London Borough of Hillingdon v Springwell Lane Metal Recycling Limited & Ors [2026] EWHC 1676 (KB)

[2026] EWHC 1676 (KB)

Case No KB-2026-001493

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KING'S BENCH DIVISION

Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date 3 rd July 2026

Before

ANNABEL DARLOW KC

(Sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court)

Between

LONDON BOROUGH OF HILLINGDONClaimant

SPRINGWELL LANE METAL RECYCLING LIMITEDDefendants

MARTIN JAMES NOLANDefendant

MARK STANLEY GREENDefendant

JEFFREY ALAN MCNABDefendant

LISA JANE MCNABDefendant

Mr O’Brien O’Reilly (instructed by Legal Services – Hillingdon Council) for Claimant

The Defendants were unrepresented.

Hearing Hearing dates: 23 June 2026

Approved Judgment

.............................

ANNABEL DARLOW KC :

[1]This is the hearing of an application in which the Claimant seeks final injunctive relief pursuant to section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (‘the Act’). The relief sought is of both a prohibitory and a mandatory nature. The claim concerns land located in Rickmansworth. The land in question (‘the Land’) consists of two plots of land; Land North East of Springwell Lane, Rickmansworth, known as Springwell Factory, Springwell Lane, Harefield WD3 8UX, referred to as ‘Plot A’ and Land to the North of Springwell Factory, referred to as ‘Plot B.’

[2]The Claimant in this matter is the relevant local authority, the London Borough of Hillingdon (‘the Council’), which has responsibility for investigating and enforcing breaches of planning control within its area. The first Defendant is Springwell Lane Metal Recycling Ltd (‘SLMR’). The second Defendant is Martin Nolan, who is shown at Companies House to be the Director of SLMR. The third defendant is Mark Green, who is shown at Companies House to be the resigned Director of SLMR. The fourth and fifth defendants are, respectively, Jeffrey McNab and Lisa McNab. Mr and Mrs McNab are the registered owners of Plot A, for which the Land Registry Title Number is AGL35668 and Mr McNab is the registered owner of Plot B, for which the Land Registry Title Number is NGL41605. The sixth Defendant is stated to be ‘Persons Unknown.’

Procedural History

[3]On 8 May 2026, an interim injunction order against the first, second and third Defendants was granted by Mr Malcom Sheehan KC, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court. The injunction prohibited the use of the Land in breach of the requirements of an Enforcement Notice issued by the Claimant and dated 6 September 2024; the use of the Land as a scrap metal yard; the carrying out of any development on the land, as defined by section 55(1) of the Act; the carrying out of any further works on the Land; the deposition on the Land of any waste materials, hardcore or similar substances and the bringing onto, or storage, on the Land, of any vehicles, plant and/or machinery, save where to do so was necessary to secure the cessation of the use of the Land and/or to clear the Land.

[4]At the hearing on 8 May 2026, the applications for an interim injunction against the fourth and fifth Defendants were adjourned, as was the application for an interim injunction against the sixth Defendant. The learned Deputy Judge set down the trial of this action for the first available date after 23 June 2026 and made further directions, including for the exchange of evidence, for the final hearing. On the same date, the sealed interim injunction Order was issued to the first five Defendants and the sealed Order was attached to the fence at the Land.

[5]The adjourned application against the sixth Defendant was heard before Mr Guy Vassall-Adams KC, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, on 10 June 2026. At the hearing, an interim injunction was granted against the sixth Defendant.

[6]On 19 May 2026, a Notice of the Final Hearing on 23 and 24 June 2026 was issued to the first and second Defendants and on the following day, the Notice was issued to the third Defendant and to Unknown Persons, by fixing two copies of the Notice at the entrance to the site.

[7]The first, second and third Defendants did not attend the Final Hearing of this matter on 23 June 2026. Neither the first, second, nor third Defendant were legally represented. The fourth Defendant, Mr McNab, attended on behalf of himself and the fifth Defendant. The Claimant accordingly applied to proceed in the absence of the remaining Defendants.

[8]The court was satisfied on the evidence before it, that the sealed interim injunction had been served upon on each of the absent Defendants and that each had been notified of the date of the final hearing. No Acknowledgment of Service has been lodged by any of the absent Defendants and neither the second nor the third Defendant attended the hearing on 8 May 2026. My attention was further drawn to an e-mail sent to the Council on 7 May 2026 by the second Defendant, in which he confirmed that he would not attend the interim injunction hearing and stated; ‘I don’t intend to challenge the injunction but would ask for 42 days to clear the site.’ The absent Defendants have not contacted either the Claimant nor the court to request an adjournment or to represent that they were unable to attend the hearing.

[9]CPR 39.3 provides that the court may proceed with a trial in the absence of a party and makes provision for a party who fails to attend to apply for the judgment or order to be set aside. In the light of the circumstances outlined above, I concluded that an adjournment of the Final Hearing would not be in the interests of justice and would not further the overriding objective pursuant to Part 1.1 CPR. There was no indication that an adjournment would cause any alteration in the position presently before the court and postponing the hearing would give rise to significant cost implications. The application of the Claimant to proceed in the absence of the first three Defendants was therefore granted.

[10]The Claimant has sought an order that the claim against the fourth and fifth Defendants is adjourned and that, within nine months of the Order, the Claimant shall either apply for the claim against those defendants to be re-listed, or to discontinue the claim against those defendants. The court grants that application. Factual Background

[11]The Land has been used by SLMR as a scrap metal yard since approximately April 2023. The Land comprises an area of Green Belt Land and is located within the Springwell Lock Conservation Area. The site is strategically located for wildlife and is in close proximity to the River Colne. Residential properties are located 87 metres to the south of the site and the Grand Union Canal, used by canal boaters, passes to the east of the site.

[12]Mr Daniel Lord, the Area Planning Enforcement Team Leader at the Council, has provided five witness statements, dated 20 April 2026, 5 May 2026, 7 May 2026, 2 June 2026 and 2 June 2026, supported by a number of exhibits. Mr Lord sets out within those statements a number of relevant matters pertaining to the relevant planning history and breaches of planning control at the Land.

[13]Plot A previously comprised a hard surface area of approximately 974 sqm of land, used for parking and storage of vehicles. Plot B was undeveloped Green Belt Land but more recently, metal fence panels previously demarcating the edge of the scrap metal yard have been removed and the site now surrounds the previously fenced area.

[14]Following complaints received by the Council, a site inspection was conducted in September 2023, which established that a breach of planning control had occurred, due to a material change of use of the Land to a Scrap Metal Yard.

[15]The third Defendant thereafter made an application for retrospective planning permission on 2 February 2024, seeking permission for a material change of land use from Industrial to a Scrap Metal Yard, which was being operated by SLMR. The Council refused the application on 30 July 2024. There was no subsequent appeal, pursuant to section 78 of the Act, against that decision.

[16]On 6 September 2024, an Enforcement Notice was issued by the Council, which alleged a breach of planning control in respect of the material change of use of the Land at Springwell Factory for use as a Scrap Metal Yard (sui generis). The Enforcement Notice was due to take effect on 18 October 2024 with a one-month compliance period, and required steps to be taken which included the cessation of the use of the land as a scrap metal yard, the demolition and removal of all fence panels and posts, the removal from the land of all skips, scrap metals and related items, and the removal from the land of all vehicles and machinery associated with the scrap metal yard.

[17]An appeal against the Enforcement Notice was made by the third Defendant; however the appeal was dismissed on 28 March 2025 by a Planning Inspector appointed by the Secretary of State. The second to fifth Defendants were each informed by letter as to the position in relation to the Enforcement Notice and that an inspection would take place to check that there had been compliance with the Enforcement Notice. The operational effect of the Enforcement Notice had been suspended in the usual way until the determination of the appeal.

[18]The time period for compliance with the Enforcement Notice duly lapsed and on 29 April 2025, following a site visit by Mr Lord of the same day, Mr Green and Mr Nolan were informed by letter that it was evident that the storing and sorting of scrap metal continued, the scrap metal yard remained in operation and there had not been compliance with the requirements of the Notice. The second, third, fourth and fifth Defendants were each warned by letter of the Council’s intention to institute prosecution proceedings.

[19]On 30 April 2025, the second Defendant notified Mr McNab that Mr Green had resigned his directorship. Mr Nolan indicated that he had lost all but one of his employees and expressed his intention to operate in contravention of the Enforcement Notice; ‘in fact, if the council served a summons on me I would probably go for broke and just keep trading as long as I possibly could because what have I got to lose.’

[20]The second Defendant attended an interview under caution on 17 June 2025 at Council offices. He confirmed that he was the director of SLMR and that the site had continued to operate as a scrap metal yard after the Enforcement Notice had taken effect. Mr Nolan further stated that he was actively looking for a new site to re-locate the business and asserted that he was not in a financial position to close the business and fire its employees.

[21]As a result of further inspections carried out on 4 November 2025, 25 February 2026 and 26 March 2026, Mr Lord observed that the scrap metal operations had significantly intensified since earlier visits and development of the site was still ongoing. Concrete hard surfaces were laid at the site, as observed at site inspections on 25 February and 26 March 2026, with the apparent purpose of enlarging the original scrap metal yard and accommodating a large digger to sort waste. The size of the site occupied by the scrap metal yard had expanded. Mr Lord noted that the third Defendant was working at the site on 25 February 2026 and the second Defendant was present at the site on 26 March 2026.

[22]The alleged unlawful use of the Land as a scrap metal yard, in contravention of the Enforcement Notice, has been made subject to prosecution proceedings against the second Defendant, who faces charges for alleged offences contrary to section 179 of the 1990 Act. A trial date has been fixed at Isleworth Crown Court for 5 March 2029.

[23]Pre-action correspondence was sent by the Council to the second, fourth and fifth Defendants on 16 March 2026.

[24]On 27 March 2026, the second Defendant sent an email to the Council, in which he asserted that: (i). The use of the Land as a scrap metal yard had been ongoing for over three years and the Council had therefore allowed such use to continue for a significant period before applying for an injunction; (ii). The activity on the site was a re-organisation and not an intensification of ongoing works; (iii). The scrap metal yard benefited from a waste exemption licence and the Environment Agency had undertaken to licence the yard if certain steps were taken; (iv). A concrete base being installed at the site was located outside of the area of land affected by the Enforcement Notice; (v). The Council was motivated to apply for an injunction because of frustration that the trial for the criminal proceedings would not be until March 2029; (vi). The Council had failed to serve either a temporary stop notice or a stop notice.

[25]On 5 May 2026, a large fire broke out at the scrap metal yard, necessitating the attendance of approximately 65 firefighters. On 7 May 2026, Mr Lord was notified by a resident that a large metal fence had been erected along the boundary of the site. This constituted further unauthorised development. On 12 May 2026, Mr Lord attended the site and found the third Defendant working on a large digger. Drone footage supplied to Mr Lord by a resident on 13 May 2026 appeared to show further materials being unloaded from a van into a container at the site.

[26]The Environment Agency have confirmed to Mr Lord that they have taken steps to deregister the waste site and are now treating the site as an illegal waste site. The Statutory Framework and Legal Principles

[27]Section 187B of the Act provides, in so far as material: Injunctions restraining breaches of planning control.(1) Where a local planning authority consider it necessary or expedient for any actual or apprehended breach of planning control to be restrained by injunction, they may apply to the court for an injunction, whether or not they have exercised or are proposing to exercise any of their other powers under this Part.

(2) On an application under subsection (1) the court may grant such an injunction as the court thinks appropriate for the purpose of restraining the breach.

(3) Rules of court may provide for such an injunction to be issued against a person whose identity is unknown.

[28]Section 171A of the Act provides that the carrying out of development without the required planning permission is a breach of planning control. Section 172 of the Act empowers the Local Planning Authority to issue a Planning Enforcement Notice where a breach of planning control has been established and it is considered expedient to issue the notice, having regard to the provisions of the development plan and to any other material considerations.

[29]Section 57(1) of the Act provides that planning permission is required for the carrying out of any development of land. ‘Development’ is defined in section 55(1) of the Act as the ‘carrying out of building, engineering, mining or other operations in, on, over or under land or the making of any material change in the use of any buildings or other land.’

[30]The approach to be taken by the court in considering whether to grant an injunction under section 187B of the Act was considered in the leading authority of South Buckinghamshire District Council v Porter

(2003) 2 AC 558

(‘South Bucks’) and more recently, in Ipswich BC v Fairview Hotels

(2022) EWHC 2868

(KB) (‘Ipswich’), in which latter case the applicable guidance was summarised by Holgate J: (i). The need to enforce planning control in the general interest is a relevant consideration and in that context the planning history of the site may be important. The ‘degree and flagrancy’ of the breach of planning may be critical. Where conventional enforcement measures have failed over a prolonged period, the court may be more ready to grant an injunction. The court may be more reluctant where enforcement action has never been taken; (ii). On the other hand, there might be urgency in the situation sufficient to justify the avoidance of an anticipated breach of planning control; (iii). An anticipatory interim injunction may sometimes be preferable to a delayed permanent injunction; (iv). While it is not for the court to question the correctness of planning decisions which have been taken (e.g. decisions to refuse a planning permission or to dismiss an appeal), the court should come to a broad view as to the degree of environmental damage resulting from the breach and the urgency or otherwise of bringing it to an end; (v). The achievement of the legitimate aim of preserving the environment does not always outweigh countervailing rights (or factors). Injunctive relief is unlikely to be granted unless it is a ‘commensurate’ remedy in the circumstances of the case. (vi). It is the court’s task to strike the balance between competing interests, weighing one against the other.

[31]A Local Planning Authority cannot exercise the power to apply for an injunction under section 187B of the Act unless they consider it necessary or expedient to restrain a breach of planning control by seeking an injunction, rather than by some other means of enforcement (South Bucks at [71] and Ipswich at [88]).

[32]The court has a discretion as to whether to grant an injunction and must decide whether in all the circumstance, it is just to grant an injunction: South Bucks at [28] and [29]: in the judgment of Lord Bingham; The discretion of the court under section 187B, like every other judicial discretion, must be exercised judicially. That means, in this context, that the power must be exercised judicially… with due regard to the purpose for which the power was conferred: to restrain actual and threatened breaches of planning control. The power exists above all to permit abuses to be curbed and urgent solutions provided where these are called for.

[33]Whereas the exercise of the court’s discretion is a fact-specific assessment for which there is no single test, the guidance set out in South Bucks includes the following: 38. … It seems to me perfectly clear that the judge on a section 187B application is not required, nor even entitled, to reach his own independent view of the planning merits of the case. These he is required to take as decided within the planning process, the actual or anticipated breach of planning control being a given when he comes to exercise his discretion. But it seems to me no less plain that the judge should not grant injunctive relief unless he would be prepared if necessary to contemplate committing the defendant to prison for breaching the order, and that he would not be of this mind unless he had considered for himself all questions of hardship for the defendant and his family if required to move, necessarily including, therefore, the availability of suitable alternative sites… The degree and flagrancy of the postulated breach of planning control may well prove critical. If conventional enforcement measures have failed over a prolonged period of time to remedy the breach, then the court would obviously be the readier to use its own, more coercive powers. Conversely, however, the court might well be reluctant to use its powers in a case where enforcement action had never been taken. On the other hand, there might be some urgency in the situation sufficient to justify the pre-emptive avoidance of an anticipated breach of planning control. Considerations of health and safety might arise. … Previous planning decisions will always be relevant; how relevant, however, will inevitably depend on a variety of matters, including not least how recent they are, the extent to which considerations of hardship and availability of alternative sites were taken into account, the strength of the conclusions reached on land use and environmental issues and whether the defendant had and properly took the opportunity to make his case for at least a temporary personal planning permission.

[34]Lord Bingham also observed at [29]: …Where it appears that a breach or apprehended breach will continue or occur unless and until effectively restrained by the law and that nothing short of an injunction will provide effective restraint…that will point strongly towards the grant of an injunction. So will a history of unsuccessful enforcement and persistent non-compliance, as will evidence that the defendant has played the system by wilfully exploiting every opportunity for prevarication and delay, although section 187B(1) makes plain that a local planning authority, in applying for an injunction, need not have exercised nor propose to exercise any of its other enforcement powers…

[35]As emphasised by Lord Scott at [102], the hardship likely to be caused to a defendant by the grant of an injunction to enforce the public law will always be relevant to the court’s decision whether or not to grant the injunction. However, in many cases, the hardship relied upon by the defendant will be of insufficient weight to counterbalance a continued and persistent disobedience to the law and there is a strong public interest in ensuring that planning controls should be observed and, if not observed, enforced.

Persons Unknown

[36]The general principles governing the availability of injunctions against persons unknown have been considered in a number of authorities following the judgment of the Supreme Court in Wolverhampton City Council v London Gypsies and Travellers and others

(2023) UKSC 47

(‘Wolverhampton’), which was concerned with injunctions restraining the activities of persons unknown in the context of gypsy and traveller cases. Those principles have been considered on a number of occasions, including by the Court of Appeal in London Borough of Barking & Dagenham v Persons Unknown & Ors

(2022) EWCA Civ 13

[37]The restricted circumstances in which an injunction against Persons Unknown is likely to be justified of relevance to the instant case, include (at [167] of Wolverhampton): (i). A compelling need, sufficiently demonstrated by the evidence, for the enforcement of planning control, which is not adequately met by any other measures that may be available to the applicant; (ii). The Claimant must show a strong probability that a breach of planning control is to be committed and that this will cause real harm and that the threat is real and imminent (at [218] of Wolverhampton). (iii). Procedural protection for the rights, including Convention rights, is available for those affected by the injunction, including an obligation to take all reasonable steps to draw the application, and any order made, to the attention of those likely to be affected by it; (iv). The injunction is constrained by territorial and temporal limitations; (v). It is, on the particular facts, just and convenient that such an injunction should be granted.

[38]The Supreme Court further stated that Persons Unknown should be ‘defined, so far as possible, in non-technical and readily comprehensible language which a person served with or given notice of the order, is capable of understanding without recourse to professional legal advisers’ [at 224].

Whether Final Injunctive Relief should be granted

[39]As Counsel for the Claimant submitted, the fact that there has been a breach of planning control does not appear to be contested by any of the Defendants. By making a retrospective application for planning permission, the third Defendant accepted that planning permission was required, albeit that it had not been granted. The Enforcement Notice was issued by the Council because it appeared to them that that there had been a breach of planning control and the appeal against the Enforcement Notice by the third Defendant was brought on grounds (f) and (g); it was not brought on either ground (b); namely an assertion that the alleged breach of planning control did not take place, or (c); namely that even if the activities had occurred, they did not constitute a breach of planning control.

[40]The evidence relied upon by the Claimant, as set out in the witness statements of Mr Lord and the supporting exhibits, demonstrates that there have been actual breaches of planning control. Planning permission was refused for the unauthorised use of Plot A as a scrap metal yard and in addition, unauthorised operational development has taken place by the installation of concrete hard surfaces upon the Land. Future breaches of planning control are apprehended on the grounds that the Claimant considers it is likely that further development of the Land will take place. The history of intensified activity, non-compliance with enforcement measures and the increase in the size and development of the site, all substantiate the Claimant’s concerns in this regard. I therefore conclude that there has been a clear breach of planning control, both on the grounds of a material change of use, as well as the operational development of the Land.

[41]Turning to consider the issue of the degree and flagrancy of the breach, the evidence of Mr Lord indicates that the unauthorised use of the Land as a scrap metal site, and the unauthorised development of the Land, has not only continued but intensified after the period for compliance with the Enforcement Notice concluded on 29 April 2025. Criminal proceedings in respect of the alleged non-compliance with the Enforcement Notice are ongoing against the second Defendant. In correspondence and in interview, the second Defendant has indicated wilful and persistent non-compliance with the enforcement process, in the face of both a refusal of retrospective planning permission and the dismissal of the appeal against the Enforcement Notice. As set out in South Bucks, the degree and flagrancy of any breach may be critical and in this case, the failure of conventional enforcement procedures has occurred over a prolonged period.

[42]The environmental sensitivity, or the existence of strong developmental control policies, in the area where the alleged breaches have occurred, is a matter to which the court may have regard in considering the flagrancy of any breach (at [117] of Ipswich.) The Land is located in the Green Belt and in an area of environmental sensitivity, both of which factors support a conclusion of flagrancy.

[43]In balancing the public interest in securing the enforcement of planning policy and decisions against the private interests of individuals said to be in breach of planning control, I have considered the evidence before the court as to the environmental harm occasioned by the planning breaches. Harm to the natural environment and to amenity has been identified as including noise levels, traffic disruption, pollution risk and environmental degradation. These matters have been the subject of complaints received by the Council over a prolonged period. The use of the Land as a Scrap Metal Yard represents inappropriate development within the Green Belt and is harmful by definition to its open character and appearance. The fire at the site on 5 May 2026 is indicative of the risks endemic to operations at the site.

[44]The Environment Agency has conducted an EPR Compliance Assessment Report, dated 6 March 2026, which sets out its findings in respect of several Waste Exemption non-compliance issues, including as to water run-off into the surrounding area, which is a Source Protection Zone (1) for drinking water abstraction. The Recovering scrap metal Waste Exemption registered for the site in November 2024 was de-registered by the Agency, who instructed the site operator to remove all waste material from the site and not bring any further such material onto the site.

[45]The private rights of the individuals who would be affected by the grant of final injunctive relief have also been considered by the court and particular attention has been given by the court to the assertions advanced by the second Defendant, both in the form of written communications and in interview under caution.

[46]The chronology demonstrates that the Claimant issued an Enforcement Notice within two months of the refusal of the application for retrospective planning permission and thereafter acted promptly in response to allegations of non-compliance with the Enforcement Notice, through the issue of warnings as to an intention to institute criminal proceedings and the issue of pre-action correspondence. Despite this action by the Council, activity on the site intensified.

[47]The Environment Agency have now de-registered the site. Whilst the concrete base was installed on an area falling outside the land affected by the Enforcement Notice, the development of the site generally has indicated a flagrant disregard of planning procedures. It is apparent that the escalation of action taken by the Claimant against the Defendants has been in response to the failure of each successive step to control the planning breaches. The decision to seek injunctive relief, far from being motivated by frustration at the distant trial date in the Crown Court, forms part of the process of escalation rendered inevitable by non-compliance with earlier measures and is a matter of last resort. The criticism advanced by the second Defendant as to the failure of the Council to seek either a temporary stop notice or a stop notice does not extend to any explanation as to why either of those measures might have given rise to a different effect to that produced by the Enforcement Notice.

[48]It is recognised by the court that the cessation of operation of the Scrap Metal Yard at the site has the potential to impact upon commercial interests and the personal circumstances of the Defendants and that these factors should be considered within a wider evaluation of the human rights and equalities impact of the making of the order sought. However, no evidence as to any such impact has been placed before the court, despite opportunities to do so. In considering the extent of any adverse impact of the order, it is noted that the 2024 Application for Planning Permission stated that the business had two full-time and one part-time employee and in correspondence in April 2025, the second Defendant indicated that only one employee remained. The second Defendant stated in interview that he was actively seeking an alternate site at which the business might continue to operate.

[49]I am therefore satisfied that the human rights and equalities impacts have been considered fully by the Claimant. However, these are qualified rights and for the reasons I have stated, the interference with those rights is justified as it is for a legitimate aim and is proportionate. The Claimant seeks to uphold the law as it stands, whereas the first to third Defendants have demonstrated a continued disregard of the law and a failure to comply with enforcement measures.

[50]In considering whether the grant of the injunction sought is necessary and expedient, I have taken into account the history of enforcement measures attempted by the Claimant. Such measures have not proved effective in either preventing further breaches or bringing the breach to an end. Although a criminal trial will take place in March 2029, the threat of institution of criminal proceedings has not to date been proven to have a deterrent effect and, should those proceedings result in a finding adverse to the second Defendant, the sanctions available to the criminal court would be limited to a financial penalty and would not extend to an order with prohibitory or mandatory effect with regards to the site.

[51]I am therefore satisfied that significant planning harm has occurred and that a final injunction is necessary to uphold the integrity of the planning system, prevent further breaches and bring the breaches to an end. It is highly likely that, in the absence of a final injunction, further harm and damage will be caused. Prolonged efforts by the Claimant to remedy the breaches of planning control have not proved effective and the injunctive relief now sought by the Claimant represents the most expedient remaining route to secure compliance.

Persons Unknown

[52]As set out in the evidence relied upon by the Claimant, the Council have been unable to identify all individuals who have been involved in a breach of planning control at the site. For example, Mr Lord has provided a witness statement dated 2 June 2026, stating that his review of drone footage recorded by a resident on 13 May 2026 showed three unknown persons involved in unloading materials from the back of a van into a container at the site, apparently depositing scrap metal on site. On 15 May 2026, the Council contacted the second Defendant in respect of this footage, requesting information from Mr Nolan which included the identity of those depicted in the footage; Mr Nolan did not provide the information sought and instead stated only that he was not in the relevant image.

[53]In a witness statement of 20 April 2026, Mr Lord indicated that different unknown persons had been observed to work at the site when Mr Nolan was not present. Mr Lord noted that the previous Director of SLMR had been the third Defendant until his resignation in April 2025 and that he appeared to retain an interest in the company. The Council were therefore unable to be sure of the identities of the companies and individuals involved in the development and use of the site, or that further changes would not be made to the directorship of the company.

[54]Considering the relevant principles set out in Wolverhampton, I consider that there is a compelling justification for an injunction against the sixth Defendant in the terms sought. Contrary to what the interim injunction had sought to achieve, there is every indication that the deposition of scrap metal at the site has continued, and that this deposition has relied in part upon unknown individuals. The history at the site has demonstrated that there is a sufficiently real and imminent threat of further breaches of planning control. Whereas the Claimant has sought to identify at least some of the individuals working at the site, those efforts have been unsuccessful.

[55]The terms of Order are sufficiently clear and precise and go no further than that which is necessary to restrain the apprehended breaches of planning control. There are geographical limits to the Order, which includes liberty to apply to the court at any time to vary or discharge the Order. I therefore conclude that an injunction against the sixth Defendant is just and convenient.

Conclusion

[56]For the reasons set out, I have concluded that a final injunction against the first, second, third and sixth Defendants, is necessary to prevent further harm from occurring, to uphold the integrity of the planning system and to restrain ongoing and further breaches of planning control. The final injunction in the terms sought, is proportionate having regard to the interests of the Defendants.

Costs

[57]The Claimant is entitled to its costs of the claim, to be jointly paid by the first, second and third Defendants, on the standard basis to be subject to detailed assessment. Pursuant to CPR 44.2(8), the First, Second and Third Defendants shall each make a payment on account of £10,000.