Kevin Cadogan t/a Ebonycare & Ors v London Borough of Haringey [2026] EWHC 1972 (KB)

[2026] EWHC 1972 (KB)Case No KA-2023-000187
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 29/07/2026
Before
MR JUSTICE CAVANAGH
Between
(1) KEVIN CADOGAN t/a EBONYCAREClaimant(2) EBONYCARE LIMITEDClaimant(3) EBONYCARE (A FIRM)ClaimantLONDON BOROUGH OF HARINGEY
MR CADOGAN for CLAIMANTMR O SAROMI for Defendant
JudgmentThis judgment was circulated to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................
[1]MR JUSTICE CAVANAGH: I am, somewhat unusually, providing a written judgment at the end of a half-day hearing which was listed primarily to resolve disagreements about the contents of the Appellants’ Appeal Bundle. The hearing took place yesterday, 28 July 2026. It is, of course, unusual in itself for half a day of court time to be taken up with matters of this sort. The main reason why I am providing a written judgment is to provide the judge who deals with the next hearing with a summary of the issues in the case, and its procedural history.[2]Mr Cadogan has also filed an application notice seeking payment of £50,000 which has been held by the Sheriff’s Office since 2018 in part execution of a default judgment that Mr Cadogan had obtained. The default judgment was then set aside. The Respondent said that I should order that this sum should be paid out to the Respondent. I will deal with this issue at the end of this judgment.[3]The Appellants seek permission to appeal and an extension of time in relation to a number of orders and rulings made in proceedings in Central London County Court against the Respondent local authority. The Appellants are the claimants in these proceedings. I will refer to them as the claimants, and to the Respondent as the defendant.[4]The claimants seek permission to appeal in relation to the judgment and order of HHJ Monty KC in these proceedings, dated 18 August 2023, for which an extension of time for appealing has already been granted (by Sir Stephen Stewart, on 5 December 2023). The Appellant also seeks an extension of time for appealing and permission to appeal in relation to three earlier orders. These are an order of HHJ Luba KC dated 14 February 2020 (but sealed on 25 February 2020), which I will call the “Luba Order”, a consent order dated 11 June 202,0 “the Consent Order”, and the His Honour Judge Gerald’s order dated 8 July 2022, “the Gerald Order”.[5]The claimants were represented before me by Mr Cadogan, a litigant in person, who is the first claimant. The defendant is represented by Mr Ololade Saromi, who has been counsel for the defendant throughout these proceedings (which have, so far, lasted some eight years). In his skeleton argument for this hearing, filed late in the evening before the hearing, Mr Saromi said that, on 6 November 2023, the second claimant, a limited company, had been made subject to a winding up order by Insolvency and Companies Court Judge Greenwood, on the petition of HMRC; that in or around June 2025, the liquidator of the second claimant agreed to assign the second claimant’s interest in the claim to the defendant and duly executed under seal a Deed of Assignment; and that on or around 24 November 2025, the defendant paid £5,000 to the liquidator in consideration for the assignment. The skeleton argument said that the defendant awaits the counter-executed copy of the Deed, though Mr Saromi said that he had a copy of the Deed in court. Mr Cadogan did not see the skeleton argument until the start of the hearing, at which point I adjourned for a few minutes to give him the opportunity to read it. He said that this was the first time he had heard of such an assignment. He said that he had also signed a Deed of Assignment in relation to the second claimant.[6]If the second claimant’s interests in these proceedings have been assigned to the defendant, then this will have major implications for these proceedings. As things stand, in light of HHJ Monty’s ruling, only the second claimant has any extant claims against the defendant. However, both parties agreed that it was not necessary for me to address the Deed of Assignment issue for the purposes of this hearing. The main purpose of this hearing, as I have said, has been to resolve disputes about the contents of the Appeal Bundle. Mr Saromi was content for Mr Cadogan to represent all three claimants for this limited purpose. The issues in the proceedings and the appeal[7]In order to resolve the disputes about the documentation to go into the Appeal Bundle, it is necessary first to identify the central issues in the case and in the appeal. What follows is just a brief summary of these issues. A more detailed summary of the issues can be found in the judgment of HHJ Monty KC dated 18 August 2023.[8]The proceedings in the County Court commenced on 18 August 2018. At that stage, Mr Cadogan was the sole claimant. He claimed the sum of £101,598.72 in respect of unpaid or part-paid invoices, plus statutory late payment interest and compensation, in respect of services provided to the defendant by a business called “Ebonycare”. Ebonycare provided child placement services to the defendant, until Ebonycare’s care homes were closed down by Ofsted in 2016.[9]Mr Cadogan contended that he had contracted with the defendant as a sole trader.[10]The defendant’s defence has several strands to it. First, the defendant claims that it has paid in full all of the valid invoices rendered by Ebonycare. Second, the defendant said that Mr Cadogan had not been the other contracting party at any stage. The defendant averred that the services to which the claim relates were supplied pursuant to two separate and successive contracts: the London Care Placements Model Contract 2010 (the “2010 Contract”) and the London Model Contract 2014 (“the 2014 Contract”). The defendant averred that the counterparty to the 2010 Contract was a firm of partners trading as “Ebonycare”, and consisting of Mr Cadogan and one or more of his parents, i.e. the third claimant, and that the counterparty to the 2014 contract was a limited company trading as “Ebonycare”, i.e. the second claimant, for which Mr Cadogan is the sole director. Accordingly, the defendant denied ever having contracted with, or being indebted to, Mr Cadogan. The defendant denied that it would ever enter into a contract with a sole trader for child placements.[11]The correct identity of the claimant has particular relevance for limitation purposes. The second claimant, the partnership, was joined to these proceedings on 11 June 2020, by means of the Consent Order. This joinder was on the condition that:
“it is agreed between the parties that the Second Claimant is statute barred in respect of invoices claimed in these proceedings that were either dated or paid/part paid prior to 8 June 2014”
. The third claimant, the limited company, was joined to the proceedings on 8 July 2022 by means of the Gerald Order on the offered basis that the third claimant is statute barred in respect of invoices that were either dated or paid/part paid prior to 6 July 2016.[12]The trial before HHJ Monty KC dealt with two sets of issues. The first was concerned with which of the claimants was the contracting party at various times, and the second was concerned with Mr Cadogan’s argument that the 2010 Contract entered into by deed, rather than by simple contract, so that the limitation period was 12 years rather than 6 years.[13]In a detailed judgment, following a six-day hearing, HHJ Monty KC made the following key findings:(1) The contracting party for the 2010 contract was the third claimant and so the third claimant is the correct claimant in relation to all invoices up to 30 March 2013;(2) The parties did not in fact enter into the 2014 contract. From 31 March 2013 onwards, all child placements by the defendant with Ebonycare were with the second claimant, the partnership, trading as Ebonycare;(3) The 2010 contract took effect as a simple contract and not a deed, and a six-year limitation period applied to all invoices from Ebonycare to the defendant;(4) Accordingly, as he was not a contracting party in the capacity of sole trader at any stage, the claims of Mr Cadogan were dismissed;(5) The claims by the third claimant in relation to invoices dating back before 31 March 2013 (when the third claimant was the contracting party) are all statue-barred and so the claims of the third claimant were also dismissed; and(6) The claims of the second claimant are statute-barred save to the extent that they relate to invoices after 8 June 2014, six years before the second claimant was joined in the proceedings.[14]The remaining part of the proceedings, therefore, will be concerned with the second claimant’s claims in relation to 32 invoices relating to the period after 8 June 2014. HHJ Monty KC gave directions for a final hearing to determine these claims, with a time estimate of two days. The trial was to be listed for the first available date after 14 January 2024. That is, of course, long gone, and the trial of the second stage of the proceedings is yet to be listed.[15]The claimants filed an Appellant’s Notice accompanied by Grounds of Appeal. The claimants’ appeal relates to the Luba Order, the Consent Order and the Gerald Order, but the main thrust of it is an appeal against HHJ Monty KC’s judgment. The claimants take issue with the judge’s identification of the contracting parties, which, as I have said, has consequences for the limitation issues, and with the judge’s finding that the 2010 Contract was not a deed. The detailed grounds of appeal make many criticisms of HHJ Monty KC’s judgment. These include allegations of bias, and allegations that the defendant muddied the waters by non-disclosure of evidence. The claimants contend that HHJ Monty KC erred in allowing the trial to go ahead with a grossly deficient trial bundle. There are allegations that the judge gave too much or too little weight to some considerations. In particular, Mr Cadogan says that the judge failed to take account sufficiently of a document that was signed by his mother and which, he says, shows that the 2010 Contract was a deed. That document was provided to the defendant as an exhibit to a witness statement by Mr Cadogan dated 17 June 2021. He submits that there has been a concealment by the Defendant in relation to that document, such that when the Consent Order was made in June 2020, the parties were proceeding on the basis of inadequate evidence. He says that this ought to be opened up so that the Consent Order might be set aside. Mr Cadogan also says that the judge erred in the way that he dealt with comments made by Mr Cadogan after the draft judgment was circulated. There is also an allegation of bias against HHJ Luba KC.[16]In a judgment delivered at a hearing on 22 February 2024, Freedman J said:
“There are, undoubtedly, very significant obstacles the defendant would have to surmount, both in relation to time and in relation to the matters relating to his apparent consent as recorded in the orders. It also does not follow from the fact that there are complaints in relation to disclosure, that that would afford any answer to the points about time or about limitation or about consent.”

The procedural history of the appeal

[17]On 5 December 2023, on the papers, Sir Stephen Steward refused an extension of time for appealing against the Luba, Consent and Gerald Orders, but he granted an extension of time for the appeal against HHJ Monty KC’s order. He did not determine the application for permission to appeal against HHJ Monty KC’s order. The judge ordered that a full fresh Appeal Bundle must be filed.[18]On 22 February 2024, there was an oral hearing before Freedman J to decide whether ruling by Sir Stephen Stewart to the effect that the appeals against the three earlier orders were out of time should be set aside, and for an extension of time to file a fresh Appeal Bundle. In the event, Freedman J decided to adjourn consideration of the time points, so that they could be dealt with in a single hearing along with the application for permission to appeal the Monty KC judgment and, if an extension of time was granted, the applications for permission to appeal against the earlier three Orders. He said that the hearing should be listed for one day.[19]Freedman J also gave directions about the Appeal Bundle. He said that only documents that are relevant and necessary to decide the issues may be included in the Bundle, which must comply with Practice Direction 52B. He gave direction for the parties to exchange lists of documents for inclusion in the Bundle. He said, at paragraph 3(6) of his order, that if there are documents in relation to which the parties are unable to reach agreement and a party insists on their inclusion, the parties have liberty to apply by letter by 4pm on 22 March 2024, and the dispute will be resolved by the Court on the papers and without a hearing by 19 April 2024.[20]Freedman J gave an oral judgment on 22 February 2024, a transcript of which has been made available to me. In addition, in the Observations which accompanied his order he said that, “The parties are expected to co-operate in this exercise which is predominantly to place before the court the relevant documents in one bundle rather than (as has happened in the past) in separate bundles of the respective parties. If there are concerns of either of the respective parties about a lack of openness, or a lack of co-operation, then this will be addressed by the Judge in the manner set out in the order”. This was a reference to sanctions, including costs.[21]It will be seen, therefore, that Freedman J intended that any dispute about bundles would be resolved on the papers and without any further hearing, and that the issues would be resolved speedily, by 19 April 2024. Unfortunately, nearly 2 and ½ years have elapsed since the hearing before Freedman J and, prior to this hearing, the Bundle had not been finalised, and the various extension of time and permission to appeal issues have not yet been determined.[22]The claimants made an application to resolve disputes about the bundle, as envisaged in paragraph 3(6) of Freedman J’s order4. The parties thereafter exchanged lists of documents, and prepared Excel spreadsheets, essentially in the form of a sort of Scott Schedule, identifying the disputed documents, or classes of documents, and summarising each party’s position in relation to each one.[23]The papers were eventually placed before Sir Stephen Stewart, who ordered on 13 November 2025 that the Bundle application be listed before a High Court Judge with a time estimate of half a day. He gave directions for a bundle of disputed documents to be prepared.

The hearing before me

[24]I dealt with the Bundle application on 28 July 2026. By that stage, agreement had been reached that a large number of documents should be included in the Appeal Bundle. There remained, however, disputes about some 80 documents, or classes of documents. I was provided with one spreadsheet that listed the agreed documents, and another that set out the disputed documents, with brief summaries of the parties’ arguments. Mr Cadogan had also, helpfully provided the court with an electronic bundle which contained his Appellant’s Notice, Grounds of Appeal, the orders and judgments below and other relevant documents. He also provided me with a much longer electronic bundle, called “exhibits”, which ran to some 2023 pages. The disputed documents were set out in Part 3 of this bundle. They ran to 1690 pages. Mr Cadogan also had a hard copy of this bundle in court.[25]The disputed documents were entirely, or almost entirely, documents that Mr Cadogan wished to include and which Mr Saromi wished to exclude. During the hearing, I went through, one by one, the 80 or so disputed documents or classes of documents, heard submissions from Mr Cadogan and Mr Saromi, and gave a ruling as to whether they should or should not be included in the bundle for the extension of time/permission to appeal hearing. I bore in mind CPR PD 52B, paragraph 6.4, which sets out what an Appeal Bundle should contain. These include the catch-all final category of “any other documents which any party considers would assist the appeal court.” I also bore in mind the firm guidance given by Freedman J to the effect that only documents that are relevant and necessary to decide the issues may be included in the Bundle. I took account of the issues in the appeal, and of the overriding objective, and the need for the Bundle to be proportionate. It is to be a Bundle for a 1-day hearing, and a large number of documents will be going into the bundle by agreement.[26]I refused to permit the great majority of the documents in the disputed documents bundle to be included in the Appeal Bundle. I gave my reasons orally at the time, and I will not set out here my reasons for each decision. In essence, however, I took the view that these documents were not relevant to the claimants’ appeal, even on the most generous interpretation of the scope of that appeal. None of the documents had any relevance to the extension of time issue.[27]I did, however, rule that 8 documents, or categories of documents, should be included in the appeal bundle. These are:(1) All witness statements of Cadene Tyser, from 7 August 2019 to 16 September 2022. Ms Tyser works in the defendant’s finance team and the defendant acknowledged that her evidence might be relevant to who was the other contracting party;(2) The draft judgment that was circulated by HHJ Monty KC. It is extremely unusual for a draft judgment to be relevant to an appeal, but in this case Mr Cadogan says that the differences between the draft and final versions of the judgment are relevant to his appeal;(3) The defendant’s skeleton arguments for the hearings before HHJs Luba KC and Gerald. Mr Cadogan says that they will shed light on his non-disclosure argument. Whether or not they will do so remains to be seen, but it cannot be discounted entirely;(4) Pages 957-959 in part 3 of the “exhibits” bundle. These are emails relating to disclosure;(5) The index prepared by the defendant’s legal team for the hearing on 28 January 2022, and all emails from the claimants or the defendant’s legal advisers relating to the preparation, or contents, of the bundle for that hearing. The hearing on that date was listed to deal with an application to join new claimants to the claim and to amend the particulars of claim. The hearing, before HHJ Lochrane, was adjourned because there was insufficient time to deal with it;(6) All emails between the parties and from the parties to the court pertaining to HHJ Monty KC’s draft judgment dated 11 July 2023, up until the date when the final judgment was handed down; and(7) Emails relating to disclosure from Mr Cadogan to Mr Saromi dated 31 January 2023, but not the exhibits and documents attached to those emails.[28]The fact that I have allowed these various documents to be included in the Appeal Bundle should not be regarded as an indication that they are crucial documents for the purposes of the extension of time/permission to appeal arguments. Some have been included out of an abundance of caution and because they are relatively short documents.[29]In an application notice dated 26 June 2026, Mr Cadogan applied for a number of documents which had been omitted from the Bundle application to be added to the Appeal Bundle, and he also applied for an order for a transcript of a conference call between the parties on or around 15 March 2024, which was a discussion about what should go into the Appeal Bundle. The defendant had not been formally served with the application notice, but it had been uploaded to CE-File and had been seen by their legal advisers, and Mr Soromi did not object to me dealing with this application. In the event, Mr Cadogan did not press this part of his application dated 26 June 2026 at the hearing. He accepted that there were no copies of the main documents in the application and that there is no transcript of the conference call.

The £50,000 which is currently held by the Sheriff’s Office

[30]At the very beginning of these proceedings, in 2018, Mr Cochran obtained judgment in default against the defendant. In part-execution of the default judgment, the defendant lodged £50,000 with the Sheriff’s Office. That sum remains with the Sheriff's Office.[31]On 19 October 2018, in the Interim Applications Court of the Business List in the High Court, Nugee J stayed the writ of control obtained by the claimant, dated 28 September 2018, pending the final determination of the defendant’s application to set aside dated 4 October 2018 in the County Court. On 26 October 2018, at Croydon County Court, DJ Bishop ordered that the defendant’s application to set aside judgment be listed for hearing, and that the writ be stayed pending the outcome of the application. At a hearing on 3 April 2019, DJ Bishop then set aside the default judgment, on condition that the defendant filed and served a fully detailed defence by 3 May 2019. The defendant met this condition, and so the judgment in default was set aside. There can be no doubt about this, because the proceedings have continued ever since.[32]In his application notice dated 26 June 2026, Mr Cadogan said that, when setting aside the default judgment, DJ Bishop expressed to Mr Saromi that the payment made generally on account by the defendant should remain with Mr Cadogan, as the court was satisfied that the money was owed. He asked me to order that the sum of £50,000 be paid to him, along with interest, less the bailiff’s fee. In the alternative, he asked me to say that the issue will be decided by the trial judge at the conclusion of proceedings.[33]For the defendant, Mr Saromi did not object to the matter being dealt with at the hearing before me, even though the application notice had not been formally served. He was in a position to deal with it. He said that the basis upon which the payment of £50,000 had been made has now fallen away, as the judgment in default has been set aside. He asked me to order that the sum now be returned to the defendant.[34]I am not prepared to order that the sum of £50,000 plus interest less charges be paid over to Mr Cochran. As Mr Saromi pointed out, the basis upon which the payment was ordered, namely that Mr Cochran obtained judgment against the defendant, no longer applies. The default judgment was set aside. More recently, HHJ Monty KC has ruled that Mr Cochran has no claim of any sort against the defendant. That is the position unless and until HHJ Monty KC’s judgment is set aside on appeal. In those circumstances, there is no proper basis for ordering this sum to be paid to Mr Cochran. There is no record of what DJ Bishop said at the hearing on 3 April 2019 but, in any event, matters have moved on since then. Mr Cochran made criticisms of the defendant’s conduct of proceedings and referred to the costs that he has incurred, but that is not what the payment lodged with the Sheriff in 2018 was for. This was lodged as part-payment of a judgment in default which has now been set aside. The £50,000 cannot be used either to punish the defendant for its conduct of proceedings (even if the defendant is open to criticism in the ways that Mr Cochran contends) or as an indirect way of obtaining a payment of costs in Mr Cochran’s favour. There can be no question of security for costs, given that the defendant is a local authority, and, anyway, the £50,000 was not lodged as security for costs.[35]On the other hand, I am not prepared to make an order at this stage that the £50,000 should be returned to the defendant. I think that it is highly likely that the defendant council is entitled to recover the money, but it has not yet made a formal application to the court for its recovery. There is no application notice to that effect before me and, in any event, I think it is a matter for the County Court to deal with, rather than the High Court on appeal. Mr Cochran had not been given notice that the defendant would ask for its money back. He was informed of this for the first time when he was shown Mr Saromi’s skeleton argument at the beginning of the hearing on 28 July 2026. I am told that the reason that there was no application before DJ Bishop on 3 April 2019 for the return of the money was because the default judgment was set aside on a conditional basis, but there was no reason why the defendant could not have filed an application for the return of the money at any point since then. It is unfortunate that the defendant will have to issue an application notice for the return of the money, but I do not think it would be fair to Mr Cochran to order it at this hearing.[36]Finally, I am not prepared to order that the matter must be dealt with by the judge who deals with the second-stage trial in the County Court, because it may well be that the defendant will make an application to recover the money which can be dealt with before then.

Conclusion

[37]I have asked Mr Saromi to draft an order which reflects the decisions I have made.[38]Now that the Appeal Bundle has been sorted out, there is no impediment to listing the one-day hearing to deal with the extension of time/permission to appeal issues. Given the very great delays that have already taken place in this case, I hope that this hearing can be fixed as soon as possible.