Perseus Ventures Limited v David Foskett & Ors [2026] EWHC 2008 (KB)

[2026] EWHC 2008 (KB)Case No KB-2024-001774
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 31/07/2026
Before
MR JUSTICE DEXTER DIAS
Between
(1) DAVID FOSKETTDefendants / Respondents(2) RICHARD ALFORDRespondent(3) EMMA LOUISE ATKINSONRespondent(4) JOHN DUFFYRespondent(5) BARCLAYS BANK UK PLCRespondent
Graham Smith (direct access) for claimant/applicantJames McWilliams (instructed by Addleshaw Goddard LLP) for defendants/respondentsHearing Hearing dates: 17 June 2026(Judgment circulated in draft: 28 July 2026)
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 11.00 am on 31 July 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.MR JUSTICE DEXTER DIASTable of Contents I. Introduction 1 II. Issues 2 III. Law 2 IV. Facts 4 V. Issue 1: Jurisdiction 6 VI. Issue 2: June application 11 VII. Issue 3: October application 14 VIII. Issue 4: The ECRO 14 IX. Issue 5: Costs 19 X. Disposal 21Mr Justice Dexter Dias :
[1]This is the judgment of the court.[2]To assist the parties and the public to follow the main lines of the court’s reasoning, the text is divided into ten sections, as set out in the table of contents above. The table is hyperlinked to aid swift navigation.

I. Introduction

[3]This is an application to vary or set aside the order of Soole J made on 17 December 2025 in dismissing two applications before him (“the Soole order”) and certifying each application as totally without merit. The applicant also seeks to discharge the extended civil restraint order (“ECRO”) Soole J made at the same time.[4]The applicant in this hearing is Perseus Ventures Limited (“Perseus”), a company registered in the British Virgin Islands. Proceedings have been actively pursued by Martin Walsh acting on behalf of Perseus. He owns the company and is its director. When proceedings were before Freedman J in July 2024, the judge was satisfied that it was appropriate to grant Mr Walsh rights of audience on behalf of Perseus ([2024] EWHC 2120 KB). Many of the documents that have been filed in these proceedings have been authored by Martin Walsh and circulated by him. At the hearing before me, he instructed counsel Mr Smith.[5]The defendants and respondents are as listed above. Mr Foskett and Mr Alford are receivers, being senior partners of Coppice Joyce Limited (“the Receivers”). Addleshaw Goddard LLP (“Addleshaw Goddard”) is the solicitors firm acting for the Receivers. Two of its lawyers are joined: Emma Atkinson and John Duffy. Barclays (“the Bank”) provided the claimant with credit facilities. The respondents are represented by Mr McWilliams of counsel. The court is grateful to both counsel for their submissions.[6]I have read the documentation the parties signposted to the court. In particular, I have read and re-read what Martin Walsh calls Appendix X. It is a ten-page “intelligence report” by an organisation called Intelligence UK Investigations Limited (“IUKIL”). It was clarified at the oral hearing that Martin Walsh is a director of IUKIL. He calls the document the “crucial evidence” in the claim and the claimant’s “most important evidence”. He has criticised other judges for not reading it or referring to it. I make no finding about whether that is or is not true. Along with all the other material the applicant relies on, the report has been fully considered for this hearing, together with, for example, with IUKIL’s five-page legal analysis of the grounds for setting aside an order which is “void or voidable”. Although Mr Walsh did not attend the hearing, other members of IUKIL attended the hearing and took notes. They were perfectly entitled to and conducted themselves with decorum.[7]As noted, the Soole order has two relevant elements: i) It dismissed the applicant’s applications dated 26 June 2025 and 8 October 2025, and certified them as totally without merit; ii) It made an extended civil restraint order (“ECRO”) against the applicant company.

II. Issues

[8]The issues for determination are: i) Whether Master Brown had jurisdiction to make the orders he granted on 5 June 2025. ii) Whether to vary/set aside the Soole order in respect of the June application. iii) Whether to vary/set aside the Soole order in respect of the October application. iv) Whether the ECRO should be discharged. v) What costs order, if any, should be granted.

III. Law

[9]Where under CPR 23.8, an order is made without a hearing, as Soole J made an order on the papers here, the affected party may apply to have the order varied or set aside under CPR 23.8(3).[10]The application proceeds by way of a rehearing (Wintermute Trading Limited v Terraform Labs Pte Limited [2024] EWHC 141 (KB), per Lavender J, paras 34-35). The court may have due regard to the original decision, and will look for good reason if departing from it (R (Kuznetsov) v London Borough of Camden [2019] EWHC 3910 (Admin) (“Kuznetsov”), once more per Lavender J, para 24). Therefore, the original order, while not determinative, carries weight and is not irrelevant. How much weight it carries is entirely fact-dependent.[11]The court has powers to restrain access to the court process in cases of persistent conduct by a party that results in applications being certified as totally without merit. One such mode of restraint is an ECRO. The question is whether the offending party has persistently issued claims or has made applications which are totally without merit. CPR PD3C says at para 3.1 (emphasis provided):
“Extended civil restraint orders 3.1 An extended civil restraint order may be made by – (1) a judge of the Court of Appeal; (2) a judge of the High Court; or (3) a Designated Civil Judge or their appointed deputy in the County Court, where a party has persistently issued claims or made applications which are totally without merit. 3.2 Unless the court otherwise orders, where the court makes an extended civil restraint order, the party against whom the order is made – (1) will be restrained from issuing claims or making applications in – (a) any court if the order has been made by a judge of the Court of Appeal; (b) the High Court or the County Court if the order has been made by a judge of the High Court.”
[12]Being certified totally without merit is an evaluative judgment, and includes situations where no rational argument could be raised (R (Wasif) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] 1 WLR 2793 (CA) (“Wasif”)). As the Court of Appeal said at paras 15:
“There are indeed cases in which the judge considering an application for permission to apply for judicial review can see no rational basis on which the claim could succeed: these are in our view the cases referred to in the Grace case as “bound to fail” (or “hopeless”).”
[13]The Court of Appeal provided guidance, albeit in the context of judicial review, about the level of detail required when a judge makes a totally without merit certification following refusal of permission. The court said at para 21:
“There is a further point about reasons in TWM cases. It is in our view important in principle that the judge gives reasons for the TWM certification separately from the reasons for refusing permission. We acknowledge that since the difference between the two thresholds is one of degree it may be that all that can be said in many or most cases is something to the effect of “I consider the application is totally without merit: my reasons are those already given above”
. But even saying that much is a valuable discipline because it reminds the judge that the exercises are distinct. And there will be some cases where it is possible to identify a particular reason which the judge regards as taking the claim over the TWM threshold.” IV. Facts

IV. Facts

[14]The origins of these proceedings can be traced back to 2006 when Martin Walsh granted a legal charge over a property at 94 Rope Street, Surrey Quays (“the property”), London in favour of Barclays Private Bank Limited. After an institutional reorganisation, the bank became Barclays Bank plc (“the Bank”). Barclays in turn became the registered proprietor of the charge. In 2008, Mr Walsh transferred the legal title of the property to Perseus for no consideration. The chronology is taken up by Freedman J at paras 9-10 of his judgment:
“9. …By a facility letter dated 27th July 2011 the Bank offered the claimant a further loan facility of £600,000 so as to refinance a 2006 facility which had by then expired. 10. By a personal guarantee dated 9th December 2011 Mr. Walsh personally guaranteed the repayment obligations of the claimant to the Bank under a term loan to the Bank. That guarantee was in consideration of the Bank giving or continuing to give time credit and/or banking facilities and accommodation to the client. It was also intended, as is stated in the guarantee, that it would take effect as a deed. It was signed as a deed by Mr. Walsh. It was a continuing guarantee as per paragraph 4.1 and extended to the ultimate balance of the guaranteed amounts and to performance in full of any obligations guaranteed. The guarantee was in respect of time credit and/or banking facilities and accommodation to the client. “The client” meant the claimant. The guarantee was repayable on demand.”
[15]In 2017 the Bank sent letters of demand to Perseus qua borrower and Mr Walsh qua guarantor demanding repaying of the outstanding sum, specified as being £457,349.85. With no compliance, the Bank appointed the Receivers. They endeavoured to sell the property. However, there were complications. These included the registration of a unilateral notice in favour of another company (White Mid Sloan Limited) and occupants disinclined to vacate. The Receivers ultimately gained possession in September 2023.[16]In November 2023, the applicant made an application for pre-issue disclosure. It was struck out by Cotter J on 15 December 2023. On 16 December 2023, the applicant applied to set aside Cotter J’s order and made a series of further applications. They were dismissed by Collins-Rice J on 3 May 2024.[17]On 4 June 2024, the applicant issued Part 8 proceedings. It alleged a conspiracy between the Receivers who functioned as “agents” of the Bank and solicitors at Addleshaw Goddard. A series of grave allegations were made. Further applications for interim declarations and further information pursuant to Part 18 were made. They were dismissed by Freedman J (judgment 8 July 2024; order 23 July 2024). He prohibited further applications by the applicant under Part 18 or for disclosure before the close of pleadings.[18]5 September 2024 saw the sale of the property. On 26 September 2024, following the end of the prohibition, the applicant began making further applications. The application for standard disclosure and further and better particulars was listed before HHJ Pearce, but adjourned as the applicant was absent and not represented. The respondents applied to strike out the claim and for security for costs.[19]The case came on for CMC on 5 June 2025 before Master Brown. In his order (“the Brown order”), he dismissed the application for further information as totally without merit; struck out the part of the claim implicating the Receivers in a “conspiracy”; struck out the claim against the solicitors and the Bank as defendants; imposed unless orders for what remained of the claim with conditions of paying outstanding orders for costs and court fees and required provision of security for costs.[20]The applicant failed to comply. Therefore, the claim stood struck out as at 4 pm, 24 June 2025.[21]The applicant did not appeal the Brown order, nor did it seek relief from sanctions. Instead, on 26 June 2025 (“the June application”) it applied for a series of orders, including that the orders of HHJ Pearce and Master Brown were void and there should be summary judgment in favour of Perseus.[22]The applicant sent a letter dated 30 June 2025. Its contents were considered on the papers by Murray J. By an order dated 18 August 2025 (“the Murray order”), Murray J dismissed the application as totally without merit, noting that the claim stood struck out.[23]On 21 August 2025, the respondents applied for an ECRO. Bennathan J considered the application on the papers on 2 October 2025. He dismissed the respondents’ application.[24]On 8 October 2025, the applicant made a further application: now to vary Bennathan J’s order, for trial of a preliminary issue and for interim payment (“the October application”).[25]The June and October applications were considered by Soole J on the papers on 17 December 2025. They were dismissed. An ECRO was granted. Although Soole J identified five previous totally without merit certifications, in fairness to the applicant, and because he recognised an overlap between two of them, he proceeded on the basis of four previous totally without merit certifications (ECRO reasons, para 7).[26]By virtue of the ECRO, the applicant was prohibited from making applications in the proceedings save for applying to vary or set aside the Soole order and/or discharge the ECRO.[27]Discontent with the orders of Soole J, on 6 January 2026 the applicant filed to set aside the Soole order and discharge the ECRO.

V. Issue 1: Jurisdiction

[28]The applicant submits that orders made by Master Brown are void as they were made in relation to “a subject matter that falls outside a Master’s jurisdiction by reason of PD2B”. Two paragraphs within PD2B are relevant:
“1.1 Rule 2.4 provides that Judges, Masters and District Judges may exercise any function of the court except where an enactment, rule or practice direction provides otherwise. In respect of proceedings in the High Court, Section II of this Practice Direction sets out the matters over which Masters or District Judges do not have jurisdiction or which they may deal with only on certain conditions. 3.1 A Master or District Judge may not make orders or grant interim remedies- (a) relating to the liberty of the subject; (b) relating to criminal proceedings or matters except procedural applications in appeals to the High Court (including appeals by case stated) under any enactment.”
(emphasis provided)[29]The submission is that the claim as filed “involves criminal matters allegations”. Therefore, HHJ Pearce’s direction that Master Brown manage the claim is “without jurisdiction” rendering Master Brown’s orders “void ab initio”. It is submitted by the applicant that the unless order Soole J interpreted as resulting in the claim standing struck out in fact has no such effect, being void. Equally, the totally without merit certification by Master Brown is invalid. Since Master Brown had no jurisdiction, his orders are a nullity. The claim should be restored and “case-managed by a High Court Judge”.[30]The respondents submit that this argument is fundamentally misconceived. Master Brown had jurisdiction to make the orders he did. There is no “knock on” effect, as the applicant puts it, on other orders. The applicant’s submission relies on a misconception of what PD2B means and the essential nature of the claim, which is a civil proceeding. At the outset of the hearing, the respondents provided the court with the Supreme Court authority of R (Belhaj) v DPP (No 1) [2019] AC 593 (“Belhaj”). The question is what “criminal proceedings or matters” means for the purposes of PD2B. It is in respect of this question that the respondents referred the court to Belhaj, to which I now turn.

Belhaj

[31]The facts of Belhaj are far removed from the instant case. These were judicial review proceedings brought against the DPP by two claimants who alleged they had been unlawfully “rendered” from Thailand to Libya, where they were imprisoned and tortured. They alleged that the rendition had been carried out with the assistance of the British Secret Intelligence Service. The DPP decided not to prosecute any person. It was that decision not to prosecute that was the subject matter of the application for judicial review. The question was whether a closed material procedure was available in judicial review proceedings. That in turn engaged the question whether the proceedings were civil or criminal. This is apparent from the key provision examined in Belhaj, section 6 of

the Justice and Security Act 2013 (“JSA 2013”) that deals with closed material proceedings:

“6 Declaration permitting closed material applications in proceedings (1) The court seised of relevant civil proceedings may make a declaration that the proceedings are proceedings in which a closed material application may be made to the court. … (11) In this section— “closed material application” means an application of the kind mentioned in section 8(1)(a), “relevant civil proceedings” means any proceedings (other than proceedings in a criminal cause or matter) before— (a) the High Court, (b) the Court of Appeal, (c) the Court of Session, or (d) the Supreme Court.”
[32]The Supreme Court reached a 3-2 majority decision. In the majority, Lord Sumption, with whom Lady Hale agreed, delivered the primary judgment, supported by a shorter judgment from Lord Mance. Lord Lloyd-Jones, with whom Lord Wilson agreed, dissented.[33]The first point to note is that the phrase under consideration in Belhaj is “criminal cause or matter”. The phrase in the PD2B is “criminal proceedings or matters”.[34]Second, the phrase considered by the Supreme Court appears in the JSA 2013. This section of the statute deals with making declarations about closed material procedures in civil proceedings on certain conditions. The first step is to apply for a declaration that the proceedings are those in which such a step may be taken. This is governed by section 6. Pertinently for the instant case is section 6(11) which defines “relevant civil proceedings” by excluding certain other proceedings. Therefore, the exclusion is of “proceedings in a criminal cause or matter”. The question in Belhaj was whether judicial review of a decision not to prosecute were civil proceedings or proceedings in a criminal cause or matter. This is the question Lord Sumption turned to at para 15:
“ … in its ordinary and natural meaning “proceedings in a criminal cause or matter” include proceedings by way of judicial review of a decision made in a criminal cause, and nothing in the context or purpose of the legislation suggests a different meaning.”
[35]At para 16, Lord Sumption outlines the High Court’s “extensive” criminal jurisdiction by way of review. Shortly put, there can be review of the exercise of any official’s functions in relation to the criminal process (decisions to investigate or charge, administer cautions, to prosecute or not). Additionally, the High Court has a supervisory jurisdiction over inferior tribunals, which include the magistrates’ court and, except in relation to trial on indictment (where the Court of Appeal holds sway), the Crown Court (binding over of acquitted persons, for example). As such, Lord Sumption concluded that judicial review of a decision to prosecute or not prosecute “is an integral part of the criminal justice system”. This is the background to construe the phrase as it appears in section 6(11). Lord Sumption noted (para 17) that the phrase is “of some antiquity”. It has been used since the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873. It finds modern expression in section 18(1)(a) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. As Lord Sumption notes, it is defined in the definitions section at section 100 in this way:
“.. “cause” means “any action or any criminal proceedings”, and “matter” means “any proceedings in court not in a cause”.”
[36]Lord Sumption refers to Amand v Home Secretary [1943] AC 147, a wartime case about the arrest and handing over of a deserting Dutch serviceman, where Lord Wright said at 162:
“The principle which I deduce from the authorities I have cited and the other relevant authorities which I have considered, is that if the cause or matter is one which, if carried to its conclusion, might result in the conviction of the person charged and in a sentence of some punishment, such as imprisonment or fine, it is a ‘criminal cause or matter’. The person charged is thus put in jeopardy.”
[37]Having reviewed the authorities, Lord Sumption moved on at para 20 to his understanding of the phrase:
“ … But the real basis of the decisions on appeals was that the phrase “criminal cause or matter”, read as a whole, spoke for itself. A “cause” is a proceeding, civil or criminal, actual or prospective, before a court. A “matter” is something wider, namely a particular legal subject-matter, although arising in a different proceeding. That is why a “criminal cause or matter” in the Judicature Acts extends to a judicial review in the High Court of a decision made in relation to actual or prospective criminal proceedings: see R (Aru) v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police …”
[38]This wider definition was relevant to the decision in Belhaj because (ibid.):
“The reality of the Appellants’ application is that it is an attempt to require the Director of Public Prosecutions to prosecute Sir Mark Allen. That is just as much a criminal matter as the original decision of the Director not to prosecute him.”
[39]Therefore, although there were no extant criminal proceedings because of the decision not to prosecute, the judicial review proceedings nevertheless concerned prospective criminal proceedings because if they were carried to their conclusion, in Lord Wright’s terms, they would put the individual in “jeopardy”. The result may be his conviction and punishment. Thus, the judicial review proceedings were a criminal cause or matter and fell into the exception under section 6(11). The significance of this for the instant case is the intense focus on what criminal proceedings or matters are. They involve the prospect of the individual in question being charged or prosecuted or punished. They are distinct from civil proceedings.[40]I turn next to the speech of Lord Mance. At para 26, he indicated that he would allow the appeal “ … essentially for the same reasons as Lord Sumption. A challenge by judicial review to a decision to prosecute would seem to me to fall naturally within the concept of “proceedings in a criminal cause or matter”; and so too a challenge to a decision not to prosecute, the whole point of which would be to lead to a prosecution.”[41]Lord Mance notes at para 30 that criminal proceedings generally “involve an accusation by the state”. Naturally, there is a class of prosecutions that can be brought by non-state agencies, but their consequence if carried to conclusion is conviction and criminal sanction. Reflecting on the speeches in Belhaj, I make the following seven observations.[42]First, the wording in the two phrases is similar but different.[43]Second, one phrase appears in a statute, the other in a practice direction and therefore their contexts are different.[44]Third, and nevertheless, the purpose of the phrases is similar: to direct and demark different classes of legal proceedings. In the JSA 2013, the purpose is to determine in which civil proceedings the closed material procedure may be appropriate (see Lord Mance in Belhaj at paras 28-31). The importance of making that distinction is because when a person faces criminal charge, conviction or punishment, she or he must know the evidence against them. If the prosecution declines to disclose material in the interests of national security, the option is to discontinue proceedings. Civil proceedings are different. The need to know the evidence that may lead to adverse criminal consequences is absent. The purpose of PD2B is to ensure that appropriately authorised judicial office holders deal with different types of cases. Masters and district judges (subject to the procedural exception in the practice direction) must not deal with criminal proceedings or matters. Therefore, because the purpose of the phrases is similar, I find some assistance in the Supreme Court’s analysis of “criminal cause or matter”.[45]Fourth, I take criminal cause to be broadly synonymous with criminal proceedings. The terms “matters” and “matter” I also interpret as plainly having the same essential meaning. They describe matters where there are not yet extant criminal proceedings, but as in Belhaj, the consequence of carrying out the matter might (not would) result in the conviction and sentencing of the person. The individual would be placed in jeopardy of criminal consequence.[46]Fifth, with this understanding, I turn to the applicant’s submission that in civil proceedings where a person makes allegations that in substance could be criminal in nature – fraud, theft, certain conspiracies – those proceedings are criminal proceedings or matters. As such a Master or District Judge, the argument runs, should not make orders or grant interim relief. The flaw in the notion is that should the civil proceedings filed by the claimant be carried to conclusion, they could not result in criminal charge, conviction or sentence. This is a fundamental jurisdictional and conceptual divide.[47]Sixth, the submission made by the applicant, unable to credibly contest the lack of criminal consequence point, is that it is the gravity of allegations within civil proceedings that makes it inappropriate for Masters and District Judges to make orders in such cases. The applicant, on enquiry, concedes that there is no authority to support such a proposition and presently Masters and District Judges regularly make orders, as Master Brown did here, in civil proceedings in which allegations of what would otherwise amount to criminal conduct are made. I cannot think it is a rational interpretation of PD2B that in every civil claim in which allegations that would otherwise amount to a crime are made, the orders must be made by Circuit Judges or High Court Judges. This would have far-reaching ramifications for the business arrangements within the civil jurisdiction with what Mr McWilliams terms “a vast number of cases” having to be dealt with by the more senior judiciary. I am sure that the drafters of the practice direction could not possibly have intended such a thing. What it does expose is the fallacy in the applicant’s argument. The applicant’s concession that its interpretation “may present practical difficulties” underestimates the severe real-world implications of its submission.[48]Seventh, the applicant further submits that the term “relating to” in PD2B is “slightly different” to the term in the statute. It should be given a “wide meaning” and denotes any proceedings that “could have a criminal element in it”. The phrase in section 6(11) “other than proceedings in” is used simply because the statutory provision seeks to exclude criminal causes or matters from the closed material procedure in civil proceedings. This is a distinction without a difference. All that “relating to” means is arising from. There is nothing difficult about this. There is nothing in this point.

Conclusion: jurisdiction

[49]The jurisdictional challenge to Master Brown’s order is fundamentally misconceived and dismissed.

VI. Issue 2: June application

[50]The June application has three constituent elements. The applicant sought an order(1) that declares “void” the orders of HHJ Pearce and Master Brown;(2) sets them aside;(3) enters summary judgment in favour of Perseus. About these applications, Soole J’s reasoning is as follows:
“REASONS: (1) Further to the Order of Master Brown dated 3 June 2025, as amended under the slip rule on 6 June 2025, and to the failure of the Claimant to comply with any of the Unless Orders in paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 11 thereof, this Claim has stood struck out since 4 pm on 24 June 2025: see also the Order of Murray J dated 18 August 2025 which likewise noted that the Claim had been struck out. There was no appeal against the Order of Master Brown and there has been no application for relief from the sanction which has resulted from the breach of the Unless Orders therein. There is accordingly no basis to make this application. (2) In any event the Claimant’s application is plainly and obviously unarguable. There is no basis for the contention that the Orders of His Honour Judge Pearce dated 15 October 2024 and of Master Brown are ‘void’ or should be set aside; nor for the various allegations of judicial impropriety which are made in the application and supporting evidence. (3) For these reasons the application is bound to fail and totally without merit.”
[51]The applicant originally submitted that the application should not have been dismissed “because it had merit”. However, when its submissions were sought about each constituent part, the merits of the submission could be viewed in a clearer light.[52]As to the orders made by HHJ Pearce and Master Brown, the applicant accepted that Soole J was “correct in stating that the appeal process should have been followed rather than seeking a declaration that the orders were void”. Next, it was conceded that the set aside application was not properly advanced. Finally, the applicant accepted that there was no basis to seek summary judgment. Further, the applicant accepts that as applications were not properly conceived, it could not submit that Soole J’s certification of the June application as totally without merit was “wrong”.[53]This leaves the application to vary/set aside Soole J’s decision to dismiss the June application in tatters. In such circumstances, Soole J’s certification of the June application as totally without merit cannot rationally be faulted.

Totally without merit certification

[54]I now consider the respondent’s submission that the application now before the court to vary/set aside Soole J’s dismissal of the June application should itself be certified as totally without merit.[55]I have regard to the Court of Appeal’s precept in R (Grace) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 1091 (“Grace”) that reasons for a totally without merit certification should be distinctly given. While Grace involved a totally without merit certification in judicial review proceedings, it undoubtedly has wider relevance for the totally without merit concept. In Grace, Maurice Kay LJ said at para 13 of his judgment:
“I return to the purpose of CPR 54.12.7. It is not simply the prevention of repetitive applications or the control of abusive or vexatious litigants. It is to confront the fact, for such it is, that the exponential growth in judicial review applications in recent years has given rise to a significant number of hopeless applications which cause trouble to public authorities, who have to acknowledge service and file written grounds of resistance prior to the first judicial consideration of the application, and place an unjustified burden on the resources of the Administrative Court and the Upper Tribunal. Hopeless cases are not always, or even usually, the playthings of the serially vexatious. In my judgment, it would defeat the purpose of CPR 54.12.7 if TWM were to be given the limited reach for which Mr Malik contends. It would not produce the benefits to public authorities, the Administrative Court or its other users which it was intended to produce. I have no doubt that in this context TWM means no more and no less than 'bound to fail'. …”
[56]He continued at para 15:
“The adoption of this approach does contain within it two important safeguards. First, no judge will certify an application as TWM unless he is confident after careful consideration that the case truly is bound to fail. He or she will no doubt have in mind the seriousness of the issue and the consequences of his decision in the particular case. Secondly, the claimant still has access to a judge of the Court of Appeal who, with even greater experience and seniority, will approach the application independently and with the same care. To my mind, these safeguards are sufficient. CPR 54.12.7 so applied does not detract from the vital constitutional importance of the judicial review jurisdiction. Moreover, it is consistent with the overriding objective of the CPR.”
[57]I also have regard to the Court of Appeal’s further guidance in Wasif on the proper approach to certification, which closely followed Grace and was again in the context of judicial review. I accept the applicant’s submission on Wasif that all relevant arguments should be properly considered before a totally without merit certification.[58]At one point it appeared that the applicant challenged Soole J’s certification of the dismissed applications as being in contravention of Grace/Wasif (skeleton argument, para 25). It is clear from his reasoning, as already set out, that Soole J appropriately considered the arguments. I have set out the Court of Appeal’s guidance in Wasif at para 21. It is clear that Soole J provided reasoning in accordance with the Court of Appeal’s observations. He distinctly considered the question of totally without merit certification and did not simply wrap it up in the dismissal of the underlying application. Instead, he provided particulars of the key features of the procedural history and explained why the application was bound to fail.[59]Soole J correctly states that the failure to comply with the unless orders resulted in the claim standing struck out. There was no application for relief from sanctions. He might have added that there was no appeal of the orders. The applicant accepts that Soole J was correct to dismiss the application (and refuse each of its constituent elements) and “cannot say” that the totally without merit certification was “wrong”. In such circumstances, I have no hesitation in concluding that the application to vary/set aside Soole J’s order in respect of the June application is totally without merit. It was bound to fail.[60]The applicant’s further submission is that what the applicant “really seeks” is to reverse the certification of the claim “as a whole” as totally without merit and “get this claim off to a fresh start and have the court make directions”. This is a misunderstanding. At no point has any court certified the claim as a whole as totally without merit. Master Brown struck out certain elements of the claim: the conspiracy allegation against the Receivers, the accusations against solicitors. This order was not appealed. The remaining breach of duty claim was allowed to proceed, and Master Brown ordered the standard disclosure the applicant sought. However, conditions were imposed as was unquestionably within Master Brown’s discretion. The applicant failed to comply with the court’s conditions and the claim stood struck out. That order was not appealed, nor was relief from sanctions sought. I pause to recall that part of the application to vary/set aside is the challenge to Master Brown’s jurisdiction. I have found that argument to be fundamentally misconceived.[61]Stepping back and viewing the application to vary/set aside Soole J’s decision about the June application, I judge that it was bound to fail for the reasons I have given.

Conclusion: June application

[62]The application to vary/set aside Soole J’s dismissal of the June application is dismissed and certified as totally without merit.

VII. Issue 3: October application

[63]The applicant applied(1) to vary the order of Bennathan J dated 2 October 2025;(2) for a trial of a preliminary issue;(3) for interim payment. Soole J’s reasoning was in the same terms as the reasoning for the June 2025 dismissal, save for the addition at the end of para 2 that “There is no basis to vary the Order of Bennathan J dated 2 October 2025 nor to grant any of the other forms of relief which are claimed.”[64]As to the application to vary/set aside the Bennathan order, the applicant’s counsel told the court that “I would not advise him to make that application”. No rational basis for the application could be identified. On the trial of preliminary issue application, the applicant conceded that it was not properly formulated. On the interim payment application, once more it was acknowledged that it was not properly conceived. In light of these concessions, the applicant’s counsel stated that he would not “quibble” with totally without merit certification by Soole J.[65]It seems to me that Mr Smith realistically faced up to the inevitable. The allegation made by the applicant is that for some reason that remains unexplained, Soole J has deliberately (taken “particular care”) to disregard crucial evidence and factual material. This is a baseless and empty assertion. There is no rational account of why the Bennathan order is wrong. There was no application to appeal the Bennathan order. The paradox is that Bennathan J did not accede to the respondent’s application for an ECRO, but dismissed it. The application for a trial of a preliminary issue is misconceived: as Soole J observed in his careful reasoning, the claim has stood struck out as of 4 pm on 24 June 2025 following the failure to comply with the unless order of Master Brown dated 3 June 2025. The application for an interim payment for a claim that has been struck out is equally misplaced.

Totally without merit

[66]The applicant no longer contests the correctness of Soole J’s totally without merit certification for the October application.[67]For all the reasons provided above, I have no hesitation in certifying that the application to vary/set aside Soole J’s order about the October 2025 application is totally without merit. There is no rational basis to set aside the Bennathan order; the applications for the trial of preliminary issue and an interim payment were bound to fail.

Conclusion: October application

[68]The application to vary/set aside Soole J’s dismissal of the October application is dismissed and certified as totally without merit.

VIII. Issue 4: The ECRO

[69]The reasons given by Soole J for granting the ECRO applied for by the respondents are detailed. It repays examining the care with which he explained his reasoning: “REASONS:(1) These proceedings were preceded by the Claimant’s application against the same Defendants, dated 30 November 2023 with the claim number KB-2023-004679 which relates to the same underlying subject matter as this action. The Claimants’ application therein dated 16 December 2023 was by Order of Collins Rice J dated 3 May 2024 dismissed and stated to be totally without merit.(2) In this action, the Claimants’ application dated 26 September 2024 was by the Order of Master Brown dated 3 June 2025 (amended under the slip rule on 6 June 2025) dismissed and, insofar as it sought the provision of further information, stated to be totally without merit.(3) In this action, the Claimant’s letter to the President of the King’s Bench Division (headed ‘Pursuant to Section 9 Criminal Justice Act 1967’) dated 30 June 2025 was placed before Murray J for consideration. By his Order dated 18 August 2025 the letter was treated as an informal application (‘the Applicant’s Application’) which had not been made by formal application in accordance with CPR 23 and was refused and certified as totally without merit. The Claimant’s letter referred to an application which the Claimant had made to the Court. From the details provided in the letter, this must be the Claimant’s application dated 26 June 2025. Murray J evidently did not consider or determine that application. The Observations at the conclusion of his Order stated: ‘I am required by CPR r.23.12 to consider whether it is appropriate to make a civil restraint order against the Claimant. I do not consider it necessary to make one on the basis of the Applicant’s Application alone. It may be necessary to do so, however, in due course should the Applicant issue any further claims or applications relating to this or any related matter that the court finds to be totally without merit.’(4) The Defendants’ application for a CRO dated 21 August 2025 was placed before Bennathan J. By his Order dated 2 October 2025 Bennathan J refused the application on the essential basis that, whilst sympathising with the Defendants who had been ‘endlessly troubled by ill founded, eccentric and defamatory claims including applications correctly held to be Totally Without Merit’, in circumstances where the Claimant had not made any further claims or applications since the Order of Murray J dated 18 August 2025 ‘it does not seem to me to be proper for me to make an order that would go behind Murray J’s decision’. However he concluded with the observation that ‘Although it will almost certainly be a judge other than myself who deals with any further applications by the Claimant, if any are made and they too are totally without merit, I would anticipate a CRO or ECRO would almost certainly be imposed’.(5) Six days later, on 8 October 2025, the Claimant made the application which by paragraph 2 of this Order I have dismissed and certified as totally without merit.(6) By paragraph 1 of this Order I have also dismissed the Claimant’s application dated 26 June 2025 and certified it as totally without merit.(7) Accordingly, in this action and the related proceedings (KB-2023-004679) there are 5 Orders which state that applications made by the Claimant are totally without merit. In view of the overlap between the Claimant’s letter of 30 June 2025 and the Claimant’s application dated 26 June 2025, I think it fair to treat them (for the purposes of considering a CRO) as in substance constituting one combined application which was totally without merit. Thus I proceed on the basis of a total of 4 applications certified as totally without merit.(8) I also take account of the fact that, by each of the Orders of Murray J dated 18 August 2025 and of Bennathan J dated 2 October 2025, the Claimant has been given judicial warning of the risk that a CRO will be granted if he were to make a further application which was dismissed and certified as totally without merit. By the issue of its application dated 8 October 2025 the Claimant has evidently ignored those warnings.(9) Standing back and looking at the matter entirely afresh, I am satisfied that the Claimant has persistently made applications which are totally without merit and conclude in the exercise of my discretion that it is necessary to impose an ECRO so as to restrain the Claimant from issuing claims or making applications in the High Court or County Court concerning any matter involving or relating to or "touching upon or leading to the proceedings in which this Order is made without first obtaining the permission of a Judge identified in the[70]One instantly sees how any challenge to the ECRO through a want of reasoning is unsustainable and misconceived.[71]A key submission made by the applicant is that the court should consider the merits of the claim “as a whole” and accordingly determine that the ECRO should be discharged. The first point made by the applicant is that there is “no basis to conclude that the applicant’s core case is totally without merit.” As I have observed, at no point has any judge ruled that the claim as a whole is totally without merit. Nevertheless, the applicant submits because the allegation of “embezzlement” against Barclays has not been found to be totally without merit, the matter should proceed to trial, despite the procedural missteps taken by the applicant which previously has been unrepresented.[72]The difficulty with the submission is that the claim stands struck out. The jurisdictional challenge to the order of Master Brown is misconceived. Master Brown’s order was not appealed. No relief from sanctions was sought in respect of the unless orders. The applicant submits despite these procedural realities that Soole J should have made a “more sophisticated order”. This is said to mean that Soole J should have made a direction “that the matter proceed to trial”, as should this court. In light of the procedural history, the applicant fails to explain how and why the struck-out claim should be restored now by this court, and particularly when the hearing has only been listed to consider the Soole orders of 17 December 2025 by virtue of CPR 23.8(3).[73]The difficulty with the submission is exacerbated by the applicant’s concession that Soole J was “fully entitled to make the orders he did”. Soole J had (on his generous estimation) four previous certifications of totally without merit from a range of other judges. He concluded that the two applications before him were also totally without merit. As to the previous certifications, the applicant, when asked how Soole J should approach the intact certifications, agreed that Soole J was entitled to rely on the previous totally without merit certifications. Further, the applicant’s counsel stated that he made “no criticism whatsoever of Soole J”. In Crimson Flower Production Limited & Ors. v Glass Slipper Limited & Ors [2020] EWHC 942 (Ch), the Deputy Judge held that unchallenged totally without merit certifications are to be treated as conclusive. The Deputy Judge said at paras 27-28:
“27 Having considered the matter carefully, it seems to me that I should not go behind an express declaration of an earlier court that a particular application was totally without merit. It goes further than the suggestion that I should be slow to go behind such orders - I quite simply should not. Such express declarations, so it seems to me, should be treated as conclusive. "28 Indeed, an application to make a litigant subject to a civil restraint order is designed to be a relatively straightforward summary procedure. It is designed ultimately to unclog the courts from litigation. If I were to go into each of the eleven declarations, it would involve a mini trial and a rehearing of these matters which could be extensive – it would involve extensive consideration of evidence and extensive consideration of submissions. It would involve, no doubt, much longer hearings, much more detailed evidence, and much longer submissions and, as I say, effectively reopening matters which have already been heard. As I say, it seems to me that not only should I be slow to go behind such findings but that I quite simply should not do so. An express declaration by an earlier court of an application being totally without merit is something which, so I hold, a later court hearing an application for a CRO simply cannot go behind.”
[74]For the purposes of the instant case, there is no material difference between a conclusive approach to previous totally without merit certifications and one that grants them significant weight. This is because the applicant accepts that Soole J was entitled to rely on the previous certifications by a number of judges.[75]The respondents submit that discharge of the ECRO would have no practical effect since the claim stands struck out. Applications in the claim save for those under CPR Part 28, should in the first instance seek permission from Soole J (unless he is unavailable: see ECRO, section 2). There has been no application to seek Soole J’s permission for any procedural step. As a result, the respondents submit that there is no point discharging the ECRO.[76]First, it seems to me that the prime question is whether the test for making an ECRO is established and whether the court’s discretion was properly exercised. The legal basis for making such an ECRO is fully met by the repeated findings of the court that the applications advanced by the applicant are totally without merit. This opens the door to the court’s discretion. I can see no good reason in Kuznetsov terms to depart from Soole J’s decision. It is clearly comfortably within the wide ambit of the court’s discretion and cannot be faulted.[77]Second, I turn to whether there is a change of circumstances such that the ECRO should be discharged. I note from the sixth statement (AC6) of Mr Cooper of Addleshaw Goddard (“AG”) the following at para 13 about the applicant serving a statutory demand on Barclays: “In response to the AG Letter, by email dated 4 March 2026 (received at 13:31), Mr Walsh, on behalf of the Claimant, stated that: “There is no restraint order, the Master Brown order is void, without jurisdiction, and everything after is void from the beginning (ab initio); “The demand will be served”; and “that the clock will start ticking on the demand from the date it is validlyprocess served on [Barclays]”.[78]The applicant refused to withdraw the statutory demand and Barclays had to apply for injunctive relief. It was granted by a judge of the ICC, Judge Mullen on 16 March 2026 (sealed the next day). It includes a penal notice. As Mr Cooper notes (para 19), the applicant has persistently voiced an intention to present a winding-up petition against Barclays even though there is an injunction imposed by the court. Martin Walsh continues to send emails to multiple recipients, including claims that Judge Mullen was “lying” and “fraudulently failing in his judicial duties and by concealing the underlying serious criminality, making the penal order on his own whim to assist the Defendants in defrauding PVL of the liquidated sum of the demand.”[79]Barclays’ counsel is accused of making false representations to the court. Addleshaw Goddard emailed the applicant on 26 March 2026 stating that the terms of the injunction restrained the presenting of a winding-up petition without permission from Soole J. On the same day, the applicant replied that “there is neither a penal injunction nor a civil restraint order, there was never any jurisdiction to issue either”. Further, on 27 March 2026 Martin Walsh emailed Addleshaw Goddard stating:
“Following service of the Creditor's statutory demand on you on 9 March 2026 ... if payment is not received by 4pm on Tuesday 31 March 2026, enforcement action will be taken without further notice”
[80]In April, Mr Cooper and his colleague Ms O’Callaghan were “invited” to comment on the Appendix X intelligence report. The report contains very serious allegations of fraud and criminal misconduct involving Barclays and its solicitors.[81]On 9 April 2026, the report was sent to Metropolitan Police, members of the judiciary and the Solicitors Regulation Authority (“SRA”). The SRA declined to investigate. The SRA itself was then accused of having “failed in its duty by ignoring compelling evidence of misconduct” and “taken an overly passive and procedural stance”. In an email on 11 May 2026, the applicant served a form N266 Notice to Admit Facts in respect of claim number KB-2024-001774 that related to the claim that stands struck out. On 20 May 2026 the applicant tried to serve the Receivers (Messrs Foskett and Alford) with what was said to be a letter before action, relating to their role as Receivers, and thus the intention was to herald proceedings directly connected to the proceedings that stand struck out and are subject to the ECRO. The applicant did not seek permission from Soole J to take these procedural steps, in clear contravention of the ECRO.

Conclusion: the ECRO

[82]The applicant has made numerous unmeritorious applications. The vary/set aside applications made to me are totally without merit. I have no doubt that the ECRO must remain in place and should not be discharged.

IX. Issue 5: Costs

[83]The respondents apply for costs. The applicant has failed in all its applications and therefore there can be no doubt but that the respondents are the successful party in CPR Part 44 terms.[84]I find no reason to depart from the general rule under CPR 44(2)(a) that costs follow the event. Further, the respondents apply for costs on the indemnity basis. The test for such an order under CPR 44.3 is well known. It is whether the conduct of the unsuccessful party is unreasonable to a high degree and/or is out of the norm (Excelsior Commercial & Industrial Holdings Ltd v Salisbury Hamer Aspden & Johnson (Costs) [2002] EWCA Civ 879 (“Excelsior”)).[85]It is not the case that just because an application fails that an order for indemnity costs must follow. The court must examine the nature of the unsuccessful party’s conduct and assess the merits of the application. I note that the respondents do not apply for a totally without merit certification in respect of the application to discharge the ECRO. This seems to me to be proportionate and responsible approach. However, different considerations apply to the applicant’s remaining applications.[86]The application notice challenges the dismissal of the June and October applications. At the hearing, the applicant conceded that the June and October applications considered by Soole J were correctly dismissed by him. To take one example, it is hopeless to make an application for summary judgment in a case where the claim stands struck out. Similar considerations apply to seeking trial of a preliminary issue for a claim that is not extant and seeking an interim payment in your favour for it.[87]The applicant does not submit that Soole J’s certification of each application as totally without merit is wrong. Nevertheless, the applicant sought to vary/set aside the certifications. To the extent that it relies on the challenge to Master Brown’s jurisdiction, I have found the argument to be fundamentally misconceived.[88]I judge the applicant’s applications to vary/set aside the June and October decisions of Soole J to be unreasonable in a high degree and bound to fail. The same applies to the challenges to his certification of the applications as totally without merit. As the respondents submit, just because the applicant’s counsel made significant concessions at the oral hearing, that did not preclude the respondents’ from having to prepare to oppose the applications as formulated in the application notice and indeed the applicant’s skeleton argument. This is true. However, that is not the end of the applicant’s relevant conduct.[89]The application notice contains a series of very serious allegations against the judiciary, members of court staff and legal professionals. The accusation is that they have lent themselves to a “conspiracy” against the applicant. For example, the Appendix X report states:
“It appears to us, what happened was acting with Master Brown, allegedly an agent for Addleshaw Goddard LLP of the King’s Bench Division, they hatched a plan in conspiracy, to embezzle the sale proceeds owed to PVL. Part of that plan entailed an (alleged) EXTORTION ATTEMPT by Master Brown, who made an UNLESS ORDER on 5 June 2025 demanding that PVL paid the sum of over £100,000 upfront, whilst pretending that BARCLAYS BANK PLC and ADDLESHAW GODDARD LLP had not EMBEZZLED at least £353,576.73. … It appears to have been Master Brown, or ‘Agent Brown’s more like, intent, to put up the extortionate unreasonable demand, solely as a means of defeating the ends of justice, preventing justice being served on the allegedly bent Addleshaw Goddard LLP lawyers, Barclays Bank PLC and their LPA Receivers who failed to receive.”
[90]When asked whether there is any evidence to support these claims against any member of the judiciary, Mr Smith appropriately drew the distinction between any personal views counsel may have about the integrity of the judiciary and the allegations made by his lay (corporate) client as voiced by Martin Walsh its director. Counsel has a professional duty to act without fear or favour in the best interests of his clients. If I may say so, Mr Smith commendably did that. The applicant, however, has made grave allegations of what amounts to criminal conduct against diverse people in the justice system. As Mr Smith stated, he has seen no evidence to support such serious allegations. However, he submits that it was nevertheless “reasonable” for the applicant to make the allegations if the applicant “believes them to be true”. He draws the distinction between what is “right” (objectively true) and what is “reasonable”. I emphasise that I make no findings of fact at this point save for evaluating whether the applicant’s conduct has been reasonable, or more precisely, unreasonable to a high degree for costs purposes. I have no hesitation in concluding that the allegations made against, for example, Master Brown, that he has been acting as an “agent” for alleged embezzlers in the absence of any evidence his counsel has seen save for the unevidenced claims of Martin Walsh and IUKIL, is grossly unreasonable conduct.[91]I must also consider the detail of the applications placed before the court in the applicant’s skeleton argument. The applicant sought orders to set aside not only the Soole order, but orders on 2 October 2025, 18 August 2025, 3 June 2025 and 15 October 2024 (para 26). None of these orders has been appealed. Time to appeal expired many months ago. These applications are plainly totally without merit. Further, the applicant seeks (paras 29-34) a declaration that the Receivers “breached” their “fiduciary and statutory duties” to collect rent and income. The court was invited to “decide the preliminary issue now” or at least give directions for “an early trial window” (para 33). This hearing was not listed for anything except the application to vary/set aside the orders of Soole J. In any event, the application fails to engage with the procedural fact that the claim stands struck out. This is further support for the degree of unreasonableness of the conduct of the applicant. Once more, contrary to Soole J’s order, no application to him has been made for order or relief.[92]I examine the conduct of the applicant as a whole in the period after the ECRO was granted and in respect of the applications before me. I conclude its conduct as a whole is out of the norm in Excelsior terms and marked by unreasonableness of a high degree. Costs should be assessed on the indemnity basis.[93]There is no need for a hearing, nor for detailed assessment. I note that none of the adverse costs orders previously made against the applicant has been paid, but the fact that the applicant wilfully ignores the orders of the court is not a reason not to make the correct costs order.

X. Disposal

[94]In summary, the decisions of the court are: 1. Application to declare orders of Master Brown void for want of jurisdiction: Dismissed. 2. Application to vary/set aside Soole order in respect of application dated 26 June 2025: Dismissedand certifiedtotally without merit. 3. Application to vary/set aside Soole order in respect of application dated 8 October 2025: Dismissedand certified totally without merit. 4. Application to discharge the ECRO: Dismissed. 5. Costs: the applicant to pay the respondents’ costs of the application dated 6 January 2026 on the indemnity basis, to be determined by summary assessment if not agreed.[95]If agreement cannot be reached on costs, the parties are granted permission to file and serve short submissions on the respondents’ costs claim. No hearing is necessary. The applicant to notify any objections within 7 days of this judgment being handed down, with the respondents to respond within 3 days after that.[96]The parties are directed to agree an order to reflect the terms of this judgment. I emphasise this is not an opportunity for further argumentation, but simply an agreed record of what the court has in this judgment ordered.

order

Practice Direction 3C para.3.1-3.11. The maximum term for such an order is 3 years. I will impose an order for the period of 2 years expiring 16 December 2027.”