Eileen Roberts v Ford Motor Company Limited [2026] EWHC 1787 (KB)

[2026] EWHC 1787 (KB)

Case No QB-2019-002530

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KING’S BENCH DIVISION

Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date 25 th June 2026

Before

HIS HONOUR JUDGE TINDAL

(Sitting as a Judge of the High Court)

Between

EILEEN ROBERTSClaimant

(As the widow and administrator of the Estate of DENNIS ROBERTS, deceased)Claimant

FORD MOTOR COMPANY LIMITEDDefendant

JUDGMENT

MR PATRICK KERR appeared for Claimant

MR TOBY STEWART appeared for Defendant

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HHJ TINDAL:

[1]All mesothelioma claims are tragic, but this one may fairly be described as particularly so. When the deceased, Dennis Roberts (‘Dennis’) died on 13 October 2025, aged 74, his widow, Eileen Roberts, the Claimant (‘Eileen’) not only lost her husband of 20 years (though they had been together for almost 40 years). She also lost her live-in carer for her complex disabilities. Dennis died not only in physical pain, but with the emotional pain of knowing that he did not know what would happen to his beloved wife after his death and who would care for her. In the event, Eileen's sons - Dennis's stepsons - Paul and David stepped into the breach after his death. They tried their best to manage for about three months until early January 2026, with some carer support and significant hospital stays for Eileen. But whilst Dennis had been retired, Paul and David both worked and had families, so understandably, the strain of sharing the amount of care that Eileen needed was simply too much for either of them. As a consequence, in January 2026, Eileen went into a care home, initially on a respite basis, but after a lengthy hospital stay of three months until April 2026, she is now resident in a different care home. Whilst she would very much like to return to her own home, the medical evidence is that is not practical and she is likely to remain in that home the rest of her life, which the experts agree is sadly likely to be by the end of 2027. The expert evidence is that but for Dennis’ mesothelioma, he would have lived for almost another decade, and certainly outlived Eileen. Now the family are left to pick up the pieces without him.

[2]Against that background I can entirely understand the anger and the agony of Eileen, David and Paul – and doubtless the rest of their family – as David put it in his statement:

"My Dad died far too soon. The impact of losing him, caring for my mum and trying to hold my own family life together has left me feeling broken at times. While I continue to do my best to move forward, the effects of his illness and death remain with me every day."

One can only have sympathy for this family in their grief. But sympathy cannot decide these cases; or indeed any case. There is a well-known lawyers’ expression - ‘hard cases make bad law’ - which means that when a judge strains the law out of sympathy for a party, the law is undermined. My job is to apply the legal principles to this very sad case and come up with what I hope is the right legal answer.

[3]Indeed, in fairness, the Defendant Ford has gone a long way to acknowledge the effect of its tort on Dennis and his family by exposing him to asbestos decades ago in the late 1960s to the early 1980s. It has accepted liability, so judgment was entered. It has agreed some of the heads of loss before this assessment of damages hearing and this morning agreed all but three heads of loss. General damages are agreed at the sum of £102,500 (interest remains to be calculated). Care and assistance by David and Paul to Dennis is agreed at £3,000. Travel expenses are agreed at £250, funeral costs at £4,133 and Eileen’s bereavement award at £15,120. Eileen’s past income dependency on Dennis is agreed at £3,838.70 and her future income dependency at £8,320, with her loss of spousal intangible benefits agreed at £3,500. I am grateful to Mr Kerr, Counsel for the Claimant; and Mr Stewart Counsel for the Defendant, for narrowing the issues and focussing on the key disputes, as well as their excellent submissions on the matters still in dispute.

[4]That leaves three disputed heads of loss for me to assess today and which are closely inter-related. The first is what has been called the ‘replacement services’ claim. This is a claim on behalf of Dennis’ estate to recover the value of the services offered by David and Paul, not to Dennis but to Eileen, between Dennis' diagnosis in August 2015 and his death in October 2015. Mr Kerr values those at £11,587.80; Mr Stewart values them at £3,862.60. The second head of loss is a Fatal Accident Act 1976 dependency claim by Eileen for services – i.e. care - from Dennis of which she has been deprived from his death in October 2025 up to the date of trial in June 2026. That past dependency is valued by Mr Kerr at £62,572.29 and Mr Stewart at £1,685.19. The final head is the future services dependency between trial and Eileen's estimated life expectancy at the end of 2027. Mr Kerr values this at £135,383.67, but Mr Stewart values it at nil.

[5]The central dispute between the parties – and the reason this case has not settled - is therefore the past and future services dependency claims. This is not so much the mathematics of how the claims are calculated which is largely agreed, but issues of principle. At the start of trial, I articulate three questions I must answer on the services dependency claims which overlap with the ‘replacement services’ claim. The first is:

‘When is the dependency valued - at the date of Dennis’ death in October 2025, or an earlier time ?’

This arises because the replacement services claim seems to assume David and Paul took over from Dennis in caring for Eileen between August and his death in October 2025. Mr Kerr argues this does not matter as the dependency should be valued in July 2025. Mr Stewart insists it should be at Dennis’ death in October (albeit curtailed from January, which I consider as a separate point). The second question is whether the services dependency claims (and indeed the replacement services claim) should be valued at the commercial rate as Mr Kerr says, or at the gratuitous care rate as Mr Stewart says. The third question is whether the services dependency claim was cut off in January 2026 when Eileen was admitted to a care home, given that she can no longer receive the care at home that Dennis provided ? Mr Stewart says it was, which is why the Defendant’s valuation of the past service dependency is so much smaller than the Claimant's and it denies any future services dependency. Mr Kerr says it was not, so higher awards are sought. This last question is not directly covered by existing authority. However, due to the quality of Mr Kerr and Mr Stewart’s submissions, the time I have had to prepare – and urgency for Eileen and her family of knowing her award that may help fund her care, I will try to answer all those questions today (although as I indicated I would, I have tidied up this transcript considerably).

Evidence and Findings of Fact

[6]My findings of fact are based on largely undisputed lay and expert evidence – indeed, I did not hear any live evidence at the hearing. There are statements in this case from Dennis himself: the most recent on 9 October 2025, only days before his tragic death on 13 October, capturing the position at that time. There is also a statement from Eileen from 2nd May 2026, by when she was already in the care home, where she remains and will likely remain for the rest of her life. There are statements from David and Paul, dated 30th April 2026. Whilst Eileen was never realistically going to be cross-examined, David and Paul remained willing to be cross-examined if necessary, one remotely, one in person. That was not necessary because Mr Stewart helpfully – and humanely - indicated that he had no questions of either of them, so I take their evidence as agreed (even if the legal consequences of their evidence remain disputed).

[7]There is also agreed expert evidence in three disciplines. Firstly, there is agreed expert evidence from Dr Robin Rudd, a consultant physician, who opines on the causation and progress of Dennis's mesothelioma and what his life expectancy would have been had he not contracted it. Secondly, there is also agreed nursing evidence from an expert nurse Ms Wells on Eileen’s past and future care needs (I will go into Eileen's disabilities in a bit more detail in a moment). Thirdly, there is bi-lateral expert evidence from consultant physicians in respect of Eileen’s life expectancy: for the Claimant Dr Hilton and for the Defendant Dr Cohen. Dr Hilton's original opinion of Eileen’s life expectancy was it would be a further 2.7 years from the date of his report in May 2026. From a similar time, Dr Cohen estimated Eileen's life expectancy based upon her frailty and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (‘COPD’) as only one year. But in their joint statement in June 2026, they agreed that Eileen's life expectancy would be slightly longer than Dr Cohen's estimate but not as long as Dr Hilton's: 1.6 years from trial - namely December 2027. Their reason is Eileen's susceptibility to respiratory infections, that are most common in winter and which they fear will prove fatal by Winter 2027/28.

[8]All that evidence is unchallenged and Griffiths v TUI

[2023] 3 WLR 1204

(SC) makes clear that unchallenged evidence should be treated as agreed (except if obviously wrong, peripheral or with other exceptions which do not arise). The following findings of fact are therefore essentially agreed. There may be slight differences in emphasis, but certainly this is not a case where there are real disputes of fact. Of course, the burden of proof is on the Claimant and the standard of proof is a balance of probabilities and these are my findings on the balance of probabilities.

Before Dennis’ diagnosis

[9]Dennis was born in Liverpool in January 1951. Eileen was born not far away six months later in July 1951. Their love blossomed later in their lives, after they had each previously been married. Between 1968 and 1984, Dennis had worked at the Defendant Ford’s Halewood car manufacturing plant on Merseyside. Until 1978, he worked in the press room, where huge metal presses were used to press out the sides of cars. Dennis's suspicion, once he was diagnosed with mesothelioma in 2025, was that he was exposed to asbestos in the press room because of the number of pipes lagged with asbestos in poor condition. I need not go into the detail, as the Defendant accepts it negligently exposed Dennis to asbestos and this caused his mesothelioma. Certainly, in the subsequent 30 years of his career, latterly as driver and care assistant for Liverpool City Council, Dennis did not undertake any roles risking exposure to any asbestos.

[10]After Dennis had left the Halewood plant in 1984, he was working as a taxi driver when he met Eileen at a disco in 1986. There is a poignant part of her statement where she confesses she was initially worried Dennis would not get back in contact after she told him she had no fewer than four children from a previous marriage. It was a testament to Dennis's determination that he decided to commit himself not only to Eileen, but also to all her children. He brought up David and Paul who called him ‘Dad’, before and after Dennis married Eileen in 2005.

[11]By all accounts, Dennis was a pretty amazing man. He was not only the lynchpin of his family, but also a dedicated public servant, in particular from the mid-90s to his retirement in 2016 from working as a driver and a care assistant for Liverpool City Council. As I will explain, that point is relevant to Dennis' commitment to caring for Eileen given her various disabilities she described in her May 2026 statement as follows: “I have a number of health conditions, including severe COPD, asthma, I suffer with bi-polar disorder. I am also under the diabetic eye team for my eye symptoms and have now been advised that I only have 10 per cent of my vision left. I therefore do not feel safe being left in the house on my own. I have severe breathing difficulties and can't walk very far at all. I use a wheeled trolley just to walk from the chair in the sitting-room to my bed, which has been set up in the same room downstairs since approximately 2022."

[12]Indeed, it appears 2022 was a tough year for Eileen. Dr Hilton observed that year, having only just given up smoking, Eileen was diagnosed with severe COPD. Dennis also had mild COPD, but it did not stop him caring for Eileen (which Dr Rudd took into account in assessing his fitness but for the mesothelioma). In the six months to October 2022, Eileen had had no fewer than five hospital admissions, three with an exacerbation of her COPD, exacerbated by COVID. On another admission, she required non-invasive ventilation; in other words: an oxygen mask. Eileen was also diagnosed with a 90% visual impairment due to diabetes. On top of that, in July 2022, Eileen had a serious fall and the specialists diagnosed osteoporosis and reduced mobility. At that time, an occupational therapist reviewed Eileen at home and said Eileen ‘had ceased to live upstairs and Dennis started sleeping downstairs next to her’.

[13]Eileen fell again in early 2024 and by June 2024, her GP described her as being severely frail. According to an occupational therapist who visited them, Dennis was Eileen's main carer. She was downstairs living with a commode and could only self-mobilise using a four-wheeled walking frame. Dennis shopped and did all the household chores. In another review in January 2025, Dennis described himself to the practice nurse as a retired social worker and told the nurse specifically that he would feel shame if he were unable to look after his wife and so up until that point, he had declined support.

[14]Perhaps understandably given all of that, the 2026 report from Ms Wells, the nursing expert, was that by early 2025 and probably before that, Dennis was providing a level of care commensurate with a live-in carer. As Ms Wells said at para [5.1] of her report:

"Dennis attended to all the household chores. He attended to the garden, he would oversee all Eileen's appointments, arrange hospital transport for her as it was too difficult for her to manage to walk to the car and for him to transport her. He attended to all the household administration and finances and he provided her with all necessary care, including cooking meals, overseeing and ordering medication, assistance with positioning, fetching and carrying, washing and dressing and care at night as well as during the day."

Indeed, Ms Wells's opinion at para [8.1] of her report was that: "Before the onset of his mesothelioma, Mr Roberts had been his wife's main carer and I consider this is commensurate with the level of care that would be expected from a live-in carer.” Ms Wells's also concluded that, assuming Eileen's condition had remained stable, she would have continued to need a similar level of care until the date of her death. Indeed, as I will explain, the expert evidence shows if Dennis had not contracted mesothelioma, he would have outlived Eileen and remained her primary live-in carer and she would have remained at home until her death, as clearly they would have both wanted.

From Dennis’ diagnosis to his death

[15]In July 2025, Dennis developed a cough that would not stop and chest pain. He spoke to a neighbour, a GP, who advised him to get a chest X-ray. Dennis did on 15th August and underwent further tests, which suggested pleural plaques indicative of mesothelioma. On 28th August, Dennis was admitted to hospital, where his lung was drained of fluid and he had a catheter fitted. He was discharged on 1st September with a dressed wound, but when he coughed and material came out of it, so he had to get it re-dressed.

[16]On 16th September 2025, Dennis was told he had mesothelioma. The diagnosis was explained to him and there was some discussion of where he might have been exposed to asbestos, in particular his time at Halewood. Dennis was re-admitted to hospital on 23rd September, but was discharged again shortly afterwards. He then gave his statement to his solicitor on 9th October, only a few days before his death, saying this:

"In addition to all the housework and cooking and shopping, I was the main carer for my wife Eileen. I do everything for her. She is bi-polar and has COPD asthma and suffers with severe breathing difficulties. She does not walk very far at all. She has a wheeled trolley just to walk from the chair in the sitting-room to her bed, which has been set up in the same room downstairs. Eileen can't go upstairs at all now, so I have looked after her and slept downstairs on the settee for the past three years. I used to bathe her and wash her and dress her. I used to be a support worker and it was never a chore for me to look after Eileen as she is my wife and I love her. I am worried about what will happen to Eileen if anything happens to me. Eileen's sons, David and Paul have been helping out as much as they can. When I was admitted to hospital on both occasions they've stayed and looked after Eileen."

Dennis then described the fact that his main problem was breathlessness and pain, that he was out of breath and could not walk very far before having to stop to catch his breath.

[17]Eileen’s statement records that when Dennis began to get ill in Summer 2025, her sons Paul and David (and David's partner) started helping out Dennis with looking after Eileen. So, when Dennis was admitted to hospital, Paul and David would stay over and take care of her. Paul and David themselves made witness statements. As David said:

"As Dennis's condition worsened, I became more involved in supporting both him and my mum. I helped with hospital visits, treatments and day to day tasks. At the same time my mum's health was deteriorating and she relied heavily on both of us."

Similarly, Paul described:

"As time progressed, Dennis' own physical health concerns became more noticeable and had more of a severe impact on him. He was diagnosed with…mesothelioma and he had to attend medical appointments and reviews. Due to this condition and how it affected Dennis, I did have to accompany him on some of these appointments and other family members accompanied Dennis at other times. At these times my mum was alone in the house."

[18]I do not minimise in any way what David and Paul did for their mum whilst Dennis was managing his symptoms in July-October 2025, but neither they nor Dennis himself said he stopped giving care to Eileen when he was at home, as he was for most of that period. David and Paul stepped up to help, primarily at times when Dennis could not care for Eileen because he was in hospital. After all, in his statement on 9th October, only four days before his death which I have quoted, Dennis himself did not say he had stopped caring for Eileen, but only that he was (previously) her main carer, that ‘I do everything for her’ and David and Paul ‘have been helping out as much as they can’ and stayed over when he was in hospital, not all of the time for Eileen instead of Dennis. That is directly relevant to the replacement services claim to which I will return. It is important not to mix-up what David and Paul did for their mum before and after Dennis’ death.

[19]Indeed, on the morning of the day he died, Dennis was still at home. As Eileen described:

"On Monday 13 October, I couldn't rouse Dennis and he was unresponsive, so Paul and David called an ambulance and he was taken to the Royal Liverpool Hospital where he sadly passed away later that same day."

Since Dennis's death

[20]As Eileen then said in her May 2026 statement, following Dennis's death on 13 October, David and Paul started providing 90% of her care (with the other 10% from other family):

“Following Dennis death, the boys have been taking it in turns to stay overnight to look after me. I am not sure how long they can carry on doing that for. Both…work full-time and have families of their own.”

[21]It is clear David and Paul in particular dedicated as much time as they possibly could to filling the void left after Dennis’ death in caring for their mum. As Eileen worried, that took a significant emotional and at times financial toll on them both (they at times have had to take time off, or to take carer's leave). As David said in his statement:

"Being [mum’s] joint source of support, almost like a carer, meant being away from my own home for long periods of time and painfully being away from my daughter. Missing time with her while trying to support my mum was incredibly difficult. I constantly felt pulled in different directions, trying to be a good son and a good father at the same time. The emotional strain of trying to maintain that balance has been immense. The physical and mental exhaustion built up over time. My sleep suffered, my mood was low and I felt anxiety about the future and the GP signed me off work for six weeks and I didn't get paid for one month, receiving only [SSP]."

[22]Moreover, Eileen's condition deteriorated significantly and rapidly after Dennis's death. She was in hospital from 27th October to 7th November 2025 with deterioration of COPD, missing Dennis’ funeral, to her evident distress. She then returned home where David and Paul again cared for her from 7th to 26th November. That day, Eileen was re-admitted to hospital, again with deterioration of her COPD, until 11th December when she returned home supported by her sons and other family. Dr Hilton summarised in his report Eileen’s deterioration after Dennis death through to Christmas 2025:

"In October 2025, when admitted into hospital Eileen was described as being bed-bound most of the time. When she was re-admitted to hospital with breathing problems in November, it was noted both David and Paul were struggling to help care for their mother after Dennis's death and family were trying to be present almost 24 hours a day. Indeed, after she was discharged from the hospital the second time in December 2025, the GP noted family were struggling at home, even with a four times daily care package from the local authority; and that Eileen was not able to be left alone and continued to struggle with her breathing. Her sleep was poor, she was unable to care for herself and, importantly, her mood had deteriorated since her husband's death and she was having panic attacks. She was bouncing back into hospital after each COPD exacerbation."

[23]Eileen remained home supported by family over Christmas, but in early January 2026, David and Paul said Eileen was having care from family around the clock (including administering her medication) as the social service care package was inadequate and her health was deteriorating. So, it was no longer tenable for Eileen to remain at home and she was placed for a respite care in a residential home on 6th January 2026.

[24]However, Eileen went into hospital again on 30th January 2026 and she stayed in for 12 weeks until 20th April, when she was discharged to a different care home, even though she would have preferred to be at home, as she explained in her 2nd May 2026 statement:

“I have now been admitted to Grace Lodge Nursing Home on a 28-day placement. They have said if I like it, I can stay here, although I will probably have to pay for my own care once the 28 days have passed. However, my wish is to return to my home….as I know all of the neighbours and it has been my home for 45 years. I now have to wear an [oxygen] mask every night, so that means I need nursing care and I am no longer suitable for a residential home placement, so if I do go back home, I will need full-time care.”

Sadly, it is the joint conclusion of both Dr Hilton and Dr Cohen that Eileen is not well enough to return home and will remain in a nursing home the rest of her life, which they agree is likely to end by December 2027.

[25]Therefore, standing back from that background timeline, I can make three key findings of fact. First, but for Dennis's mesothelioma, Eileen would have stayed at home, cared for by Dennis, until she would have passed away in December 2027. That is not only consistent with the lay evidence I have summarised, it is the clinical professional opinion of Dr Rudd, Dr Hilton and Ms Wells. For example, as Dr Hilton put it:

"[O]n the balance of probabilities, when the time came for Eileen to use night-time non-invasive ventilation [oxygen mask] at home, she and her husband would have been able to cope with this at home and would have gotten on with it. Her care needs would probably not have deteriorated much up until the time of her death. Dennis would have continued to care for his wife until her death, without the need for outside carers coming into the marital home to care for her."

For the same reasons, had Dennis not died, Eileen would not have gone into a care home.

[26]The second key finding of fact is that between the onset of Dennis's symptoms in July 2025 and his tragic and untimely death on 13 October 2025, Dennis remained Eileen's live-in carer. Dennis was not replaced by his sons - they do not say that they replaced him. He and they said they assisted, particularly when Dennis was in hospital due to his mesothelioma. But the fact that Dennis was still there, at home, until the day of his death, speaks volumes as to his determination, which he expressed more than once to outside professionals, that he wanted to care for Eileen himself as much as possible.

[27]The third key finding of fact, is that since Dennis's death, Eileen’s health has deteriorated. That is not only clear from all the expert evidence I have summarised, it is also obvious common sense. Eileen is a lady with severe physical disabilities but also with a severe psychiatric condition. She had been cared for, for years, by her beloved husband. He was taken away from her by his death. It stands to reason that her health would deteriorate as a result - as it in fact has done. Before Dennis death, Eileen did not go in and out of hospital as she has done since Dennis’ death, which speaks volumes.

[28]In fairness to David and Paul, this deterioration is one reason it was so difficult for Paul and David after Dennis' death, even between them - trying to juggle their own family and work responsibilities as well - to step into the void left by Dennis as they tried to do.

Law and Conclusions

[29]It is against the background of those findings of fact on the balance of probabilities, which stem from undisputed lay and expert evidence, that I turn to my conclusions. I will deal first – and briefly - with the replacement services claim, before considering the key legal provisions and principles on the past and future service dependency claims, then finally my conclusions on the three key questions and my valuation of those claims.

The Replacement Services Claim

[30]It is important to differentiate between the present ‘replacement services claim’ and the ‘services dependency claim’ I will consider later. The replacement services claim is not a claim under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (‘FAA’) by Eileen as Dennis’ dependent like the service dependency claim. The replacement services claim is Dennis’ own claim for losses and expenses up to his death, pursued after it by his estate (i.e. Eileen as his administrator) under s.1 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934. Dennis also brought (and his estate continues) a normal claim for gratuitous care provided to himself from Paul and David, which as I have said is agreed at £3,000. The replacement services claim is linked, but relates to services Dennis could not provide to Eileen until his death due to his mesothelioma. These also happen to be care services - but the principle would be the same if it had been gardening or DIY etc. That it relates to care for Eileen does not turn it into her own claim as under the FAA. A ‘replacement services’ award was made to the estate of the claimant for household services she could not provide before her death from mesothelioma in Knauer v Ministry of Justice

[2014] EWHC 2553 (QB)

at [13]. (Whilst the appeal was allowed in Knauer v MoJ

[2016] 2 WLR 672

(SC) this was in fact a ‘leapfrog appeal’ on whether the multiplier is calculated from death – as Bean J (as he then was) in the High Court was reluctantly bound by authority to hold – or trial, as the Supreme Court then decided. It did not affect Bean J’s analysis on this or any other issue I discuss). In any event, there is no dispute in the present case that Dennis’ estate is entitled to pursue the 'replacement services claim’ for care to Eileen that Dennis was unable to provide before his death, which David and Paul had to provide instead.

[31]It is also agreed the rate of care should be as Ms Wells calculated ‘gratuitous care rates’ of 10 hours a day at the NJC Care Rate of £16.62 per hour plus expenses discounted by 25% - namely £3,862.60 a month. As neither David nor Paul gave up work to care for Eileen before Dennis’ death, the 25% discount is consistent with Nicola Davies LJ’s approach in Steve Hill Ltd v Witham [2022] PIQR P2 (CA) at [53]-[54] I discuss later: as the undiscounted commercial rate is sought on Eileen’s services dependency claim. The dispute on the ‘replacement services claim’ is simply its duration.

[32]As I said, Mr Kerr values the replacement services claim at £11,587.50 on the basis of three months’ replacement care from the start of Dennis’ mesothelioma symptoms in mid-July 2025 to his death on 13th October 2025. But this assumes Dennis provided no care to Eileen at all after mid-July 2025. As I have explained, I do not accept that. What I have found happened is closer to what the Defendant says in its Counter-Schedule: "When [Dennis] was unable to provide these services prior to his death, mainly when he was admitted to hospital, the services were provided instead by [Eileen’s] two sons, Paul and David.”

[33]The basis of calculation in the Defendant’s Counter-Schedule was to assume that David and Paul provided replacement care before Dennis death, mainly when he was in hospital estimated at 50% of the time between 13th August and 13th October 2025. It is true I have not found that was the case either. Instead, I have found the level of Paul and David's care for Eileen in Dennis’ final three months waxed and waned. It waxed particularly when Dennis was in hospital. It waned when he balanced his care for Eileen with managing his own symptoms at home, including only a few days before his death, as described in his 9th October statement. I therefore accept that Dennis remained Eileen’s live-in carer until the end. However, in the absence of an alternative and more specific calculation, I am content to adopt the Defendant's calculation of the equivalent of one months’ replacement care by David and Paul in the last three months of Dennis’ life, as a rough and ready assessment, as these awards so often are. So, I assess the replacement services claim in the figure sought by the Defendant of £3,862.60, plus interest.

[34]My finding that Dennis never stopped giving Eileen care, right up to his death, even if it waxed and waned over the final three months of his life, especially when he was in hospital, is relevant to the date of assessment of Eileen’s dependency. This is one of the three key issues on the services dependency claim, to which I now turn. General Principles of Service Dependency Claims

[35]The services dependency claim, on the other hand, is quite different in its legal basis under Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (‘FAA’) ss.1, 2, 3 and 4, which materially state:

"1 Right of action for wrongful act causing death. (1) If death is caused by any wrongful act, neglect or default which is such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the person injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, the person who would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured. (2) …[E]very such action shall be for the benefit of the dependants of the person ('the deceased') whose death has been so caused. (3) In this Act 'dependant' means (a) the wife or husband or former wife or husband of the deceased; (e) any child or other descendant… 2 Persons entitled to bring the action. (1) The action shall be brought by and in the name of the executor or administrator of the deceased…. (3) Not more than one action shall lie for and in respect of the same subject matter of complaint. 3 Assessment of damages. (1) In the action such damages, other than damages for bereavement, may be awarded as are proportioned to the injury resulting from the death to the dependants respectively…. 4 Assessment of damages: disregard of benefits. In assessing damages in respect of a person’s death…under this Act, benefits which have accrued or may accrue to any person from his estate or otherwise as a result of his death shall be disregarded."

[36]Mr Kerr and Mr Stewart referred me to several authorities on the quantification of ‘damages’ under s.3 FAA for ‘dependents’ under s.1 FAA, in particular Witham, but also Welsh Ambulance Service NHS Trust v Williams

[2008] EWCA Civ 81

and Jay J’s decision in Rupasinghe v West Hertfordshire Hospitals NHS Trust [2017] PIQR Q1; and I also referred Counsel to Bean J’s decision in Knauer. (As I will explain in the postscript, since giving this oral judgment at Court on 25th June 2026, I have also come across in different cases other authorities on s.3 FAA, but they do not change my analysis). For present purposes, I draw five general principles from Witham, Williams, Rupasinghe, Knauer and cases they analysed, that set the legal scene for my conclusions in this case.

[37]Firstly, the guiding principle under s.3(1) FAA is quantifying the dependants’ loss, based upon their reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit from continuance of the life of the deceased, which depends on the facts of the particular case. In Witham (the most important authority to this case I discuss in more detail), Nicola Davies LJ reviewed previous cases, including at [16] Cape v O’Loughlin

[2001] EWCA Civ 178

“Latham LJ [in Cape], in considering the s.3 FAA dependency valuation, identified the question to be answered as…. the extent to which the dependants have been deprived of a ‘reasonable expectation of pecuniary advantage from the continuance of the life of the deceased’.…At [14 he] stated: ‘…the court’s task in any case is to examine the particular facts of the case to determine whether or not any loss in money or in monies worth has been occasioned to the dependants and if it determines that it has, it must then use whatever material appears best to fit the facts of the particular case in order to determine the extent of that loss’…..”

In Witham, Davies LJ put it as follows at [41]: 38. "The assessment of the dependency valuation is fact specific. In approaching such an assessment, the court should identify and assess the loss which is truly suffered.."

In Witham, Davies LJ put it as follows at [41]:

[38]Secondly, whilst cases have drawn a distinction between the methods of quantifying ‘financial dependency’ and ‘services dependency’, they overlap - though Courts seek to avoid double recovery and non-dependency losses. As Jay J summarised in Rupasinghe at [27], [36] and [49], financial dependency tends to be calculated by aggregating a conventional proportion of the spouses’ net income and then deducting a proportion of the surviving spouse’s net income (depending on whether there are children). By contrast, as he said (and I discuss later), a services dependency tends to be calculated by calculating the cost or replacement services and sometimes discounting them. Both were awarded in Knauer. But those methods are not set in stone. In O’Loughlin, a financial dependency of a widow on her husband’s property portfolio was quantified by costing a replacement manager. Indeed, in the passage quoted from Witham at [16], Davies LJ also saw the income dependency in O’Loughlin as akin to one for services:

“At [13 of O’Loughlin], in respect of the loss of a husband’s services, [Latham LJ] stated that: “… His death, whatever other loss may result, will mean that the family will have to replace that expertise and advice at the appropriate market cost. That cost is as much a loss to the family as could be the cost of a gardener…”

However, in Williams, in endorsing a similar award as in O’Loughlin for replacing the entrepreneur of a family business, Smith LJ noted in Wood v Bentall Simplex [1992] 1 PIQR 332 (also cited in Witham), the Court of Appeal held where a widow inherits the assets which have produced the income from which the dependency derived, she cannot have both those assets and damages for lost income. Similarly, in Rupasinghe, Jay J held where a widow had settled her financial dependency claim for loss of her husband’s wages and a services dependency claim for his parenting of their children, she could not also recover her own loss of earnings from having to move back to Sri Lanka for family support with the parenting, since her loss of earnings was not part of her dependency.

[39]Thirdly, in a similar way, both financial and services dependencies are fixed at the point of death and not generally affected by events afterwards, unless those events ‘affect the continuance of the dependency’. Whether a widow moving permanently into a care home ‘affects the continuance’ of her services dependency is the most central issue in this case and I consider it later. But in Williams at [50], Smith LJ stated the general principle before concluding the family’s profitable continuance of a family business after their father entrepreneur’s death did not curtail their income dependency:

“[I]t was irrelevant that [the children] had made a success of the business. That was not because the financial benefit which they had brought to the family was a ‘benefit accruing as a result of the death' which had to be ignored under s.4. It was because that financial benefit was irrelevant to the assessment of the dependency under s.3. [The Judge] was correct when he said that nothing that a dependant (or for that matter anyone else) could do after the death could either increase or decrease the dependency. The dependency is fixed at the moment of death; it is what the dependants would probably have received as benefit from the deceased, had the deceased not died. What decisions people make afterwards is irrelevant. The only post death events which are relevant are those which affect the continuance of the dependency (such as the death of a dependant before trial) and the rise (or fall) in earnings to reflect the effects of inflation.”

[40]As Mr Stewart pointed out, in Rupasinghe at [26], Jay J observed that Williams was a financial dependency case and the claimant before him argued (see [40]) it did not apply to a services dependency. I can see no reason for a different underlying principle about curtailment of different types of dependency and in any event, at [46]-[59] of Rupasinghe, Jay J rejected the claimant’s submissions. Whilst he did not specifically decide the principle in Williams at [50] does apply to service dependencies, in Witham at [30]-[31] Davies LJ decided that it did. As I will discuss, she held the removal from the widow’s home of foster children she and her deceased husband had planned that he would care for whilst she worked meant that the services dependency ‘cannot be said to be continuing as the premise upon which it was based no longer exists’. That is one example of a dependency ending between death and trial (or in Witham, the appeal). Another given by Smith LJ in Williams at [50] is the subsequent death of the dependant. Indeed, Smith LJ also discussed in Williams at [41]-[42] that childrens’ dependency can end when they become adults, unless they were still financially dependant on the deceased when he died (as was also found in Williams itself). As I discuss later, Mr Stewart likewise submits when a wife previously dependant on her husband’s care goes into a care home after his death, that too ends her services dependency on him.

[41]Fourthly, it is likewise irrelevant to a dependency claim quantified as replacement for the deceased’s services that in fact the dependant has so far not replaced them. That argument was made by the defendant in Knauer at [25], who pointed out the widower of his wife who died of mesothelioma had not in the five years since her death replaced her household services. Bean J rejected this at [26]-[27]:

“This submission, with respect, is misconceived, on basic principles of the law of tort. If a claimant’s brand new Rolls-Royce is written off through the defendant’s negligence the damages must include its replacement value even if the claimant decides that he will change to a cheaper car or in future take public transport. The same principle applies to claims for loss of services under the [FAA]; …Of course in a sense the value of a lost spouse cannot be measured in money terms…but the law has to do the best it can….[I]n predicting the future one can take account of what is known to have happened already. As Aneurin Bevan said in a different context ‘why look into the crystal ball, when you can read the book?’ The classic example …is a [FAA] claim where the surviving spouse has himself died by the time of trial: there will be no award for his future dependency, though there may be for that of the deceased’s children. But this does not alter the basic rule that the claimant is entitled to the value of what he has lost. Indeed… in Hay v Hughes [1975] QB 790 at 809B Lord Edmund-Davies said “the fact that a widower decided to manage himself after the death of his wife would not disentitle him to sue for and recover damages for the pecuniary loss he sustained.” 43. It is really quite immaterial…whether having received…damages, the plaintiff chooses to alleviate her own housekeeping burden, … by employing the labour [lost] … or whether she chooses to continue to struggle with the housekeeping on her own and to spend the damages which have been awarded to her on other luxuries … .”

[42]Finally, the usual approach to calculating service dependency awards, including for care, is normally to calculate the cost of a replacement for the services on a commercial basis and then decide whether that should be discounted if provided gratuitously (often by 25% to approximate to tax and national insurance not incurred). However, sometimes the Court allows recovery of the carer’s lost income, as Jay J explained in Rupasinghe: "49. Ordinarily, the court approaches the quantification of a services dependency claim by considering the cost of replacing the services formerly provided by the Deceased. In some situations, it is appropriate to approach this exercise by looking to the cost of furnishing commercial care...In other situations, the claim is in essence one for gratuitous care, and the authorities make clear that commercial rates fall to be discounted to reflect that…. 50….[Sometimes], the Courts have followed an alternative approach. In appropriate situations, the court values the services formerly provided by the deceased with reference to the earnings foregone by the claimant in order now to furnish these services herself or himself. This is not a claim for loss of earnings in the strict sense; it is a claim for loss of services but using the surviving partner’s earnings as a proxy or surrogate measure for the value of the services foregone. 51 The precise constraints on this alternative principle have not been set forth in the authorities, although there is general recognition that the claim must be reasonable….”

[43]Alternatively, in Witham, Davies LJ confirmed where the carer has lost earnings in order to provide gratuitous care, it may be appropriate to use the commercial care rate itself: “53. …In Housecroft v Burnett [1986] 1 All E.R. 332 a claim for personal injury….O’Connor LJ stated at p.343: “…where the relative has given up gainful employment to look after the plaintiff, I would regard it as natural the plaintiff would not wish the relative to be the loser and the court would award sufficient to enable the plaintiff to achieve that result. The ceiling would be the commercial rate.” 54. [Housecroft] was not an FAA claim, but I regard it as authority for the proposition where earnings have been lost, the commercial rate of care may be appropriate. Whether it is appropriate is a fact-specific assessment for the court.” 46. "It is the value of the services lost which requires assessment and compensation, not the value of how the dependant manages following the death. The decision of the judge to value care, not on the basis of the gratuitous replacement by a friend or relative, but on the basis of the estimated cost of employing labour to replace the lost service, was one open to him to make. Further, having so found, there is no identified requirement to make a 25% or other deduction."

Conclusions on the Service Dependency Claim

[44]The first question I framed at the start was - when is the services dependency claim to be valued: the date of death, or some other – Mr Kerr says earlier - date ? The answer is clearly the former from Williams, where Smith LJ said at [50]:

‘The dependency is fixed at the moment of death’

. Similarly, as Jay J said in Rupasinghe at [36], [50] and [51]:

“For these purposes the court does not consider evidence of facts arising post-death but focuses on the instant in time immediately preceding it.”

I recognise Smith LJ in Williams and Jay J in Rupasinghe were concerned with the relevance of events after death. However, their observations are equally inconsistent with the dependency being fixed at a date before death, such as the onset of the deceased’s symptoms as Mr Kerr suggested. Whilst there was tragically only three months between Dennis’ symptoms and his untimely death – in other fatal disease cases it could be much longer. This would lead to anomalously different dependency valuation methods depending on the manner of death e.g. where it took months (as with illness) compared being instantaneous or on the same day (e.g. in road traffic collisions).

[45]Therefore, in the present case, if the evidence had supported what the Claimant had pleaded - that Dennis was essentially replaced for the last three months of his life by his sons - that could have had a dramatic effect on the level of the dependency. But as I have explained in relation to the replacement services claim, that is not in fact what happened. As I have discussed, Dennis’s case for Eileen over the last three months waxed and waned, the latter especially when Dennis was in hospital. In my judgment, that does not in principle or on the evidence affect the level of Eileen’s care dependency on Dennis:a. In principle as stated in O’Loughlin and Witham, it suffices for a dependant to prove at the time of death, she had a ‘reasonable expectation of pecuniary advantage from the continuance of his life’, even if not receiving income or services at the time of death (e.g. if it was imminent). I find Eileen’s reasonable expectation - that Dennis would have remained her live-in carer had he continued to live - cannot be affected by him in his last three months occasionally needing cover from David and Paul due to the symptoms and eventual death the Defendant’s tort caused. (It might be different if Dennis’ absences from care for Eileen were unrelated to mesothelioma).

b. In any event, on the evidence, I have found Dennis remained Eileen’s live-in carer until the end, despite occasionally being in hospital over his final three months. As Mr Stewart said of the replacement services claim, the amount of care Dennis gave at the end of his life was not substantially different than it had been a few months earlier, which is why I accepted the Defendant’s valuation of the replacement services claim. The flip-side is the services dependency claim is not cut down by Dennis’ occasional absence from caring for Eileen in his final three months. There is no double-counting between the replacement services and services dependency claims, as though the latter was fixed at the time of death, it is only recoverable for the period afterwards, whereas the former only covers the period beforehand. Since I found Dennis remained Eileen’s live-in carer until he died, applying Davies LJ’s words in Witham at [41], the ‘loss truly suffered’ by Eileen is the loss of not just her beloved husband, but of her live-in carer (even if by the end he occasionally needed help). In reality, Ms Wells’ quantification of a live-in carer cannot replace all Dennis’ care, so even if he was supported a little towards the end by David and Paul, I am satisfied Ms Wells’ assessment of ten hours a day remains reasonable.

[46]My finding on the level of the dependency then leads to the second question, which is whether the services dependency should be at the commercial rate, or discounted by 25% as gratuitous care. As I said, the replacement services claim used discounted rates for David and Paul’s care. It is true that it quantifies the care they provided before Dennis’ death, whilst the services dependency claim represents Eileen’s dependency on Dennis as a live-in carer which she has lost by his death, so they do not have to be the same rate. Mr Kerr suggested that Dennis's services should be valued by reference to the cost of professional care, as Eileen had needed it to replace Dennis after his death, initially at home and now in a care home. But that confuses her requirements after Dennis’ death with her dependency on him before his death. As said in Williams, dependency is valued at the date of the death, even if its continuance is subject to later events, as I will discuss.

[47]In any event, as confirmed by Davies LJ in Witham, whether to award full commercial or discounted gratuitous care depends on the particular facts. As Davies LJ added in Witham, the undiscounted commercial rate is legitimate when someone gives up work to become a carer. Here, Dennis had not given up his job to care for Eileen; he had long since retired. Similarly, David and Paul did not give up their jobs or lose earnings significantly prior to Dennis's death. They did afterwards, but that does not change the dependency, any more than the widow emigrating to a lower-paid role abroad after her husband’s death did so in Rupasinghe. I accept a commercial rate was awarded in Knauer where the wife had undertaken household tasks without giving up work before her death, though Bean J did refuse the cost of a housekeeper and awarded the agency rate for cooks and cleaners instead; and it does not seem that a further gratuitous care discount was argued. In the present case, given Dennis evidently saw his care for Eileen as part and parcel of his loving marriage with her, it would be inappropriate to quantify his services at the commercial rate. Dennis – just like David and Paul on occasion before and regularly after his death – provided gratuitous care, so the discount is appropriate.

[48]That leads to perhaps the main dispute between the parties, which is whether Eileen’s care dependency ended in January 2026 on her admission into a care home ? In arguing that it did, Mr Stewart relies heavily on Witham, so I must discuss it in detail. Witham was an unusual case where the husband and wife had agreed to take on foster children and that the husband would care for those children and the wife would be the breadwinner. The husband contracted mesothelioma and sadly died, so the wife gave up work to care for the children. That was the position when the judge at first instance assessed damages. On the facts as they stood before the judge, the Court of Appeal endorsed the judge's conclusion that as they had agreed the husband should care for the children, the wife was the dependant of her husband not just the children; and she did suffer loss by her husband’s death, despite continuing to be paid the foster care allowance (as those had been paid before the husband’s death when he was caring and she was still working). As I also said, Davies LJ held the judge was justified, on the material as it stood before him at the time, to make an assessment on the basis of commercial care.

[49]However, between the Judge’s decision and the appeal in Witham, the position had fundamentally changed. The widow, for various reasons, struggled to care for the children who were then taken back into care (as they were fostered, not adopted) at the discretion of the local children's authority in their best interests. The Court of Appeal allowed a new ground of appeal to be argued and admitted the evidence of that fundamental change in circumstances on Ladd v Marshall criteria. Davies LJ concluded that it cut off the widow’s child-care services dependency, as she explained at [29]-[31]:

“29…. It is the unforeseen and undisputed fact that the children have been removed from Mrs Witham. It follows that since their removal the factual basis of the dependency claim no longer exists. 30 I accept, as was stated by Smith LJ in…Williams…that dependency is valued as at the date of death. That said, there are qualifications to that statement as identified by Smith LJ at [50]: “… The dependency is fixed at the moment of death; it is what the dependants would probably have received as benefit from the deceased, had the deceased not died. What decisions people make afterwards is irrelevant. The only post death events which are relevant are those which affect the continuance of the dependency (such as the death of a dependant before trial) and the rise (or fall) in earnings….” 31 In my view, the new evidence is directly relevant to the continuance of the dependency. As the children are no longer in the care of the Claimant, the dependency cannot be said to be continuing as the premise upon which it was based no longer exists.”

Therefore, I accept that Witham shows that if the premise for a dependency claim ceases to exist after the death, that will have the effect of curtailing the dependency. “… The dependency is fixed at the moment of death; it is what the dependants would probably have received as benefit from the deceased, had the deceased not died. What decisions people make afterwards is irrelevant. The only post death events which are relevant are those which affect the continuance of the dependency (such as the death of a dependant before trial) and the rise (or fall) in earnings….”

[50]Mr Stewart submitted the same was true here. He accepted that care at home replacing Dennis was provided by Paul and David between October 2025 and January 2026 when Eileen was not in hospital. However, in early January, she had gone into a care home, been admitted to hospital for several weeks then discharged to a different care home from which there was no likelihood she could return home. Therefore, Mr Stewart argued that curtailed the past care dependency claim from early January 2026 and disallowed the future care dependency claim, as from then there was no longer any need for live-in care. However, I respectfully disagree with that submission for five reasons.

[51]Firstly, Smith LJ’s phrase in Williams at [50] ‘events which affect the continuance of the dependency’ must be read in the light of s.3(1) FAA which permits damages for ‘the injury resulting from the death to the dependants’. It would be inconsistent for events forming part of the ‘injury resulting from the death’ to curtail the dependency. Instead, Davies LJ in Witham at [31] focused on whether the event meant ‘the premise on which the dependency was based no longer exists’. This is why she held removal from the widow of the children needing care constituting the dependency curtailed it – the care was no longer needed. That removal did not form part of the ‘injury resulting from the death’ itself, but simply part of the background leading up to it. Likewise, the examples given by Smith LJ in Williams of a dependant before trial dying, or becoming an adult and financially independent, remove ‘the premise on which the dependency was based’ and on the face of it, have nothing to do with the tortious death. If anything, by analogy to another principle in tort law, the curtailing event breaksthe chain of causation of dependency from the death, rather than resulting from it. Indeed, if dependency could be curtailed by an event also resulting from a tortious death, this would permit the tortfeasor to rely on the consequences of their own tort to cut off loss, which would seem wrong in principle. By contrast, as I have found, Eileen’s admission to the care home in January 2026 was directly caused by the death of her live-in carer, Dennis. It is part of Eileen’s injury resulting from his death that she will now be in a care home until she dies. In my view that does not in principle curtail her dependency.

[52]Secondly, even if other events part of the dependant’s injury resulting from the death can in principle curtail a dependency by removing the premise on which it is based, I do not accept in principle that a dependant meeting their same care needs in a different way after the death than they were met before the death curtails a care dependency. Of course, I accept Mr Stewart’s point there is a fundamental difference between care at home and being in a care home, as any older person with care needs knows. But it is artificial to define Eileen’s dependency as ‘live-in care’ only: it is a need for care, ideally at home but if not in a care home. As Mr Kerr said, the need for Eileen’s care underpinning her dependency on Dennis remains (and is if anything worse, as I discuss below), it is simply being met in a different way in a care home rather than at home. As said in Daly and Knauer, a claimant is entitled to recover the cost of a replacement carer even if they do not replace it on a like-for-like basis. Similarly, as explained in Williams, decisions made by a dependant after the death (including about how care is to be met) do not affect the dependency, only events affecting the continuance of the dependency, like the death of the dependant or the removal of the children requiring care. In both cases the need for care has gone. Likewise, if Eileen's condition after Dennis’ death had actually improved so that she no longer needed care, that too would have curtailed her care dependency. But that is not the position: Eileen’s s.3(1) dependency continues.

[53]Thirdly, even if I am wrong on the first two points, it is not just a case of Eileen’s need for care remaining, I have found it has increased, because in Dennis’ absence, it is no longer practicable or possible for Eileen’s family to care for her at home and she has needed to go into a care home. That is the opposite of what happened in Witham. Far from the need for care and dependency ending, Eileen's needs and her loss have got worse as a result of Dennis's tortiously-caused death. Whilst that post-death event does not increase the dependency, as it is fixed at death as said in Williams, it certainly does not curtail the dependency. Indeed it is part of the ‘injury’ to Eileen from Dennis’ death.

[54]Fourthly, even if (which I do not accept) a dependant’s voluntary move into a care home when their needs deteriorate after the death of their carer do curtail their dependency, Eileen plainly did not and does not want to live in a care home. That fundamental change in her life does not derive from her voluntary choice, but because Dennis proved genuinely irreplaceable. Eileen now has to have what she does not want. Therefore, far from the dependency ending as she has gone into a care home, that has happened as Eileen’s dependency cannot be met at home in the way she wants, so she must accept a type of care she does not want. However, her s.3(1) FAA care dependency continues.

[55]Finally, there is the point under s.4 FAA, which I repeat for convenience: “In assessing damages in respect of a person’s death…under this Act, benefits which have accrued or may accrue to any person from his estate or otherwise as a result of his death shall be disregarded." Whilst Mr Stewart submitted Eileen going into a care home was not ‘a result of Dennis's death’, I have found that but for Dennis's death, Eileen would not have gone into the care home. It is true that Eileen does not subjectively see the care home as a ‘benefit’ because she would prefer to be home, objectively it is unquestionably a ‘benefit’ because her care needs are being met (at least in the new care home if not in the first one) which were not being met at home after Dennis’ death, despite David and Paul’s best efforts. Accordingly, the care home is a s.4 benefit, whether or not Eileen must pay. In any event, whilst there is no evidence whether Eileen now pays for her care in her present home, there is evidence she did not do so initially in her statement: "I've now been admitted to Grace Lodge Nursing Home on a 28-day placement. They've said if I like it I can stay here although I will probably have to pay for my own care once the 28 days is past." I have italicised Eileen’s evidence that she did not pay for the first 28 days in her present care home. That was plainly a ‘benefit’, whether or not she wanted to be there – and so cannot curtail the dependency because s.4 FAA says it must be disregarded. However, the s.4 point is very much a fall-back position. The four other reasons I have given why Eileen’s care dependency was not ended by her going into the care home, which overlap to an extent, are all not to do with s.4 FAA and disregard of benefits, but to do with s.3 FAA and calculation of dependency, just as Smith LJ discussed in Williams at [50].

[56]Therefore, I conclude this judgment by drawing the threads together. I endorse the agreed figures in relation to all the various claims that have been agreed both before this trial and this morning. In relation to what has been called the replacement services claim, for the reasons I have said, on a broad-brush basis I adopt the Defendant's calculation of £3,862.60. On the past services dependency, I will award it to the date of trial; and the future services dependency until the end of December 2027 - consistent with the agreed expert evidence in relation to Eileen's life expectancy. However, in both cases, I will assess the awards at the gratuitous care rates calculated in Ms Wells’ report. I leave it to Counsel to agree figures and interest reflecting my ruling.

Postscript

[57]That completes the transcript of my judgment at the hearing on 25th June 2026. When I indicated to Counsel at trial that I would give an oral judgment so that Eileen’s position was clear as quickly as possible, I explained I would need to tidy up my legal summary which I have headed ‘General Principles of Service Dependency Claims’, as I now have. However, since the hearing, in the course of other work, I have come across some other relevant cases which were not cited, but which I make clear do not affect my decision.

[58]Firstly, just before Davies LJ handed down her judgment in Witham in August 2021, she handed down Paramount Shopfitting v Rix [2022] PIQR P1 (CA), a financial dependency case similar to O’Loughlin and Williams about quantification of the loss deriving from the tortious death of an entrepreneur. I hope my own summary of the principles of service dependency cases, for what it may be worth, is consistent with Davies LJ’s summary of financial dependency principles in Rix at [54], understandably similar to her approach in Witham at the same time (and is also consistent with a similar financial dependency case to Rix and Williams: Denning v Stone [2026] PIQR Q1).

[59]Secondly, I hope my ‘fall-back’ fifth reason that the dependency did not end on Eileen going into the care home as it was a s.4 FAA ‘benefit’ is buttressed by the child-care services case ATH v MS [2003] PIQR Q1. The Court of Appeal held where a children’s caring parent is tortiously killed and they move in with the other parent who had not previously cared for them, that can be a ‘benefit’ under s.4 FAA. It seems to me the same applies where a live-in carer is killed requiring a dependant to move into a care home.

[60]Finally, whilst a FAA claim is different from a personal injury claim, I also hope my decision that if a tortious death of a carer causes their dependant to move to care home does not curtail dependency chimes with a tortfeasor being responsible for aggravating the care needs of a pre-disabled claimant: Reaney v NS NHS [2016] PIQR Q3 (CA). ------------------------------------------------------ Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE Email: civil@epiqglobal.co.uk-