Mosaraf Hossain & Ors v The Home Office [2026] EWHC 1989 (KB)

[2026] EWHC 1989 (KB)Case No QB-2020-003667QB-2022-001062; QB-2020-004075
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 30 July 2026THE HONOURABLE MRS JUSTICE HEATHER WILLIAMS DBE
(2) MOSARAF HOSSAINClaimants(6) NAVEED KHANClaimant(11) ASHIQUR RAHMANClaimantTHE HOME OFFICEDefendant
Greg Ó Ceallaigh KC and Alex Schymyck (instructed by Bindmans LLP) for ClaimantsVikram Sachdeva KC, Colin Thomann KC, Daniel Kozelko (instructed by Government Legal Department) for DefendantDetermination of the Defendant’s applications to amend its Defences
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 30 July 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................

Introduction

[1]On 10 June 2026, I handed down judgment on the Claimants’ applications to strike out parts of the Defences filed in these proceedings (“the Main Judgment”). I concluded that, as a result of issue estoppel, the Defendant was prevented from relying on pleaded assertions that C6 and C11 had obtained the results in their TOEIC tests by fraudulent means. I also found that C2 had failed to show that it would be an abuse of process for the Defendant to assert that he had obtained his TOEIC test results by fraudulent means. I noted that the parties would need to consider carefully which passages in the Defences would fall to be struck out in light of my rulings. I indicated that if the parties were unable to agree on this, then I would consider their written submissions on this topic. My accompanying order set out a timetable for the filing of applications to amend the Defences and the subsequent provision of written submissions (in default of agreement being reached).[2]By application notices dated 6 July 2026, the Defendant made applications to amend its Defence in each of the three cases. In submissions dated 13 July 2026, the Claimants opposed the majority of the proposed amendments and contended that additional amendments are required in light of the Main Judgment. The Defendant then filed a response dated 20 July 2026, disagreeing with the Claimants’ contentions and maintaining that the Court should permit the proposed amendments. The parties are content for the applications to be determined on the papers.[3]Whilst I will refer to specific aspects of the Main Judgment, I will not take up time repeating its contents and this supplementary judgment should be read in conjunction with it. Cross-references to parts of the Main Judgment will be in the form “JX” with “X” denoting the relevant paragraph. I will use the same abbreviations and acronyms as I used in the Main Judgment.

The Main Judgment

[4]For the purposes of determining the present applications, I refer in particular to the following parts of the Main Judgment: i) My account of the UT Presidential Panel cases regarding allegations of TOEIC fraud: J16-39; ii) The circumstances relating to each Claimant: J44-66; iii) My summary of the parties’ respective pleaded cases: J68-81; iv) The rule in Hollington v Hewthorn: J127-128. As I set out at that juncture, it is a general rule of the common law (subject to questions of issue estoppel and abuse of process) that findings made by another decision-maker are not admissible as evidence of the facts found in subsequent proceedings; v) My consideration of the impact of DK and RK both within the Tribunal system and more widely: J148-159. I determined that DK and RKboth arrived at factual findings on the generic evidence relating to TOEIC fraud (that had a precedent fact status within the Tribunal system) and, in light of those factual findings, prescribed an approach that the FTT was to follow: J148. I emphasised that the UT’s decision contained factual assessments of the generic evidence (J149) and that it was these factual conclusions that formed the basis of the guidance which the UT then provided for the FTT (J150). I reiterated these conclusions at J158. I found that outside of the Tribunal system, the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn applied; C6 and C11 were not parties to DK and RK and no relevant exception to the rule had been established: J158. As I said at J159:
“This means that findings of fact made by the UT in DK and RK as to the strength of the SSHD’s generic evidence would not be admissible as evidence of the facts found for the purposes of trial in the present proceedings and I have already explained that the UT’s guidance was predicated on those factual findings.” vi) In rejecting the Defendant’s change in the law argument, I repeated that “the factual findings made in DK and RK would not be admissible in the High Court trial of these claims”: J179; vii) In considering whether “special circumstances” existed such as to warrant the application of the Arnold change in the law exception, I took account of the impact on this litigation of my reaching a conclusion that issue estoppel applied: J178. After noting that I had not been addressed in any detail on the impact of such a ruling on the pleaded claims and defences, I observed: “However, on any view, it is evident from the pleaded issues I have summarised…that this will likely have a significant impact on the way that the Defendant is able to defend the claims and I bear this in mind. I do so with this qualification, it seems to me that there is likely to be a distinction between allegations that the particular IE Claimants cheated in their tests (precluded by issue estoppel if it applies) and pleaded allegations and counter allegations about the stage of the generic evidence and theDefendant’s knowledge of it at particular times which, on the face of it, do not appear to be caught by the res judicata doctrine, albeit the dividing line between the two may be less than straightforward.” (Emphasis added.)
viii) My evaluation of the new evidence relied upon by the Defendant in relation to C6 for the purposes of the new evidence exception to the application of issue estoppel: J191-196.

The respective positions of the parties

[5]The Home Office rightly accepts that in light of the application of issue estoppel in relation to C6 and C11 “any text in the Defendant’s Defences which directly or indirectly makes an allegation of fraud, either by way of positive averment or putting to proof, is required to be struck out”.[6]The Home Office also accepts that “any text which offends the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn be struck out”. However, the Defendant emphasises that the rule only prevents earlier findings from being admitted in the subsequent proceedings “as evidence of the facts found”. In this regard, Mr SachdevaKC emphasises the distinction I drew at J178, which I have already quoted. He contends that reliance is placed upon the complete UT chronology of the Presidential Panel cases:(i) to provide relevant context for the earlier pronouncements of the UT relied upon by the Claimants;(ii) because it is material for the purposes of the assessment of the reasonableness and therefore lawfulness of the Defendant’s reliance upon the evidence of TOEIC deception provided by ETS, that a senior panel of the UT examined that evidence and found no reason to reject it as anything other than reliable; and(iii) for the purposes of causation and an examination of whether any of the alleged investigative shortcomings by the Defendant could and would have resulted in a different outcome. Mr Sachdeva further submits that it would not be fair for these claims to be determined on a partial account of the developments of the UT jurisprudence.[7]The Claimants have rightly not objected to existing text or proposed new passages in the C6 and C11 Amended Defences which aver that the reasonableness of the Defendant’s decision making stands to be assessed in the context of the evidence available to her at the time; that there was at all material times significant evidence to conclude that the TOEIC certificate in question was fraudulently obtained; and that the Defendant made and maintained a reasonable assessment on the basis of the evidence available to it at the time: for example, see the opening lines of paras 95 and 100(b), draft Amended Defence in C6’s case and paras 62(a)(ii) and 63, draft Amended Defence in C11’s case.[8]However, C6 and C11 identify a number of passages in the draft Amended Defences which they say continue to directly allege or insinuate / imply that they committed TOEIC fraud or which impermissibly rely on the factual findings made in DK and RK and Varkey for the truth of their contents. The Claimants raised an additional point in relation to the findings and evidence in these two UT cases, namely that they cannot be relied upon as evidence of the reasonableness of the Defendant’s conduct because the decisions post-dated all of the Defendant’s relevant decision-making in their cases.[9]C2 argues that a number of passages in the draft Amended Defence offend the principle in Hollington v Hewthorn in that they impermissibly rely on the factual findings made in DK and RK and Varkey.

Analysis and conclusions

[10]It is necessary to consider the particular wording of the controversial passages in the draft Amended Defences. Accordingly, I will address each of the objections in turn.[11]I record that the proposed amendments to the following paragraphs in the draft Amended Defence in C6’s case are uncontroversial: paras 10, 40(d), 54, 100(a) and 100(b)(i).

Para 1

[12]The objection to para 1 relates to both the text the Defendant has failed to remove / amend and to the added text. In this and in all subsequent quotations from the draft pleadings, I will show proposed amendments as underlined or struck through (as appropriate). The material passage states:
“Voice analysis of the speaking and writing test audio recordings, retained under the Unique test ID number matching the certificate that NK relied upon, and the date and time of the test sat at Darwin’s College test centre on 15 October 2011, resulted in the identification of a multiple (“proxy”) test taker, leading to the refusal of his application for leave to remain on 4 December 2014.”
[13]The Claimant says this is an insinuation of fraud on his part that is precluded by issue estoppel. I do not agree. The text is simply narrative, explaining how it came to be that C6’s application for leave to remain was refused.[14]Accordingly, the proposed amendment to para 1 is permissible and none of the existing wording needs to be removed.

Para 4

[15]The second objection relates to the Defendant’s failure to remove / amend the wording of para 4 of the Defence. The material wording states:
“NK’s claims that he was treated unlawfully fellalls to be assessed on its facts, having regard to the evidence of fraud available: a. With respect to corruption at the test centres where NK was examined. b. The evidence of NK’s TOEIC certificate, and the documentary records linking him to the date and place where he claimeds to have sat that a test.”
[16]I do not accept the Claimant’s contention that this is an insinuation of fraud on his part. The passage states that his claims fall to be assessed by reference to the evidence of fraud available to the Defendant. Rightly, the Claimant has not objected to this kind of averment elsewhere in the draft Amended Defences (para 6 above). Insofar as C6 takes issue with the use of the word “claimed”, it is factually correct that he did claim this; and claim, in itself, is a neutral word in terms of whether the claim was true or not. Moreover, the passage must be read in the context of the other parts of the pleading which repeatedly make clear that it is accepted that the Defendant is estopped from denying and thus admits that the Claimant did not himself practice a deception.[17]Accordingly, the proposed amendment to para 4 is permissible and none of the existing wording needs to be removed.

Para 17

[18]The Claimant objects to the draft amended version of para 17 on the basis it offends the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn and that it is an insinuation of fraud on his part. The text states:
“The voice recognition process has since been examined by a number of Presidential Panels of the Upper Tribunal. It is noted that reliance is placed at ¶¶29 to 27 upon decisions of the Upper Tribunal said to record suggested “frailties” and “shortcomings” and “unanswered questions” with respect to ETS’s ability to link test entries to candidates and voice recognition analysis. The pleadings provide a partial picture of the Tribunal jurisprudence only. It is material to the assessment of the reasonableness of the Defendant’s decision and causation that the Tribunal has concluded, on successive occasions, that the process has been shown to be clearly and overwhelmingly reliable in pointing to an individual test entry as the product of a repeated voice…[DK and RK]. The Defendant will rely, in respect of paragraph 31, defending the reasonableness of its decision making and on the issue of causation, inter alia, upon the concessions of Professor Sommer, recorded in DK and RK (1) that candidates would not remain in ignorance that tests were being taken on their behalf: and (2) that it was very unlikely that there were accidental errors in the production or transmission of results.”
[19]I do not accept that this paragraph contains an insinuation of fraud on the part of C6. He is not referred to in this paragraph.[20]However, parts of this paragraph do offend the rule in Hollington v Hewthornand my conclusions in the Main Judgment (referred to at para 4 above). The reference to the UT’s conclusion that the process “has been shown to be clearly and overwhelmingly reliable in pointing to an individual test entry as the product of a repeated voice” is clearly a reference to and a reliance upon factual findings that were made in DK and RK as to the reliability of the material that the Home Office acted upon. The fact that the Defendant intends to rely upon those findings in relation to the reasonableness of its decision making and in respect of causation does not alter the position that it is the facts found by the UT that are said to support the Home Office’s case on those issues.[21]J178 of the Main Judgment does not assist the Defendant; the point I was making there was that issue estoppel would not preclude the Defendant from defending its actions by reference to the state of the evidence at the material time and its knowledge of the same (as I have also recognised at para 7 above). It follows that the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn does not prevent the Defendant from relying upon the evidence of Professor Sommer that was before the UT in DK and RK. Whether or not it is relevant to the Defendant’s defence, given it appears to have post-dated the actions complained of (which concluded on 25 July 2019: para 126, Particulars of Claim) is an issue for another day. I am solely concerned at this stage with the Claimant’s strike out applications and the consequences of the Main Judgment. My decision at this stage should neither be seen as endorsing or rejecting the relevance of evidence that only became available to the Defendant at a later stage.[22]Further, there can be no objection as such to the Defendant asserting that the Claimants’ chronology provides a partial picture of Tribunal jurisprudence. I make four observations in relation to the Defendant’s contention of unfairness (para 6 above). First, insofar as this is an attempt to re-run part of the earlier substantive arguments, I explained in the Main Judgment why the situation did not amount to the narrow “special circumstances” exception sufficient to disapply the issue estoppel that otherwise arises. Secondly, whilst I have heard no argument on the point at this stage and the Defendant has not made any application in respect of the Particulars of Claim, on the face of it, the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn would also apply to findings of fact made by the UT in SM and Qadir and MA (the earlier authorities relied upon by the Claimant). Thirdly, the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn does not preclude reliance being placed on the evidence that was before the UT in the Presidential Panel cases, as I have recognised. Fourthly, insofar as the Claimant’s chronology of the generic material is selective (as I noted at J69), it is unlikely to carry substantial weight at trial.[23]Accordingly, para 17 of the draft Amended Defence as currently worded does offend the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn. However, as parts of it do not offend this rule – and I have rejected the alleged insinuation of fraud objection – the text could be re-worded in a permissible form.

Para 24

[24]C6 also objects to para 24 from the third sentence onwards on the basis that the wording offends the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn. The text states:
“With respect to test centres operating as ‘fraud factories’ (and noting that Darwin’s College was engaged in mass fraud), the guidance of the Presidential Panel in DK and RK is that it is overwhelmingly likely that those individuals to whom the proxy results were attributed are those who took/ obtained their tests by that method. The Defendant contends that any challenges to the reasonableness of its decision-making, premised upon the same or similar generic evidence, stands to be assessed in light of (1) the contemporaneous evaluation of that evidence by an expert tribunal and (2) the guidance as to approach to be adopted to that evidence in DK and RK. Such evidence included, in NK’s case, information withheld by NK, but provided by ETS and stored by the Home Offices Performance and Reporting Analysis Unit.”
[25]I agree that the majority of this passage offends the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn. I rely on, without repeating, the reasoning I set out in paras 20-22 above. The Defendant is clearly seeking to rely on the facts found in DK and RKas to the likelihood of those to whom the proxy results were attributed having obtained their test results by that method. Further, as I explained at J148-150 the UT’s guidance was predicated upon the factual findings that it made.[26]The last sentence of this paragraph appears to relate to the new evidence that the Defendant relied on in relation to C6. It is not at all clear how this has any bearing on the state of the generic evidence before the Presidential Panels or the findings on the generic evidence made in those cases. As such, the last sentence does not satisfy the basic requirement of coherence.[27]Accordingly, the text from the third sentence onwards of para 24 should be removed insofar as it is part of the current Defence and I refuse permission to amend the paragraph by way of the additional proposed wording.

Para 38

[28]C6 objects to para 38 on the basis that it offends the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn. The text states:
“By its determination and reasons of 11 March 2024, the Presidential Panel (Mr Justice Dove, President and UT Judge Mandalia) dismissed both appeals, and expressed itself entirely satisfied that the SSHD had discharged the burden that the first appellant had employed dishonesty to secure the TOEIC speaking and writing score he had relied upon in support of his application of leave to enter the UK as a Tier 4 student. Any challenge to the reasonableness of the Defendant’s treatment of the same or similar generic evidence in NK’s case stands to be assessed by reference to the guidance promulgated, and consistent, concurrent conclusions reached on the evidence by the expert tribunal.”
[29]I agree that the contents of this paragraph offend the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn. I rely on my reasoning at paras 20-22 and 25 above. The Defendant seeks to rely on the facts found in Varkey that dishonesty had been employed to secure the appellant’s TOEIC score as evidence of that proposition. As I have already explained, there is no material distinction for present purposes between the UT’s factual findings and its guidance, as the latter was based on the former.[30]Accordingly, the first part of the paragraph, which appears in the existing wording of the Defence should be removed and I refuse permission to amend the paragraph by way of the additional proposed wording.

Para 40

[31]In relation to para 40, the Claimant objects to the phrase I have italicised in the following sentence: “The Defendant notes the evidence of such widespread cheating at Darwin’s College and the evidenceapparently linking NK to this fraudhas at all material time comprised the following…”.[32]I agree with the Defendant’s submission that there is no insinuation of fraud here. The use of “apparently” indicates that this is a reference to how the evidence appeared; it is not an allegation that C6 committed fraud.[33]Accordingly, none of the wording in para 40 requires removal and the proposed amendment is permissible.

Para 41

[34]The Claimant objects to para 41 on the basis it offends the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn. The text states:
“The claims pleaded in these proceedings as to the extent of understanding and/or information received from ETS, and its reliability, were considered in detail by the Presidential Panel of the specialist tribunal, and the challenge thereto rejected.”
[35]Whilst this paragraph does not spell out in terms why the Defendant is relying upon the UT’s decision, it is nonetheless apparent that it is the factual findings of the Presidential Panel in relation to the information the Home Office received from ETS that are relied upon as evidence of those facts. Accordingly, for the reasons I have already explained, this text offends the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn and should be removed.

Para 52 / 53

[36]Whilst the next paragraph identified in the Claimants’ document is numbered para 52, I assume from the contents of the paragraphs and the nature of the objection raised, that the intended reference is to para 53. The paragraph states:
“…it is admitted that, (1) in consequence of the High Court’s judgment in Hossain & ors v Home Office [2026] EWHC 1413 (KB), and (2) pending the Defendant’s application for permission to appeal that determination, the Defendant is estopped from denying and thus admits that the Claimant did not himself practice deception on 15 November 2011. With respect to the challenge to the Defendant’s decision making, it is nonetheless material what evidence was available to it. The evidence included, at all material times, the fact that there exist recordings of the speaking and writing test modules completed at Darwin’s College in NK’s name on 15 November 2011, under a location-specific unique registration number that, it is understood, NK accepts is his (1000000224387308) featuring his date of birth and nationality, which are not of NK’s voice. The audio files retained by ETS were analysed, and ETS concluded that they were conducted by a multiple, proxy test taker on NK’s behalf, with the proxy test taker obtaining the 200/200 speaking test score and 170/200 writing test score that NK achieved. NK therefore obtained a TOEIC test certificate with the certificate number 1000000224387308 for the speaking and writing test module based on those tests and, on 6 December 2011, submitted the certificate in support of his subsequent application for LTR as a Tier 4 (General) Student.”
[37]C6 argues that this passage contains an insinuation of fraud on his part. I accept the Defendant’s point that the paragraph needs to be read as a whole, including the clarification provided in the first sentence. For reasons I have already addressed, I also accept that the Defendant is able to plead reliance on the evidence that was available to it at the time. Further, C6 accepts that the recordings supplied by ETS were not of his voice. Accordingly, the objection is well-founded in relation to the majority of this paragraph. However, I do consider that the last sentence contains an allegation / insinuation of fraud in stating that C6 obtained a TOEIC test certificate based on “those tests”, which, in context, can only be a reference to the tests taken by the proxy that were referred to in the preceding sentence.[38]Accordingly, the amended wording is permissible, save for the last sentence; the words “based on those tests” should not be included.

Para 55

[39]C6 objects to para 55 from the second sentence onwards. The first sentence is similar to the first sentence of para 53 which I have set out above. The controversial part of the text reads:
“The reasonableness of the Defendant’s decision making falls to be assessed nonetheless, having regard to thewill contrast between these full marks in listening and 425/495 in reading with the Claimant’s initial listening & reading test 13 days earlier on 5 November 2011, at the ETS Global UK test centre in London, where the Claimant scored just 315 for listening, which is B1 level, and 255 for reading, which is A2 level. These scores are too low to apply for most immigration routes. In other words, in the space of 13 days the Claimant jumped from demonstrating beginner/intermediate level English to intermediate/fluent level. The Defendant will say therefor that this information could and would reasonably have been assessed, if analysed, as corroborating the finding of the Claimant having used a proxy to sit his subsequent test. The Defendant will also say that, in the listening element of the test, 62 of the 100 candidates achieved the maximum score of 495 (including the Claimant) and overall scores were heavily weighted towards the upper end of the score ranges.”
[40]I do not accept that this passage contains an insinuation of fraud precluded by issue estoppel. The text addresses the reasonableness of the Defendant’s decision making, it does not assert that C6 did cheat in his TOEIC test. Again, this passage has to be read in the context of the concession that is made in the first sentence.[41]The Claimant raises a second argument, namely that this information is irrelevant as it was not considered by the Defendant at the time. This contention formed no part of the strike out application and insofar as there are issues about the extent to which, if at all, subsequently discovered material can be relevant to the data protection / GDPR and/or the Article 8 claims, the issue is not before the Court at this stage (as I have observed at para 21 above). The last sentence is unobjectionable in any event as this was material that the Defendant was aware of at the time.[42]Accordingly, I am willing to permit the proposed amendment to para 55.

Para 70

[43]C6 alleges that the opening sentence of para 70 contains an insinuation of fraud on his part. (The cross reference to para 82 of the Particulars of Claim is a reference to the letter refusing him leave to remain.) The text says:
“Paragraph 82 is admitted, except that the Claimant is put to proof as regards his awareness of the deception practiced, on a systemic basis, at Darwin College.”
[44]I agree that this text does contain an insinuation of fraud precluded by the issue estoppel. There is no purpose in the Defendant referring to the Claimant’s state of knowledge of the TOEIC fraud that took place at Darwin College other than to imply that he was a part of it. This paragraph is not about the Defendant’s knowledge or the evidence available to the Defendant.[45]Accordingly, permission to amend the pleading in accordance with the proposed wording of the first sentence is refused. I record that no objection is taken to the deletion of the last sentence of the paragraph.

Para 95

[46]C6 objects to the text of para 95 from the words “and the guidance” onwards. The relevant part of the paragraph says:
“…The Defendant notes however…the reasonableness of the Defendant’s decision making stands to be assessed in the context of the evidence available to her at the time and the guidance as to the legal position and approach to be adopted with respect to that evidence now available from the decisions of the UTchanged with …[DK and RK and Varkey]”
[47]I agree that the controversial wording offends the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn. I rely on, without repeating, the points I have made in paras 20-22 and 25 above. Accordingly, I refuse permission for this amendment.

Para 100

[48]Para 100 of the draft Amended Defence denies the allegations set out in para 125 of the Particulars of Claim regarding the data protection / GDPR claim. Objection is raised to various passages on the basis they offend the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn. As material, the text states:
“b.…With respect to the plea that there has subsequently been a “growing corpus of evidence” undermining the reliability and accuracy of the data, the Defendant again relies upon the Upper Tribunal’s judgments on the strength of the ETS evidence and/or the evidence set out in the Tribunal judgment t and wider evidence of Darwin’s College operating fraudulently. … ii. As to paragraph 125(iii)(e) and the observations made in the FTT judgment, the Defendant (1) acknowledges the effect, pending her application for permission to appeal of the High Court judgment in Hossain, set out above but (2) notes that it is not suggested that the FTT’s observations were available to inform the Defendant’s decision making in the index period prior to his successful appeal…In so far as the observations of the FTT judgment with respect to the evidential value of the generic evidence available to the Defendant, and the approach thereto, are to be used to gauge the lawfulness of the Defendant’s decision making, it is contended that those observations stand to be assessed in light of predated and rendered unreliable by the UT’s subsequent decisions the guidance promulgated in DK and RK…on the proper approach to the evidence, the concessions of the appellant’s own experts there recorded, and NK’s acceptance that he sat, and failed by a significant margin, the Listening and Reading modules of the ETS test just days prior to his arrangement of the index tests at Darwin College.”
[49]As regards the first part of para 100(b) (before the sub-sub paragraphs), the Defendant’s purported reliance on the UT’s decision as to “the strength of the ETS’s evidence” offends the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn for the reasons I have identified in relation to earlier passages; the Presidential Panel’s findings are clearly relied on as evidence of that proposition. As I have noted, this rule does not prevent the Defendant from relying on evidence that was before the UT, and I do not make any determination at this stage on the Claimant’s point about the evidence post-dating the acts relied upon (paras 21 and 41 above).[50]As regards para 100(b)(ii), the first part of this text is uncontentious. However, the Defendant’s reliance upon the UT’s assessment of the generic evidence and its related guidance in DK and RK offends the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn for the reasons I have identified at paras 20-22 and 25. By contrast, the Defendant’s reliance upon the concessions made by the experts and the later discovered material regarding C6’s earlier test results do not offend this rule. I reiterate that I do not make any determination at this stage on the Claimant’s point about the Defendant’s knowledge of the evidence post-dating the acts relied upon (paras 21 and 41 above).[51]Accordingly, I decline permission to amend the passages in 100(b) and 100(b)(ii) in their current formulation, but I have recognised that some of the material contained therein is permissible.

C11

[52]For the record, no objection is raised to the Defendant’s proposed amendments at paras 7(b), 7(c), 15, 16, 36, 62(a)(i), (ii) and (iv), 62(b), 63 and 77 of its draft.

Para 6

[53]C11 objects to para 6 of the draft Amended Defence on the basis it contains an insinuation of fraud. The text states:
“While SR has set out a number of general allegations at ¶¶1; 5-44 said to be relevant to a “group of claims”, the Defendant’s position is that (1) there is no group litigation order in place and (2) the examination of whether an individual has cheated in his/her test is was at all material times, inherently, fact-sensitive. 4. Paragraph 1 is therefore disputed. SR’s claim that he was treated unlawfully fellalls to be assessed on its facts, having regard to the evidence of fraud available: a. with respect to corruption at the test centres where SR claimeds to have been wasexamined,” b. the evidence of SR’s TOEIC test, and the documentary records linking him to the date and place where he claims to havesat athat test.”
[54]This concern is not well-founded. The deletions to this paragraph remove the allegations of fraud. The Defendant is entitled to rely on the evidence that was available to it at the time, as I have explained earlier and, indeed, the Claimants have accepted this in relation to various other passages.[55]Accordingly, this proposed amendment is permissible.

Para 7(a)

[56]C11 objects to para 7(a)(i)-(iii) on the basis it contains an insinuation of fraud. It states:
“Of the TOEIC test referred to above and below: i. On 17 October 2012, SR claimeds to have taken a test at Colwell College. ii. There wasis significant evidence to conclude that the certificate was fraudulently obtained by the use of a proxy test taker. iii. It was the results of the test sat by a proxy that were The certificate obtainedwas submitted for the purposes of SR’s application for leave to remain under Tier 4 rules on 7 December 2012.” i. On 17 October 2012, SR claimeds to have taken a test at Colwell College. ii. There wasis significant evidence to conclude that the certificate was fraudulently obtained by the use of a proxy test taker. iii. It was the results of the test sat by a proxy that were The certificate obtainedwas submitted for the purposes of SR’s application for leave to remain under Tier 4 rules on 7 December 2012.”
[57]I can see no basis for this objection. C11 did claim to have taken a test at Colwell College and in this regard, I rely on the point I made at para 16 above. The Defendant is entitled to aver that there was significant evidence to conclude that the certificate was fraudulently obtained and it is a matter of fact that it was submitted for the purposes of his Tier 4 application.[58]Accordingly, the proposed amendments in para 7 are permissible.

Para 8

[59]The Claimant objects to para 8 on the basis that it contains a direct allegation of fraud. It states:
“In light of the above, the speaking test recorded and retained under SR’s Unique Test Identity Number was not SR’s (which he accepts), and therefore theDefendant avers that the test certificate produced as a result of that recording, andresultsthus the certificate submitted in support of SR’s application for leave, were was the product ofconducted by a multiple, proxy test takeron SR’s behalf.”
[60]I accept that the Claimant’s objection is well-founded. This paragraph does not make any averments about the evidence before the Defendant or its state of knowledge at the material time; it is a direct allegation that the test certificate submitted by C11 was the product of a test undertaken by a proxy test taker. This can only be being raised to suggest that C11 did not take the test himself and was party to a fraud and, as such, it is precluded by the issue estoppel.[61]Accordingly, I refuse permission to rely upon the proposed amendment to para 8 of the Defendant’s draft.

Para 9

[62]The Claimant objects to para 9 on the basis it contains a direct allegation of fraud or an insinuation of fraud on his part. The text states:
“The Defendant relies upon the strength of the evidence available at the material timethat SR’s test was taken by someone other than him. That evidence at all material timesincludeding the wider evidence of fraud available with respect to the operation of tests by Colwell College, both on the day purports to havesat his test and on other days in the index period, SR’s own acceptance that the voice on the audio file for the test retained by ETS under his Unique Test ID numberis not his and the wider evidence of the centre operating fraudulently and not conducting tests under genuine examination conditions.”
[63]The difficulty with this paragraph as currently drafted is that it does not make clear why the Defendant relies upon the strength of the evidence available. If it is in support of its state of knowledge and/or the reasonableness of its actions and/or causation, I do not see a basis for objection. However, given the current ambiguity, the paragraph could also be read as an assertion / implication that C11 did participate in TOEIC fraud.[64]Accordingly, I would not grant permission to amend on the basis of the current wording of the draft paragraph, but it seems to me that it could be re-worded to remove the concern I have expressed (if that is the Defendant’s intention).

Para 21

[65]C11 objects to para 21 on the basis that it offends the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn. The text says:
“The voice recognition process has since been examined by a number of Presidential Panels of the Upper Tribunal. It is material to the assessment of the reasonableness of the Defendant’s decision making that tThe Tribunal has concluded, on successive occasions, that the process has been shown to be clearly and overwhelmingly reliable in pointing to an individual test entry as the product of a repeated voice: DK & RK…”
[66]I agree that the text as currently drafted offends this rule, for the reasons I have identified at paras 20-22 and 25 above. The Defendant seeks to rely on the UT’s factual findings that the process was “clearly and overwhelmingly reliable in pointing to an individual test entry as the product of a repeated voice” as evidence of that proposition and, in turn, that its decision making was reasonable.[67]Accordingly, I refuse permission to rely upon this proposed amendment.

Para 30

[68]C11 also objects to para 30 from the third sentence onwards on the basis it offends the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn. The text states:
“Paragraphs 20 to 27 comprise a series of selective citations from the sequence of Presidential Panel determinations on TOEIC fraud, omitting the key determinations of the Court of Appeal in R (Shehzad and anr) v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 615, the Administrative Court in R (Abbas) v SSHD [2017] EWHC 78 (Admin), the Court of Appeal in the Upper Tribunal in DK & RK ... The Defendant will rely upon that jurisprudence in full. With respect to test centres operating as ‘fraud factories’, the guidance of the Presidential Panel in DK & RK is that it is overwhelmingly likely that those individuals to whom the proxy results were attributed are those who took / obtained their tests by that method. The Defendant contends that any challenge to the reasonableness of its decision-making, premised upon the same or similar generic evidence, stands to be assessed in light of (1) the contemporaneous evaluation of that evidence by an expert tribunal and (2) the guidance as to approach to be adopted to that evidence in DK and RK. The Defendant will rely, in respect of paragraphs 25-7, in defending the reasonableness of its decision making and on the issue of causation, inter alia, upon the concessions of Professor Sommer, recorded in DK and RK (1) that candidates would not remain in ignorance that tests were being taken on their behalf: and (2) that it was very unlikely that there were accidental errors in the production or transmission of results.”
[69]As I have already observed, there is nothing objectionable, in itself, in noting that the passages in the Particulars of Claim are selective. However, the third and fourth sentences do offend the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn for the reasons I have identified at paras 20-22 and 25 above. The Defendant seeks to rely on the UT’s factual findings that it is overwhelmingly likely that those individuals to whom the proxy results were attributed are those who took / obtained their tests by that method, as evidence of that proposition and, turn, in support of the proposition that its decision making was reasonable. The fifth sentence does not offend the rule because it refers to evidence given before the UT. I reiterate that I am not deciding the timing issue at this stage (paras 21 and 41 above).[70]Accordingly, I refuse permission to make the amendment as it is currently drafted, but part of the text could be used in a revised version.

Para 31

[71]C11 objects to the final sentence of para 31 on the basis it contains an insinuation of fraud. The text states:
“In so far as SR contends that any test centre made these arrangements for SR and otherswithout (1) remuneration and (2) acandidates being aware of their test results being obtained by use of fraud, this submission is contradicted by the evidence of various test centre’s practices.”
[72]I agree with the objection. The passage contains an insinuation of fraud on the part of candidates that extends to C11 (“without… a candidate being aware…”). It is directed to C11’s (and other candidates’) state of knowledge at the time and asserts or suggests dishonesty on his part. It is not related to the Defendant’s state of knowledge / reasonableness of its actions.[73]Accordingly, I refuse permission for the proposed amendment, and the last sentence of the existing text must be reworded or removed so as to avoid the insinuation that C11 obtained his test certificate fraudulently.

Para 46

[74]C11 objects to para 46 on the basis it offends the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn. The text states:
“By its determination and reasons of 11 March 2024, the Presidential Panel (Mr Justice Dove, President and UT Judge Mandalia) dismissed both appeals, and expressed itself entirely satisfied that the SSHD had discharged the burden that the first appellant had employed dishonesty to secure the TOEIC speaking and writing score he had relied upon in support of his application for leave to enter the UK as a Tier 4 student. Any challenge to the reasonableness of the Defendant’s treatment of the same or similar generic evidence in SR’s case stands to be assessed by reference to the guidance promulgated, and consistent, concurrent conclusions reached on that evidence by the expert tribunal.”
[75]This paragraph is the equivalent of para 38 of the draft Amended Defence in C6’s case. It offends the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn for the same reasons. Accordingly, the first part of the paragraph, which appears in the existing wording of the Defence should be removed and I refuse permission to amend the paragraph by way of the additional proposed wording.

Para 48

[76]C11 objects to the second sentence onwards of para 48 on the basis that it contains a direct allegation / insinuation of fraud. It says:
“The Defendant notes and avers the evidence of widespread cheating at various test centres, and the evidence of a proxy test taker that appeared tolinks SR to this fraud. The Defendant relies upon the strength of the evidence available that SR’s test was taken by someone other than him, including the wider evidence of fraud available with respect to the operation of tests at Colwell College, both on the day he purports to havesat his test and on other days in the index period, SR’s own acceptance that the voice on the audio file for the test retained by ETS under his Unique Test ID/Certificate numberis not his and the wider evidence of test centres operating fraudulently or not being genuine. It is further averred that the evidence available at this stagesuggesteds strongly that SR and other candidates attending Colwell College on said date were wasboth aware of, and a participant in, such fraudulent activity.”
[77]I consider that this paragraph is unobjectionable relying, as it does, on the evidence that was available to the Defendant as to TOEIC fraud. I was initially concerned by the last sentence, but I note the change of “suggests” to “suggested”, which I take to be an indication that the Defendant is here setting out the evidence as it appeared to the Home Office at the material time, rather than making an allegation that as matters now stand it appears that C11 participated in the fraudulent TOEIC activity at Colwell College.[78]Accordingly, the amendment to para 48 is permissible.

Para 62(a)

[79]C11 objects to para 62(a)(iii)-(iv) on the basis it contains an insinuation of fraud. It is necessary to set out some of the surrounding text in para 62, in order to provide the context: a. “Of the TOEIC test referred to above and below: i. Pending the Defendant’s application for permission to appeal, the Defendant is estopped and thus admits that, oOn 17 October 2012, SR took claimto have takena test at Colwell College. ii. There was at all material timesissignificant evidence to conclude that the certificate was fraudulently obtained by the use of a proxy test taker. iii. It was the results of the test sat by a proxy that weremarked by ETS and a Secure English Language Certificate attesting to the proxy test taker’s proficiency was submitted for the purposes of SR’s application for leave to remain under Tier 4 rules on 7 December 2012. iv. There is strong evidence (including from audits) to suggest that Colwell College, the test centre which is recorded to have submitted saidan audio recording containing the voice of a proxy testto ETS was operating in an unauthorised manner which included the conduct of its tests at a location other than that authorised, and subject to audit inspections, by ETS. v. Auditors attending Colwell College in June 2012 encountered attempts to prevent ETS auditors from entering the test centres. Examination conditions observed, were not reflective of proper test conditions. Pilot test taker telephone numbers were further discovered at the College. vi. ETS has a record of SR’s speaking test. Having undertaken a check of the test, ETS notified confirmed tothe Home Office that there was significant evidence of the use of a proxy test taker. The scores from the TOEIC test taken on 17 October 2012 have been cancelled.”[80]I note that no objection is taken to sub-sub paras (i), (ii), (v) and (vi). I consider that sub-sub para (iv) is permissible as it refers to the evidence available to the Defendant as to the way in which Colwell College was operating more generally. However, sub-sub para (iii) does contain an allegation / insinuation of fraud on the part of C11 which is therefore precluded by the issue estoppel. It says in terms that the test submitted in support of C11’s application for leave to remain was one taken by a proxy. It is not an averment as to the Defendant’s state of knowledge at the time or the evidence available to it.[81]Accordingly, the existing text of sub-sub para (iii) needs to be removed or rewritten, and I refuse the application to amend the wording in the terms of the draft supplied. The proposed amendment to sub-sub para (iv) is permissible.

Para 64

[82]C11 objects to the wording of para 64 on the basis that it contains a direct allegation / insinuation of fraud on his part. The text says:
“The Defendant relies upon the strength of the evidence then available that SR’s test was taken by someone other than him, including the wider evidence of fraud available with respect to the operation of tests by Colwell College, both on the day hepurports to have sat a histest and on other days in the index period, SR’s own acceptance that the voice on the audio file for retained by ETS underthe test with SR’s Unique Test ID Number,and matching the date and time of his attendance, is not his and the wider evidence of the centre operating fraudulently and not conducting tests under genuine examination conditions.”
[83]The Claimant, rightly, raises no objection to para 63 which avers that the test results submitted by C11 were reasonably assessed by the Defendant, on the basis of the evidence available to it at the time, as conducted by a multiple, proxy test taker on his behalf. Para 64 then identifies the evidence that the Defendant relies upon in that regard. The allegation of fraud by C11 has been deleted from this text.[84]Accordingly, the proposed amendment to para 64 is permissible.

Para 78

[85]C11 objects to para 78 on the basis it contains a direct allegation of fraud. It says:
“At paragraph 108(iii), it is denied that the representations made by SR contradicted and/or undermined the reliability of ETS’s analysis. The actual scores certified by ETS, including ST’s, were in any event, as SR now appears to accept, by persons other than the student relying upon them.”
[86]This objection is well-founded. As currently worded, the text avers that C11’s scores were in fact obtained by someone else. This is an allegation / insinuation of fraud on this part. In order to comply with the Main Judgment, this paragraph must be removed or re-worded.

Para 79

[87]C11 objects to para 79 on the basis it offends the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn. The text states:
“At paragraph 129(iii), the Particulars of Claim again recite selectively from the sequence of determinations of the Upper Tribunal’s Presidential Panels and omits the determination in DK & RK …specifically concerned with the strength of the evidence available as to the chain of custody linking fraudulent / proxy test recordings and the test purported to have been sat by an individual candidate. The Defendant will rely upon the full determination andits examination of the security of ETS’s systems and/or the record of the evidence set out in the Tribunal’s judgment as bearing upon the reasonableness of the Defendant’s decision making premised upon the same or similar evidence relating to Colwell College, then operating as a “fraud factory.”
[88]As I have already observed, there is nothing objectionable in itself in noting that parts of the Particulars of Claim are selective. However, the majority of this paragraph does offend the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn for the reasons I have identified at paras 20-22 and 25 above. The Defendant seeks to rely on the UT’s factual findings as to the strength of the chain of custody evidence and as to the security of ETS’s systems, as evidence of those propositions and, turn, in support of the proposition that its decision making was reasonable. As I have also indicated earlier, this rule does not preclude the Defendant from relying on the evidence that was before the UT; and I reiterate that I am not deciding the timing issue at this stage (paras 21 and 41 above).[89]Accordingly, the existing wording of this paragraph requires removal or rewording and I refuse permission to rely on the proposed amendment. However, the last part of the amended text, referring to the evidence before the UT could be included in a re-drafted version.

Paras 82 and 83

[90]I will take these two paragraphs together. The complaint is that the wording contains direct allegations / insinuations of fraud. It states:
“82. The Defendant relies upon the strength of the evidence available to the Defendant pointing to its conclusionthat SR’s test was taken by someone other than him, including the wider evidence of fraud available with respect to the operation of tests at Colwell College, both on the day the Defendant is estopped from denying (and the Claimant admits he purports to havesat his test and on other days in the index period, SR’s own acceptance that the voice on the audio file provided to him by ETSfor the test is not his and the wider evidence of test centres operating fraudulently or not being genuine. 83. Paragraph 109 is therefore not admitted and SR is required to prove his case. In particular, the Defendant at all material times recorded accurately the notification of its identification of deception in connection with SR’s speaking and writing test received from ETS.”
[91]The text of para 82 is focused upon the evidence available to the Defendant. As such, it is not precluded by the issue estoppel. I also consider that para 83 is unobjectionable; it refers to the Defendant’s recording of the information it received from ETS regarding C11’s test. It does not assert that the information it received was correct.[92]Accordingly, the proposed amendments to paras 82 and 83 are permissible.[93]The Claimants’ submissions suggest that, as a matter of procedure, the Court should refuse the Defendant’s application to amend because C2’s strike out application failed and that the correct course would then be for the Claimant to make a further strike out application in relation to passages in the Defence that it considers offend the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn.[94]I do not propose to adopt that approach. The application to amend the Defence has been made and there is no reason for the Court not to engage with the substance of it. The objections that have been raised relate to matters I addressed in the Main Judgment. To decline to deal with them at this stage and instead await a further application from the Claimant would simply lead to delay and increased costs. Both parties have had the opportunity to address the points that are in issue.[95]There are no unopposed amendments in C2’s case. Each of the Claimant’s objections is on the basis the text offends the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn.

Para 17

[96]The text states:
“It is material to the challenge to the lawfulness of the Defendant’s reliance upon the apparent reliability of ETS’svoice recognition process, that said processhas since been examined by a number of Presidential Panels of the Upper Tribunal. The Tribunal has concluded that the process has been shown to be clearly and overwhelmingly reliable in pointing to an individual test entry as the product of a repeated voice: DK & RK…”
[97]The wording of this paragraph clearly offends the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn for the reasons I have identified earlier. The Defendant seeks to rely on the facts found by the UT that the process undertaken by the ETS was “clearly and overwhelmingly reliable” in pointing to an individual test entry as the product of a repeated voice” as evidence of that proposition and, in turn, in support of the lawfulness / reasonableness of its reliance upon this process.[98]Accordingly, the existing wording of para 17 needs to be removed or re-written and I refuse permission to make the proposed amendment.

Para 27

[99]The text states:
“Paragraphs 20 to 27 comprise a series of selective citations from the sequence of Presidential Panel determinations on TOEIC fraud, omitting the key determinations of the Court of Appeal in R (Shehzad and anr) v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 615, the Administrative Court in R (Abbas) v SSHD[2017] EWHC 78 (Admin), the Court of Appeal [sic] in the Upper Tribunal in DK and RK [2022] UKUT 112 IAC. The Defendant will rely upon that jurisprudence in full as it is material to the challenge to the reasonableness of the Defendant’s decision making.With respect to test centres operating as 'fraud factories', a description that applies to Colwell College, the guidance of the Presidential Panel in DK and RK is that it is overwhelmingly likely that those individuals to whom the proxy results were attributed are those who took/obtained their tests by that method.”
[100]The wording of this paragraph clearly offends the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn for the reasons I have identified earlier. The Defendant seeks to rely on the factual findings of the UT that it is “overwhelming likely” that those individuals to whom the proxy results were attributed took / obtained their tests by that method as evidence of that proposition and, in turn, in support of the reasonableness of its decision making.[101]Accordingly, the existing wording of para 27 needs to be removed or re-written and I refuse permission to make the proposed amendment

Para 28

[102]The text states:
“With respect to paragraphs 28-29, the Defendant’s position is that these paragraphs consist of argument and submissions which do not reflect the practices observed at test centres in cases cited in the preceding paragraphs and are premised upon speculation rather than evidence. Material to the challenge to the reasonableness of Defendant’s decision making is againee also the consideration of such an assertion in Varkey…, the concession of the Appellant’s expert recorded at ¶96. See also the concessions of Professor Sommer giving evidence in DK and RK, recorded at ¶85 that (1) it was quite clear that candidates would not remain in ignorance that tests were being taken on their behalf, (2) it was very unlikely that there were accidental errors in the production or transmission of results.”
[103]Most of this paragraph is unobjectionable. The Defendant is entitled to rely on the point made in the first sentence. As I have already explained, reliance upon the evidence before the UT in DK and RK and in Varkey does not offend the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn. However, the second sentence goes further and relies upon the UT’ consideration of “such an assertion” in Varkey. The assertion in question – in paras 28 – 29 of the Particulars of Claim – related to possible ways that test centres could have operated the fraud without the candidate’s knowledge, including by the use of hidden rooms. The reference to the UT’s “consideration” of this issue, must be a reference to the findings that it made. This sentence indicates an intention to rely upon the findings of fact made in Varkey regarding the operation of hidden rooms, as evidence of that proposition and, in turn, to support the reasonableness of the Defendant’s decision making. As such, it offends the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn.[104]Accordingly, the second sentence of para 28 needs to be removed or re-written before permission could be given to rely on the amended paragraph.

Para 46

[105]The text states:
“By its determination and reasons of 11 March 2024, the Presidential Panel (Mr Justice Dove, President and UT Judge Mandalia) dismissed both appeals, and expressed itself entirely satisfied that the SSHD had discharged the burden that the first appellant had employed dishonesty to secure the TOEIC speaking and writing score he had relied upon in support of his application of leave to enter the UK as a Tier 4 student.”
[106]This paragraph, which has not been the subject of any proposed amendment, offends the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn for the reasons I have identified earlier. Whilst the purpose of pleading this is not spelt out, the Defendant clearly seeks to rely on the findings of fact made in Varkey as evidence of the fact that the appellant had employed dishonesty to secure his TOEIC certificate.[107]Accordingly, para 46 must be removed or amended to comply with my rulings in the Main Judgment.

Para 109(d)

[108]The text states:
“Contrary to paragraph 115(d), i. The particulars of claim again recite selectively from an expert report considered by the Tribunal in MA…; ii. The submission that the concerns in MA were subsequently “vindicated” by a report of the APPG on TOEIC and/or disclosure or forensic developments in the Upper Tribunal omits to mention that aPresidential Panel of the Upper Tribunal, in DK & RK … specifically considered the strength of the evidence available as to the chain of custody linking fraudulent/proxy test recordings and the test purported to have been sat by an individual candidate. The UT further found that it was clear beyond peradventure that where there is evidence from ETS that points to the test relied upon by the individual as having been taken by someone other than that person, that was strong evidence that would weigh against the individual and calls for a credible explanation; iii. The Defendant will rely, in rebuttal to the challenge to the reasonableness and lawfulness of its decision makingupon the full determination and its examination of the security of ETS’s systems, including the record of the evidence therein of the concessions made by experts instructed by the appellants, see DK and RK, supra at, §86 Varkey at §§96, 106-7 (that record being also relied upon generally).The UT concluded that the voice recognition process adopted by ETS was “clearly and overwhelmingly” reliable in pointing to an individual test entry as the product of a repeated voice. iv. Those conclusions were not found “in any way undermined” by the evidence of Mr Shury and Mr Stanbury considered by a Presidential Panel of the Upper Tribunal in Varkey…¶108.” i. The particulars of claim again recite selectively from an expert report considered by the Tribunal in MA…; ii. The submission that the concerns in MA were subsequently “vindicated” by a report of the APPG on TOEIC and/or disclosure or forensic developments in the Upper Tribunal omits to mention that aPresidential Panel of the Upper Tribunal, in DK & RK … specifically considered the strength of the evidence available as to the chain of custody linking fraudulent/proxy test recordings and the test purported to have been sat by an individual candidate. The UT further found that it was clear beyond peradventure that where there is evidence from ETS that points to the test relied upon by the individual as having been taken by someone other than that person, that was strong evidence that would weigh against the individual and calls for a credible explanation; iii. The Defendant will rely, in rebuttal to the challenge to the reasonableness and lawfulness of its decision makingupon the full determination and its examination of the security of ETS’s systems, including the record of the evidence therein of the concessions made by experts instructed by the appellants, see DK and RK, supra at, §86 Varkey at §§96, 106-7 (that record being also relied upon generally).The UT concluded that the voice recognition process adopted by ETS was “clearly and overwhelmingly” reliable in pointing to an individual test entry as the product of a repeated voice. iv. Those conclusions were not found “in any way undermined” by the evidence of Mr Shury and Mr Stanbury considered by a Presidential Panel of the Upper Tribunal in Varkey…¶108.”
[109]No objection is taken to para 109(d)(i). Sub-sub para (ii) plainly offends the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn for the reasons I have identified earlier. The Defendant seeks to rely on the UT’s findings of fact / its guidance based on its findings of fact as indicating that where the material from ETS pointed to the test having been taken by someone other than the candidate, this was “strong evidence” that weighed against the individual. Sub-sub para (iii) is a combination of the permissible and the impermissible. As I have noted earlier, reliance on the evidence before the UT does not offend the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn. However, reliance upon the UT’s factual findings that the voice recognition process adopted by ETS was “clearly and overwhelmingly” reliable, plainly does where, as here, this is relied on as evidence of the facts found. Sub-sub para (iv) also offends this rule as the Defendant relies on the stated finding in Varkey in relation to the evidence of Mr Shury and Mr Stanbury.[110]Accordingly, the existing wording of para 109(d)(ii)-(iv) requires substantial amendment in order to comply with the Main Judgment. In addition, I decline to permit the proposed amendments in their current form.

Form of my order

[111]Whilst some of the proposed amendments to the Defences are uncontentious or legitimate, others are not permissible, as they offend the rulings I made in the Main Judgment. In addition, further amendments are required to the existing text of the Defences in order for them to comply with my earlier rulings. I have identified each of these points as I have reviewed each of the draft Amended Defences. It is undesirable for the amendments to be made piecemeal. Accordingly, rather than making an order at this stage allowing certain listed amendments and refusing others, I consider the better course is for me to make an order directing that the Defendant file and serve revised draft Amended Defences by a stipulated date, the contents of which reflect the rulings I have given in the Main Judgment and in this supplementary judgment.[112]Whilst I very much hope that on this occasion the draft amended pleadings will indeed reflect my rulings, so that this will not be necessary, I will also make provision in the order for the Claimants to raise written objections to any of the proposed amendments and for any response to those objections by the Defendant. Any objections that are raised are to be limited to the issues covered by the Main Judgment and this ruling and I hope the Claimants will first reflect on the objections that I have rejected at this stage before filing any further submissions. Given the time of year, I will allow a little longer than I otherwise would for these various steps.[113]The revised draft Amended Defences are to be submitted for my approval. Once I know whether there are any objections from the Claimant to be addressed (and any responses from the Defendant), I will determine whether approval will be given. My decision will be based on the papers. I will make a further order at that stage and, assuming approval is given, I will then give the Claimants the opportunity to amend their pleadings in response, if so advised.[114]The Claimant argued that the Defendant should bear the costs of the applications. The Defendant contended that I should order costs to be in the case. Since it will be necessary for me to further consider the applications to amend the Defence pursuant to the process I have just outlined, it appears sensible for me to comprehensively consider how to deal with the costs relating to the applications to amend at that juncture. Accordingly, I will reserve a decision on the appropriate costs orders to be made until then. It would not be appropriate for me to leave this topic without expressing surprise at the extent to which the parties were unable to agree appropriate amendments at this stage. I hope that a more constructive and co-operative approach will apply going forward.