Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia (Cultural Bureau) v Linda Antuan & Anor [2026] EWHC 1708 (KB)

[2026] EWHC 1708 (KB)

Case No KB-2026-000829

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KING'S BENCH DIVISION

Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date 23/06/2026

Before

HIS HONOUR JUDGE AUERBACH

(Sitting as a Judge of the High Court

Between

ROYAL EMBASSY OF SAUDI ARABIA (CULTURAL BUREAU)Claimant

LINDA ANTUANDefendants

NORA CHIKH BAKRDefendant

Mr M Sethi KC and Mr J Wallace (instructed by Reynolds Porter Chamberlain LLP) for Claimant

The First Defendant in person for in person

The Second Defendant in person for in person

Hearing Hearing date: 23 June 2026

JUDGMENT

[1]The Defendants are former employees of the Claimant. The employment of the First Defendant ended in January 2023 and that of the Second Defendant in March 2023. Both Defendants have brought Employment Tribunal claims against the Claimant, including complaints of unfair dismissal and discrimination, which are ongoing. Those claims are defended, including the Claimant raising a state immunity issue which has yet to be determined by the Tribunal in either case.

[2]I will refer to the parties as they are in this Court. Arising out of disclosure of documents given in the tribunal litigation by the Defendants (as claimants in that litigation), and following correspondence between the parties relating to aspects of the disclosure that they gave, this High Court action was begun in March 2026.

[3]The Claimant alleges breach of employment contract and of the equitable obligation of confidence, on the part of both Defendants. The Claimant sought interim injunctive relief by an application sealed on 17 March supported by an affidavit of that date and exhibits, of its Head of Legal Department, Ms Mood. The application was heard by Choudhury J on 24 March 2026. The Claimant was represented by Mr Sethi KC and Mr Wallace of counsel. The Defendants both appeared in person.

[4]Choudhury J granted injunctions against both Defendants, the terms of which were set out in writing and sealed on 25 March 2026. The approved transcript of his oral judgment has since been published with neutral citation number

[2026] EWHC 1250

. The Claimant’s team tell me that they received it on 24 May. I do not know for sure if or when it was sent by the Court to the Defendants, but I accept that, one way or another, neither of them had read it before today.

[5]Choudhury J at paragraph 2, summarised the Claimant’s case in this way:

“The Claimant’s claim in these proceedings before me, in a nutshell, is that the Defendants had in the course of their employment access to the Claimant’s confidential information and they retained some of that information (“the relevant documents”) in breach of duties owed to the Claimant and in breach of confidence for the purposes of their litigation against the Claimant in the Tribunal.”

[6]In summary, the injunctions required each Defendant until judgment following a trial or further order(a) not to use or disclose the Claimant’s confidential information as defined, subject to specified exceptions;

(b) to preserve relevant documents as defined;

(d) to serve a witness statement by 1 April 2026 confirming delivery up, verifying that hard copies have not been retained and giving information about related matters. Choudhury J declined to include a further provision granting an imaging order in relation to the Defendants’ devices and electronic accounts.

[7]The Defendants’ application before me today was sealed on 17 June 2026. They apply for Choudhury J’s order to be discharged or set aside and they seek other orders. The Defendants are litigants in person and have represented themselves today. The Claimant has again been represented by Mr Sethi KC and Mr Wallace of counsel. Mr Sethi has addressed the Court, speaking to a co-authored skeleton argument; and without discourtesy to Mr Wallace, I will henceforth refer to Mr Sethi’s submissions.

[8]The Defendants’ application is set out in their application notice and attachments. These are: a document headed, “Question 10 continuation, evidence in support”; a document headed, “Detailed grounds for discharge”; a joint witness statement signed by them both with a statement of truth; and a document headed, “Exhibits.” This last document runs to 112 pages and includes extracts from various primary documents, with commentary, highlighting and submissions added by the Defendants.

[9]As well as the discharge or setting aside of Choudhury J’s order the Defendants seek an order that the court shall “review and determine the status,” of all documents and emails relied upon by the Claimant including whether they fall within the relevant articles of the Vienna Convention. They also seek an order prohibiting the Claimant from making any new assertions of confidentiality or reopening or expanding upon any issue of confidentiality.

[10]The Defendants refer to their status as litigants in person and say that they have been dealing, and continue to deal, with this matter under considerable stress. I have taken this into account in the conduct of this hearing. We had some breaks during the course of the hearing. No other particular adjustments were requested by them.

[11]There was a skeleton argument, as I have said, from the Claimant’s two counsel. The Claimant also tabled today two witness statements in support of its defence of this application, being a statement of Ms Mood and a statement of Patrick Brodie with an exhibit, he being the solicitor with conduct of this matter on behalf of the Claimant.

[12]The Claimant also canvassed the possible need, on its case, for a privacy order having regard in particular to some of the contents of the exhibit accompanying the Defendants’ application; and there was a further witness statement of Mr Brodie in support of that aspect and a draft order. In discussion, Mr Sethi KC agreed that there was no need for the court to contemplate immediately directing that any part of this hearing be conducted in private, as it was not obvious that the Defendants would, or would need to, refer to any of the substantive material which his clients regard as particularly sensitive. In the event, nothing occurred during the course of the hearing to cause Mr Sethi to revisit that aspect of matters.

[13]I had read into the Defendants’ application and their various supporting materials and the Claimant’s skeleton argument. The Defendants had received that skeleton in advance, but I considered that they should be given more time to read Choudhury J’s judgment and the Claimant’s witness statements; and indeed, I was given those statements only this morning and needed time to read them.

[14]We broke at about 11.10 for that purpose. We reconvened at around midday and I indicated that it would be proportionate and appropriate for me to make a limited order regarding the contents of the Defendants’ exhibit bundle, given that the Claimant says that this includes images of some documents that on its case are inviolably private. I will, therefore, make an order to the effect that in the event that any interested third party applies for sight of that bundle or any of its contents, there should be an opportunity for submissions from the parties and, as necessary, the interested party, as to whether any such bundle should only be provided in redacted form.

[15]I heard oral arguments from both of the Defendants and then by Mr Sethi KC in response. After the lunch break, there were further oral submissions from both Defendants in reply. I am grateful to all concerned for the way they have focused their submissions, bearing in mind the live issues before me today and the opportunity to read the more detailed submissions and documents that I had had.

[16]Choudhury J’s judgment should be read for its full content. He set out the following summary of the background, noting that he was not reaching final conclusions of fact but making a preliminary assessment based on the information before him.

[17]Choudhury J said at paras. 3, 4 and 5 of his judgment:

“3. The evidence in this case stems from the first affidavit of Abrara Mood, who is the head of the claimant's legal department. She says that the claimant's functions include implementing directives and instructions of the KSA Government, providing appropriate levels of security for the claimant's premises, protecting the claimant's data, supporting the KSA Embassy in its diplomatic and foreign affairs, and administering scholarship, sponsorship and medical insurance arrangements for KSA students studying in the UK, including for members of the KSA Royal Court and Royal Family, KSA government officials and dignitaries, KSA diplomatic agents, military personnel and security staff, and their families. It is apparent from that list of functions that the claimant handles large volumes of sensitive and confidential information. I have also been referred to a provision of KSA penal law which renders unauthorised use of classified information punishable by imprisonment. 4. The first defendant, Ms Antuan, worked primarily in the admin affairs section of the claimant. Her duties included overseeing aspects of the claimant's security and dealing with correspondence concerning the financial and medical affairs of KSA students and personnel, as well as facilitating liaison between the claimant, the KSA Embassy, and the KSA Government. By virtue of that role, Ms Antuan had access to the claimant's confidential information, including personal data, administrative data, security-related data and information relating to KSA diplomatic and foreign affairs. I should emphasise at this stage, for the benefit of the defendants, that my assessments today do not amount to final conclusions of fact; these are preliminary assessments based on the information before me. The second defendant, Ms Bakr, had a role which was split between administrative affairs and finance. Her core duties included manually filing student and staff records, reviewing invoices, and handling medical and visa reimbursement requests for KSA students and personnel. It is evident that whilst the defendants had access to some confidential information, their roles were fairly low-level administrative roles. 5. Around 1 October 2022, the claimant underwent a restructuring process which led to the termination of those on fixed term contracts with 10 or more years' service. As both defendants fell within the scope of that restructuring, their employment was terminated in January and March 2023 respectively. Upon departing, they were required to, and did, sign declarations that they had relinquished access to the claimant's systems and had returned all of the claimant's property including electronic documents.”

[18]Choudhury J went on to note that in the course of the Tribunal proceedings, the Claimant had invited the Defendants to agree, for the purposes of disclosure, what was called a confidentiality club protocol, or CCP; but although they had initially agreed to the general proposition, ultimately the proposed terms were not agreed. The Claimant then sought a further direction from the Tribunal in that regard. I have been told that the Tribunal has since made a form of CCP order in the claim brought by the First Defendant and that there is a hearing to decide whether to make some such order in the claim brought by the Second Defendant on 29 June.

[19]Choudhury J continued his account of the factual background as follows:

“7. Upon inspection of the defendants' disclosure (some of which had to be translated from the original Arabic), it emerged that about 17 of the documents disclosed by D1, Ms Antuan, were the claimant's property, and that the documents also contained confidential and sensitive information. That information included documents containing details of KSA students and staff with private and personal details, documents that contained internal communications relating to KSA governmental policy and the claimant's administrative arrangements, and documents that are potentially subject to legal professional privilege. It also appeared that Ms Antuan had sent documents from her work email address to her personal email address, and 79 such emails were identified by the claimant, some of which contained attachments and content which appeared to be the claimant's property and which the claimant asserts may contain confidential information. 8. Ms Bakr's disclosure revealed at least 71 documents that were the claimant's property. These also contained, according to the claimant, confidential and sensitive information. A further matter in Ms Bakr's disclosure was an email that suggested that she had retained access to her work email account up to at least November 2025, although the information in that account had ceased to be updated since February 2025. I note in the skeleton arguments submitted by the defendants at the start of this hearing that they dispute that they retained access to those email accounts. I of course make no final determination about that at this stage. The information also suggests that there were 27 emails sent from Ms Bakr's work email address to her personal email address - some of which again contained confidential and proprietary information of the claimant. 9. Understandably concerned by this discovery, the claimant's solicitors wrote to the defendants requesting delivery up and undertakings. Without going into the history of that correspondence in any detail, it appeared that by 2 March 2026 the defendants refused to give the undertakings in the form requested. They asserted that they had not misused any personal information or disclosed it to others and that any information they had was only being used for the Employment Tribunal litigation. Ms Bakr admitted that she had shared certain documents with a colleague. Although not identified in her documents, it is clear from the context that that colleague was Ms Antuan. She also asserted that the documents were retained "solely for Tribunal purposes", and were shared with her colleague as they had the same claims against the claimant. On 13 and 17 March 2026, Ms Bakr sent lengthy emails containing explanation and argument in respect of her retention and use of documents for the Tribunal proceedings. On 17 March 2026, the claimant issued this application for injunctive relief.” 20. In considering the approach to relief, Choudhury J noted that the Claimant relied on the well-known (to lawyers) authority of American Cyanmid Limited v Ethicon [1975] AC 396 but also, in this case, on Article 24 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) which provides that: “The archives and documents of the mission shall be inviolable at any time wherever they may be.” 21. He observed that: “An ‘archive’ for this purpose includes any form of storage of information and includes modern forms of storage such as computer disks and retrievable electronic files.” 22. He went on to refer to R (on the application of Bancoult No 3) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2018] UKSC 3 in which the Supreme Court: “…confirmed that the court must give effect to that inviolable status, notwithstanding the particular contents of the documents, save where the document ceases to be part of a mission archive or where the document has been so widely disseminated in the public domain as to destroying any confidentiality that could sensibly attach to it.” 23. As to whether some relief ought in principle to be granted, Choudhury J said: “12. I am satisfied that there is a strong case that the relevant documents are confidential and/or inviolable. Whilst they do not appear to have much, if any, commercial or financial value, they do contain details which are at the very least personal to students and personnel of the KSA mission, and include information about the workings of the mission in terms of security and invoicing. Furthermore, the documents were made accessible during employment in an environment of confidentiality, given the terms of the contractual obligations and the code of conduct to which both defendants had to adhere. That code of conduct emphasised the confidentiality of the documents. There is also the background of the KSA penal law which is relevant to ascertaining the status of the relevant documents as they would or ought to have been understood by the defendants. Even if that had not been the case, it is clear that the documents, being part of the Embassy's archive, would fall within the terms of Article 24 of the Vienna Convention and would therefore have inviolable status to which the court must give effect. 13. There is also, it seems to me, a strong prima facie case of breach, given the retention of documents post-employment. The claimant also asserts that there has been continued access to the work email account of Ms Bakr. It seems to me that the evidence on that is much more equivocal and it certainly cannot be determined at this stage whether the sending of emails from a work email address to a personal one whilst employed necessarily amounted to a breach. There may well have been allowances made during Covid for such transmission to take place. But that would not negate the breach involved in retaining such material post-termination. Of course, I note that the defendants, who are litigants in person, believed in good faith that they were entitled to retain the documents for their use in legal proceedings. They are wrong about that: it is not for the defendants to retain unauthorised control over such documents to do with as they please. The proper course is to rely on disclosure processes and to seek the court's assistance or the Tribunal's assistance if there are concerns that the disclosure by the claimant has not been complete: see, for example, Nissan Motor (GB) Ltd. v Passi [2021] EWHC 3642 (Ch), paras.13 and 18. 14. As to the balance of convenience, I bear in mind that the defendants were not senior employees, they were administrative grade employees. I also bear in mind there is very little, if any, evidence of disclosure to, or threat of disclosure to, any third party beyond themselves. There is also very little, if any, evidence of disclosure for any purpose other than the Tribunal proceedings, certainly not for any nefarious purpose. I also bear in mind that, as is often the case in such applications, the indignation on the part of the claimant is somewhat out of proportion to the harm actually done. 15. That said, I must also bear in mind that, unlike a normal commercial entity, the claimant is part of the diplomatic mission of the KSA, and as such has a particular right to maintain the inviolability of its documents. Continued possession of the relevant documents would be inimical to that inviolability. Mr Sethi also submits that there is a risk of serious harm through further disclosure, and submits that unless restrained there is every likelihood that they will continue to share the claimant's proprietary information between themselves or further afield. I agree that there is a risk of sharing between themselves, but that does not cause any further harm, let alone any serious harm in this context. As to disclosure further afield, there really is no evidence before me of such a risk. I note that Mr Sethi relies upon the uploading, or the apparent uploading, of documents to an AI system such as ChatGPT, and points to what appears to be a near paragraph-by-paragraph analysis of the CCP in an email from Ms Bakr, which has some of the hallmarks of an AI-generated document. Whilst that might lead to a potential inference that the CCP was uploaded, there is no evidence that one can see or inference that one can draw to suggest that anything else was uploaded. I note Ms Bakr's denial before me that anything else was uploaded to any AI platform. There is certainly nothing to suggest that, for example, medical details of any student or mission personnel have been uploaded. The risk of personal details being used by an unidentified third party to compromise the security of mission personnel (for example, by perpetrating identity theft or blackmail), appears to me to be very small indeed. I accept that if that small risk did materialise, then damages would not be an adequate remedy. I also bear in mind that in terms of the inviolability of mission documents or archive documents, any use or retention would amount to a breach of that principle and would not be something that could be compensated for by way of damages. 16. Taking account of all of the above, I am persuaded, but only just (and principally because of the inviolability issue), that the American Cyanamid test has been satisfied and that some relief is due.”

[24]Choudhury J considered the proposed restriction on the use or disclosure of the Claimant’s confidential information to be unobjectionable. He also made a delivery-up order, allowing four working days. Whilst observing that there might be some overlap, he was also prepared to make a limited preservation order; and he made a witness-statement order, although in a more limited form than had been sought. He refused an imaging order for further reasons that he set out.

[25]Since the hearing before Choudhury J there have been the following developments. It appears that the Defendants asked the Claimant to allow them more time to comply with the delivery-up and witness-statement orders. The Claimant indicated it was willing to agree to that if the Defendants would agree an extension of its time to file and serve its particulars of claim, but no agreement was reached.

[26]On 30 March 2026, as directed, the Defendants delivered up hard and electronic copies of the Claimant’s documents. They also provided witness statements. The Claimant considered these to be deficient in certain respects and raised this with the Defendants, and the Defendants then provided further witness statements in April 2026. The Defendants believe they have done their best fully to comply, although the Claimant considers that some gaps still remain in the witness statements.

[27]During April, the Claimant served its particulars of claim and the Defendants filed acknowledgements of service. Having verified that that had been done, the Claimant agreed to extend time for service of the defence to 2 June 2026, the maximum extension that the parties could agree amongst themselves. The Claimant did not oppose the Defendants’ application for a further extension to 30 June, which the Master granted.

[28]The Defendants are litigants in person and the various materials that they have relied upon are lengthy, often repetitive and sometimes discursive. But, in summary, it seems to me that their main points in their documentation and/or their submissions today are as follows.

[29]Firstly, the Defendants say they reviewed such documents as were in their possession. They submit that none of them amount to inviolable diplomatic archives nor are any of them confidential within the meaning of the Vienna Convention. They say that they are all routine administrative or HR correspondence which have been retained by them solely for the purposes of Tribunal proceedings. They say that neither of them ever visited the Embassy itself and there is no basis for what they say are allegations that there is some security risk that has been posed by their conduct.

[30]The Defendants submit that as the documents, on their case, all fall within the scope of the Tribunal’s proceedings, they are already governed by what they call the Tribunal’s confidentiality rules and restrictions on use; and so the Claimant’s attempt to impose an excessively restrictive CPP is unnecessary and disproportionate.

[31]The Defendants say that they have delivered up all material that they are aware is in their possession in accordance with Choudhury J’s order and there is no continuing risk to the Claimant. They have done their best as litigants in person, having had only limited time to respond to the injunction application. They refer to one of them having sadly suffered a bereavement in March and to the general stress this litigation has caused them. They say they have made this application prior to the extended deadline allowed for them to file their defence, so it will not have caused any significant delay to the progress of this litigation.

[32]The Defendants say that they have been selectively targeted while more than 40 other longer-serving staff and more than 50 other remote workers who were required to use personal accounts and devices in connection with the Claimant’s work have, on their case, been ignored. They say that this is discriminatory and unfair to them.

[33]Insofar as the Second Defendant still potentially had access to emails that had been cached and synchronised, that was a result of the Claimant’s own remote working systems not having been disabled by it sooner than they were; and in any event, all such material has now been delivered up. The Second Defendant says she did not access any live systems after her employment ended, save only that when it came to disclosure in the Employment Tribunal, she looked for material that she considered was relevant and should be disclosed.

[34]The Defendants refer to what they say was the development in another case involving the same Claimant in which its previous solicitor ceased to act.

[35]The Defendants assert that the injunctions were obtained based on material non-disclosure, presentation of forged or inauthentic documents, documents containing erroneous dates, incorrect information about job roles or titles and mistranslations. They submit that if Choudhury J had been given the true picture, he would not have granted the injunctions.

[36]The Defendants’ materials are extremely wide-ranging. They include references to various matters that have to do with events during the course of their employments, some of which, it would appear are, or may be, at issue in the ongoing Employment Tribunal claims, but much of which appears to me to be irrelevant to the issues that I have to decide today. There are also references to matters that appear to relate to the alleged treatment of other former colleagues, which again appear to me to be irrelevant to what I have to decide today.

[37]My starting point is that this is an application to revisit an order that has previously been made. It is correct that the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) give the court the power in an appropriate case to revisit a previous order. Choudhury J’s order also expressly allowed for the possibility of an application for discharge provided that it was made on 24 hours’ notice. That notice has been given in this case although Mr Sethi KC made the point that no prior approach was made to the Claimant warning of this application, and it still had less than the three days’ notice that would ordinarily be required by the CPR.

[38]However, there has to be some proper basis for the exercise of the power or discretion in the given case. See: Thevarajah v Riordan and others

[2015] UKSC 78

[39]Although the Defendants describe the hearing before Choudhury J as having been without notice, that is not correct. This is not a case where an order was made in the first instance in their absence and a further hearing date set then set for both parties to be heard, nor is it a case where the Defendants were given short notice under the CPR.

[40]I fully appreciate that as litigants in person, the task of responding within the time scale of about a week will have been challenging for the Defendants. Nevertheless both of them attended the hearing before Choudhury J. Both put in skeleton arguments and were heard. It is very apparent that he took their arguments into account and a number of their arguments found favour. He plainly did not think that they needed more time to be able fairly to respond to the application and he did not himself set a further date for the question of whether interim relief should be continued to be revisited.

[41]The underlying claim in this case is about confidential information, not, for example, about restrictive covenants that have an inherent shelf life. At least at present, the Claimant still seeks final injunctive relief. Pleadings have yet to be completed. At least potentially, this matter could proceed to a full trial at which witnesses may give live evidence and be cross-examined, and which may give rise to a decision containing definitive findings of fact and a final outcome as to whether any permanent injunctive relief should be granted. If the matter does proceed to such a trial, the Defendants will have the opportunity then to put relevant points and arguments to witnesses and/or to the Court in support of their case.

[42]Having regard to all of that, this is not a case where the Defendants are, in principle, entitled to a further hearing at this point to determine whether injunctive relief should continue until trial or further order. In so saying, I do not rely on what the Claimant says is their significant delay in making the present application. My view on this aspect would have been the same had their application been made sooner after Choudhury J’s order. Nor is it a proper basis for such an order to be revisited, that a party contends that it was in some respect made in error of law. The proper recourse in such a case, where the decision is of the High Court, is to seek permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

[43]As the extracts that I have set out show, essentially, the evidence of breach of duty on which Choudhury J relied was the evidence of the Defendants having as a matter of fact, after their employments ended, retained confidential materials in their possession to which they had gained access during, and for the purposes of, their employment, as evidenced by the disclosure that they gave in the Employment Tribunal process. He accepted that they had believed in good faith that they were entitled to do so, and to use those documents for the purposes of legal proceedings in the Tribunal. He also considered that there was no real evidence that any such material had been passed by them to any third party, as opposed to some being shared with each other, nor used for any other purpose than the Tribunal proceedings. Nor did he consider that there was any real risk of that happening.

[44]However, Choudhury J considered that as a matter of law the Defendants were wrong to believe that they were entitled to retain and use the documents for that purpose. The proper route for them to seek to rely on documents they considered to be relevant would be to seek disclosure of them from the Claimant, and, if not disclosed, to invite the Tribunal to make an appropriate order. If the Defendants considered that Choudhury J had got the law wrong on this point, the proper recourse would be a timely application for permission to appeal his decision to the Court of Appeal. Such arguments do not provide a proper basis for me to revisit his order today.

[45]For similar reasons, the Defendants’ arguments that the powers of the Tribunal to regulate disclosure in proceedings before it mean that it was unnecessary for the Claimant to be granted injunctive relief by this Court, also do not provide a basis for me to revisit Choudhury J’s order.

[46]It is also clear that Choudhury J was of the view that Bancoult in particular makes it clear that all of the material at issue did, as a matter of law, fall within the Embassy’s archive in the relevant sense and attracted the protection of the Vienna Convention, so as to have inviolable status to which the Court must give effect. This conclusion was not predicated upon his considering that there was evidence of a significant security risk as a result of the Defendants’ past or possible future conduct. Rather, his decision was based on his understanding that the legal protection conferred by the Convention, and hence the inviolability principle, extended to documents that the Defendants had retained, notwithstanding their, as he put it, fairly low-level administrative roles.

[47]It is also clear that that context, of the application of the Vienna Convention, was a significant feature for Choudhury J, tipping the balance in favour of the Claimant, and that he would have granted the injunctions specifically on that basis alone. Once again, if the Defendants considered that he erred in law in treating the documents in question as inherently forming part of the mission archive for the purposes of attracting the inviolability principle, the appropriate route of challenge would be a timely application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal, not to seek a discharge of his order by this Court at this stage.

[48]Insofar as the Defendants contend that the CPPs sought by the Claimant in the Tribunal were unnecessary or disproportionate, those were, or are, matters for the Tribunal. If the Defendant in respect of whom such an order has been made considered that the Tribunal had erred in doing so, her recourse would be a timely appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal.

[49]So far as the Defendants’ claims of unfair or discriminatory treatment during the course of their employment or by way of its termination are concerned, including their arguments as to the true reasons why they were dismissed, all of these matters may, so far as relevant, fall to be ventilated before the Tribunal. But they are not relevant either to Choudhury J’s decision to grant the interim injunction or whether there are any good grounds for me to discharge it. As well as being unnecessary, it would be inappropriate for me to comment further on those arguments, given the ongoing Tribunal claims.

[50]So far as the Defendants complain that they have been singled out, when many others will, on their case, have had similar access to, or have retained, information belonging to the Claimant, the Claimant sought and obtained an injunction on the basis of evidence that the Defendants had, as a matter of fact, retained in their possession post the termination of their employments, documents that fell to be treated as confidential. The Defendants’ arguments in this regard, therefore, also do not provide any basis for me to revisit Choudhury J’s order.

[51]The Defendants’ arguments about what may or may not have occurred regarding the representation of the Claimant in other litigation not involving them are not relevant to what I have to decide today. Insofar as the Defendants refer to the Claimant having relied before Choudhury J on provisions of Saudi law, whereas they maintain that this matter should be determined solely by reference to the law of England & Wales, I note that Choudhury J referred to these as being merely background submissions.

[52]I turn to the Defendants’ arguments to the effect that false or forged documents, or knowingly misleading statements, were presented or made by the Claimant in the application that was heard by Choudhury J. The Claimant’s general position is, firstly that many of the Defendants’ points are not accurate. Secondly, however, there is an acceptance that there have been some limited errors made either by individuals on behalf of the Claimant or errors in translation which were not picked up sooner; but that there have been no deliberate errors, and certainly no forging of documents or attempt to mislead the Court.

[53]The Claimant’s witnesses go through all of the particular documents identified by the Defendants as suspect or at issue, and give a detailed account of the position in relation to each one. The Defendants, and particularly Ms Bakr in her oral submissions today, maintain that there are too many discrepancies and do not accept that this is all entirely innocent.

[54]Mr Sethi KC submitted that such errors as it is now acknowledged that there were in any event relate to matters on which Choudhury J’s decision did not rely. He accepted in principle that, were the evidence before me to show a strong case that Choudhury J had been knowingly misled or knowingly presented with false documentation, that might potentially give grounds to revisit his order. But he submitted very firmly that the detailed witness statements put before me fully addressed the Defendants’ points, item by item, and that there was no basis for such a concern. I note that Ms Mood in her statement says, “I vehemently deny that any of the documents submitted by the Cultural Bureau in the course of these proceedings have been forged, fabricated or are otherwise deliberately misleading.”

[55]Turning to the particular documents, there is a document on its face dated 22 November 2009 being an employment request document for the Second Defendant. The Second Defendant queries this on the basis that it predated the start of her employment on 1 December 2009, and was also apparently dated on a Sunday. The Claimant makes the points: that this document was not relied upon before Choudhury J; that the Second Defendant was interviewed on 18 November; and that it is unremarkable that the individual processing the document was working on a Sunday. It accepts that the Second Defendant did not sign the document, and says that a translation error gave rise to the mistaken suggestion that she had.

[56]The Second Defendant points to an assertion in a document presented to the Employment Tribunal, that she had worked in archiving in 2008/2009. The Claimant accepts that this was an error, and that there is no dispute that she started on 1 December 2009. The error has been corrected and was not material to Choudhury J’s decision.

[57]The Second Defendant refers to a document dated 7 December 2009, which she queries, as she started on 1 December. The Claimant says that this was an internal piece of paperwork likely dated on the date when it was completed.

[58]The First Defendant says that she never worked in the Claimant’s archive, as some documents appear to suggest, and that her role was purely administrative. The Second Defendant says the same. They say that various documents give them job titles or roles that are not accurate. The Claimant says that all of these documents are genuine documents, as such, which were retrieved from HR files for the two Defendants. As to what the Defendants were actually doing from time to time, that is a live issue in the Employment Tribunal.

[59]The Defendants say that the Claimant has fabricated the suggestion that they have posed a security risk. The Claimant says that Choudhury J’s decision did not find that they were any kind of high level security risk, but was posited correctly on the Vienna Convention nevertheless applying to all of the documents in question.

[60]The Defendants say that the Claimant never produced a copy of its code of conduct signed by the First Defendant and that what the Claimant says is the Second Defendant’s signature on the code is not in fact hers. The Claimant acknowledged in the original application that no signed code had been found for the First Defendant. Ms Mood maintains that the document apparently bearing the Second Defendant’s signature came from her HR file. The Claimant submits that if there is a dispute about whether she did sign it, it would be a matter for expert evidence. In any event Choudhury J did not rely on these documents presumptively having been signed, but on the Defendants being aware in any event that they ought to comply with the code.

[61]The Defendants say that clearance certificates, relating to the Claimant’s protocols for departing employees, were not signed by them, and, in the case of the Second Defendant, query why the document was dated two days after her date of termination. The Claimant once again says that these documents were taken from the HR files, and that they reflect an internal protocol. The Claimant accepts that they were not signed by the Defendants. It says that they were misdescribed in bundles and exhibit descriptions for Choudhury J’s hearing, which was an inadvertent error, arising from the fact that there were multiple signatures of members of staff on those documents. Once again, it says that, ultimately, what mattered before Choudhury J was whether the Defendants knew that in principle they should have returned any documents which they in fact retained.

[62]The Defendants say that so-called OST files of emails were automatically updated, because the server continued to synchronise after they left, which was not their fault, and that the Second Defendant only screenshotted sent emails when seeking to comply with disclosure obligations to the Tribunal, not believing that this was wrong. The Claimant relies simply on the fact that the documents were retained, and accessed at least on that occasion.

[63]More generally, the Claimant refers to having used independent professional translation services, and relied entirely on documents taken from the HR files, which were genuine documents, as such, even if they may have contained some inaccuracies.

[64]These responses are highlights from the Claimant’s witness statements which I have read alongside the detailed material presented by the Defendants. I do not have to come to a definitive view. But I consider that the accounts given in the Claimant’s witness evidence potentially provide a complete answer to all of the Defendants’ concerns and suspicions about the documentation at issue. I stress that I have not made findings of fact about these matters. Nor am I determining whether it might be said that the Claimant could or should have done better in terms of checking the documents at the time of its previous application. But I do not consider that any of the material before me provides a sufficient basis to support me discharging Choudhury J’s order today.

[65]It is evident from Choudhury J’s decision, and having myself heard and seen the Defendants in Court today, that they feel that they have done their best at all times to comply with the law as they understood it, and to be open about what they have or have not done. They feel a strong sense of grievance at how they feel they have been depicted by the Claimant. The Claimant, for its part, and in particular, its deponent, Ms Mood, feel very strongly that very serious allegations have been made against them by the Defendants, for which it is their very firm case there is no foundation whatsoever. The parties’ strength of feelings do not, however, provide a basis for me to discharge Choudhury J’s order.

[66]On all the information I have, I do not accept that there is any basis for criticising the Claimant in terms of the indulgence that it has or has not given to the Defendants by way of extensions of time to comply with Choudhury J’s orders and/or the filing of their defence.

[67]The Defendants’ arguments that Choudhury J’s injunction has now been substantially satisfied, do not mean that I ought to discharge it today. I note again that the Claimant as presently advised says that the witness statements are in certain respects incomplete and relies on what it says is the ongoing duty of preservation and to maintain confidentiality pursuant to Choudhury J’s order, pending conclusion of a trial. It has not at present ruled out seeking to pursue this matter to a trial at which it may seek a final order.

[68]The Employment Tribunal litigation has some way to go. I observe that it is the main event. Both sides are, in fact, I think, keen for this High Court litigation in one way or another to come to a close as soon as possible. I would expect the Claimant to review its position at close of pleadings, if not before, and I would expect both sides, notwithstanding the strength of feeling and what both appear to consider are the high stakes, to reflect on opportunities for dialogue in order to seek to bring about some closure to this High Court litigation sooner rather than later.

[69]But today I am only concerned with whether I should discharge the interim injunction granted by Choudhury J insofar as there do indeed remain some elements of it which still have ongoing currency as not having been fulfilled. For all of these reasons, I am not so persuaded, and the Defendants’ application to do so is refused.

[70]Nor is it appropriate for me to grant the other relief sought by the Defendants.

[71]To the extent that there do remain disputes to do with the authenticity or accuracy of documents, relevant to this High Court litigation, those disputes may be ventilated at trial, if it gets that far. However, I encourage the Defendants also to review carefully further, after today, the further evidence that has been put forward by the Claimant, and it may be that there can at least be some narrowing of what is at issue in this regard.

[72]Any issues about evidence that any party may seek to present to any eventual trial of this High Court action would fall to be considered in particular at the case management hearing and are not a matter for me today.

[73]Nor, finally, is there any basis for me to grant an order restricting the ability of the Claimant to advance arguments based on confidentiality in the future that may not have already been ventilated, if it believes that it has some proper and necessary basis for raising such matters. If it does, the Defendants would have a fair opportunity to respond before anything was decided.

[74]For all of these reasons, I therefore refuse the Defendants’ applications. On the Claimant’s application, I will make the limited order that I have described. ---------------