KDY & Anor v Nicholas Langham & Ors [2026] EWHC 2068 (KB)

[2026] EWHC 2068 (KB)

Case No KB-2025-003437

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KING'S BENCH DIVISION

Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date 07/08/2026

Before

CLARE PADLEY (SITTING AS A DEPUTY JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT)

Between

(1) KDY (a child, by his litigation friend, NGP)Claimants

(2) NGP (anonymised party)Claimant

(1) MR NICHOLAS LANGHAMDefendants

(2) MRS FIRDUSI UDDINDefendant

(3) GOVERNING BODY OF LANGDON PARK SCHOOLDefendant

(4) UNIVERSITY SCHOOLS TRUSTDefendant

(5) LONDON BOROUGH OF TOWER HAMLETSDefendant

(6) GOVERNING BODY OF ST. LUKE'S PRIMARY SCHOOLDefendant

(7) GOVERNING BODY OF WOOLMORE PRIMARY SCHOOLDefendant

(8) EAST LONDON NHS FOUNDATION TRUSTDefendant

(9) POPLAR HOUSING ASSOCIATION AND REGENERATION COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LIMITEDDefendant

(10) DR TINA SODEDefendant

(11) LONDON LEGACY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONDefendant

The Second Claimant, NGP, appeared in person for Claimants

Katharine Elliot (instructed by Browne Jacobson LLP) for First to Seventh and Tenth Defendants

Harry Trusted (instructed by Clyde & Co LLP) for Eighth Defendant

Henry King (instructed by DWF Law LLP) for Ninth Defendant

Thomas Clarke (instructed by Kennedys LLP) for putative Eleventh Defendant

Hearing Hearing date: 1 July 2026

Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 7 August 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

.............................

Clare Padley (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge):

[1]This judgment follows the hearing on Wednesday 1 July 2026 of four strike out/summary judgment applications made by the various defendants in this case.

[2]Before outlining those applications, I will identify the parties to this claim and context of these applications. An anonymity order dated 27 November 2025 was made in this case by Master Brown.

Parties

[3]The first claimant (‘C1’) is a child, known in this case as KDY, who brings this claim by his mother as his litigation friend, who is to be known as NGP. NGP is also the second claimant (‘C2’) who brings some claims in this case in her own right.

[4]C2 is a litigant in person. She attended the hearing in person accompanied by a McKenzie Friend and an emotional support worker. She had indicated in a written application dated 20 June 2026 that she may need reasonable adjustments to enable her to participate effectively. I treated her as a vulnerable party and I engaged with her at the outset and during the hearing to check whether she needed any additional breaks or other adjustments. In the event she was able to present her case effectively throughout the hearing, with support from those accompanying her.

[5]There were initially nine defendants named on the original claim form which was dated 17 September 2025 and issued for service on 18 September 2025. Two additional defendants were added by the claimants at a later date. Their status has been the subject of two recent directions orders made by Master Brown on 12 and 26 June 2026, to which I will return in due course. For present purposes, the tenth defendant (‘D10’) now accepts that it was added as a party via an amendment to the claim form prior to service, for which permission was not required pursuant to CPR 19.4.

[6]The status of the putative eleventh defendant (‘D11’) has not yet been resolved. I will return to that issue in due course.

[7]The claimants described the defendants and their roles in a ‘Schedule of Defendants’ annexed to the anonymised Claim Form, in the following terms: D1- Mr Nicholas Langham (Head Teacher, Langdon Park School (D3)) - sued in his personal capacity; D2 - Mrs Firdusi Uddin (Head of School - Secondary and Sixth Form, St Paul’s Way Trust School (D4)) - sued in her personal capacity; D3 - Governing Body of Langdon Park School - a statutory body corporate pursuant to the Education Act 2002 – sued as the responsible body for the acts and omissions of D1; D4 - University Schools Trust - the corporate governing body and responsible body for St Paul’s Way Trust School pursuant to section 20 of the Education Act 2002 and the School’s Instrument of Government -sued as the responsible body for the acts and omissions of D2; D5 - London Borough of Tower Hamlets - a local authority within the meaning of the Local Government Act 1972and a public authority for the purposes of section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 responsible for education, children's services and social care functions within its area – sued as the responsible public authority body for the acts and omissions of its officers and agents in Education, Children’s services and Social care services; D6 - Governing Body of St Luke’s Primary School - a statutory body corporate pursuant to the Education Act 2002; D7- Governing Body of Woolmore Primary School - a statutory body corporate pursuant to the Education Act 2002; D8 - East London NHS Foundation Trust – an NHS Trust established pursuant to the National Health Service Act 2006 and responsible for the provision of CAMHS services in Tower Hamlets - sued as the responsible body for the acts and omissions of its employees, agents and clinicians engaged in the Tower Hamlets CAMHS Service; D9 - Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd (trading as Poplar HARCA) – a registered provider of social housing and community services and the responsible body for Spotlight Youth Service - sued as the responsible body for the acts and omissions of its employees, agents, youth workers and contractors engaged in the Spotlight Youth Service; D10 - Dr Tina Sode - Head of SEND, LB Tower Hamlets (D5)) - sued in her personal capacity; D 11 - London Legacy Development Corporation - a statutory corporation established pursuant to the Localism Act 2011 and the London Legacy Development Corporation (Establishment and Functions) Order 2012, and the responsible body for the delivery, commissioning and oversight of the East Summer School programme - sued as the responsible body for the acts and omissions of its employees, agents and contractors engaged in the East Summer School programme.

[8]All the named defendants appear to be either linked to schools which C1 has previously attended or are public bodies or other organisations which have been involved in some way with the provision of educational, health or recreational services to C1. As can be seen, some of the defendants are individuals who have been sued in a personal capacity.

Defendants’ applications

[9]There were four applications listed before me for hearing on 1 July 2026: i) Application by D1, D3, D5, D6, D7 and D10, dated 13 March 2026, to strike out all the claims against them and/or for summary judgment on those claims; ii) Application by D2 and D4 dated 13 March 2026, to strike out all the claims against them and/or for summary judgment on those claims; iii) Application by D8 dated 13 March 2026 to strike out all the claims against D8 or for summary judgment on those claims; iv) Application by D9 dated 11 March 2026 to strike out all the claims against D9 or for summary judgment on those claims.

[10]In addition, the defendants also raised the following consequential issues, in the event that proceedings endure beyond the instant hearing:(a) whether NGP meets the criteria to be a suitable person to act as KDY’s litigation friend in CPR, r.21.4(3)(a) and (c); they ask the Court to consider the issue of suitability pursuant to CPR, r.21.7;

(b) whether D1, D2 and D10 should be removed as parties pursuant to CPR, r.19.3;

(d) whether proceedings against D8, D9 and D11 should be severed and dealt with separately.

[11]The claimants opposed all the strike out applications and, in the alternative, sought permission to amend their Particulars of Claim if any pleading deficiencies were identified by the court. They also sought clarification in relation to the status of D10 and D11 and standard case management directions.

Procedural history of this claim

[12]Before turning to the specific applications, I will summarise the nature and procedural history of this claim. This summary is based on my review of the parties’ chronologies and the various court documents in the bundles provided by the claimants and the defendants.

[13]The original claim form is dated 17 September 2025 and was prepared by C2, on her own behalf, and as C1’s litigation friend. The claim form was issued on 18 September 2025. The claim is described on the front of the claim form in the following terms:

“Brief details of claim The Claimants bring claims in negligence and personal injury; discrimination, harassment and victimisation under the Equality Act 2010; defamation; and breaches of human rights under Articles 3, 8, 14 and Article 2 Protocol 1 ECHR (via the Human Rights Act 1998). The First Claimant (a disabled child with an EHCP) has been unlawfully excluded from education since 10 September 2025 and is wholly without suitable educational provision. The Second Claimant, as parent-carer, has suffered direct harm, including stress and anxiety materially increasing her risk of serious health consequences, including stroke. The Claimants seek damages, declarations, injunctions and other remedies. Interim relief is being sought by separate N244 application to secure urged educational provision for first claimant pending trial. Value The Claimants seek damages in excess of 2.8 million, including: General damages for personal injury, pain, suffering, and loss of amenity; Special damages for past and future educational loss, therapy, and care costs; Aggravated damages for distress, humiliation, and reputational harm; Damages for defamation; Damages for breaches of Human Rights and Equality Act rights; and Exemplary damages, if justified, to reflect deliberate or reckless disregard of statutory duties. A full Schedule of Loss will be served alongside the Particulars of Claim (See attached justification note for breakdown.)”

Value

[14]The claim form referred to alleged statutory breaches for a period of 5.5 years from March 2020 to September 2025 and stated that “they are pleaded as continuing wrongs.” It also included details of the Claimants’ vulnerabilities and requirements for reasonable adjustments. It stated that full Particulars of Claim would follow within 14 days.

[15]I will return to the form and substance of this claim, and the other claims brought by C2 in the Administrative Court and SEND First Tier Tribunal arising out of the same or related concerns, in due course.

[16]It appears that before service of the POC, the case had been transferred to the County Court on 24 September 2025 by Master Brown without a hearing, on review of the claim form, but this transfer was opposed by the claimants and the transfer order was then set aside and the matter was listed for a case management conference.

[17]On 25 November 2025, a case management conference (CMC) hearing took place before Master Brown. An anonymity order was made, and directions were given for service by C2 of the claim form, POC, medical evidence and schedule of loss. At that stage there were nine named Defendants on the court order. The Order records that C2 was present and that all nine defendants were represented except D8, who was not present or represented. It is plain from the recitals in his Order, and the evidence of D9’s solicitor, that Master Brown specifically directed C2’s attention to CPR 16, PD 16, CPR 53B and CPR 19.4 in relation to the relevant jurisdiction for certain types of claims and the requirements for pleadings.

[18]On 16 January 2026, C2 served a claim form on D1-D10 by email. It is now accepted by D10 that the claim form had been amended before it was served, and that D10 was properly joined as a defendant.

[19]C2 has since filed a Certificate of Service and evidence to indicate that the Claim form was also served on D11 by first class post sent out on 16 January 2026. The validity of their joinder is disputed by D11.

[20]On 10 February 2026, C2 then filed and served a 574-page bundle called a “medical evidence bundle”. The defendants contend, and C2 accepts, that this bundle comprised medical records and treating clinicians’ reports relating to C1 and C2 but did not contain any Part 35-compliant independent medical expert reports. This issue is addressed later in this judgment.

[21]On 13 February 2026, C2 filed and served a further 318-page bundle of documentation on all the defendants, including a 247-page Particulars of Claim (POC), 50 additional pages of ‘Annexes’ to the POC, an 18-page ‘Quantum Bundle’ and a 3-page ‘Judicial Roadmap’.

[22]On 18 February 2026, C2 filed a ‘Re-Verification of Statement of Truth’, signed in her full name, after concerns had been raised that the claim was not verified with the correct version of Statement of Truth.

[23]On 11 March 2026, D9 applied to strike out the claim and alternatively for summary judgment. On 13 March 2026, the remaining defendants, save for D11, all made their applications to strike out the claim and alternatively for summary judgment.

[24]On the 14 March 2026, the claimants served a 16-page response to D9's application. In it, she strongly resisted the application and did not accept any of the criticisms made in relation to the POC or the other procedural breaches. She also disputed that she had not served a response form on D9’s solicitors as was claimed by D9.

[25]On the 16 March 2026, D9’s solicitor, Mr Stephen Cornfield, then served a supplemental witness statement conceding that a response pack had been included with the claim form when it was served on D9 and apologising to the court for his earlier erroneous statement.

[26]On 16 March 2026, C2 served a 14-page skeleton argument in response, opposing all the defendants’ strike out applications, maintaining that the POC disclosed recognised causes of actions, and seeking permission to amend if any pleading deficiencies were identified by the court. C2 also filed a further 76-pages of witness statements and exhibits and a series of “matrix documents”.

[27]On 12 June 2026, D11’s solicitors, Kennedys, wrote to Master Brown, explaining that its uploads to the CE file had been rejected on the grounds that it was not a party. Furthermore, D11 contended that the documents filed by C2 demonstrated that D11 had not been properly added as a defendant. The solicitors stated that in those circumstances, D11 would not be attending the hearing on 1st July 2026. In the event, D11 was represented at the hearing by Counsel.

[28]On 12 June 2026, Master Brown then sought confirmation from C2 of the basis on which the joinder of D10 and D11 was said to be effective and directed that further evidence must be filed by C2 by 29 June 2026. On 16 June 2026, C2 then filed and served evidence in relation to the joinder of D10 and D11 which included copies of emails and proof of posting and certificates of service. It is not clear from the court file if this bundle was in fact seen by Master Brown.

[29]On 12 June 2026, C2 also lodged a hard copy at court of a 92 page ‘Core pre-reading bundle’ for the hearing on 1 July 2026, which included the 16 March 2026 skeleton argument and witness evidence and other ‘guidance’ and ‘matrix’ documents, but not any of the original claim documents. This bundle was then filed and served on 21 June 2026.

[30]On 22 June 2026, D8 served its skeleton argument and cost schedules for the hearing on 1st July. On 29 June 2026, D1-7 and D10 served their joint skeleton argument and their costs schedules.

[31]In the meantime, on 26 June 2026, C2 sent an email to Master Brown drawing the court’s attention to the defendants’ chronology and case summary which indicated that the only remaining issue was in relation to the joinder of D11, as D10 had by then accepted it had been properly added as a defendant.

[32]On 29 June 2026, Master Brown made a further order in the following terms:

“Upon it appearing that the Claimant has sought to join two further parties which she has named as the Tenth and Eleventh Defendants (‘the additional parties’) And the Claimant having filed the attached letter dated 26 June 2026 which does not appear sufficiently clarify the position The purported joinder of the additional parties shall be deemed ineffective in the absence of further order by the Court at the hearing on 1 July 2026 This order having been made without a hearing any party affected by the order may apply to set it aside or vary it within 7 days of receipt.”

[33]As I have noted, it is not clear from this order whether Master Brown had also seen the bundle of service documents filed by C2 on 16 June 2026 or the concession from D10.

[34]All the defendants, including D11, have now filed an Acknowledgment of Service, but no defences have yet been filed or served by any of the defendants. The defendants’ position is in line with CPR 3.4 (7) which states:

“If a defendant applies to strike out all or part of the claim form or particulars of claim, that defendant need not file a defence before the hearing.”

Joinder of D10 and D11

[35]I will briefly address this discrete issue first. I have reviewed the bundle of documents filed by C2 on 16 June 2026 in response to the directions order made by Master Brown on 12 June 2026. This bundle appears to have been delivered by hand to the Masters’ corridor in the Royal Courts of Justice.

[36]In that bundle, C2 provided evidence which she relies on to demonstrate that D10 and D11 were added as defendants before the claim form was served, so that no permission of the court was required under CPR 19.4. Her evidence did not include a copy of the amended claim form, but C2 maintained that there was a copy on the court file.

[37]Ms Elliot told the court that D10 now accepts that it was added as a party via an amendment to the claim form prior to service, for which permission was not required pursuant to CPR 19.4. In light of that acceptance by D10, I am prepared to direct that D10 was effectively joined as a defendant before service of the claim form on D10 by e-mail on 16 January 2026 and this will be recorded in the order following this judgment.

[38]The position of D11 is different. Counsel for D11, Mr Clarke, attended the hearing on 1 July 2026 and indicated that D11 does not accept that the claim form was properly amended to add D11 before service, and that D11 has never been added as a party by the court, which was the reason for the emails sent by Kennedys to Master Brown as they were unable to access the CE file for this claim.

[39]As only one day had been set aside for the hearing of the multiple strike out applications and neither C2 nor the court had received any advance notice of D11’s intention of attending the hearing, I declined to deal with the issue of joinder of D11. To do so would have left insufficient time to ensure that the main applications were dealt with fairly, taking into account C2’s position as a vulnerable party. I explained to D11 and C2 that the position of D11 would have to be considered at a separate hearing, if required, following my judgment on the strike out applications. Mr Clarke made clear that, in any event, although D11 had not filed its own strike-out application or evidence given its position on joinder, it supported all the points made by the other defendants about the POC.

Documents for this hearing

[40]I have been provided by the parties with several separate bundles and other documents for this hearing: i) a 704-page main hearing bundle comprising all the formal ‘claim’ documents filed by C2 up to 18 February 2026, the defendants’ four March 2026 strike out applications, including witness statements from solicitors Katherine Langley, Sam Nelson, Christina Bateman and Stephen Cornfield, and the C2’s initial documents filed in response on 14 and 16 March 2026. ii) a 94-page supplementary bundle containing the defendants’ amended case summary and chronology, skeleton arguments of D8 and D1-7 &10, a draft order filed by C2 and copies of all parties’ statements of costs. iii) a 92-page ‘Core pre-reading bundle’ including C2’s skeleton argument and a ‘Judge Navigation Sheet’, filed by C2. iv) a 588-page authorities bundle filed by the defendants. v) a further 107-page supplementary bundle filed by the defendants containing copies of documents relating to C2’s FTT and Judicial Review proceedings and two additional authorities.

Relevant legal principles

[41]The relevant legal provisions in respect of strike out and summary judgment applications are set out in CPR 3.4(2) and CPR 24 respectively. CPR 3.4 forms part of the court’s wide case management powers and gives the court power to strike out a statement of case. The relevant parts of CPR 3.4 provide: "(1) In this rule and rule 3.5, a reference to a statement of case includes reference to part of a statement of case. (2) The court may strike out a statement of case if it appears to the court –(a) that the statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending the claim;

(b) that the statement of case is an abuse of the court’s process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings;

(c) that there has been a failure to comply with a rule, practice direction or court order; or [(d) relates to strategic litigation against public participation (‘SLAPP’) claims and has no application in this case]

[42]Guidance on the approach which should be taken to the use by the court of this striking out power is set out in the White Book at sections 3.4.1 to 3.4.21. That guidance includes the following points which are relevant in this case:(i) Strike out is defined in the Glossary (to the CPR) as “Striking out means the court ordering written material to be deleted so that it may no longer be relied upon”. This rule enables the court to strike out statements of case in whole or in part and then make consequential orders.

(ii) Grounds (a) and (b) cover statements of case which are unreasonably vague, incoherent, vexatious, scurrilous or obviously ill-founded and other cases which do not amount to a legally recognisable claim or defence. This power can be exercised by a judge acting on their own initiative at the stage of issuing a claim in order to spare defendants against whom an ill-founded action is sought to be brought needless expense in having to initiate “strike out” proceedings;

(iii) Ground (c) covers cases where the abuse lies not in the statement of case itself but in the way the claim or defence (as the case may be) has been conducted. The strike out can be made even where there was nothing in the rule, practice direction or court order breached which specified that this might happen as a consequence of breach. In many circumstances such a strike out would seem unduly harsh unless the party concerned was warned (possibly in writing by another party) of the risk of their statement of case being struck out if they did not comply with the rule, practice direction or court order in question.

[43]Further guidance is then given in PD 3A (Striking out a Statement of Case) paragraphs 1.4 in relation to ground (a). Examples of cases where the court may conclude that particulars of claim disclose no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim include: claims which set out no facts indicating what the claim is about; claims which are incoherent and make no sense; and claims which contain a coherent set of facts but those facts even if true, do not disclose any legally recognisable claim against the defendant.

[44]In applications based on ground (c), the courts have often considered one of the various alternatives to a strike out as being a more proportionate remedy for a breach of the rules, and in the case of Biguzzi v Rank Leisure plc

[1999] 1 WLR 1926

, the Court of Appeal highlighted the draconian nature of this power in a case of non-compliance and the need for the proportionality of the sanction itself to be carefully considered.

[45]This provision must also be read in the light of the general case management power in CPR 3.1 and CPR 3.1A and the overriding objective in CPR 1.1. namely, to enable the court to deal with cases justly and at proportionate cost.

[46]In particular, the factors of relevance to these applications include: i) CPR 3.1(2)(f) allows the court to order proceedings to be dealt with separately. ii) CPR 3.1A does not lower the standard of compliance with rules or court orders which litigants in person are required to achieve. The fact that a person is unrepresented is most unlikely to amount in itself to a good reason for breach of a rule (see Barton v Wright Hassall LLP

[2018] UKSC 12

[47]CPR 24 relates to summary judgment and, at 24.3, the grounds for summary judgment are set out:

"The court may give summary judgment against a claimant or defendant on the whole of a claim, or an issue if – (a) it considers that the party has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim, defence or issue, and (b) there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at a trial."

[48]In practice, the parties agree that broadly the same test should be considered by the court in relation to the defendants’ applications to strike out the claim under 3.4(2)(a) and their summary judgment applications.

[49]In short, such applications should only succeed at this early stage when the claimant has an unwinnable case, where continuance of the proceedings is without any possible benefit to the person bringing the claim, and it would waste resources on both sides. In other words, the claim is bound to fail.

[50]On a summary judgment application, it is appropriate for the court to examine the evidence that is relied upon to prove the claim and consider the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be available at trial. It is not however appropriate for the court to undertake a mini-trial on any factual issues (as made clear by the Court of Appeal in Swain v Hillman

[2001] 1 All ER 91

) and the court should proceed on the basis that the facts pleaded are accurate unless they are contradictory or obviously wrong.

[51]Finally, in considering whether the claimants have a real prospect of success, I must consider whether the claimants have a realistic, as opposed to a fanciful, prospect of success, and one which carries some degree of conviction.

Relevant factual background

[52]As I explained to the parties at the hearing, I am not going to conduct a mini-trial or resolve any factual disputes at this stage. That said, it is important to briefly summarise the factual context of this claim as it appears from the evidence before the court. I do not intend to rehearse all the alleged factual incidents relied on by the claimants and I understand that the factual basis for many of the decisions taken by the various defendants in relation to C1 are not accepted by the claimants. This summary is not intended to reflect any determination by the court of those disputed factual issues, but simply to provide a broad summary of the background events which have led to this claim.

[53]C1 was born in April 2013 and is now aged 13, so he is still of compulsory school age. He lives with C2 and his father. He has had an Education, Health and Care Plan (“EHCP”) since November 2018, when he was 5. A full copy of the EHCP does not appear in the bundle but section F is included in C2’s documents and its contents are referenced in many exhibits.

[54]C1 has a number of diagnosed conditions including autism spectrum disorder (“autism”) and Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”). He is also said to have Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) and to suffer from depression, anxiety disorder and sleep disorder. He has been accepted as being disabled in previous claims. D8 is the local NHS healthcare provider responsible for health care provision to C1 and C2.

[55]C1 is described in the defendants’ evidence as having significant Social, Emotional and Mental Health ('SEMH') needs which manifest in physical aggression towards others (hitting, pushing and pulling), verbal aggression and using sexualised language in a threatening way. This description is not accepted by the claimants.

[56]In the claim documents, C1 is also described as being a designated vulnerable Child in Need (“CIN”) with a CIN plan since 11 March 2024 following school-based trauma, acute distress and multiple episodes of serious self-harm between January and March 2024. C2 has reported that C1 has attempted suicide on multiple occasions, including in February 2021 and January 2024 and relies on documentary evidence relating to these reports. This information about suicidal ideation does not appear to be agreed by the local CAMHS team.

[57]His mother, C2, describes herself as a disabled parent-carer who has autism and other diagnoses including PTSD, depression, anxiety disorder, sleep disorder, chronic headaches, and migraine with aura. She is not currently working as she is a full-time carer for C1.

[58]The broad chronology of events set out in witness and documentary evidence filed by the defendants is broadly consistent with the claimants’ claim documents and C2’s witness statements. The evidence indicates that C1 has previously attended the following schools and groups which are linked to the defendants named in this claim, whilst the underlying factual allegations remain in dispute:(a) St Luke’s Church of England Primary School (St Luke’s) London E14, a mainstream primary school maintained by D5, as the local education authority. C1 enrolled there in June 2018. He left St Luke’s in a managed move to Woolmore Primary School with the consent of D5 and C2 in June 2021 when he was in Year 3. C1 was first issued with an EHCP while at St Luke’s. D6 is the Governing Body of this school.

(b) Woolmore Primary School (Woolmore) London E14, a mainstream primary school also maintained by D5. C1 enrolled there in June 2021, following the move from St Luke’s, and stayed there until the end of Year 6 in July 2024. D7 is the Governing Body of this school.

(c) Langdon Park School (Langdon Park) London, a mainstream secondary school maintained by D5. C1 enrolled there in September 2024 at the beginning of Year 7. C1 was permanently excluded from Langdon Park on 3 December 2024. In her witness statement Ms Langley states that this exclusion decision followed multiple breaches by C1 of the Langdon Park behaviour policy and was taken following an incident during which C1 is alleged to have attempted to assault a pregnant member of staff. C1 was taken off the roll on 19 March 2025, having started to attend another school on 17 March 2025. Due to C1’s move to another school, the exclusion decision did not take effect in law as it was not reviewed by D3 as the governing body, which is a pre-requisite for the exclusion decision to take effect. D1 was the Head Teacher at the relevant time. The circumstances of C1’s exclusion are disputed by the claimants.

(d) St Paul’s Way Trust School (St Paul’s) an academy school which is part of the D4 trust. D2 was the Head of Secondary School at the time. C1 enrolled at this school in March 2025 to continue his Year 7 education. C1 was permanently excluded from St Paul’s on 10 of September 2025 when he was in Year 8. In his witness statement, Mr Nelson states that this decision followed persistent breaches by C1 of the school’s behaviour policy, including incidents of physical assault and verbal abuse towards school staff, which culminated in a serious incident of assault and verbal abuse on 5 September 2025. The permanent exclusion decision was upheld by D4 as the governing body on 30 Sept 2025. C1 was removed from the school roll on 22 October 2025. C2 does not accept the stated basis for this exclusion decision and alleges that C1 was assaulted by a teaching assistant at the school, but she did not seek a review of that decision by an independent panel, despite having a right to do so.

(e) Spotlight Centre - a community youth centre owned and run by D9, a housing association based in East London. The centre offers some youth services including a boxing gym and various dance and music classes which are provided free of charge on a charitable basis to the local community. C1 attended the Spotlight Centre on occasions between 23 April 2024 and November 2024. The parties dispute what took place during those months, but it appears to be agreed that an incident took place in November 2024 between C1 and another service user (who was not an employee of D9) and C1 alleges that he was assaulted. C1 has not attended since that time.

(f) East Summer School - a free two-week summer school run by D11 for local teenagers. C1 is alleged to have been denied access to this provision on or about 29 July 2025. The reasons for this decision are disputed.

[59]The evidence before the court indicates that since October 2025, C1 has not been enrolled at another school. In an order made on 27 November 2025 by Kirsty Brimelow KC (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge), she refused an application for interim relief in the form of mandatory order for suitable interim education provision for C1, in related judicial review proceedings (to which I will return in due course). It appears from the written reasons set out in that Order, that after October 2025, C2 sought Education Otherwise than at School (EOTAS) provision for C1, and negotiations with D5 were ongoing at that time.

[60]Since that time an amended EHCP was issued in December 2025. C2 has a current claim in the First-tier Tribunal (Health, Education and Social Care Chamber) by which she is challenging the content of sections B, F and I of the EHCP (relating to C1’s special educational needs, provision and placement). C2 advised the court that some interim personal budget funding for C1 has been agreed in May 2026.

Other related proceedings

[61]C2 accepts that she has brought other claims arising out of the same broad factual background which I have outlined. I will summarise those other proceedings here, as they are relevant to submissions made by the defendants about cause of action or issue estoppel, namely whether some parts of the current claim have already been litigated or determined in other claims. The parties’ submissions in relation to those points are addressed later in this judgment. Disability discrimination claims

[62]Three claims for disability discrimination under the Equality Act 2010 (EA 2010) have been brought by C2 on behalf of C1 in the First-tier Tribunal (Special Educational Needs and Disability) (the “FTT”):(i) a claim against D7 (Woolmore) brought in December 2024. That claim relates in broad terms to events in July 2024 concerning behaviour management decisions and alleged disability discrimination arising from acts or omissions of staff at D7. The FTT made case management orders on 28 January 2025 and 13 March 2025, by which some allegations made by C2 were struck out on the basis that they were out of time and/or had no real prospect of success. A final hearing was scheduled on 15 April 2026, but that hearing date has since been vacated and has not yet been relisted;

(ii) a claim against D3 (Langdon Park) brought in May 2025. That claim relates in broad terms to events in 2024-2025 concerning behaviour management decisions, including the exclusion decision in December 2024, and alleged disability discrimination arising from acts or omissions of D3. Again, the FTT struck out multiple elements of C2’s claim on 23 January 2026, on the basis that the allegations made were out of time or had no reasonable prospect of success. A final hearing was scheduled on 14 April 2026. but that hearing date has also since been vacated and has not been relisted.

(iii) a claim against D4 (St Paul’s) brought in July 2025. The claim relates in broad terms to allegations about some specific events in 2025, including: (i) an alleged refusal to enrol C1 (ii) a decision to put C1 on a reduced timetable; and (iii) decisions around behaviour management, including the September 2025 exclusion decision. By an order dated 16 October 2025, various elements of the claim have been struck out by the FTT as having no reasonable prospect of success. A final hearing was scheduled on 14 May 2026, but that hearing date has also since been vacated and has not been relisted. Judicial review claim

[63]C2 also brought a claim for judicial review claim (‘the JR claim’) in the Administrative Court against D5 (Claim No: AC-2025-LON-002995). That claim was brought by C2 as C1’s litigation friend and issued on 5 September 2025. It related in broad terms to alleged failures by D5 during 2025 to secure C1’s SEND provision as set out in his EHCP, to secure independent advocacy for him and to carry out a carer’s assessment for C2; and D5’s decisions around safeguarding, permanent exclusion and complaints made by C2. The JR claim also included claims of discrimination and harassment contrary to the EA 2010, breaches of various education and social care law statutory duties and breaches of rights under ECHR (specifically Articles 8 and 14 and Article 2 of Protocol 1). Damages were sought by way of remedy. C2 also sought interim relief.

[64]D2 and D4 were initially identified by C2 in the claim form as interested parties to the JR claim but they were discharged as interested parties by an order of Kirsty Brimelow KC on 27 November 2025, and C2’s application for interim relief was refused. Permission to bring the JR claim was then refused on the papers by Alan Bates KC on all the grounds on 13 April 2026, and at an oral renewal hearing by Stephen Midwinter KC, on 21 May 2026. An oral judgment was given at that hearing by Mr Midwinter, but an approved transcript is not available, and C2’s application for a transcript at public expense has not yet been determined. I have seen a note of the judgment prepared by D5’s solicitor who was in attendance, but it is not agreed by C2. It is plain from that note that Mr Midwinter determined that the claim in relation to EOTAS had become academic and that permission should not be granted in relation to the other parts of the claim.

Applications to strike out/summary judgment

[65]The defendants have filed detailed applications, grounds, witness evidence and skeleton arguments in support of their applications and made joint oral submission on their key grounds for seeking to strike out this claim. I am grateful to Counsel for the way they divided up their submissions to avoid unnecessary repetition and duplication. I am also grateful to all parties for accommodating my request that C2 be given an opportunity to respond to the points being made by Counsel in relation to each specific topic in turn, so as to make the hearing more manageable for all concerned, given the overall complexity of this claim and the breadth of the parties’ submissions.

[66]I do not propose to rehearse all the defendants’ submissions in full, but in summary, the multiple grounds for striking out the claim form and POC in this case can be grouped under several different heads: i) some parts of the claim are not within the jurisdiction of High Court at all – including all the claims brought under EA 2010, by reason of s. 114 EA 2010; ii) some parts of the claim are time-barred by statutory limitation periods, e.g. claims under EA 2010 and Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998) are subject to time-limits of 6 months and 12 months respectively by virtue of s.118(1) EA 2010 and s.7(5) HRA 1998 respectively; iii) some parts of the claim should be struck out as an abuse of process on the grounds of cause of action estoppel or issue estoppel in that the same claims have been previously determined or are due to be determined by another competent court/tribunal; reliance placed on Baldudak v. Matteo

[2024] EWHC 167

; iv) some allegations made in the POC do not amount to a legally recognised claim, such as claims for “stigmatisation”, which is not a recognised cause of action and common law duties of care which do not exist; v) some parts of the claim are inadequately pleaded in that the requisite elements of the claim are not pleaded, such as the elements of specific claims of “harassment” and “victimisation” under section 26 and 27 EA 2010, the requisite elements for a claim of misfeasance in public office as set out in Three Rivers DC v Bank of England

[2003] 2 AC 1

and the causation elements of the claims for damages for personal injury and clinical negligence. vi) some parts of the claim plead common law duties of care against multiple defendants who do not owe such duties to C1 or C2. vii) the claim includes claims for aggravated, exemplary and provisional damages in relation to which the required criteria are not met, and the Schedule of Damages includes heads of damage and sums claimed jointly against all 11 defendants totalling £1.84 million for which no proper justification is provided; reliance placed on case-law including Rookes v Barnard

[1964] AC 1129

and Appleton v Garrett [1996] PIQR Q1, and CPR 41.2. viii) overall, the allegations set out in the POC are unreasonably vague and incoherent, and POC as a whole is described as “so long, scattergun and prolix” as to be “incapable of meaningful reply” by the individual defendants applying proportionate cost and resource. ix) the claimants have also failed to comply with procedural rules which are intended to ensure a fair procedure including: failure to provide a concise statement of facts, as required by CPR 16.4(1)(a); failure to verify the statement of case by an appropriate statement of truth as required by CPR 22; failure to file the required medical evidence in support of the claims for personal injury and clinical negligence, under CPR PD 16.4.3. x) in relation to the remaining parts of the claim, even if the current drafting issues were addressed, and the facts are accepted as pleaded, it is contended that they have no real prospect of success: for example, there is a claim for misfeasance in public office which does not meet the Three Rivers threshold, and the HRA claims do not meet the requisite thresholds so as to give rise to claims, and the personal injury and clinical negligence claims brought by C2 on her own behalf, are bound to fail in light of the Supreme Court decision in Paul v Wolverhampton

[2024] UKSC 1

in relation to duties owed to ‘secondary victims’. xi) in relation to their submissions on proportionality and the overriding objective, the defendants also relied on the fact that many of them were public bodies so that any unrecovered costs, or indeed any damages if awarded, would be met from public funds.

[67]In the alternative, and for the same reasons, each of the defendants seeks summary judgment under CPR 24.3 in respect of those elements of the claim relating to them on the basis that claimants have no real prospect of succeeding, and there is no other compelling reason why the allegations made should be disposed of at trial.

[68]In addition to the joint submissions summarised above, Counsel for D9 highlighted its distinct status as not being a public body and so not owing any of the same statutory or common law educational or health duties to C1 or C2 as are alleged against the other defendants. D9, being the first defendant to make a strike out application, had asked the court to strike out the whole claim on the basis of the individual and cumulative reasons outlined above. In the alternative, D9 had attempted to assist the court and the claimants, by attaching a 20-page section of the Particular of Claim with sections struck through in red indicating the parts of the pleaded claim against D9 which it was submitted should be struck out as a minimum as they disclosed no reasonable cause of action (for the same reasons articulated above). The ‘struck-through’ sections amounted to approximately 14 out of the 20 pages. D9 also applied in the alternative to sever its claim from the others.

[69]It is apparent that this approach taken by D9 was based on an initial review of the POC by which D9 had identified a 20-page section [paragraphs 770-836] which appeared to include all the claims against D9. In fact, it is now plain from the submissions made by C2 and the various ‘matrix’ and ‘navigation’ documents which she has provided at various stages to the court and to the defendants, that the unusual structure of the POC means that many other joint and ‘global’ sections of the POC also applied to D9 and that she is seeking the full damages claim totaling £1.84 million against each defendant, jointly and severally, but expressly with no double recovery.

Claimants’ response

[70]C2 filed a number of documents in response to the defendants’ four applications which I have set out earlier in this judgment. I note that these documents were intended by C2 to be ‘navigation aids’ to assist the court. They all either repeat or seek to summarise, the same claims as are set out in the 300-page POC and annexes, or seek to present the same factual and legal claims in different formats, such as tables or diagrams including: i) A judicial ‘road-map’; ii) A multi-defendant causation map; iii) A strike out matrix; iv) A negligence and statutory duty matrix.

[71]As the court on a strike out application must consider the statements of case as they have been drafted, rather than any separate documents, this additional ‘explanatory material’ has not been of much assistance to the court. They do however demonstrate that even C2 has recognised that some additional explanatory material may be needed by anyone trying to navigate the complicated and interwoven nature of the claimants’ pleaded case.

[72]C2 also filed a succinct skeleton argument of 14 pages which helpfully summarised her response to the main points raised in the defendants’ applications. She then expanded on these points in her oral submissions. Again, I do not propose to rehearse all her responses in full, but I will summarise the key points in the following paragraphs. Her primary response to the majority of the points made about the form and content of the pleading, is that the POC do disclose reasonable grounds for bringing the claim and raise clear triable issues of fact arising from contemporaneous documentary evidence which should be determined at trial.

[73]In particular, C2 submits that this claim concerns a sequence of events involving multiple public bodies and professionals interacting in relation to C1’s safeguarding and welfare. Determining the respective roles and responsibilities of those different actors requires disclosure of contemporaneous records, witness evidence and expert evidence and as result, C2 submits that this claim is simply not suitable for determination on a strike out or summary judgment application.

[74]C2 plainly feels very strongly that the defendants should not have made these strike out applications, but should each have responded in full to the relevant parts of the POC applicable to them and made any pleading points in their defences or sought clarification under CPR 18, and then she could have applied, if necessary, to make any amendments to her statement of case.

[75]C2 did not respond to the specific jurisdiction issues relating to EA 2010 in her written responses and has not applied to amend her claim. In her oral submissions, she accepted in principle the effect of s. 114, EA 2010 in relation to a lack of jurisdiction, but she also maintained her primary submission that those parts of her claim relating to alleged breaches of EA 2010 formed part of the overall factual matrix of failings by all the defendants and it would be unjust and disproportionate to transfer them to the county court. She did accept in the alternative, that if the court did not accept her primary submission, those claims could be severed and transferred to the county court, rather than being struck out.

[76]C2 responded to the issue over the time limits relating to EA and HRA by saying that her pleaded claim involves a ‘continuing course of conduct’ so such time limits are not applicable, and she did not accept the defendants’ submission that this is not a statutory concept under the HRA. She contended that in any event there were good reasons to extend the time limits, given the cumulative and multifaceted nature of the defendants’ failings in this case.

[77]In relation to the concerns raised about the absence of any compliant medical evidence to support her claims, C2 contended that expert evidence requires permission of the court under CPR Part 35 and is ordinarily addressed at the case management stage. At this early stage, the claimants rely on contemporaneous medical and safeguarding records documenting the impact of the events on C1 and C2. In other words, C2 contends that the reports from the treating psychiatrists and other mental health clinicians in the large ‘medical evidence’ bundle filed following the POC are sufficient as ‘condition and prognosis’ reports and that expert evidence on breach of duty and causation in relation to the clinical negligence and personal injury claims will be filed at a later stage. She also submitted that the absence of expert evidence at this stage cannot justify striking out the claim and she placed reliance on the case of Mark v. Universal Coatings

[2018] EWHC 3206 (QB)

[78]In her skeleton argument, C2 disputed the applicability of the case of Paul v Wolverhampton

[2024] UKSC 1

relied on by D8 in relation to her own personal and clinical negligence claims. She submitted that Paul concerned “claims by secondary victims arising from sudden shocking events” and that her case is “materially different” as it concerns ‘cumulative and prolonged trauma arising from systemic institutional conduct…”. Having heard the defendants’ submissions on Paul, explaining that in fact it was not limited to secondary victims of sudden shocking events but those whose loved ones had died or suffered injury over long periods following negligent clinical misdiagnoses or treatment, C2 then submitted that she had in fact directly witnessed physical injury sustained by C1 but she was unable to tell the court where this was pleaded in her 300-page POC.

[79]In relation to the abuse of process/issue estoppel points, C2 strongly disputes that the FTT and JR proceedings involved all or any of the same causes of action and remedies that she is making in this case. In any event, she contended that the factual evidence underpinning all the claims was relevant to the cumulative nature of this case, and that in neither the FTT nor the JR claims could she recover the global damages for personal injury and other financial losses which she is seeking in this case. She also relied on the fact that the FTT claims were still ongoing.

[80]C2 did accept in response to a question from the court that the only claims relating to D1 and D2 related to actions taken in their roles as employees of the schools in question. However, she did not accept that this should determine whether they had been properly joined as separate parties.

[81]In her oral submissions in relation to the data protection and breach of confidence claims pleaded against D9, she accepted that she could not pursue a defamation claim (mentioned in her claim form) given the effect of CPR 53 to which she had been referred by Master Brown. She also accepted that one ‘record’ she was relying on in relation to her DPA and GDPR claims was not in fact a record held by D9, but a note of a verbal statement in an email.

[82]C2 has also repeatedly stated in the filed documents and in her oral submissions that she is a disabled litigant in person who has sought to comply with the Civil Procedure Rules and the court’s orders to the best of her ability. She does not accept that the POC are prolix and difficult to follow as she says that they are carefully ordered by each defendant and by each cause of action. She says that to the extent that any procedural or technical defect is identified by the defendants or the court in the pleadings, she would be willing to rectify it by promptly by amending her claim. She did not however explain why she had not made any application to amend the POC prior to this hearing, taking into account the directions given by Master Brown at the hearing in November 2025 before she served the POC, and the defendants’ applications.

[83]C2’s primary submission in response to all the applications is that all the claims she has made are fact-heavy and context dependent and that they turn on the factual disputes concerning the defendants’ conduct, motives and duties of care. She submits that her statement of case raises “serious, triable issues of fact and law in dispute that can only be properly determined by a judge at a full trial” and relied on Swain v Hillman and Three Rivers DC v Bank of England

[2001] UKHL 16

. She submits that the fact that the defendants have been able to identify the various discrete causes of action within the claim and bring their strike out applications must mean that the claim is capable of a meaningful response from each defendant and is not incapable of being pleaded to by way of a full defence.

[84]Overall, C2 contends that the defendants are simply seeking to avoid responding to all her detailed factual allegations and have made these applications in an attempt to prematurely dispose of the claim. In oral submissions she accepted the need for the court to consider the application of overriding objective but did not accept that this should result in her claim being struck out, as that was a draconian measure of absolute last resort which was not applicable in this case. She also relied on the case of Mark v UniversalCoatings in support of this point.

[85]C2 was also resistant to any suggestion of severance, as she considers the claims she has brought to be indivisible. The overall nature of the claim is pleaded at section A.1.i of the POC which states:

“the Claimants seek to rely on cumulative and inter-dependent causation and do not plead that any single Defendant’s acts were the sole cause of the harm suffered”

. Elsewhere in the multiple causation sections of the POC, reference is repeatedly made to a ‘single, indivisible, chain of causation’ by which it appears to be alleged that the actions of each of the defendants have made a material contribution, resulting in the psychiatric injury and consequential losses suffered by C1 and C2, for which the global sums of damages are claimed. For this reason, C2 wants all the claims to remain part of a single case in the High Court, including the claim against D9. As I have noted, she did however submit in the alternative that the EA 2010 claims should be severed and transferred to the county court, if the court concluded that the High Court had no jurisdiction.

Discussion and conclusions

[86]Although there are four separate strike out applications before the court, many of the points raised by the defendants are overlapping or very similar. I propose to consider the specific points raised about the different types of claims brought by the claimants in the POC, rather than considering the claims against each defendant separately. Finally, I will consider the cumulative effect of all the issues raised about the overall nature and form of this statement of case and the impact of any breaches of the CPR and determine what is an appropriate order to make on these applications having regard to the overriding objective.

Equality Act claims

[87]I will turn first to the claims for discrimination, harassment and victimisation brought under the EA 2010. The claimants have made such claims against each of the defendants.

[88]This type of claim made under EA 2010 must be brought in the County Court and the High Court does not have jurisdiction to hear such claims pursuant to section 114, EA 2010. (The only exception are some specific claims in relation to which the FTT has jurisdiction rather than the County Court, and judicial review proceedings). This lack of concurrent jurisdiction for such claims in the High Court was confirmed in case of Summers v Richmond LBC

[2018] EWHC 782 (Admin)

[89]The defendants’ witness evidence confirms that Master Brown explained this lack of High Court jurisdiction in relation to the EA 2010 claims to C2 at the CMC hearing before the POC were served, but she has persisted in her claims and made it clear that she does not want them transferred from the High Court.

[90]I am satisfied that the High Court has no jurisdiction to hear any of the claims brought by the claimants under EA 2010 and that it is appropriate for all these parts of the claim against all the defendants to be struck out.

Equality Act 2010 and Human Rights Act claims – time limits

[91]For completeness, I would add that in any event, I accept the defendants’ submission that any claims under EA 2010 are subject to a limitation period of six months under EA 2010. As the claim form was dated 17 September 2025 and issued on 18 September 2025, this time limit would apply to any EA 2010 claims based on facts prior to 17 March 2025 in any event.

[92]C2 sought to rely on the concept of a ‘continuing course of conduct involving systemic failures across multiple institutions’ and has pleaded a ‘last material act” relied upon against each defendant. This submission is based on section 118(6) EA 2010 which provides that for the purpose of the 6-month time limit which applies to these claims, “conduct extending over a period is to be treated as done at the end of the period”. The defendants dispute that this concept of ‘continuing conduct’ applies in this case. For completeness, even if the EA 2010 claims had not been struck out by reason of section 114, EA 2010, I do not accept that it is permissible to rely on this concept of continuing conduct in relation to a series of separate disciplinary decisions made by multiple defendants over a number of years to create an unbroken period of ‘conduct’ so as to bring them all within the statutory time limit. Although they all related to C1, I do not consider that the separate decisions made by four different schools and two community organisations over a period of 6 years amount to an extended course of conduct, so as to warrant an extension of the time limit under section 118 (6).

[93]I also accept that any claims brought under HRA 1998 must be brought within 12 months, under s.7(5) HRA 1998.As this claim was issued on 18 September 2025, this means any HRA 1998 claims based on facts prior to 17 September 2024, were brought outside the applicable time limits, and are also prima-facie time-barred.

[94]I do not accept that there is any equivalent statutory concept of “continuing course of conduct” in the HRA 1998 upon which the claimants can rely and I accept the defendants’ submission that the authority of O’Connor v Bar Standards Board

[2017] UKSC 78

, which related to a single disciplinary process, does not assist the claimants in this case where the claim is based on multiple decisions by different defendants.

[95]Finally, both these statutory time limits under EA 2010 and HRA 1998 are subject to the court’s discretion to extend time. Such discretion can be exercised where court considers it is ‘equitable’ to do so. Guidance on the approach to be taken on such an application under section 7(5) HRA was given by the Supreme Court in Rabone v Pennine Care NHS Trust

[2012] 2 AC 72

and I was referred to a recent case of Rafiq v Thurrock Borough Council

[2022] EWHC 584

(QB) in which it was applied. In this case, C2 submitted, in the alternative to her primary submission that the time limits did not apply, that the court should extend time on the basis that C1 was a child; both claimants’ disabilities and vulnerabilities; the ongoing nature of the conduct; and the absence of any ‘forensic prejudice’.

[96]I am not satisfied that C2’s pleaded case on limitation or her further submissions for this hearing lead to the conclusion that it would be equitable to allow a longer period to bring these claims than the statutory time limits in this case. In particular, I have taken into account that C2 has previously brought other complaints and tribunal claims relating to these issues within the relevant time frames despite her disabilities, so there would appear to be no good reason why she could not have brought these claims earlier. I also consider that to extend time would give rise to prejudice to the defendants facing these claims, when, as public bodies, they are entitled to rely on the statutory time limits, which were put in place as a matter of public policy. Most significantly, I have considered my assessment of the merits of all the various HRA claims relied on by the claimants, which I have set out in the next section of this judgment. Taking into account all these factors leads me to the conclusion that it would not be equitable to extend time in this case.

[97]In these circumstances, I have concluded that: i) any EA 2010 claims based on facts prior to 17 March 2025, even if not struck out under section 114, would be time-barred in any event; ii) all the claims made under the HRA 1998 relating to events which took place prior to 17 September 2024 against all the defendants are also time-barred and must be struck out.

Human Rights Act claims

[98]As I have considered the merits of these claims in reaching my conclusion that many of them will be time-barred, and for completeness in any event, I will now set out briefly my conclusions on the merits of the claims made against multiple defendants under HRA.

[99]The POC includes broadly drafted allegations of breaches of Articles 2, 3, 6, 8 and Article 14/Article 2 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The list of Articles relied on varies throughout the claim form and the POC with Articles 2 and 6 only appearing in some of the lists. For completeness, I will briefly address all these claims.

[100]In relation to Article 2 (right to life), this appears to be based on the bald factual assertion that C1 was at risk of serious self-harm between 2021 and 2026 and that multiple defendants failed to take reasonable operational measures within their powers to protect life. C1 is still alive, and even if the facts put forward by the claimant, are accepted, I am not satisfied that this claim meets the threshold for an Article 2 claim.

[101]Similarly in relation to the multiple claims under Article 3 (prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) even if the facts put forward by the claimants are accepted at face value, I am not satisfied that the factual allegations relied on meet the high thresholds established in the case law to engage this right. I have reviewed a sample of the numerous paragraphs in the POC identified by the defendants in which these claims are made, and they include specific examples including ‘repeated early pick-up requests’, ‘removal from classroom for questioning by head teacher’, ‘humiliation in front of peers’ and broad assertions such as “prolonged deprivation of education with known suicide risk”. None of these allegations of disciplinary action taken by individual schools or the local authority would properly engage Article 3, nor be sufficient to establish that it has been breached.

[102]The allegations in the POC in relation to Article 6 (right to a fair trial) do not identify in what respect the right to a fair hearing is engaged or breached. Although some documentary issues in relation to various school complaint processes are pleaded and there are references to “cumulative procedural unfairness contrary to Article 6” this part of the claim is simply not properly articulated nor made out on the facts. Furthermore, it is plain from the chronology I have summarised above that the claimants have had access to independent reviews and other tribunal and judicial review proceedings.

[103]The POC also includes numerous alleged breaches of Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) against multiple defendants. This claim appears to be based on factual allegations which are described in broad terms in the introduction section of the POC as “cumulative failures to safeguard, exclusionary practises, unfavourable conduct and stigmatising narratives” but all relate to actions taken by the various defendants in relation to C1 whilst in various school settings. It was established in the recent case of R (EBB) v Gorse Academies Trust

[2025] EWHC 1983 (Admin)

, that allegations about behaviour management in education settings like those made in the POC will not generally engage

Article 8 of the ECHR

. Having reviewed the case of Gorse, I am not satisfied that any of the allegations relied on in this claim would meet the threshold for an Article 8 claim.

[104]The claim also includes numerous allegations under Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) and Article 2 of Protocol 1 (right to education) of the ECHR (both alone and in combination with each other). These claims are all primarily based on allegations of discrimination which are either time-barred for the reasons set out above, and/or are the subject of the FTT proceedings based on the claims of discrimination at three schools arising out of the same facts. Furthermore, it has been clearly established in the case law that a right Article 2 of Protocol 1 does not secure admission to a specific school or access to specific special educational needs provision or that specific reasonable adjustments should be made.

[105]For all these reasons, I am also satisfied that on the basis of the case pleaded in the POC, the claimants have no reasonable grounds for bringing any of the claims under HRA, and the remaining claims which are not time-barred must be struck out in any event.

Stigmatisation and other unrecognised claims

[106]The POC includes numerous references to claims for stigmatisation against multiple defendants. This is not a recognised cause of action. To the extent that these parts of the claim appear to be an alternative way of pleading a claim for defamation, then the claim does not comply with CPR 53. The provisions of CPR 53 were brought to C2’s attention by Master Brown at the CMC and in the directions order, but once again, his directions do not appear to have been heeded. All the parts of the POC referring to stigmatisation must be struck out.

[107]The claim also includes various claims relating to records, and claims arising out of alleged verbal disclosures about C1. Verbal disclosures are not covered by GDPR/Data Protection 2018, so any claim pleaded on that basis must also be struck out.

Personal injury and clinical negligence claims

[108]The POC also includes claims for damages for personal injury in relation to C1 and C2 against all the defendants and a claim for clinical negligence in relation to C1 and C2 against D8. Two specific concerns are raised by the defendants in relation to these claims: first, the lack of any compliant medical evidence in support of the claims in relation to condition or causation, and second, the position of C2 as a secondary victim, in light of the Supreme Court decision in Paul. The defendants have also challenged the overall merits of the claimants’ pleaded case.

[109]I will deal with the medical evidence point briefly. As was highlighted by Master Brown in his directions order, there are very strict procedural requirements for statements of case in personal injury cases, as set out in CPR 16 and PD 16. PD 16, 4.3 states “where the claimant is relying on evidence from a medical practitioner, the claimant must attach a report from the medical practitioner about the claimant’s personal injuries.” However, in the case of Mark v. Universal Coatings

[2018] EWHC 3206 (QB)

, which I brought to the parties’ attention during the hearing, the court held that PD 16.4 does not fall within the category of the type of rule or practice direction to which the implied relief from sanction doctrine should be applied or which would, in itself, warrant a strike out order for non-compliance.

[110]In this case, although the bundle of ‘medical evidence’ does not contain any Part 35 compliant expert medical reports, it does contain relatively recent reports from treating psychiatrists who have assessed C1 and C2 and provide a diagnosis and recommendations for treatment.

[111]In all these circumstances, I do not consider that the claimants’ failure to serve medical reports in compliance with PD 16.4 is a breach of the rules that would be sufficiently serious to warrant striking out the claim under CPR 3.4 (c) on that basis alone.

[112]Furthermore, I also accept C2’s submission that that there is no requirement on a claimant to serve expert medical evidence in relation to causation in respect of either the personal injury or clinical negligence claims with the initial statement of case. Such evidence is usually served by the parties in accordance with directions given by the court at a CMC following the close of pleadings. That said, most claimants would usually base their pleaded case in relation to breach of duty and causation on expert evidence, although disclosure of the underlying expert report would not be required with the POC. I will return to the separate issue raised about the deficiencies in the claimants’ pleaded statement of case in due course.

[113]I now turn to the issue arising out of the Supreme Court decision in Paul and the impact on C2’s claim in this case for damages in relation to her own personal injuries. It appears from my reading of the POC that she seeks to bring such a claim as a secondary victim against all the defendants, on the basis of their cumulative breaches of statutory and common law duties towards C1. Indeed, she states at A3.a in the Introduction section of the POC (with my underlining):

“C2 Experiences psychiatric injury and psychosomatic pain arising from secondary trauma associated with living with and responding to C1's traumatic experiences in educational settings between 2021 and 2025.”

[114]However, I also note that in the same section and elsewhere in the POC, C2 claims that she: “has sustained psychiatric injury, reputational harm and economic loss arising from the defendants’ misconduct towards C1 and from acts and omissions directed towards C2 as his parent and carer;” and that she brings claims in her own right as a ‘direct victim’ of the defendants’ ongoing breaches.

[115]In short, C2 makes numerous allegations in the POC relating to her own claims for damages for psychiatric injuries and consequential losses, which are pleaded in slightly different ways across the 300-page POC. However, the common thread is that they are all pleaded as having arisen out of the impact on C2 of having to manage and deal with the harm she alleges has been suffered by C1 due to the alleged breaches of duty by all the defendants and the clinical negligence of D8.

[116]Paul is a recent decision of the Supreme Court which rejected claims for damages for psychiatric injury made by secondary victims in three clinical negligence cases. The starting point in any negligence claim is that a claimant must establish an independent duty owed to them by the defendant under ordinary negligence principles (namely, foreseeability, proximity and whether it is fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty). In Paul, the Supreme Court considered the previous authorities in relation to secondary victims including McCloughlin v. O’Brien

[1983] 1 AC 410

and Alcock v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police

[1992] 1 AC 310

and refused to extend the scope of allowable claims by secondary victims. The effect of the decision is that a person who has suffered psychiatric injury from witnessing the death of a close relative, or its immediate aftermath, from a medical condition which a doctor or health authority had negligently failed to diagnose and treat, is not entitled to claim damages as a secondary victim. The court also held that a doctor's duty of care did not extend to protecting members of a patient's close family from exposure to the traumatic experience of witnessing the death or manifestation of disease in their relative.

[117]As Mr Trusted explained to the court, it was primarily a policy-based decision by the Supreme Court, which recognised the need for there to be some limit on the categories of eligible secondary victims, so the court did not agree to extend the categories identified in previous cases to include the close family members in the Paul cases who had witnessed the suffering of their relatives. I am satisfied having carefully reviewed the decision in Paul that it does support the defendants’ submissions in relation to the claims of personal injury and clinical negligence on the part of C2 which in substance arise out of alleged primary breaches of duty to C1. Whilst Paul was concerned with whether doctors owe a duty to family members, I also consider that to the extent that any of the other defendants were under a statutory duty to C1 which could give arguably rise to a common law duty of care (which is not accepted by the defendants), they were not under an independent direct duty to prevent consequential psychiatric injuries or consequential losses to C2 as his mother and carer. C2 was not able to refer me to any authority supporting such a proposition.

[118]As I have noted above, it was plain from her skeleton argument and initial oral submissions that C2 had fundamentally misunderstood the decision in Paul and thought it could be distinguished from her case. When challenged by the defendants’ counsel and taken to the decision itself, she then changed her submissions and sought to argue for the first time that her claim as a secondary victim was based on being a witness of a traumatic event, in the form of C1’s suicide attempts. She was not however able to confirm where this was pleaded in the POC, and I do not accept that this is the way her claim for damages has been put.

[119]For the reasons I have summarised, I am satisfied that C2’s claim for damages for psychiatric illness and consequential losses on the basis of clinical negligence against D8 and her claims for personal injury as a secondary victim due to any alleged negligence or breach of statutory duty, should be struck out under CPR 3.4(a) on the basis that she has no reasonable grounds for bringing these parts of her claim.

Misfeasance in public office

[120]The POC includes claims for misfeasance in public office against many of the defendants. Ms Elliot identified a non-exhaustive list of examples of the pleading of this cause of action, at paragraphs 214, 260, 316, 497, 560, 638, 848 of the POC. This includes a pleaded claim against D9, whose employees and volunteers do not hold public office and so do not come within the scope of this tort.

[121]There is a high threshold for a claim of this nature, and the relevant test is set down in the case of Three Rivers DC v Bank of England

[2003] 2 AC 1

. In short, the court made clear in that case that the tort of misfeasance in public office involves an element of bad faith, and arises either when a public officer exercises their power specifically intending to injure a claimant (targeted malice) or when they act in the knowledge of, or with reckless indifference to, the illegality of their act and in the knowledge of, or with reckless indifference to, the probability of causing injury to the claimant or persons of a class of which the claimant was a member. The court also concluded that subjective recklessness, in the sense of not caring whether the act was illegal or whether the consequences happened was sufficient, that a deliberate omission involving an actual decision not to act might also give rise to liability; and that only losses which had been foreseen by the public officer as a probable consequence of their act were recoverable.

[122]I am satisfied that the claimants in this case have failed to properly identify all the requisite ingredients of a claim for misfeasance in public office in the POC against all the defendants, and in particular, the motive and knowledge elements and whether targeted or untargeted malice is relied upon. The POC includes allegations of intent, knowledge and recklessness in the alternative in some places and the specific abuses of power relied on to maintain this very serious claim are not clear.

[123]Furthermore, I am satisfied that even if the pleadings were amended to correct these shortcomings, and the version of facts relied on by the claimants were accepted, these claims are bound to fail on the basis of those pleaded facts when the appropriate Three Rivers test is applied, whether in relation to targeted or untargeted malice. The alleged actions taken by the various defendants in terms of disciplinary action taken by schools or youth centres and their employees in relation to C1 do not fall into the category of targeted or untargeted unlawful acts or abuses of power by public officers that could have any real prospect of being considered by a court to come within this scope of this tort.

[124]For these reasons, I have reached the conclusion that the claims against each defendant in relation to misfeasance in public office should be struck out under CPR 3.4 (a).

Education claims – multiple defendants

[125]The claim includes allegations of a failure to secure the provision set out in Section F of the C1’s EHCP against D1-D7 and D10.

[126]I accept the defendants’ submissions that the statutory duty to secure such education provision, which arises under s.42 of the Children and Families Act 2014, only lies with D5 as the relevant local education authority and not with any of the other named defendants. D5 accepts in principle that it would be vicariously liable for the actions of others in this regard, so there is no need or justification to joining all the other named defendants, and in particular the individual defendants including D1, D2 and D10.

[127]The POC also includes other allegations against multiple defendants in respect of other EHCP related matters which are also misplaced. To the extent that all these allegations against defendants other than D5 which are pleaded under any duty in relation to the content or provision of C1’s EHCP which does not apply to them can be identified in the POC, I direct that they should be struck out as they have no basis in law.

[128]I will return to the broader pleading points in relation to these claims in due course.

Damages

[129]The POC includes claims for aggravated, exemplary and provisional damages in addition to damages for personal injury and financial losses. On the basis of the underlying facts set out in the claimants’ pleaded case in relation to the actions taken by the various defendants in relation to C1 and C2, I do not consider that there are reasonable grounds for bringing any of these claims, having regard to the required criteria for each type of damages.

Abuse of Process – cause of action and issue estoppel

[130]As I have outlined, in their written applications, the defendants have sought to argue that all or part of this claim should be struck out on the basis of cause of action or issue estoppel.

[131]Turning first to the judicial review claim, I have carefully reviewed the available material relating to this claim in the bundle, including the claim form and statement of case, and the permission decisions.

[132]I am satisfied that the judicial review claim encompassed a broad public law claim against D5 in relation to its alleged failures in terms of its duties as an education authority towards C1, and many of the same heads of claim were relied on as are pleaded in this claim. It also included a claim for a direction for D5 to provide EOTAS (which is repeated as a remedy sought in this claim) and a claim for damages.

[133]I have carefully considered the case of Baldudak v. Matteo to which I was referred, which was a recent case in which questions of issue estoppel arose in relation to previous proceedings between the same parties. Issue estoppel arises where the court’s finding on a particular issue involving the same parties was essential to the final resolution of the proceedings in which the finding was made, even if the later proceedings concern a different cause of action. In short, it means that a party is not entitled to advance an argument of fact which conflicts with a court’s determination of the same issue in earlier proceedings between the same parties, where the determination of that fact was an ingredient or a necessary part of that party’s cause of action or defence.

[134]The judicial review proceedings did not progress beyond the permission stage, following the refusal of permission at the oral renewal hearing on 21 May 2026 on all the claimant’s grounds by Mr Midwinter. In those circumstances, there were no findings of fact, so I do not consider that issue estoppel arises in relation to any factual findings raised in the judicial review claim.

[135]The defendants also rely on cause of action estoppel (previously known as res judicata) in relation to the judicial review claim. This principle is based on the fact that a party may not reopen a matter that has already been determined in earlier proceedings. Cause of action estoppel involves the same party seeking to re-litigate the same cause of action and serves as an absolute bar to a later claim, save for an instance of fraud. It does not depend on particular findings on a particular issue. In this case, the defendants contend that many of the claims in the POC are based on alleged public law duties owed to C1 in relation to his education rights, in relation to which the claimants have already brought a separate judicial review claim against D5 relying on the actions of D2, D4 and D5. Those defendants contend that it is an abuse to allow the claimants to relitigate the same issues, when a court has already concluded that they have no arguable grounds for bringing such a claim. C2 disputed these submissions, relying on the different private law causes of action and remedies sought in this claim.

[136]I consider that the defendants’ submission is well-founded in relation to the claims for breaches of public law duties made against D5, D2 and D4. The claim form in the judicial review claim includes the same broad concerns about the actions and decisions of D2, D4 and D5 in relation to C1 in 2025 as those relied on in the POC and includes the same causes of action in terms of breaches of education law statutory duties, failure to act/abuse of power, discrimination and harassment contrary to the EA 2010, and breaches of rights under ECHR (specifically Articles 8 and 14 and Article 2 of Protocol 1). It is plain from the note of Mr Midwinter’s oral judgment, that he considered whether there were any arguable grounds for challenging the lawfulness of D5’s decisions and concluded that there were not. I accept the thrust of this note, as such findings would have been necessary for a final decision on permission to be made.

[137]To the extent that the claimants are seeking to bring the same public law claims against D2, D4 or D5 in relation to the period between February and September 2025 in the current claim, I consider that those parts of the claim should be struck out as an abuse of the court’s process under CPR 3.4(b) on the grounds that another judge in the High Court has already reached a determination on the merits of that part of the claim.

(a) FTT claims

[138]I have already outlined the three ongoing FTT cases brought by C2 in relation to claims of discrimination, harassment and victimisation against D3, D4 and D7. As at the date of the hearing on 1 July 2026, Counsel confirmed that contrary to the parties’ expectations, none of the FTT claims have yet been heard. It follows that as no findings have been made in those claims, there can be no issue estoppel in relation to any specific findings.

[139]The defendants submitted in the alternative, that if necessary, the parts of this claim arising out of the same factual allegations of discrimination which form the basis of the HRA claims under Article 14 should be stayed pending the outcome of those FTT claims. I accept that there is significant duplication in the factual basis for these claims, although the remedies sought by the claimants are different. For the reasons which follow, I do not consider it necessary to stay this claim to await the outcome of those claims.

Particulars of Claim as a statement of case

[140]Having ruled on the most significant specific issues relating to causes of action and pleading requirements raised by the defendants, I now turn to the overarching concern raised by all the defendants about the claimants’ statement of case, in the form of the 250-page POC and 48 pages of annexes. As should be apparent from the contents of this judgment so far, the specific issues raised by the defendants are illustrative rather than exhaustive in terms of the challenges presented by the POC in this case.

[141]CPR 16.4 sets out the requirement that the particulars of claim must include a concise statement of the facts on which the claimant relies. PD 16, paragraph 1.3 states that if the particulars of claim exceed 25 pages (excluding schedules) an appropriate short summary must also be filed and served. This gives an indication as to the anticipated length of the POC.

[142]The case of Hague Plant Limited v. Hague

[2014] EWCA Civ 1609

is referred to in the notes to CPR 16.4 in the White Book 2026 at 16.4.1. The case is helpfully summarised as follows: “the claimant sought permission to amend its 12-page particulars of claim into a document which did not include a concise statement of the facts relied on, but instead amounted to a rambling and extensive (65 page) history of the alleged misdeeds of the defendants and the evidence the claimant wished to present at trial. Permission to amend was refused mainly on the ground that, taken as a whole, the draft pleading was disproportionate in the sense that it would not lead to the litigation being conducted at proportionate cost and would lead to further extensive judicial time being expended at the expense of other litigants. That decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal. The draft amendments obscured, rather than clarified, the claim and so would not have assisted the court to achieve the overriding objective of “dealing with the case justly and at proportionate cost”.

[143]Whilst that case concerned an application to amend, I consider that the conclusions reached by Lord Justice Briggs are equally relevant to an initial statement of case. In his judgment, he referred to the case of McPhilemy v Times Newspapers

[1999] 3 All ER 775

in which Lord Woolf, then Master of the Rolls, stated “As well as their expense, excessive particulars can achieve directly the opposite result from that which is intended. They can obscure the issues rather than providing clarification.”

[144]C2 was expressly referred by Master Brown to CPR 16 and PD 16. The POC filed by the claimants in this case does not comply with CPR 16. It does not contain a concise statement of the facts on which the claimants rely. Instead, despite what may have been C2’s best intentions, the POC is a 300-page typed document comprising 1009 paragraphs, which is extremely difficult to navigate. Even if the parts of POC which I have already ruled must be struck out were to be removed, I estimate that it would still amount to 120-150 pages. This is in part because it is structured in such a way that the initial sections A-L, which are intended to be cross-cutting, comprise some 50 pages, before the 150-page section M even begins. Section M then sets out multiple causes of action separately in slightly different terms by each claimant, against each defendant, so as to combine 22 separate claims, each made up of 6-7 different causes of action. The next 50 pages (Sections N to R) are again cross-cutting and include sections on loss, damage and remedies, and the final 50-odd pages contain six annexes. The POC is then supported by a separate 15-page quantum bundle and 574-page bundle of medical evidence.

[145]Whilst this court is familiar with lengthy pleadings in some complex commercial matters, or claims which involve multiple defendants, the POC in this case is by any measurement an extraordinary document. As will be apparent from the matters I have already addressed, it purports to include multiple inter-independent causes of action against 11 different defendants in such a way as to amount to a cumulative claim for damages against all the defendants jointly in the sum of some £1.8 million. The complexities of the presentation of this claim are amply illustrated by the various ‘matrix’ and ‘judge navigation’ documents, and indeed the ‘judicial road-map’ at the start of the POC (which may have been intended to provide the ‘summary’ required by PD 16, 1.3 to which I have referred). Far from assisting the court or the defendants, these documents simply serve to highlight the repetitious, needlessly prolix, confusing and scattergun nature of the POC.

[146]Fundamentally, standing back from all the separate submissions made by the individual defendants in relation to specific causes of action said to form part of this claim, which I have already addressed, I have reached the conclusion that the real problem with the POC is the nature of the claim itself.

[147]C2 has arrived at the pleading in this case by seeking to knit together the many separate incidents relating to C1 involving the actions of 11 defendants over a period of about 6 years and multiple different causes of action into a coherent whole. In my opinion, the nature of the pleaded claim is fundamentally misconceived in seeking to recover a global sum of damages for C1 and C2 on a ‘cumulative and inter-dependent basis’ against these 11 defendants. The result of this approach is that the remaining parts of the claim which I have not ruled should be struck out, are broadly made up of various allegations of negligence and breach of statutory duty against multiple defendants. None of these claims meet the basic pleading requirements of establishing the scope of the duty owed, and the specific breach of duty and causation in relation to the type of damage. I have also reached the conclusion that the way they have been pleaded in the POC means that it is almost impossible for the defendants to know what case they each have to meet and it is certainly not possible for them to respond in a way which is proportionate or cost-effective in line with the overriding objective.

[148]In these circumstances, for all the reasons outlined above, I do not consider that the claimants have reasonable grounds for bringing their pleaded claim. This is a clear example of a case in which to allow the continuance of these proceedings beyond this point would be without any possible benefit to the claimants and would waste resources on both sides and be an inappropriate use of the court’s resources.

[149]In addition, I reject C2’s suggestion that these applications are premature and I accept the submissions of all the defendants in this case that to require them to respond to each and every one of the remaining paragraphs pleaded in the POC which is relevant to them, would be wholly disproportionate and not in line with the overriding objective for the reasons I have outlined.

[150]I have already concluded that there has been a very significant breach of CPR 16.4 in this case. This provides an additional ground for a strike out application in relation to the POC in accordance with 3.4(c).

[151]I fully recognise that striking out a statement of case for a breach of the rules should be a case management action of last resort and I have considered long and hard as to whether there is any way in which the court should allow even part of this claim to be taken forward in its current form or by allowing amendments. I have come to conclusion that there is not, primarily because of my conclusions about its underlying merits. C2 has made it clear that she regards the different parts of this claim and the role of the multiple defendants in it as wholly inter-dependent. Since receiving the multiple applications to strike out her claim, she has made no specific application to amend any part of it and resisted any suggestion of severing any parts of it prior to the hearing. Furthermore, the way that the POC is drafted would make any attempt to sever the claims within it a fruitless task, as so much of the pleaded case is cross-cutting.

[152]The only part of the claim which is of a slightly different nature to the others, is the clinical negligence claim made on behalf of C1 alone against D8 in relation to the mental health services he has received. This claim has not been the subject of any previous proceedings and would, in principle, have some proper legal basis. I have considered carefully whether it would be appropriate to sever that part of the claim, but after careful review of the relevant sections of the POC I do not consider that it has a reasonable prospect of succeeding on the basis of C1’s pleaded case. It does not include the basic requirements for such a clinical negligence claim, including specific dates and times of treatment, expert-informed particulars of negligence and causation, together with appropriate medical evidence. Even though, for the reasons I have already outlined, the claimants may not yet be under a duty to disclose any expert liability evidence in relation to breach or causation, this does not mean that a clinical negligence claim can be allowed to proceed which is based solely on bald allegations of negligence and conjecture.

[153]C1 is still a child, so there is no immediate concern in relation to limitation, and it will be for a future court, taking into account the contents of this judgment, to determine if any new properly pleaded claim against D8 should be allowed to proceed, in the event that the claimants were able to secure the support of a suitably qualified liability expert. This decision should not be taken as a bar to such a course of action, nor as any encouragement for it.

[154]For all the reasons outlined above, I direct that the entire Particulars of Claim in this case is struck out under CPR 3.4 and the claim is dismissed against all the defendants.

[155]In these circumstances, no further directions are needed in relation to any of the secondary issues raised by the defendants and no further hearing is required in relation to D11.

[156]Finally, nothing in this judgment is intended to minimise the challenges faced by C2 in her day-to-day role as a mother and carer for C1. I note that Mr Midwinter encouraged the parties to adopt a more positive and collaborative approach to addressing C1’s future needs rather than engaging in litigation. I can only echo his sentiments. Post-script

[157]Following preparation of this judgment, an embargoed draft was sent to the parties and their legal representatives in the usual way to provide an opportunity for them to make suggestions for the correction of obvious errors, including any typographical errors. The claimants responded with a 16-page document containing 11 minor typographical errors and 49 other detailed suggestions for redrafting sections of the judgment. The defendants provided a joint response comprising a 2-page list of 23 typographical or minor factual corrections. I have considered all the suggested corrections and made the changes I consider appropriate and necessary.

[158]The parties have also made submissions in writing in relation to costs and the terms of the final order. A final order reflecting the court’s decisions in relation to costs will follow in due course.