Chanel Limited v Charlotte Skeens [2026] EWHC 1460 (KB)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KING’S BENCH DIVISION

[2026] EWHC 1460 (KB)

Date 9 June 2026

MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS LIST

B E T W E E N:

Claim No. KB-2024-002470

Before

MRS JUSTICE STEYN

_______________________________

Between

CHANEL LIMITEDClaimant

-v-

Between

CHARLOTTE SKEENSDefendant

_______________________________

Niran de Silva KC (Instructed by Mishcon de Reya LLP) appeared for Claimant

Luke Decker (Instructed by Aqua Law Solicitors) appeared for Defendant

JUDGMENT

(Approved)

Digital Transcription by Epiq Europe Ltd,

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[1]This is an application by the defendant for an adjournment of the trial. It is made at the outset of the first day of a three-day trial.

Background

[2]Chanel is a luxury brand. Ms Skeens was formerly employed by the company. Her employment ended when the parties entered into the first settlement agreement, which contained obligations of confidentiality and not to make derogatory statements about Chanel.

[3]In July 2024, the claimant became aware that the defendant was posting on TikTok about Chanel and its group of companies. This led to the claimant issuing proceedings and obtaining interim relief. The trial was initially listed for December 2024. It was adjourned on the defendant's application and relisted in March 2025.

[4]On or about the first day of the trial, the parties reached a settlement agreement (‘the second settlement agreement’) and agreed a consent order. As part of the consent order, which contains a penal notice, the defendant gave undertakings.

[5]On 7 March 2025, two days after settling the claim, the defendant posted a video on TikTok, which the claimant contends breached the undertakings the defendant had given to the court. The defendant denies the claim, contending that the permissible exceptions applied.

[6]An interim injunction was granted on informal notice by Mr Justice Sweeting on 15 March 2025. At the return date hearing on 30 April 2025, Mr Justice Nicklin continued the interim injunction to trial. The trial was originally listed to begin on 4 November 2025. A week or two prior to the trial, the defendant secured direct access pro bono counsel through the Media and Communications List Pro Bono Scheme. Then, with counsel's assistance, Leigh Day came on the record on 27 October 2025, also acting pro bono for the defendant. The defendant made an application for disclosure and adjournment of the trial, which Mr Justice Murray granted, ordering the claimant to pay the costs of those applications.

[7]On 10 March 2025, Leigh Day applied to come off the record, because the defendant was not engaging with them and they were unable to take instructions from her. That application was granted on 12 March 2025, and the defendant has represented herself since then, until today.

[8]On 19 March 2026, there was a hearing before Dan Squires KC (sitting as a judge of the High Court) which the defendant did not attend, having made a request that day for an adjournment. The adjournment was granted by the judge, who observed in doing so:

"I was concerned about granting an adjournment. That was so, in particular, given the indication in the Claimant's solicitor's email of 10:41 a.m. of 19 March 2026 that, according to the Claimant, the Defendant had requested adjournments on the day hearings were due to be heard on three previous occasions. I was also concerned that the Defendant had not produced any evidence in support of her very late request for an adjournment. That said, the order sought by the Claimant, if granted, would impose intrusive requirements on the Defendant, in particular that she provides passwords for, or otherwise grants access to, her email account. In my view she should be given a further opportunity to attend a hearing. I therefore granted an adjournment."

[9]The defendant attended the subsequent hearing before Mr Justice Coppel on 30 March 2026, at which an imaging order was made against her, and she attended the pre-trial review before Mr Justice Sheldon on 20 May 2026 (that is, less than three weeks ago) at which her applications to vary the interim injunction and the imaging order and for further information were heard and dismissed. Mr Justice Sheldon made the imaging order subject to a penal notice. He also gave directions for a limited part of the trial to be in private.

[10]The defendant has continued to engage in these proceedings. On 4 June 2026, she filed an application for compliance by the claimant with the order of Mr Justice Murray of November 2025, supported by a witness statement. Yesterday, she filed a skeleton argument for trial.

The application to adjourn

[11]The defendant is not present at court today. This morning, Aqua Law Solicitors came on record as her representatives, representing her pro bono. Mr Decker of counsel was instructed for the purposes of making the adjournment application. The adjournment application is supported by a witness statement made this morning by the defendant’s newly instructed solicitor, Mr Hadi Khalisadar.

[12]The primary basis for seeking an adjournment is that her solicitor has formed "a real and reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant has the capacity to conduct these proceedings."

[13]A secondary ground is that the defendant's two-year-old son has this morning been seen by paramedics and taken to hospital. In addition, reliance is placed on practical matters such as the defendant only having had copies of the electronic version of the bundle which it is said she is only able to access via her phone as she has no computer.

Legal principles

[14]I accept Mr Decker's submission, which has not been disputed, that I should apply the following principles drawn from Barclays Bank Plc v Shetty

[2022] EWHC 19 (Comm)

:(1) The guiding principle in an application to adjourn of this type is whether if the trial goes ahead it will be fair in all the circumstances. The assessment of what is fair is a fact-sensitive one: Barclays Bank Plc v Shetty, [49].

(2) The decision to adjourn a trial is a case management decision, to be exercised in accordance with the overriding objective: Barclays Bank Plc v Shetty, [44]. The overriding objective includes, so far as practicable, ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing (rule 1.1(2)(a)), saving expense (rule 1.1(2)(b)) and ensuring that a case is dealt with expeditiously and fairly (rule 1.1(2)(d).

(3) If the Court concludes that it is necessary to adjourn a hearing in the interest of fairness, then it must be adjourned, for the court cannot countenance an unfair hearing: Barclays Bank Plc v Shetty, [45]

(4) When considering whether a particular outcome is fair, it should not be assumed that only one outcome is fair. But equally in some circumstances there is really only one answer: some adjournments must be granted: Barclays Bank Plc v Shetty, [49].

(5) Fairness involves fairness to both parties. But inconvenience to the other party (or other court users) is not a relevant countervailing factor and is usually not a reason to refuse an adjournment: Barclays Bank Plc v Shetty, [49].

[15]It is common ground that there is a presumption that a person has capacity. However, as Nugee LJ observed in Solicitors Regulation Authority Ltd v Khan

[2024] 1 WLR 4212

, [72]:

“I think there is some force in Mr Bogle’s submission that if the evidence that a party may lack capacity to conduct proceedings is insufficient to persuade a judge the the balance of probabilities, but nevertheless does leave him in real doubt whether a party has capacity or not, it may be appropriate for the application to be adjourned for further and better evidence to be obtained, in line with what was said in Teinaz and Solanki. To proceed on the basis that a person has capacity when there is a real doubt about it may not only be unfair to the party concerned but cause problems for proceedings as a whole, because if a party does in fact lack capacity, then no party may take any further step without the court's permission until the party without capacity has a litigation friend, and any step taken before then has no effect unless the court orders otherwise: see CPR rule 21.3(3) and 21.3(4).”

[16]I shall first address the position today in light of the evidence regarding the defendant's son. Mr Khalisadar has given evidence that he had a lengthy conversation with the defendant yesterday evening. He says:

"During part of the call after 10.00 pm, I could hear that the Defendant's two-year-old son ... [was] crying and then, once calmed, having very laboured breathing - so noticeably that it could be heard through the telephone. I was obliged to end the conversation so that the Defendant could attend to her son, as it was apparent to me that it was not in the best interests of the minor child for the conversation to be continued. When the conversation resumed this morning, 9 June 2026, at 8am, so that I could obtain further information, the child's laboured breathing was still noticeable. I told the Defendant that she needed to focus on [her son] and to take him to Accident and Emergency (A&E) immediately. It was obvious to me that [her son] needed immediate emergency help. The Defendant took my advice and immediately called 9-9-9. I left it with the Defendant there."

[17]Mr Decker informed me that he understands from his instructing solicitors that paramedics were called to the defendant's house this morning. The defendant's son had laboured breathing. He was described as inconsolable, and it took time to calm him down to be able to get him to the hospital comfortably. He will be taken to the hospital for further testing to be carried out. The paramedics are of the view that he does have an upper respiratory issue that needs to be addressed.

[18]Although I do not have medical evidence - unsurprisingly, given the timing of the issue arising - there is independent evidence that there was an emergency from Mr Khalisadar, who is, of course, an officer of the court. In my judgment, the need to obtain emergency medical support for the defendant's two-year-old son is a good reason for the defendant not to have attended the trial today.

[19]I explored during the hearing the question whether she might have been able to attend this afternoon if I were to refuse an adjournment, but it seems to me that is unlikely to be practicable in circumstances where it appears that, around midday, she was taking – or about to take – her child to hospital. In any event, I do not consider that she could fairly be expected to attend court today and leave her child in these circumstances.

[20]However, if her son’s health were the only ground on which the application to adjourn was made, I would have explored whether the trial could begin tomorrow, perhaps with slightly extended days and, if necessary, finding a third day later this week or next week. But as I have said, there are further bases on which the application is made, the principal basis being the defendant's representatives’ concerns as to whether she has capacity to conduct litigation.

[21]Mr Khalisadar has explained that he was only able to come on the record after hours yesterday evening, 8 June 2026, the day before trial, on a pro bono basis. The circumstances in which that arose is that the defendant had (again) sought pro bono representation through the Media and Communications List Pro Bono Scheme by contacting the administrator of that scheme on 25 May 2026. That is shortly after being reminded of the scheme at the pre-trial review.

[22]On 6 June 2026, she was informed that the scheme were not able to find a barrister available for her trial. But separately, Mr Decker was contacted and although he was unable to act at the trial itself because, at that stage, he had a commitment to a two-day hearing in the county court at central London, listed for 8 and 9 June 2026, he offered to speak with the defendant in order to help her understand the case. Mr Khalisadar has stated in his evidence:

"In the course of his discussions with the Defendant on 8 June 2026, Mr Decker formed the view that the Defendant may, in fact, lack the capacity to conduct these proceedings. Having formed that view, he concluded that he could not properly continue to assist the Defendant on a direct (public) access basis, because a barrister instructed in that way is not permitted to act for a client who may lack the capacity to conduct her own litigation. As it happened, the solicitors instructing Mr Decker in his County Court matter were this firm, Aqua Law. That matter, although listed for two days, concluded in one day. After the hearing, Mr Decker asked whether Aqua Law would be able to come on the record to assist the Defendant in the light of his concern about her capacity. Aqua Law agreed to do so, and I came on the record as the Defendant's solicitor, after hours, on 8 June 2026. Having taken such instructions as I have been able to and having spoken with the Defendant at length, I have formed the same view as Mr Decker: (1) that there is a real and reasonable doubt as to the defendant's capacity to conduct these proceedings; and (2) that an assessment of her capacity needs to be carried out."

[23]The explanation that Mr Khalisadar has given is, first, that he had a lengthy conversation with the defendant during the evening of 8 June 2026 and that what he observed is "itself part of the reason for my very serious concerns". He recognises that the starting point is that the defendant is presumed to have capacity, and the question is ultimately one for the court on proper evidence. But he states that he has a genuine and reasonable doubt which engages his professional obligations. In his statement, he states:

"Where a solicitor has a reasonable doubt about whether his client has the capacity to give proper instructions, he is obliged to satisfy himself on the question, to act in her best interests, and to bring the matter to the attention of the court, rather than simply to proceed. Consistently with those duties (and given my concerns detailed above in respect of her 2-year-old son ...), I am unable to require the Defendant to give evidence and to conduct her defence over a three-day trial without first being satisfied that she is able to do so. Nor can I properly take the steps of the conduct that the trial would require - approving her evidence, and advising upon and (if it arose) compromising the claim - unless I am satisfied that she can give me proper instructions upon them. The proper course is to invite the Court to adjourn the trial so that the Defendant's capacity can be assessed and, if she is found to lack capacity, a litigation friend appointed to act for her."

[24]Mr Khalisadar draws attention to the fact that the defendant is in receipt of Personal Independent Payment (‘PIP’), having undergone a medical assessment in or about July 2025, which resulted in the award of PIP in October 2025. Mr Khalisadar states:

"Awards are made by reference to a point-scored schedule of activities and ‘descriptors’. For each activity, the assessor selects the descriptor that applies to the claimant on the majority of days, and only the highest scoring descriptor for each activity counts. A claimant must score at least 8 points across the daily-living activities to receive the standard rate of the daily-living component, and 12 points for the enhanced rate ... I am instructed that the Defendant recalls, and her award reflects, that she scored as follows on the daily-living activities: (1) Activity 3 (managing therapy or monitoring a health condition): 2 points - 'Needs supervision, prompting or assistance to be able to manage therapy that takes no more than 3.5 hours a week'; (2) Activity 9 (engaging with other people face to face): 4 points - 'Needs social support to be able to engage with other people'. (3) Activity 10 (making budgeting decisions): 4 points - 'Needs prompting or assistance to be able to make simple budgeting decisions'. Those scores total 10 points and qualified the defendant for the standard rate of the daily-living component of PIP. The descriptors are not mere labels, they are findings made by the State following assessment, as to what the Defendant is unable to do unaided. Two of them bear directly on her ability to conduct a trial. (1) The State has found that the Defendant needs ‘social support’ - which means support from a person trained or experienced in assisting engagement, something more than mere prompting - simply to engage with other people face to face. (2) The State has found that she needs ‘prompting or assistance’ to make even ‘simple budgeting decisions’. A litigant assessed as requiring such support is nonetheless required, at this trial, to engage directly with leading counsel for the Claimant over three days of cross-examination, and to take for herself decisions far more complex and consequential than the budgeting decisions to which the assessment refers."

[25]Mr Khalisadar also refers to a history of concern about the defendant's mental health, referring to diagnoses of generalised anxiety disorder and obsessive compulsive disorder, amongst other matters.

[26]I have also been taken to medical evidence, which indicates that the defendant is currently signed off by her GP as unfit for work, although that has been true also in respect of the period during which she engaged in the hearings earlier this year, to which I have already referred.

[27]On behalf of the claimant, Mr da Silva opposes this application to adjourn. He has referred to a "pattern of applications to adjourn at very late stages, often just before or on the day of hearings". He submits that the basis upon which Mr Khalisadar has expressed concerns as to the defendant's capacity to conduct litigation is slim. Her award of PIP was made back in July 2025 and the evidence does not go into any detail as to the basis upon which Mr Khalisadar has formed the view that he has that she may lack capacity.

[28]In considering Mr Khalisadar's evidence, I bear in mind, first, that it was, as he has explained, prepared “under acute time pressure”. Secondly, that given his expressed concerns as to the defendant's lack of capacity, he would not have asked her to waive privilege in respect of any conversation that he had with her. Thirdly, I also bear in mind that it can be difficult for individuals who are not medically trained to explain precisely what it is about an individual's presentation that gives rise to such concerns. Explaining the oddity of a way in which an individual presents can be difficult.

[29]It is plain that at this stage on the evidence before me, the court cannot decide on the balance of probabilities that the defendant lacks capacity. The evidence does not begin to show that and nor is that what the defendant submits or asks me to find. What defendant's representatives are asking for is the opportunity to have the defendant's capacity assessed by an independent consultant psychiatrist with a view to a litigation friend being appointed in the event that she is found to lack capacity.

[30]In my judgment, the court cannot fairly dismiss the concerns of the defendant's solicitor, supported as they are by the defendant's counsel's initial view and reasons for referring the defendant to solicitors. Applying Solicitors Regulation Authority Ltd v Khan, it does seem to me that there are sufficient grounds for concern as to whether or not the defendant currently has capacity to continue this litigation without a litigation friend, such that fairness compels me to adjourn the trial with directions for the defendant's capacity to conduct these proceedings to be assessed by an independent consultant psychiatrist.

[31]Inevitably, given the background to these proceedings and the pattern of adjournments, that is a course that this court is extremely reluctant to take. Nonetheless, where fairness requires an adjournment, it necessarily must be granted. It seems to me that, on the basis of the evidence presented this morning, it is necessary to adjourn the hearing in the interests of fairness, so I will do so. I will discuss with counsel in a moment the directions to be given with a view to the trial being relisted as soon as possible.

[32]As regards the final basis upon which an adjournment was sought, that is not a basis on which I would have granted an adjournment. It is apparent from the materials before me that the defendant has asked not to be provided with hard copy bundles. On previous occasions she has sought electronic bundles rather than hard copies. Although it is said that she does not have a computer, it appears that at least on occasions she has borrowed or rented a computer and, certainly, she must have had some access to a device to have been able to prepare the skeleton argument she filed for this hearing, as well as the application notice and witness statement she filed recently. So I place no reliance on the suggestion that there is any unfairness in the way in which bundles were provided to the defendant by the claimant for this trial.

[33]Nor would I have granted an adjournment on the basis that the defendant's newly instructed representatives would need time to prepare. Whilst that is a factor to be borne in mind, and I do take into account that the defendant did seek assistance several weeks ago and has only just been able to obtain it, nevertheless on its own, that would not have been sufficient in circumstances where I have to bear in mind the importance of fairness to both parties. Given the history of the proceedings, that would not have been a sufficient basis, in my judgment, to have adjourned the hearing.

[34]Nevertheless, for the reasons that I have given, I will adjourn this trial. Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground, 18-22 Furnival Street, London EC4A 1JS Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Email: civil@epiqglobal.co.uk