distinction between a working diagnosis and a settled diagnosis in the context of detention under the MHA. He said that a working diagnosis is one on which a course of treatment would be based. But it is still acceptable practice, and some would say good practice, to provide treatment whilst enquiries are continuing. He was then asked a similar question which was whether a working diagnosis was the same as a definitive diagnosis. He said that in psychiatry diagnoses are made on a balance of probability but that working diagnosis was not the same as a settled or definitive diagnosis. A working diagnosis is one that is kept under review and as you gather evidence you come to a settled diagnosis. He was clear that he did not agree that it was not proper to detain without making a settled diagnosis. Similarly he did not accept that it was wrong to detain on the basis of a working diagnosis. It was suggested to Dr James Briscoe that a working diagnosis is not included in the definition of mental disorder in MHA. Dr James Briscoe was clear that if a psychiatrist made a working diagnosis of mental disorder then that was an indication that the individual concerned has a mental disorder for the purposes of the MHA. He stated that the MHA deals only with mental disorder and it requires psychiatrists to justify their opinion that the individual has a mental disorder of a nature or degree that meets the test under the MHA. The Doctors have to complete the MHA Forms with their reasoning and they have to undertake that with care to ensure that is sufficient. Those medical recommendations are then scrutinised. He made clear that the application itself is made by the AMHP and who does not have to act on the recommendations of the Doctors. The AMHP can say ‘no’, but they cannot say ‘yes’ without the opinion of two Doctors.[115]Dr James Briscoe was again asked about working diagnoses and he stated that a working diagnosis could satisfy the definition of mental disorder. Dr James Briscoe referred to the Code of Practice and stated that it gives examples of mental disorders of possible diagnoses. It was suggested to him that in the absence of a settled diagnosis or clear diagnosis the First Claimant could not be detained. Dr James Briscoe did not agree. He said that the First Claimant was detained on the basis of having a mental disorder as defined. He said that his Reports are based on the opinions of the psychiatrists and in conjunction with the medical records. He had seen the statements and their justifications for why the First Claimant had a mental disorder that required detention and he has set out the reasons why in his opinion she did and why the correct procedure was followed in this case.[116]Dr James Briscoe was asked about the assessment of Dr Andrew Cobb and it was suggested that the assessment only took 20 minutes and that was not enough. Dr James Briscoe did not accept that that was not enough time. He stated that in clinical practice he would devote whatever time was necessary. That could be a short time or it could be a long time. Dr James Briscoe observed that the Dr Jonathan King was aware of the First Claimant as he had been treating her. Dr James Briscoe was clear that Dr Andrew Cobb not only attempted to assess the First Claimant in person but also spoke to those who were familiar with her care and that would be the right and proper thing to do in order to determine whether the MHA criteria was met. The reason why he had a limited amount of information from the First Claimant was that she refused to provide it. In short Dr James Briscoe’s opinion was that it is not necessary to obtain any more detail than is required in order to determine the test for MHA detention. That general statement has to be considered in conjunction with the fact that Dr James Briscoe made clear that as a psychiatrist you are trained to have the expertise to judge whether or not someone is presenting with a mental disorder or not, as he observed “That is what our training gave us”.[117]Dr James Briscoe was asked about the DSM-V and ICD-10/11 diagnostic criteria. The Second Claimant’s questioning was based on the fact that neither Dr Jonathan King nor Dr Andrew Cobb referred to the criteria and it was suggested that, instead, they used “guesswork”. Dr James Briscoe said “I do not agree”. Their justification was based on their own observations of her, her symptoms and her behaviour and the information they had received from those caring from her. Dr James Briscoe’s opinion was that it is not necessary to make a DSM-V or ICD diagnosis to detain. He said that the MHA does not require such a diagnosis.[118]Dr James Briscoe was asked question about proof and psychiatry. He said that the term proof is difficult in a psychiatric context as there are grades of proof from 0 – 100. Psychiatrists make detention decisions on the basis of a balance of probability and the decision made in this case were perfectly reasonable and based on the Code of Practice. He said that Dr Bhagat used his judgement and the evidence he received and his own assessment and his knowledge and expertise as a psychiatrist and he requested a second opinion. The fact that someone has not had a mental health disorder in past is not determinative. It may be helpful but it not necessary.[119]It was suggested by the Second Claimant that the Tribunal had rejected the assessment of Dr Jonathan King and Dr Andrew Cobb. Dr James Briscoe did not agree and stated that the Tribunal did not determine the lawfulness of past detention. The Tribunal found that the statutory criteria at the time they sat were not made out and it is not a retrospective assessment. In his opinion they did not make any determination as to the lawfulness of the initial detention. Dr James Briscoe accepted that Dr Jonathan King’s report was before the Tribunal and that Dr McHarg attended and gave evidence. Dr James Briscoe correctly stated that there is no reference to Dr McHarg’s evidence in the ruling.[120]It was suggested that Dr Nimmagadda’s opinion was not based on the interview in that he diagnosed delusional disorder despite how she presented. Dr James Briscoe stated that Dr Nimmagadda had a duty to provide an opinion and if he had rejected the opinion of Dr Jonathan King then he should have said that and he did not. Dr James Briscoe stated that Dr Nimmagadda’s opinion is logical despite the interview because of everything else and he has made a judgement and come to his conclusion.[121]He was asked about the position cumulatively and whether the various psychiatrists had proof that the First Claimant was mentally ill. He said that the short answer to that was ‘yes’. In his opinion the First Claimant had a mental disorder within the meaning of the MHA and their opinion was based on all of the evidence in front of them.[122]Dr James Briscoe was asked if it was unlawful to detain on the basis of suspicion alone. He stated that if that amounts to a working diagnosis and the MHA requirements are satisfied then that would be lawful. He stated that his reading of the notes is that their view was there was underlying disorder that necessitated treatment.[123]Dr James Briscoe was asked about First Claimant’s witness statement and that she had been working, yet Dr Jonathan King’s opinion was that her health would deteriorate if she was discharged. Dr James Briscoe stated that he accepted that opinion. He was asked if Dr Jonathan King was right then how was the First Claimant able to work? He said that whether she was working or not does not provide any evidence of her mental state and that deterioration might occur over a period of time. Dr James Briscoe made clear that the concern from Dr Jonathan King was that the First Claimant would become significantly unwell and the situation would revert to when she had been in prison if she did not remain treated. He was then asked whether he accepted that the Tribunal was correct in discharging her in light of her ability then to work. He said that he accepted that the Tribunal was entitled to discharge and that he had not seen evidence of her mental state since discharge.[124]Dr James Briscoe was asked about the note of 12th August 2019 when the First Claimant was at the Becklin Centre which stated that when she was transferred from the Newsom Centre there had been no evidence of psychosis and the perception was of nil abnormity? Dr James Briscoe’s answer is important and it was that “If someone no longer demonstrates the symptoms of the disorder due to treatment that does not mean that they no longer have the mental disorder.”[125]Dr James Briscoe was asked about the relevance of cultural issues in this case. He stated that he comes back to his analysis through training and that looked at in the round in terms of symptoms and reports from others that the First Claimant had a mental disorder. He said that you have to bear in mind cultural issues and background (if available) and make a judgement on presentation and expectation based on expertise and training and in his opinion that is what happened in this case. He was asked where it was written in Dr Jonathan King’s report that he took all of these things into account? Dr James Briscoe stated that the fact it was not in his report does not mean that he did not take these matters into account. He was part of a multidisciplinary team and there are references in the medical records to cultural considerations after she was detained under section 3. He was asked similar questions about Dr Andrew Cobb and Dr Bhagat and gave the same answer.[126]Dr James Briscoe was then asked about the use of section 3 detention in this case. He said that you can detain under section 3 of the MHA first. He said that if somebody has been in Hospital under section 48/49 MHA and you know the nature of the disorder you can go straight onto section 3 and you do not need to use section 2. Dr James Briscoe stated that in his opinion the Doctors had sufficient evidence that the statutory criteria were established. There was the evidence of Dr Bhagat, there was Dr Jonathan King (who had had extensive dealings with the First Claimant) and there was Dr Andrew Cobb (on the day).[127]Dr James Briscoe was asked about the relationship between Dr Jonathan King and the First Claimant. He said that he had seen what she had said in her witness statement. It was suggested that as good practice should there have been an alternative report? Dr James Briscoe said, no. He said we do not know how bad it was and it is not uncommon not to get on. As long as he was not biased then he did not consider there was a difficulty.[128]Dr James Briscoe was asked about the First Claimant’s letter of complaint and whether that was indicative of somebody with a mental disorder. Dr James Briscoe said that it was necessary to be very careful about what someone has written. He said that having a mental disorder does not mean that you cannot write a letter that makes sense. The Second Claimant was then asked whether someone who lacks capacity could write the letter of 1st June 2019 that refers to 5 points. Dr James Briscoe stated that the test for capacity is not about what someone writes. It is about decision making and not their writing. He said that the letter does not tell him whether the First Claimant had capacity or not and that capacity is decision specific. He said that many people who lack capacity would write what is contained in the first paragraph of the First Claimant’s 5 points of note. He said that in his clinical experience over many years this note does not prove she had capacity. It was pointed out that Dr Nimmagadda concluded that she had capacity and he was asked whether Dr Jonathan King was wrong? He said, no and they can disagree and that capacity can change.[129]In respect of procedural defects Dr James Briscoe explained that you do not have to use section 5(2) of MHA at all if someone has been detained already under a different power such as section 48/49 of the MHA. However, the reason that section 5(2) MHA was used here was to cover the period of time when the section 48/49 had expired. It was suggested that section 5(2) should be used for the entirety of the 72 hours and not less than that. Dr James Briscoe was clear that it provides for a maximum of 72 hours but it is not a requirement to use all of that period of time.[130]Dr James Briscoe was asked about Dr Jonathan King’s observation that the Second Claimant was “Not entirely mentally appropriate”. Dr James Briscoe said that if that was a concern of Dr Jonathan King’s then he would have a duty to consider it and to offer help. More generally Dr James Briscoe stated that Dr Jonathan King’s report complies with the standards he would have expected.[131]Last of all Dr James Briscoe was clear that any option of a lesser restriction than section 3 was not appropriate. He said that if the First Claimant had been willing to have a community order it would still have required her consent and she would not have given that.

Post trial:

[132]The evidence at trial concluded at the end of the third day of the three day trial. There was insufficient time for oral closing submissions. In any event I had concluded that the fairest thing for the Claimants was to be given time to file and serve written submissions after those of the Defendant. I directed that the Defendant serve those by 27th May 2026 and that the Claimants do so by 10th June 2026. The Defendant complied with that direction. The Claimants served increasingly longer written closing submissions on a number of dates. First on 10th June 2026 and then on 11th June, 12th June and 23rd June 2026 and then finally on 26th June 2026. The last of those was the longest and was 93 pages in length. The Claimants did not apply for permission to rely upon written submissions which were filed out of time. Nevertheless I have, in fairness to the Claimants, considered all of their written closing submissions. Analysis: Introduction

Analysis:

[133]It is clear from everything that I have read as well as what I heard and observed during the trial that the Claimants passionately believe that the First Claimant was unlawfully detained and they should receive very significant damages from the Defendant as a result. What I have to determine is whether, as a matter of fact and law, that is right.[134]The evidence in this case comprises the four witnesses that gave evidence, as well as a very significant amount of more contemporaneous documentation. I make clear at the outset that it is unfortunate that Dr Jonathan King could not be located to give oral evidence. He has retired, has not been found and was not called as a witness. I have given less weight to his hearsay witness evidence as a result of him not being cross-examined. However, as it transpires that is not determinative of the decision that I have to make because his contemporaneous documentation and the opinions of others at the material time, as opposed to significantly earlier than that, are consistent with each other and his evidence.[135]A trial such as the one that I heard is not a roving inquiry. It is based upon the issues set out in the pleadings for which the parties have permission to rely. This claim is therefore not one for damages for negligence whether for personal injury or clinical negligence. The Claimants made their position clear beyond any doubt on that question in their document entitled Amended Notice of Non-Reliance on Expert Report dated 23rd March 2025. I should not and will not determine (with some minor exceptions) theoretical issues which do not have a foundation in the pleadings even if questions were asked about them during the evidence. The claim that I have to determine is one for false imprisonment (both at common law and in breach of Article 5 of the ECHR) and breach of the Claimants’ Article 8 rights and the treatment received whilst detained is alleged to have breached Article 3 of the ECHR. On that basis there are in my judgement on the pleadings five main issues for me to determine. They are as follows:(a) (A) Has the Defendant established on a balance of probabilities that the First Claimant was lawfully detained on 26th April 2019 because she had a mental disorder requiring detention under the MHA?(b) (B) If the First Claimant was lawfully detained on 26th April 2019 then was that detention unlawful at any stage before it came to an end on 23rd August 2019?(c) (C) Even if lawfully detained throughout has the Claimant established any procedural breaches of the MHA and, if so, can they lead to any award of damages?(d) (D) Even if lawfully detained under the MHA throughout does the Claimant have any additional claim(s) under Article 5 and/or 8 and/or 3 of the ECHR?(e) (E) Does the Second Claimant have any (parasitic) claim upon any of the those matters? For the avoidance of doubt the Second Claimant does not have any pleaded claim in respect of the comments of Dr Jonathan King about the Second Claimant’s mental health and so I will not address that issue as amounting to any form of cause of action for the Second Claimant.

The issues

[136]I will take those issues in turn. (A). Has the Defendant established on a balance of probabilities that the First Claimant was lawfully detained on 26th April 2019 because she had a mental disorder requiring detention under the MHA?[137]I have characterised the issue in that way because of the burden of proof in a case of false imprisonment and because there is no issue that the First Claimant was detained.[138]Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, 24th Edition at paragraph 14.24 states:
“False imprisonment is the unlawful imposition of constraint on another’s freedom of movement from a particular place. The tort is established on proof of (1) the fact of imprisonment; and (2) the absence of lawful authority to justify that imprisonment. For these purposes, imprisonment is complete deprivation of liberty for any time, however short, without lawful cause.”
[139]As Lord Dyson put it in R (Lumba) v SSHD [2011] UKSC 12; [2012] 1 AC 245 at [§65]:
“All that a claimant has to prove in order to establish false imprisonment is that he was directly and intentionally imprisoned by the defendant, whereupon the burden shifts to the defendant to show that there was lawful justification for doing so.”
[140]As Lord Bridge said in R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison, Ex p Hague [1992] 1 AC 58, 162C D:
“The tort of false imprisonment has two ingredients: the fact of imprisonment and the absence of lawful authority to justify it.”
[141]The second limb of the tort of false imprisonment requires there to be an absence of lawful authority to justify the imprisonment. This must be considered against well-established authorities that the common law jealously guards liberty. William Blackstone, in the Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol 1 (1765) ch 1, p134, states:
“Next to personal security, the law of England regards, asserts, and preserves the personal liberty of individuals … it is a right strictly natural … the laws of England have never abridged it without sufficient cause and … in this kingdom it can never be abridged at the mere discretion of the magistrate, without the explicit permission of the laws.”
[142]This first issue in this case can be determined by my conclusion on whether the First Claimant was suffering at the material time from a mental disorder requiring her detention under section 3 of the MHA. I can say without hesitation that the Defendant has established that the First Claimant did have such a disorder and that it required detention for the following reasons.[143]First a significant number of Doctors and who are independent of each other considered the First Claimant to have a mental disorder at the material time. They are Dr Bhagat, Dr King (who saw and assessed the First Claimant on many occasions), Dr Soliman, Dr Cobb, Dr Nimmagadda and Dr McHarg. I accept that that does not of itself mean that they must have been right. I have therefore scrutinised their conclusions and their contemporaneous notes and the consistencies or inconsistencies of their conclusions. Having done so I am satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the First Claimant did have a mental disorder and the Doctors were not wrong about that. Indeed their assessments are not carried out at the same time but both pre-date the period of detention as well as being throughout the period of detention. Allied to that but in addition to that I accept that the mental disorder was such that it required detention and that no lesser measure was available to them. In doing so I accept that the written evidence of Dr King and Dr Cobb and the assessment of Christopher Lee. This is all supported by the evidence that I accept of Dr James Briscoe.[144]Second the evidence referred to in the first point is consistent with a gradual improvement in the First Claimant’s mental disorder as a result of the depot medication. That supports and is consistent with the existence of a mental disorder and one requiring detention under the MHA because it is tolerably clear that otherwise the First Claimant would not have taken it.[145]Third there is the evidence of Dr James Briscoe whose detailed reports and evidence before me were balanced and persuasive. That evidence was not undermined in cross-examination. Indeed, if anything, it was strengthened as a result of being tested and in the answers given by him.[146]Fourth there is no expert evidence before me to counter the opinions of the Doctors who assessed the First Claimant at the material time and that of Dr James Brisoce. It is important to note in that context that the Claimants have not relied upon any expert evidence on this issue. Indeed the only expert that they did instruct, Dr Nimmagadda, concluded shortly before the Tribunal hearing that the First Claimant was suffering from a mental disorder and I reject the Claimants’ criticisms of the Report of Dr Nimmagadda. His evidence poses a significant problem for the Claimants’ claim.[147]Fifth there is no proper basis for preferring the evidence of the Claimants on the issue of a mental disorder at the time. In particular the Second Claimant only visited the First Claimant once a week (when the First Claimant was in Hospital) and he was not present during any of the multiple assessments. He was not present at all when the First Claimant was in prison and was not then in contact with her. Neither are medically qualified. In addition to not having called any expert evidence, they have not called anyone who treated the First Claimant in either Hospital or any family members or friends to provide any factual support for their contentions.[148]Sixth (and I only place limited weight upon this) both of the Claimants are dismissive in an unpersuasive way about the view of anybody else unless it supports their own case. The Defendant submits that their approach is contemptuous but I prefer to categorise it as dismissive.[149]Seventh the attempts of the Claimants to rely on circumstantial evidence in support of this issue are wholly unpersuasive. During the trial various payslips for the First Claimant were relied upon as evidence that the First Claimant did not have a mental disorder between April and August 2019. Whilst these payslips were not exhibited to her witness statement and had not been disclosed to the Defendant I indicated that I would consider their potential relevance. They reveal the First Claimant’s employment between February 2020 and December 2020 – albeit some of it whilst on COVID furlough – for HT Enterprise Kirkstall Limited as well as payslips for the First Claimant for salary paid in May 2021, June 2021, July 2021, August 2021, September 2021, October 2024, December 2024 and February 2026 for Troia (UK) Restaurants Limited. They do not provide any real assistance to the Claimants because they do not cover the period before the First Claimant’s detention and in any event the First Claimant was lawfully detained before 26th April 2019 both as a result of criminal proceedings and sentence and then for immigration purposes. Further Dr Briscoe made clear that these do not provide any support for the First Claimant’s mental state at the time.[150]Eighth the First Claimant repeatedly told me that she did not consider herself to be ill. This point is very largely neutral/circular because it was her lack of insight which was characteristic of the kind of psychotic or delusional disorder of which she was suspected of suffering. I agree with the submission made by the Defendant that her own evidence is thus consistent with her not being ill, but is equally also consistent with her being ill. I make clear that I entirely accept that a patient who ispsychotic or delusional but lacks insight may come across very similarly to a patient who isnot ill and correctly insists so. That is why I place significant weight on those who have experience of assessing many patients and exploring this exact and difficult distinction, namely the medical professionals. In doing so I have looked for and found corroboration across multiple independent professionals.[151]Ninth the Claimants’ case is predicated in part on there being a Home Office driven conspiracy to detain the First Claimant and then to deport her. Aside from the obviously incredible nature of that allegation it is subject to a fundamental difficulty which is that the Doctors who concluded that she did have a mental disorder were not employed by the Home Office. But more problematic for the Claimants is the evidence of Dr Nimmagadda. He was wholly independent of the Defendant and the prison/Home Office. He took his instructions from the Second Claimant and the First Claimant (via her litigation friend at the time, the Official Solicitor), andhe assessed the First Claimant in July 2019 and shortly before the Tribunal decision. I have no hesitation in accepting the evidence of Dr Nimmagadda. In that context it is important to note that his conclusion that the First Claimant had litigation capacity is not inconsistent with his conclusion that she was detainable, because capacity is issue-specific ,or with Dr King’s opinion formed earlier in time that she did not have capacity. Indeed Dr Briscoe was clear that Dr Nimmagadda’s conclusions are logical and consistent with the underlying evidence he received.[152]Tenth the Claimants understandably place heavy reliance on the ruling of the Tribunal. However, that is based on a fundamental misunderstanding about the relevance, weight or even admissibility of that ruling. In my judgement that ruling is not binding on me. It does no more than reflect the fact that on the day it was given the detention of the First Claimant was no longer necessary. I therefore agree in that respect with Mrs Justice Yip (as she then was). It should be noted, however, that the Tribunal did not have the evidence of Dr Nimmagadda. In any event the Tribunal’s conclusion in August 2019 is consistent with a patient who had a mental disorder and was getting better. That cannot and does not by itself sustain an inference, especially in the teeth of all of the other evidence, that the First Claimant did not have a mental disorder when she was originally detained. Indeed I accept the Defendant’s submissions that the First Claimant got better, became more co-operative and was responsive to treatment. Indeed that is supported by Dr Briscoe’s retrospective analysis of the contemporary notes.[153]I do not accept that the Tribunal were making any finding about detention since April 2019. But even if I am wrong about that and the Tribunal didconsider itself to be determining the question of whether the whole of the detention was lawful, and purported to do so, that determination would be ultra vires of section 72 of the MHA and unlawful. In any event if it was not unlawful, that determination does not bind the High Court or determine the issues in a civil action for damages and in which I have received far more evidence than the Tribunal had.[154]Eleventh, in my judgement, the fact that the First Claimant was notassessed as having a mental disorder in 2013 or 2017 is not a matter that I regard as being of any real significance. I am not considering the position in 2017 or in 2013 but in 2019. I accept the evidence of Dr Briscoe that a person can develop a mental disorder without a prior medical history of such issues.[155]Drawing the strands together the fundamental and cumulative evidential difficulty that the Claimants have is the consistent views of those who were tasked with the responsibility to make a professional judgment at the material time and for which there is no alternative expert evidence before me and the evidence of Dr James Briscoe. I therefore have concluded on a balance of probabilities that the Claimant was suffering from a mental disorder on 26th April 2019 and which required detention under section 3 of the MHA on that day.[156]On that basis I simply do not need to address the academic issue of the liability of the Defendant in the event that the First Claimant did not have a mental disorder or any issues about vicarious liability and the absence of any pleaded claim for vicarious liability. It is notable that many of those who opined that the First Claimant did have a mental disorder were not employed by the Defendant. (B). If the First Claimant was lawfully detained on 26th April 2019 then was that detention unlawful at any stage before it came to an end on 23rd August 2019?[157]I can address this issue more briefly because much of my reasoning in relation to the initial detention applies to the continuing detention. I proceed on the basis that the burden of proof on legality rests with the Defendant throughout the period.[158]I have already found that the First Claimant was suffering from a mental disorder requiring her detention in April 2019. Throughout her detention she was resistant to taking the depot medication voluntarily. The best evidence that the First Claimant continued to suffer from a mental disorder after April 2019 comes from Dr Nimmagadda and whose evidence I have already made clear that I accept. On the basis that the position of the First Claimant gradually improved as a result of the medication and that that is consistent with the transfer summary in July 2019, then it is my judgement that the timing of the Tribunal hearing came at the earliest point in time where it was no longer necessary to detain the First Claimant. On that basis it follows that the entirety of her detention was lawful and that the Defendant has persuaded me, on a balance of probabilities, of that. Such a conclusion is supported by the evidence of Dr James Brisoce who has considered the position globally. It follows that the First Claimant has no common law claim for false imprisonment for any part of the First Claimant’s 120 day detention in 2019. For reasons set out below the same applies to Article 5 of the ECHR. (C). Even if lawfully detained throughout has the Claimant established any procedural breaches of the MHA and, if so, can they lead to any award of damages?[159]In my judgement the Claimants have not established any of the alleged procedural breaches.[160]I will start with an issue which is both substantive and procedural and then turn to the MHA procedural failure allegations.[161]The first issue relates to whether the medical recommendations in this case met the legal standards required. In my judgement this is both a substantive and procedural issue.[162]The Defendant accepts that an application under section 3 MHA is only lawful, and could only appear to a Hospital to be ‘duly made and founded on the necessary medical recommendations’ if it is made on the grounds that a patient is suffering from mental disorder of a nature or degree which makes it appropriate for them to receive medical treatment in a Hospital, and is founded on the written recommendations in the prescribed form of two registered medical practitioners, each stating the opinion that this is complied with. There is no doubt that Dr King and Dr Cobb provided the necessary medical recommendations. Both made their recommendations on a clinical analysis of presenting symptoms, rather than ‘mere suspicion’ as the Claimants suggest. Indeed it is tolerably clear that Dr Cobb reached his own view and did not just accept what Dr King said.[163]The Claimants seek to attack those recommendations and submit that they formed an insufficient basis for detention. However, it is clear the statutory criteria under section 3 MHA does not require a ‘settled’ or ‘definitive’ diagnosis or a specific and identified classification of a specific paragraph of DSM-V or ICD-10/11. I reject the suggestion that it is necessary for there to be ‘settled’ or ‘proven’ or ‘definitive’ or ‘clear’ diagnosis. Indeed such a suggestion would make the MHA potentially unworkable in some cases. In difficult cases the psychiatrists may not agree on the mental disorder but agree that there is one. Further given the nature and difficulty in some cases Parliament must have intended for there to be a working diagnosis of a mental disorder. Further assessment and/or treatment may well lead to a different diagnosis or a (more) settled or definite diagnosis. That is the nature of psychiatry and psychiatric cases. My conclusion in this regard is consistent with the Code of Practice, the MHA and the evidence of Dr James Briscoe.[164]Here in my judgement the law in this jurisdiction and in Strasbourg align. Article 5 permits the detention of persons ‘of unsound mind’ and in this jurisdiction it is the detention of someone with a mental disorder. The Claimants’ proposition that the ECHR legal standard requires a definitive diagnosis, or one drawn from DSM/ICD criteria, is contradicted by the case law they rely on. In Winterwerp the Court said [§37]:
‘The Convention does not state what is to be understood by the words ‘persons of unsound mind’
. The term is not one that can be given a definitive interpretation…it is a term whose meaning is continually evolving as research in psychiatry progresses, an increasing flexibility in treatment is developing and society’s attitude to mental illness changes…’[165]The Claimants’ contention is clearly unsustainable as a matter of clinical practice. Dr Briscoe gave evidence that some diagnoses are by their nature provisional (e.g. a ‘settled’ diagnosis of schizophrenia cannot be made for one month). Responsible clinical practice often requires the use of ‘working’ diagnoses and the MHA and its Code of Practice authorises detention on that basis.[166]I therefore accept the evidence of Dr Briscoe and Dr Hosker that the medical recommendations were duly completed in accordance with the statutory provisions and with reasonable standards of care within the psychiatric profession.[167]The Claimants also allege that the First Claimant’s detention under section 3 MHA was unlawful because of a failure to make an application under section 2 before assessing her. Two procedural flaws were specifically explored in cross-examination. They were a failure to comply with section 2 MHA, and a breach of section 5 MHA. I regard both as unarguable as a matter of statutory construction. Neither were clearly pleaded. However, I will address them.[168]The Claimants’ case is that when Dr King and Dr Cobb came to ‘assess’ the First Claimant for the purposes of deciding whether to make recommendations to found an application under section 3, this was an ‘assessment’ to which section 2 MHA applied, and the meaning of section 2 is that an application had to be made to the managers of the Hospital first. Without that application, the purported assessments under section 3 were, it is said by the Claimants, unlawful. I reject that interpretation of these statutory provisions.[169]Section 2 and 3 are self-contained provisions. They offer alternative routes to admission. There is nothing in the wording of section 3 to justify the Claimants’ arguments nor any case law in support of it. On the basis of the evidence from Dr Hosker and Dr Briscoe it is an interpretation that would be news to the medical profession as well. I accept that questions of statutory construction require me to consider the statutory scheme as a whole but the Claimants’ interpretation would be illogical. It would require an application to be made to Hospital beforeclinicians have even met with the patient to decide if they are ill, when the purpose of assessing a patient under either section 2 or section 3 would be to decide whether clinical recommendations can be made to support an application for a patient’s detention.[170]I accept that in practice, many mental health patients are detained first under section 2 (for up to 28 days) for assessment and are then detained under section 3 for treatment. However, in the First Claimant’s case at the time of the assessments made by Dr King and Dr Cobb, she was already in Hospital. Indeed she had been lawfully detained under other provisions of the MHA (section 48/49) for some time. There was therefore no need to use section 2 to admit her for assessment, and it was lawful and proper practice to proceed straight to section 3.[171]The next issue is whether the First Claimant’s detention under section 3 was unlawful because it began within and less than 72 hours of the use of the section 5 MHA holding power. This again is a novel argument but it is, in my judgement, untenable. What took place is clear. The First Claimant was detained under section 3 at 1.50pm on 26th April 2019. That was within five hours of Dr King using his section 5 MHA holding power at 9.11am. The Claimants submit that that was too quick and that the Defendant was required to wait for the entirety of the 72 hours before detaining under section 3.[172]Section 5(2) provides that where the registered clinician has furnished the Hospital managers with a report that an application should be made to detain a patient (as Dr King did at 09.11), ‘the patient may be detained in the hospital for a period of 72 hours from the time when the report is so furnished’. That is why the Claimants submit that it was therefore unlawful to detain the First Claimant under section 3 within 72 hours of the holding power being triggered.[173]Again this is a straightforward issue of statutory construction. The natural and purposive meaning of section 5 is that it authorises detention for up to a maximum of 72 hours. It does not say that the patient must be detained for 72 hours (and for not less than 72 hours). So 72 hours is the limit. It cannot have been Parliament’s intention to require detention for all of that period in every case. Dr Hosker and Dr Briscoe both gave evidence that the Claimants’ interpretation was wrong. In addition an interpretation that you can detain under section 3 MHA for less than 72 hours is consistent with the Code of Practice and matches their expectations of reasonable clinical practice. Indeed it is obvious that if the Claimants are correct that the effect would be perverse. It would mean that Doctors would have to delay treatment for those in need of it, or to continue detaining those who ought to be freed. In my judgement, that cannot have been and was not the intention of Parliament.[174]The Claimants’ pleaded case alleged a failure to comply with section 132 MHA in not notifying and helping the First Claimant to make an application for discharge. I can deal with this relatively summarily. The records which are contemporaneous reveal repeated attempts having been made to inform the First Claimant about her rights. Indeed the First Claimant eventually accepted in cross-examination that she may have been told about her rights and not remembered that face. The section 132 duty is to take ‘such steps are as practicable’ and that was, in my judgement, plainly complied with here.[175]There is no other identified alleged procedural defect and no other challenge to the clear evidence of Dr Hosker and Dr Briscoe that the instant application for section 3 MHA detention was lawfully completed and that all of the legal and procedural requirements were complied with. I accept that evidence and it follows that I am satisfied that there were no procedural breaches. I therefore do not need to address or assess any liability or quantum issues relating to those matters. (D). Even if lawfully detained under the MHA throughout does the Claimant have any additional claims under Article 5 and/or 8 and/or 3 of the ECHR?[176]I will start with Article 3 because there are freestanding allegations of mistreatment of the First Claimant. These are not brought under the cause of action of the tort of assault but solely on the basis of Article 3 of the ECHR. I make clear that even if they had been brought on the basis of an assault or assaults that I would have dismissed them.[177]It is clear on the evidence that the Claimant was treated with depot medication on a regular basis during her detention and that it was against her will. Further that this did require some form of restraint and that at times that was on the ground or in a prone position. I referred earlier in the judgment to some of the entries that the First Claimant was taken to in cross-examination. Those are not the only entries but I have considered them all. The most notable records were contained at the following pages of the Medical Records bundle: pages 2017, 2643 – 2644, 2759, 2829, 2877, 2928, 2991, 3086, 3132, 3196-3197, 3229 and 3274).[178]However, what the First Claimant alleges in her witness statements and in evidence is sustained violence by a large number of employees on a regular basis. I have no hesitation in rejecting the First Claimant’s evidence in that regard. It is important to assess it with cool logic and sound common sense. It is plainly, in my judgement, grossly exaggerated. My reasons for so concluding are as follows.[179]First the contemporaneous documentation is entirely inconsistent with the First Claimant’s account. The notes set out the unique and individual circumstances in respect of the use of the depot medication on a number of different occasions, sometimes being undertaken without any real difficulty and sometimes with some difficulty. The notes do not support the First Claimant’s version of events and I reject the possibility that these are contrived and false contemporaneous documents.[180]Second it is inherently unlikely that medical staff would throw the syringe at the First Claimant like a dart. The First Claimant says that this is how it happened regularly. That would run the risk of staff being injured and would be incredibly risky. It would also run the risk of the needle breaking and/or the loss of the medication and then the need to explain that fact. If the syringe missed then it would also run the risk of the First Claimant breaking free and using the syringe to inject staff. Moreover the First Claimant’s case is based upon this being undertaken as part of a plan by the Home Office to deport her. It is self-evident that this would, on the First Claimant’s version of events, have required staff at various different levels of experience and in two different Hospitals to behave in the same way and at the behest of the Home Office. Such a possibility is so fanciful that it can easily be rejected by the Court. Indeed it would inevitably over this period of time have led to a member of staff complaining about it and/or whistleblowing and it did not.[181]Third given how litigious the Claimants are it seems inconceivable that they would have waited until June 2019 to have said anything about this if it had been taking place since April 2019 as the First Claimant suggests.[182]Fourth the First Claimant’s account is not corroborated by anyone else. Whilst it does not have to be, given how inherently unlikely it is that is a relevant consideration for me. The First Claimant’s letter of complaint of 6th June 2019 is not independent of her and nor is her witness statement for the Tribunal.[183]Fifth (and whilst I only place some weight on this) the First Claimant’s oral evidence about what happened was entirely unpersuasive. I was given the impression that the First Claimant was determined to describe what took place in the most extreme (and unreliable) way. When presented with contemporaneous documentation that did not support her version she would either accept that on that particular occasion it did not occur as she had previously suggested and despite her case being that it occurred regularly or she would not answer the question fully.[184]I make clear that I am entirely satisfied that there is no CCTV evidence which could have assisted me. That is because it plainly would not exist any longer and because the Defendant has made clear and confirmed that there was no CCTV on the particular wards at the time. I accept that fact and I also find as a fact that the entry in the notes relied upon by the Claimants is based on a misunderstanding of what Nikki Askew must have said at the time and there was no need for to come to Court to give evidence about that matter.[185]There is no dispute, if the First Claimant was injected in the way described in her witness statements, that would be unlawful and in breach of Article 3 ECHR. However, for the reasons that I have given I conclude that it did not happen in the way that she suggests. Further I accept the evidence of Dr Briscoe that the administration of the depot medication and the method of administration (with some restraint) was both necessary and proportionate throughout the First Claimant’s detention.[186]Given my findings in relation to the lawfulness of the detention and the First Claimant’s treatment it must follow that the claims under Articles 5 and 8 of the ECHR must also fail. I have considered all of the authorities relied upon by the Claimant.

(H) Ashot Harutyunyan v Armenia (Third Section 34334/04)

[187]None of those authorities provide any support for the contention that on the facts before me the First Claimant could establish an Article 5 ECHR claim if she was lawfully detained under the MHA for the entire 120 day period and her common law false imprisonment claim had failed. The suggested additional Article 5 aspect of the claim must therefore also fail. (E). Does the Second Claimant have any (parasitic) claim upon any of those matters?[188]The answer to the question is undoubtedly ‘no’. In my judgement any Article 8 claim brought by the Second Claimant has to be founded on a finding by the Court that the First Claimant was unlawfully detained. That is because there can be no unlawful interference with the Article 8 rights of a family member for depriving them of their loved one’s company if their relative was lawfully detained. If such a claim were possible then it would mean that a family member could claim when their loved one received a custodial sentence having committed a crime. Whilst not the same situation there can be no distinction in principle between lawful detention under the MHA and lawful imprisonment based on a sentence being imposed or bail being lawfully refused. The restriction placed on the family life of the Second Claimant by the detention of the First Claimant is that which was necessary and proportionate and there is no breach of Article 8. This is not an issue which requires any lengthy jurisprudential analysis. Similarly the failure to establish any other claims means that the Second Claimant cannot do so either.

Conclusion:

[189]For the reasons set out above I dismiss this claim. I will hear argument following the handing down of this judgment on what orders I should make as a result.