Tanner Courrier & Anor v HKA Global LLC & Ors [2026] EWHC 1716 (KB)

[2026] EWHC 1716 (KB)Case No KB-2025-000753
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 08/07/2026
Before
MR JUSTICE DEXTER DIAS
Between
TANNER COURRIER (1)Claimants/ Part 20 DefendantsHANSELL PASCO (2)ClaimantHKA GLOBAL LLCFirst DefendantHKA GROUP HOLDINGS LIMITEDSecond Defendant/ Part 20 Claimant/ Respondent
Tom Mountford (instructed by Carter Bond) for Christopher Beirise and (instructed by Jones Day) for Accuracy US LLCCharlotte Davies and Callum Rodgers (instructed by Fieldfisher) for HKA Group Holdings LimitedHearing Hearing date: 29 June 2026(Judgment circulated in draft: 2 July 2026Received back from counsel: 6 July 2026)
JUDGMENTApproved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 8 July 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................MR JUSTICE DEXTER DIAS
[1]This is the judgment of the court.[2]To assist the parties and the public to follow the main lines of the court’s reasoning, the text is divided into seven sections, as set out in the table of contents above. The table is hyperlinked to aid swift navigation.

I. Introduction

[3]This is a judgment about consequential orders.[4]The orders are sought in proceedings in which the court dismissed an application to set aside the service out and alternative service orders of Master Eastman (“the Judge”). On 3 June 2026 (following the circulation of the judgment in draft on 19 May 2026), this court handed down its substantive judgment on the challenges to the Judge’s orders. This judgment should be read in combination with that judgment, on which the factual background rests and where it is more fully treated ([2026] EWHC 1318 (KB)).[5]The applicants are Christopher Beirise and Accuracy US LLC (“Accuracy US”). They are represented by Mr Mountford of counsel. The respondent is HKA Group Holdings Limited (“HKA UK”) and is represented by Ms Davies and Mr Rodgers of counsel. The court is grateful to counsel for their submissions.[6]The respondent alleges that Mr Beirise and the two claimants in the main action, Messrs Courrier and Pasco (Messrs Beirise, Courrier and Pasco together being “the partners”), combined with one another and with Accuracy US to conspire to lure members of the respondent’s staff to a new competitor company called Accuracy US. This is said to be in breach of a legal agreement between the respondent and the partners called the “nominee deed”. That instrument has an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the English court and a clause nominating English law as the choice of law. In accordance with this agreement, the two claimants Messrs Courrier and Pasco brought proceedings in the English court for negative declaratory relief to establish that they are not liable for breaching a non-compete covenant in the nominee deed. In response, the respondent applied to serve the applications out of jurisdiction in the United States. The Judge granted permission to serve out and then permission for alternative service.[7]The applicants applied to discharge and set aside these two orders. The first order was made on 9 July 2025, when the Judge gave permission to serve out in the United States. In the second order, made on 6 September 2025, the Judge gave permission for alternative service.

II. Substantive judgment decisions

[8]The essential background to the costs dispute between the parties can be found in the substantive judgment. The court reached the following decisions (paras 175-176):
“175. Summarising greatly, the short answers to the issues the court is asked to determine are as follows: Issue 1: Full and frank disclosure and fair presentation. Whether the respondent breached its duty of full and frank disclosure and fair presentation when applying for permission to serve out and effect alternative service. The respondent breached its duty of full and frank disclosure. Issue 2: Serious issue to be tried. Whether the respondent has established under CPR 6.37(1)(b) that there is a serious issue to be tried about the merits of its claim alleging breach of the nominee deed. There is a serious issue to be tried in the additional claim against Mr Beirise. There is a serious issue to be tried in the claim against Accuracy US as procurer of the breach of the nominee deed. Issue 3: Gateway. Whether the respondent has established a good arguable case that the claim falls within a gateway under PD6B para 3.1. The respondent has established one of the “General Grounds” in PD6B para 3.1. The applicants’ objection is misconceived. Issue 4: Forum. Whether the respondent has clearly established that England is the most appropriate forum for the trial of the breach of the nominee deed dispute. The respondent has clearly established that the most appropriate forum to determine the breach of the nominee deed is England. The respondent has the better of the argument. 176. The respondent’s breaches of disclosure obligations must be marked in costs.”

III. Issues

[9]The issues for determination now are:• Issue 1. What costs order should be made in respect of the ex parte application to serve out?• Issue 2. What costs order should be made in respect of the inter partes set aside application?• Issue 3. Directions. IV. Issue 1: ex parte costs Legal principles

IV. Issue 1: ex parte costs

[10]The parties cited a number of costs cases concerning breach of duty and especially full and frank disclosure (“FFD”). The parties recognised that fact-specific costs decisions are of limited use to the court in the exercise of its wide costs discretion under CPR Part 44. While thanks are due to both counsel for their exposition of the authorities, I particularly draw on the respondent’s commendably concise summary of relevant factors. The full case references immediately follow. Relevant considerations include:• Whether the ex parte application was for a freezing order or order for service out (the latter potentially carrying lower potential for harm from breach) (Mints, para 93);• The culpability of the failure (Leidos, para 40);• Whether the non-disclosure was in bad faith (Les Ambassadeurs Club, para 12);• The seriousness, extent and number of FFD failures (Masri, para 61; Mints, para 87);• Whether the failure was deliberate or inadvertent (Masri, para 67; Mints, para 94);• Whether the failure related to an important matter (Leidos, para 40);• The strength of the case for the order sought ex parte (Yurov, para 17);• Whether any unreasonable conduct from the parties increased the costs of the proceedings (Leidos, para 41);• The extent to which the defendant succeeded on any points (or failed to establish other failures of FFD), and the costs attributable to those points succeeded on (Yurov, paras 18-19);• Whether the failure was caused by a failure to make appropriate enquiries and/or to give sufficient attention to an important matter (Mints, para 95). PJSC National Bank Trust & Anor v Mints & Ors [2021] EWHC 692 (Comm); Leidos Inc v The Hellenic Republic [2019] EWHC 2738 (Comm); Les Ambassadeurs Club v Albluewi & Ors [2020] EWHC 1368 (QB); Masri v Consolidated Contractors [2011] EWHC 1780 (Comm); National Bank Trust v Yurov and Ors [2016] EWHC 1991 (Comm) PJSC National Bank Trust & Anor v Mints & Ors [2021] EWHC 692 (Comm); Leidos Inc v The Hellenic Republic [2019] EWHC 2738 (Comm); Les Ambassadeurs Club v Albluewi & Ors [2020] EWHC 1368 (QB); Masri v Consolidated Contractors [2011] EWHC 1780 (Comm); National Bank Trust v Yurov and Ors [2016] EWHC 1991 (Comm)[11]In Dar Al Arkan Real Estate Development Company v Al Refai [2012] EWHC 3539 (Comm) (“Dar Al Arkan”), Andrew Smith J (para 148) enunciated principles “about how the court should respond to a breach of the duties of an ex parte applicant”, summarising them at para 149:
“When making decisions of this kind the court should, of course, weigh all relevant considerations, and they importantly include: i) The culpability of the applicant (and his advisors) with regard to the breach, and in particular the extent of the breach and whether it was deliberate; ii) The importance and the significance to the outcome of the application of matters not disclosed to the court; iii) The merits of the applicant’s case; and iv) The nature of the order obtained ex parte.”
[12]In Tugushev v Orlov [2019] EWHC 2031 (Comm) (“Tugushev”) Carr J (as she then was) explained that the court has available “a range of options in the event of non-disclosure” including discharging the order (with or without regrant) and/or “making a suitable costs order” (para 7, proposition (xiii)). In exercising its discretion as to the appropriate order “the overriding consideration will always be the interests of justice” (Tugushev, proposition (xii)). In deciding on sanction “it is important to preserve a due sense of proportion” (Magomedov and others v PJSC Transneft and others [2025] 1 All ER (Comm) 826 (“Magomedov”), para 115).[13]In U&M Mining Zambia v Konkola Copper Mining [2014] EWHC 3250 (Comm) (“U&M Mining”), Teare J explained the objective (para 95(iii)):
“The court's order must mark the importance of complying with the duty of full and frank disclosure and serve as a deterrent to ensure that persons who make ex parte applications realise that they must discharge that duty. That purpose can be satisfactorily achieved, in an appropriate case, by an appropriate order as to costs.”
[14]In Les Ambassadeurs Club, the court approved the passage in Gee on Commercial Injunctions (6th Ed.), where the authors state at para 24-044 (replicated in 7th Ed., para 24-048):
“Although material non-disclosure on the ex parte application is a breach of the claimant's duty to the court, there is no general practice of the court that where there has been non-disclosure, and costs are to be awarded, they ought to be on an indemnity basis. However, the fact that there has been material non-disclosure is plainly a relevant factor to be taken into account on the question of costs and is capable of justifying an award on this basis, and such an order will usually be made if the non-disclosure was deliberate or culpable.”

Submissions

[15]The applicants submit that the respondent should not be awarded its costs of its ex parte application. In its skeleton argument (para 23), the respondent does not oppose the suggestion. The respondent submits that “the appropriate sanction is … that it be deprived of its costs of the ex parte hearing”. Conclusion[16]There is no dispute between the parties on this question. I rule that the respondent should not be awarded any costs for its ex parte service out application. However, I note the applicants’ submission that the respondent only gave up any claim to its ex parte costs following the court’s substantive judgment. V. Issue 2: inter partes costs Submissions

V. Issue 2: inter partes costs

[17]The applicants submit that the respondent should pay 60 per cent of their costs incurred in the inter partes application, to be assessed on the indemnity basis. This is because the respondent even now fails to grasp the seriousness of the court’s FFD breach findings. Instead, the respondent makes the unrealistic submission that the sanction should be confined to depriving it of its costs of making the ex parte application. The applicants made an offer to the respondent in an attempt to settle the costs issue. They are “content” for an award from the court in line with that offer: the said 60 per cent of their inter partes costs paid on the indemnity basis.[18]The respondent submits that it is the successful party in the inter partes application and the general rule in CPR 44.2 applies. The respondent, therefore, should be awarded its costs for the set aside application.

Discussion

[19]The parties dispute whether the proper approach to costs in the inter partes application is to determine as a starting-point which is the successful party under CPR 44.2(2)(a). The respondent submits that this is the place to start. The applicants oppose such an approach. It is unnecessary for me to reach a conclusion about this dispute because the applicants in any event – and inevitably – recognise that which party succeeded overall in the inter partes application is a factor the court is entitled to have regard to. I note, however, what Males J (as he then was) said in Yurov at para 11:
“11. So far as the costs of the application to discharge the freezing order are concerned, I accept the bank’s submission that it has been the successful party and that the starting point should be that it is entitled to its costs of the application. I consider, however, that it will generally be appropriate to make a deduction from the costs which would otherwise have been awarded in favour of a claimant where there have been failures of disclosure, and that this may be a very substantial deduction.”
[20]I make it plain that in exercising the court’s costs discretion, I have determined which party succeeded in the inter partes application and had regard to it as a relevant but not determinative factor. The successful party is unquestionably the respondent. There is no serious dispute about that conclusion, nor could there be. As evident from the extract of the substantive judgment, the parties sought the court’s adjudication on four issues. On three of them – serious issue to be tried, gateway and forum – the respondent succeeded. On the issue of FFD, the position is more nuanced. The court found that the respondent had breached its FFD duty in the ex parte application. However, this question needs elaboration.[21]The applicants alleged three breaches of duty. Failure 1 was a failure to disclose the nature and details of the US proceedings. This excluded the failure to mention the Delaware court’s interim decision (Failure 3). Overall, exempting the interim decision, the court found no material failure. Failure 2 was a failure to put the transition and settlement agreement (“TSA”) before the court. The court rejected the allegation. It found that the essential substance of the TSA was brought to the Judge’s attention. Failure 3 related to the interim decision. There was an admitted failure to alert the Judge to the interim decision, while maintaining that the omission was non-material. The court found that the failure was, contrary to the respondent’s case, material. Further, the court found an associated failure to present to the Judge an argument from analogy available to the applicants. Therefore, Failure 3 was made out: an FFD failure and associated failure of fair presentation.[22]While I have determined that the respondent is the successful party, I fully allow for the context: proceedings in which the court has found breaches of duty. Against this, I am not persuaded by the applicants’ submission that the fact that they failed to establish two out of three breaches “should not weigh heavily” in the court’s discretionary exercise. These failures by the applicants are bound to be relevant and court time and costs were incurred dealing with them. Indeed, in Yurov (para 19) the defendant failed to establish three out of the six alleged failures, a factor the court found to be relevant to the exercise of its costs discretion. Against this, and in favour of the applicants, as I noted in the substantive judgment, rather than adopting a scattergun approach, the failures alleged were commendably focused and limited. However, the failure to establish certain breaches led to a “smaller reduction” in inter partes costs payable in Yurov (para 21), and I adopt a similar while not identical approach, since I remain attentive to the granular facts of the instant case.[23]A further dispute is over the seriousness of the breaches. The applicants submitted in their written submissions that the breaches were held by the court to be serious. Such a characterisation of the court’s finding was repeated at the outset of the applicants’ oral submissions. It is incorrect. While the court referred in the judgment to seriousness, this was a reference to Carr J’s observation that ex parte hearings are a serious departure from ordinary principles of fairness as the opposing party or parties are not present, let alone represented. I did find that there was a logical inconsistency in the respondent’s position and for that reason Mr Mountford submits that the failure was “surprising”. However, using Carr J’s terminology in Tugushev (proposition (xii)), I did not find the breaches to have “importance” for the “issues before the judge”.[24]Ms Davies on behalf of the respondent is accurate in her submission about the findings. The court found that the breaches concerning the interim decision and fair presentation were made in an ex parte service out application (not freezing order application), were limited in extent, with no intention to mislead the court, and were not significant to the outcome of the ex parte application in the context of an application that was not made in secret, but in which the proposed parties were notified. The application papers were sent to Carter Bond before issue and to the other parties two days after issue. The parties agree that there is a spectrum of seriousness of breach of duty. I concur with the respondent that the breaches arising from the interim decision fall towards the lower end of that spectrum.[25]I also accept the respondent’s submission that the fact that it is likely that the orders would have been granted by the Judge, even if alerted to the interim decision and the argument by analogy, is a factor to weigh and not ignore in the costs discretion. The applicants submit that the starting-point is to deprive a defaulting party of “any advantage” arising from its breach. This is taken from Tugushev.

(x) of para 7 bears examination:

“Immediate discharge (without renewal) is likely to be the court’s starting point, at least when the failure is substantial or deliberate.”
In the instant case, the court has found that the failure is neither substantial nor deliberate. I use the term deliberate in the sense that Males J uses it in Yurov (para 9), as a lack of intention to withhold information “thought to be material”. The error here by the respondent was wrongly considering the interim decision to be immaterial.[26]While it is correct that the discretion to continue should be exercised “sparingly” (proposition (xii)), the overriding consideration “will always be the interests of justice” (confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Derma Med, para 30). That was my approach. The court concluded that the interests of justice fell in favour of continuation, a reflection of the non-seriousness of the established breaches. This finding of lower-level culpability affects the appropriate exercise of costs discretion.[27]Further, the point of the inter partes application was to set aside the Judge’s two orders. The applicants’ case included the submission that in light of the FFD breaches, the orders should not stand. The court rejected that submission. However, I do accept the applicants’ submission that costs consequence of the breaches should not be confined to the ex parte costs.[28]In summary, therefore, I have weighed the following factors and reached the following conclusions:• Nature of application. The FFD breaches arose in a service out application, not an application for a freezing order. I regard the distinction between the differing potentially harmful effects of these ex parte orders as relevant while not determinative, in line with established authority (Mints).• Culpability. This was not a deliberate manipulation of the court process, nor an attempt to deceive or mislead the Judge, nor in bad faith. The respondent did not completely fail to place the Delaware proceedings before the Judge (cf. Mints), but made an error of judgment about the relevance of one aspect of them: the interim decision of the Delaware Court of Chancery. Therefore, the respondent failed in its FFD duty in not mentioning the Vice Chancellor’s interim decision. At para 100 of the judgment, I noted that while Mr Lewis explicitly makes the salient points on behalf of the respondent (the different contracts, choices of law and jurisdiction), he puts nothing in the balance against them arising from the interim decision. While the respondent could validly have pointed out to the Judge that the comments of the Vice Chancellor were obiter, what should not have been wholly omitted was the availability of the argument from analogy. However, I judge that these potential arguments in favour of the applicants are not strong and the failure to mention them would similarly have made little material difference to the Judge’s permission decision. I have considered the effect of the two breaches in combination and reach the same conclusion about their cumulative lack of significance.• Seriousness. The breaches did not relate to an “important matter” in Mints, Leidos and Tugushev terms. The respondent’s breaches were limited in extent and importance.• Multiplicity. There were not repeated or multiple breaches of duty. There was a single error of judgment in respect of the interim decision and an associated failure of fair presentation about analogous arguments that are neither strong nor convincing.• Unreasonable conduct. I find unreasonable conduct by the respondent that increased the parties’ costs (Leidos) due to the lack of recognition of the materiality of the interim decision. As Mr Lewis stated on behalf of the respondent (Lewis 4, para 1), “I consider that Lewis 1 provided disclosure of all facts and matters that should have been brought to the attention of the Court for the purposes of that application.” Specifically, in respect of the interim decision, Mr Lewis said at para 12(2)(a), “I also do not see how this is relevant to a Service Out Application”. This was plainly wrong. It is redolent of the approach of the claimant bank in Yurov that right up to the inter partes hearing refused to accept that its non-disclosure of a settlement agreement was material, despite the court’s contrary finding (para 2). This lack of recognition of materiality was regarded by Males J (para 15) as a “relevant factor”. I take the same approach. I will reflect this element of unreasonable conduct in costs.[29]The applicants cite the Supreme Court decision in NML Capital Ltd v Republic of Argentina [2011] 2 AC 495. Lord Collins said at para 136:
“… the court has a discretion to set aside the order for service and require a fresh application, or to treat the claim form as validly served and deal with the non-disclosure by a costs order.”
[30]Despite the court not having set aside the order for service out, the applicants submit that they should receive their costs for the inter partes hearing on the indemnity basis. In this, the applicants rely on U&M Mining. There the respondent was deprived of its costs of the ex parte application and ordered to pay one third of the applicants’ costs of the inter partes reconsideration on the indemnity basis. I make the following observations.[31]First, in their skeleton argument for the set aside application, the applicants submitted that where breaches of FFD are established, the “usual costs consequences” are no costs recovery on the part of the respondent and an order to pay all the costs of the applicants. The applicants now resile from this position. When asked about this proposition during the oral hearing, the applicants accepted that there was no Court of Appeal authority to support such a submission.[32]The proposition that indemnity costs follow as a usual consequence of breach of FFD was considered in Les Ambassadeurs. Freedman J cited the well-known test for indemnity costs award in Excelsior Commercial and Industrial Holdings Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 879 (“Excelsior”) based on conduct “out of the norm” (per Lord Woolf LCJ, para 31; per Waller LJ, para 39). Freedman J (para 14) followed the Court of Appeal in Excelsior in holding that the proper approach to the basis of costs is to recognise that basis remains an exercise of discretion. He cites Gee on Civil Injunctions that there is no “general practice” of an indemnity basis award in instances of established non-disclosure. I reject the applicants’ submission that there is a “usual” practice to be followed. The appropriate assessment basis is fact-specific. The court will have regard to a wide range of relevant factors.[33]This was made plain by Males J in Yurov at para 12, when he said that “Every exercise of discretion depends on its own facts.” Yurov was an application for a freezing order in which the claimant bank succeeded in obtaining the order but failed to disclose three material facts (classified by Males J as “substantial … important … relatively trivial” respectively). Males J continued the order, but reduced the claimant’s inter partes costs to 40 per cent of assessed costs.[34]Second, there are important differences between the instant case and U&M Mining. That case concerned an application for a freezing order, potentially marking it as more serious than this service out application. As Males J said in Yurov (para 11), “Freezing orders can sometimes have devastating consequences for defendants and the court is heavily reliant on proper disclosure by claimants at the without notice stage.” I judge applications for service out, particularly as here on notice with application documentation provided to one proposed party pre-issue, and the others shortly after issue, to be in a lower category of seriousness.[35]The applicants in the instant case submit that the breaches in U&M Mining were non-deliberate. This is correct. However, as the Yurov judgment makes plain, the breaches were “serious and numerous” (para 94) and the court specifically mentioned the “seriousness and number of the respects in which U&M Mining failed in its duty of full and frank disclosure” (para 96). That is a markedly different position to the instant case. While the nature of the underlying application in U&M Mining was more potentially serious and the breaches more serious and numerous, the applicants here nevertheless apply for approaching twice the percentage of inter partes costs awarded in U&M Mining. This exemplifies the unrealistic nature of their application. The answer to the persuasive effect of U&M Mining to this case may be found in the applicants’ skeleton argument (para 18), where it is recognised that the citation of “other costs decisions is not normally particularly instructive”. I find that the costs award in U&M Mining of little assistance to the instant facts. In any event, as Males J said in Yurov (para 4), citing U&M Mining:
“I drew attention to the fact that, as Teare J pointed out in U&M Mining Zambia Ltd v Konkola Copper Mines plc [2014] EWHC 3250 (Comm) at [95] and [96], the requirement of deterrence can sometimes be met by an appropriate order as to costs even in a case involving various and numerous failures.”
[36]Third, the applicants submit that there should be cost consequences for the respondent in both the ex parte application and the inter partes application. I agree.[37]Fourth, I also agree that the costs sanction for the breaches of FFD should have a deterrent effect, both internally directed to the party in breach, but also externally so that it will be unmistakably understood that there will be consequences for breaches of FFD duties acting as an effective deterrent in other cases (Yurov).

Conclusion

[38]The respondent’s breaches arose from an error of judgment of not great significance to the outcome of the service out application. These considerations must be reflected in the nature of the costs sanction. The submission that the applicants should be awarded their costs on an indemnity basis is misconceived. Not every breach of duty is out of the norm resulting in indemnity basis costs awards (Les Ambassadeurs Club).[39]Therefore, the court has before it a failure of FFD and an associated failure of fair presentation and the failing party maintaining at the inter partes hearing that the failures are not material along with unreasonable conduct in failure to recognise the materiality of the interim decision failure. I consider that the overall picture requires a sanction in the costs the respondent receives for the inter partes application. The respondent’s proposal of limiting sanction to the ex parte application falls far short of what is required to provide the necessary deterrent effect. Equally, I have found the approach of the applicants to lack a sense of proportion given the limited culpability found by the court on the part of the respondent. I am mindful of what Males J said in Yurov at para 13:
“If the starting point were that costs, particularly on the indemnity basis, were awarded in favour of a defendant which has after all failed to obtain the discharge of the order, that could encourage disputes about failures to disclose to be litigated rather than promoting a realistic attitude on the part of defendants as to whether, despite a failure to disclose, a freezing order is nevertheless appropriate. An approach which, as it were, gives the defendant a free shot at discharging a freezing order so far as costs are concerned would not be helpful.”

Conclusion: Issue 2

[40]I judge that(1) the nature and quality of the respondent’s FFD breaches do not disentitle it to its costs in the inter partes application;(2) however, the respondent’s costs of the inter partes application should be reduced and the applicants must pay 50 per cent of the respondent’s costs, such costs to be assessed on the standard basis.

VI. Issue 3: directions

[41]As to the appropriate directions at this procedural stage, it is necessary to understand the chronology.• 26 February 2025. Messrs Courrier and Pasco filed their application for negative declaratory relief;• 8 April 2025. HKA duly filed its Defence;• 11 June 2025. HKA sought permission to file the counterclaim, bring the additional claim and for permission to serve out the additional claim.• 9 July 2025. Service out order.• 6 September 2025. Alternative service order.• 7 November 2025. The applicants applied to discharge and set aside the service out order and alternative service order.• 12 March 2026. The inter partes hearing of the set aside application.• 13/17 March 2026. Further submissions.• 19 May 2026. Judgment circulated in draft.• 3 June 2026. Judgment handed down.[42]A complicated series of alternative outcomes and possible directions were advanced by the parties. To my mind, a vital decision is how to approach the question of stay. I recognise that an application to appeal does not operate as a stay. Simultaneously with this judgment, as explained in the form N460, I have refused the applicants permission to appeal. It is now up to the applicants whether to renew permission to the Court of Appeal. They have 21 days to do so, as is conventional.[43]On the question of stay, I am mindful of the central fact that the applicants do not submit to the jurisdiction of the English court. I judge that if the court were to make case management orders while an active appeal remains outstanding, there is the risk of irreversible prejudice to the applicants. This is because if jurisdiction is successfully challenged, significant costs will have been incurred in a jurisdiction they are not subject to. I recognise the desire of the respondent to “get on with” these proceedings. But the case management approach must be proportionate and fair. There has been considerable delay and the extent of further delay must be weighed in that context. However, the proceedings remain in their early stages. While the respondent seeks directions for acknowledgement of service and defence, the applicants have persuaded me that the balance of prejudice or fairness (in essence the same thing here) falls in favour of granting a stay in the following way:• Proceedings stayed until the expiry of the 21 days period in which to apply for permission to appeal from the Court of Appeal. Thereafter, if no permission to appeal is applied for, each applicant to file its acknowledgement of service within 28 days of expiry and its defence 28 days after that.• If permission to appeal is applied for from the Court of Appeal, proceedings stayed until the Court of Appeal decides the permission application or makes a different order on stay.

VII. Disposal

[44]In summary, the court’s decisions are:• Issue 1: the respondent must bear its own costs of its ex parte service out application.• Issue 2: the applicants must pay 50 per cent of the respondent’s costs of the application to discharge and set aside the Judge’s orders, such costs to be assessed on the standard basis.• Issue 3: proceedings stayed until(1) expiry of the 21-day period for applying for permission to the Court of Appeal with case management directions as above (para 43); or(2) if permission to appeal is applied for, until permission is determined by the Court of Appeal or the Court of Appeal makes a different order.[45]I direct the parties to agree an order to reflect the terms of this judgment.