Wenjun Tian v Refinitiv Limited [2026] EWHC 1418 (KB)

[2026] EWHC 1418 (KB)Case No KB-2025-002016
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS LIST
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 11/06/2026
Before
DHCJ GUY VASSALL-ADAMS KC
Between
WENJUN TIANClaimantREFINITIV LIMITEDDefendant
The Claimant appeared in Person for in personKatya Pereira (instructed by RPC LLP) for DefendantHearing Hearing date: 21 May 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down at 10.30am on 11 June 2026 in Court 73 at the Royal Courts of Justice..............................DHCJ GUY VASSALL-ADAMS KC

DHCJ Guy Vassall-Adams KC:

[1]This hearing concerns the Claimant’s applications for a private hearing , anonymity and restrictions on access to the Court’s file (the “Privacy Applications”) and the Defendant’s application for a ruling under CPR Part 11 that the Court has no jurisdiction to try the claim because the Claimant failed to serve his Claim Form within the 4 months prescribed by CPR 7.5 (the “Jurisdiction Application”).[2]The Claimant is a Chinese national now living in the UK who is the subject of an entry on the World-Check database. The World-Check database is a subscription-service database of politically exposed persons and other individuals who are regarded as high risk from the perspective of corruption, fraud and money laundering. The World-Check database is owned by the Defendant to this claim, Refinitiv Limited, which is a subsidiary of the London Stock Exchange Group.[3]The underlying claim seeks Norwich Pharmacal relief concerning an entry on the World-Check database that relates to the Claimant. The Claimant is seeking the disclosure of the identity of the person or persons who were responsible for the creation and update of his World-Check database entry. The Application Notice states that this disclosure is necessary to identify the source of “reputational and financial harm caused by unverified, externally submitted materials.”

The Privacy Applications

[4]The Claimant has applied for an anonymity order, for the hearing of the Jurisdiction Application to take place in private, for restrictions on public access to the court file under CPR 5.4C and for the Court to adopt a glossary of suggested terms in any public judgment so as to prevent any risk of jigsaw identification. At the hearing I refused the Claimant’s applications for a private hearing and for anonymity but made an order permitting his home address to be redacted on any documents made available from the court file. In this judgment I set out my reasons, which reflect my ex tempore judgment at the time.[5]The Defendant opposed the application for a private hearing but was neutral on the question of anonymity. However, the fact that an opposing party is neutral on anonymity, or even consents to anonymity, is irrelevant. Orders which contain derogations from open justice cannot be granted by the consent of the parties, as they affect the Article 10 rights of public at large: Practice Guidance (Interim Non-Disclosure Orders) [2012] 1 WLR 1005, at [16]; CPR 39.2(1). There were two journalists present at the hearing and one of them took up my offer to make short submissions. Tom Webb from Lexology opposed anonymity principally on the basis that he wasn’t aware of anonymity orders having been granted in previous cases involving claims against Refinitiv.[6]The starting point for all of the Privacy Applications is the principle of open justice. In the seminal case of Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417, Lord Atkinson held that:
“The hearing of a case in public may be, and often is, no doubt, painful, humiliating, or deterrent both to parties and witnesses, and in many cases, especially those of a criminal nature, the details may be so indecent as to tend to injure public morals, but all this is tolerated and endured, because it is felt that in public trial is to found, on the whole, the best security for the pure, impartial, and efficient administration of justice, the best means for winning for it public confidence and respect.”
[7]The general rule therefore is that hearings are held in open court to which the public and media have access and that parties to legal proceedings are identified. The key principles governing the Court’s power to depart from open justice are summarised in Practice Guidance (Interim Non-Disclosure Orders)[2012] 1 WLR 1003. I would highlight four key principles. First, any departure from open justice can only be justified in exceptional circumstances, where it is strictly necessary to secure the proper administration of justice. Secondly, the burden of persuading a court to derogate from the open justice starting point lies on the person who is seeking that derogation. Thirdly, the derogation must be established by clear and cogent evidence. Fourthly, any departure from open justice must be proportionate, going no further than strictly necessary to achieve the desired objective.[8]In relation to the application for a private hearing, CPR 39.2(1) provides that the general rule is that a hearing is to be in public. A hearing may not be held in private, irrespective of the parties’ consent, unless and to the extent that the court decides it must be held in private, pursuant to sub-section (3). CPR 39.2(3) sets out a series of familiar situations where, at common law, the courts have recognised that a private hearing may be necessary e.g. confidentiality, national security. None of those exceptions applied in the present case, except potentially the principle of general application reflected in CPR 39.2(3)(g), where “the court for any other reason considers this to be necessary to secure the proper administration of justice”. This is the general common law test to which the principles I have identified above apply.[9]The hearing concerned facts relating to the procedural history of the claim and legal argument about various provisions of the CPR governing the service of claim forms. There was nothing about the hearing which made it strictly necessary for it to take place in private to secure the proper administration of justice. If necessary, the Claimant’s privacy concerns could be addressed by more proportionate means – i.e. anonymity and referencing sensitive matters on paper. For these reasons, I rejected the Claimant’s application for a private hearing.[10]Having ruled that the hearing should take place in public, I then considered the anonymity application. As the hearing would take place in public with journalists present in court it was necessary for me to make an interim anonymity order holding the ring until I had decided the anonymity application. I therefore made an anonymity order, an order under s.11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 and an order under CPR 5.4C(4) restricting access to the Claimant’s name on the court file, pending my ruling on the anonymity application. My plan was to discharge these interim orders if I ruled against the application.[11]In relation to anonymity, the Claimant’s case was advanced on two grounds, risks to his safety and protection of his reputation. The Claimant asserted that he would be exposed to a risk to his physical safety if he was identified. His witness statement referred to certain events a number of years ago where he said he had been spied on and felt threatened by others. However, there was no evidence demonstrating that his identification as the claimant in these proceedings would create a risk to his safety. It is not enough for a party seeking anonymity to show they are fearful; they must show that those fears are objectively well-founded and that identification in the proceedings is likely to lead to those risks materialising.[12]The Claimant did not assert that his identification in these proceedings would give rise to a real and immediate risk to his life, or make it likely that he would suffer inhuman and degrading treatment, engaging Article 2 or 3 ECHR. Rather the case was put on the basis that his identification would create some risk to his safety of an unspecified kind for reasons that were not articulated. A party seeking a derogation from open justice at common law must persuade the court that it is strictly necessary on the basis of “clear and cogent” evidence. Likewise, the Article 10 case law makes it clear that restrictions on freedom of expression must be “convincingly established”. There was no clear and cogent evidence in this case that the Claimant’s identification in these proceedings would create risks for his physical security – the risk was merely asserted, not demonstrated.[13]In order for a person’s Article 8 rights to be engaged any interference must attain a certain level of seriousness. Proceeding on the basis most favourable to the Claimant, namely that his Article 8 rights are engaged, it was clear that the Claimant’s primary Article 8 concern was reputational. His desire to protect his reputation is referenced in the application for a Norwich Pharmacal order and in his evidence. Article 8 does protect a person’s reputation as well as their privacy interests. However, in the context of court proceedings, Article 8 reputational interests are not any kind of trump card. Although each case must be decided on its own facts, in the court reporting context open justice, the right to a fair and public hearing (Article 6) and freedom of expression (Article 10) usually prevail when balanced against Article 8 reputational rights: Global Torch Ltd v Apex Global Management Limited [2013] EWCA Civ 819; [2013] 1 WLR 2993. Were it otherwise, the open justice principle would swiftly be undermined because most court proceedings involve potential reputational harm for either parties or witnesses.[14]This anonymity application engages a number of important common law and Article 10 principles. First, there is a recognition that the Court must take into account the ability of the public to follow court proceedings and the public interest in the identification of the people involved in them. Secondly, anonymity is a significant incursion into the media’s Article 10 rights, which includes their ability to report on cases in a way that is likely to engage the interest of their readers. As Lord Rodger put it in Re Guardian News and Media Limited [2010] UKSC 1; [2010] 2 AC 697 at [63]:
“What’s in a name? “A lot”, the press would answer. This is because stories about particular individuals are simply much more attractive to readers than stories about unidentified people. It is just human nature. And this is why, of course, even when reporting major disasters, journalists usually look for a story about how particular individuals are affected. Writing stories which capture the attention of readers is a matter of reporting technique, and the European court holds that article 10 protects not only the substance of ideas and information but also the form in which they are conveyed….”
[15]Thirdly, an important factor in balancing Article 8 and Article 10 is the extent to which information is already in the public domain.[16]The context of this case is a challenge to an entry on a World-Check database that is itself based on other information that is already in the public domain. In particular, the Claimant is identified in a public judgment of the Administrative Court: [2024] EWHC 2240 (Admin). That is a judgment of Murray J relating to an unsuccessful challenge brought by the Claimant and his wife against an order of Johnson J granting the National Crime Agency (“NCA”) a Disclosure Order under s.358 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. That public judgment includes information about the allegations of fraud against the Claimant and his wife which emanated from China which were the subject of the NCA investigation.[17]The Claimant emphasised in his evidence that he has not been convicted of any crime and that his settlement with the NCA did not involve any admission of liability. This is true. His evidence was that the allegations against him were politically motivated. I did not need to reach a conclusion on that issue for the purpose of this application. I noted however that this argument was ventilated before Murray J as part of the Claimant’s challenge to the order made by Johnson J. At paragraph 83 of the Judgment Murray J said the evidence for political motivation was “thin”. At paragraph 86 he said that, “There is no evidence that Mr Tian himself has any form of political profile in China, as a government official or as a political dissident. Nor is there such evidence in relation to Ms Hao. None was before Johnson J, and none was provided for the hearing before me.”[18]Not only was there this public judgment, there has also been reporting in the UK and international media about the settlement between the Claimant and the NCA that brought the NCA’s proceedings to an end. My Google search on the Claimant’s name brought up a host of articles e.g. The Standard dated 10 December 2024 entitled, “Chinese couple forfeit two luxury Hampstead homes suspected to be result of fraud.” The reason the Claimant sought a glossary of terms to prevent his indirect identification in this case is precisely because there is so much information already in the public domain.[19]In my view, there is a strong public interest in the identification of the Claimant in these proceedings. The public has a right to know who it is that is trying to challenge his World-Check entry. The subject matter of the Claimant’s complaint against World-Check – allegations of fraud against him - is already in the public domain. The Claimant is the subject of a public judgment of the Administrative Court and of extensive media reporting, in this country and abroad. The public is entitled to draw links between the previous reporting and the present legal challenge. The media is entitled to report these matters in a way that interests their readers, naming the Claimant as part of any story. For all of these reasons, in my view the balance fell decisively in favour of open justice and Article 10 and I refused the anonymity application.[20]The last remaining issue concerned access to the Court file. The Claimant had originally sought an order preventing public access to the whole court file. Following my rulings, the Claimant made a further submission that at least his home address should not be made public because of the previous harassment that he referred to in his evidence. I invited the Defendant and the journalists present in court to say if they had any observations about this issue. No objection was raised. It was frankly difficult for me to evaluate the Claimant’s evidence on this point, not least as it was uncorroborated, however I considered that this limited incursion into open justice was probably justified. I therefore made an order under CPR 5.4C(4) that if any documents from the court file are made available to the public the Claimant’s home address should be redacted.[21]Having ruled on all of the privacy applications, I discharged the orders I had made to hold the ring, thereby enabling the media to report on the argument and the outcome.

The Jurisdiction Application

[22]By way of brief introduction, the term “jurisdiction” is used in two different ways under the CPR. One meaning is territorial jurisdiction. This is the sense in which the term is used in the definition in CPR 2.3 and in the provisions in Part 6 relating to seeking permission to serve a Claim Form out of the jurisdiction. This application relates to the other use of the term, which denotes the court’s power or authority to try a claim. A defendant may use CPR 11.1 to challenge jurisdiction in both senses of this word.[23]This jurisdiction application concerns the relationship between several important provisions of the CPR governing the service of claim forms. It is helpful to start with an overview. In summary, CPR 7.5 prescribes that a Claim Form must be served within 4 months of issue by one of the prescribed methods. CPR 7.6 enables a court to grant a claimant permission to extend the time for service of a claim form, either before or after expiry of the 4-month period, but in the latter case only if specific and demanding criteria are satisfied. CPR 6.15 permits the court to authorise service by alternative methods where there is a “good reason” for doing so. CPR 6.16 provides that the court may dispense with service of a Claim Form altogether in “exceptional circumstances”. All of these provisions are engaged on the arguments of the parties.[24]The Defendant’s contention in its Jurisdiction Application is that the Claim Form was not served within the 4-month period prescribed by CPR 7.5 and has never been properly served at all. Accordingly, the Defendant submits that the court has no jurisdiction to try the Norwich Pharmacal claim because the court will only grant such relief where a Claim Form has been properly served, as part of an underlying claim: Towergate Underwriting Group Ltd v Albaco Insurance Brokers [2015] EWHC 2874 (Ch).

Procedural chronology

[25]The sequence of events in this case is important, both to the Jurisdiction Application and to an application made by the Defendant in the course of the hearing, for Relief from Sanction owing to the Defendant’s failure to file an acknowledgment of service under CPR 11.2.[26]The Claimant issued his Part 8 Claim Form on 30 May 2025. Pursuant to CPR 7.5, the 4-month deadline for serving the Claim Form expired on 30 September 2025. It is common ground that the Claim Form was not served within that period. On 27 May 2025 the Claimant issued an application notice for Norwich Pharmacal relief, which was eventually sealed on 8 September 2025. However, that application was not served on the Defendant as the Claimant had requested that the application be heard without notice. On 23 October 2025 Master Gidden made directions for the listing of a hearing and for evidence, but there is no indication that he was made aware that the Claimant had not served either the Claim Form or the application notice on the Defendant.[27]Upon receiving the order of Master Gidden, on 27 October 2025 the Claimant wrote to the Defendant referring to the order and making a request to restrict the processing of his personal data under the GDPR. Accordingly, notwithstanding that the Claim Form had been issued nearly 5 months previously, the first the Defendant knew of this claim was on 27 October 2025 after the 4-month period for service had already expired.[28]The Defendant instructed RPC LLP. On 6 November 2025 RPC wrote to the Claimant informing him that they acted for Refinitiv and saying that, apart from the order, their client had not been served with any documents in relation to the claim. The Claimant was asked to provide any documents, including any claim form, witness statements, applications and listing notice.[29]On 6 November the Claimant replied by return email timed at 13:47 sending RPC Master Gidden’s order, the Part 8 claim form, the application notice and the listing notice. In that email the Claimant said:
“Please confirm that service by email to this address is acceptable for your side”
. RPC replied by return email timed at 15:05 stating as follows:
“Our client has still not been formally served with any documents, despite the Part 8 Claim Form apparently having been filed on 29 May 2025.”
It should be noted that RPC’s email did not confirm that service by email was acceptable; on the contrary, RPC’s email drew attention to the Claimant’s failure formally to serve the claim form. Nonetheless, the following day the Claimant sent the Defendant further documents by email including the claim form.[30]On 13 November, i.e. one week after the Claimant sent RPC his claim form, the Defendant applied by application notice N244 for “a declaration under Part 11(1) that the court has no jurisdiction to try the claim as the Claim Form dated 30 May 2025 has never been validly served on the Defendant pursuant to CPR 7.5 and was only provided to the Defendant on 6 November 2025 after the Claim Form had expired.”

Relief from sanction

[31]The relief from sanction issue concerns the fact that the Jurisdiction Application was not made under CPR 11.1. CPR 11.1(2) states that a defendant who wishes to make an application disputing the court’s jurisdiction must first file an acknowledgment of service in accordance with Part 10. Part 10 sets out various requirements for the acknowledgment of service. CPR 10.1(3)(b) provides that, “A defendant must file an acknowledgment of service if…. they wish to dispute the court’s jurisdiction.” The Defendant did not file an acknowledgment of service (AoS) in accordance with the timetable prescribed by the CPR.[32]The application for relief from sanction was filed only one day before the hearing on the same day the Claimant belatedly filed an AoS. I had not seen it before I came into court and the Defendant said that he had not seen it either. In the circumstances, while I heard short oral submissions from the Claimant (which were that if I allowed this procedural slip up by the Defendant in relation to this application, I should also allow his procedural slip up on the claim form) I also gave him the opportunity to submit short written submissions to the court after the hearing, with an opportunity for the Defendant to reply, if he wanted to do so (in the event both parties filed written submissions).[33]There is no doubt that the requirement to file an AoS is ordinarily a condition precedent for making a challenge to the Court’s jurisdiction. There are a number of authorities that emphasise the importance of compliance with CPR 11.1: White Book 2026, para 11.1.5. However, CPR 11.1 is not a freestanding obligation; rather it proceeds from the premise that a Claim Form has been validly served. If a Claim Form has not been validly served, arguably there is no served claim that the Defendant could acknowledge receipt of by way of an AoS.[34]The Defendant’s application is put in the following way. First the Defendant submits that there is no requirement to file an acknowledgment of service if no Claim Form has been validly served. The Defendant relies on two recent judgments of the Court of Appeal, in which Coulson LJ gave the leading judgments: Robertson v Google LLC [2025] EWCA Viv 1262 (“Robertson”) and Bellway Homes Limited [2025] EWCA Civ 1347 (“Bellway Homes”). On this basis, the Defendant argues that it was permissible for it to challenge jurisdiction by way of its application notice. Alternatively, if relief from sanction is required, the Defendant submits that the criteria in CPR 3.9 and the requirements of the leading case Denton v TH White [2014] EWCA Civ 906; [2014] 1 WLR 3296 are satisfied in this case.[35]In Robertson, the Claimant had issued a Claim Form but failed to serve it within the 6-month period for a claim that is to be served out of the jurisdiction. Google did not serve an acknowledgment of service or make an application to challenge jurisdiction under CPR 11.1. On appeal, the Claimant argued that by failing to take these steps Google must be deemed to have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court. This was a late point and Coulson LJ considered it to be unarguable. After considering a number of relevant authorities including Hoddinott v Persimmon Homes [2007] EWCA Civ 1203, [2008] 1 WLR 806 (CA); Pitalia & Anr v NHS England [2023] EWCA Civ 657, [2023] 1 WLR 3584 and Hand Held Products Inc & Anr v Zebra Technologies Europe [2002] EWHC 640 9 (Ch), Coulson LJ held as follows at [70]:
“As to the CPR, I consider that all the rules concerned with the service of the AoS presuppose that the Claim Form and/or particulars of claim have been validly served. The CPR build, one upon another, on the assumption that the previous rule has been complied with. The claimant’s obligations as to service are set out in Parts 6 and 7; the defendant’s concomitant obligations are in Parts 9-11. The latter assume that the former have been complied with: otherwise the CPR would be five times as long, having to set out all the potential consequences if a previous step had not been validly taken. So r.9.2… which is the starting point of the defendant’s obligations, only works if the Claim Form has been validly served in the first place. There is no obligation to serve an AoS where the Claim Form has not been validly served.”
[36]In Bellway Homes, the Claimant’s solicitors failed to serve the Claim Form on time as their last-minute efforts to serve by fax and DX on the day of the extended deadline both failed. The Defendant’s solicitors made it clear that they did not accept there had been valid service and subsequently applied to strike out the claim pursuant to CPR 3.4(2)(c). The issue was whether the Defendant was precluded from challenging the claim on the basis of jurisdiction given that it had not served an AoS or made an application under CPR 11.1. At first instance Master Dagnall found that the lack of a Part 11 application was fatal to the challenge. The Defendant’s appeal was allowed, for the same reasons as in Robertson.[37]At paragraph 51(f) of Bellway Homes, Coulson LJ explains why the authorities stress the importance of making a Part 11 application:
“The reason that cases such as Hoddinott and Koro stress the importance of the defendant making an application under Part 11 is because such an application makes plain to everyone that the defendant is taking a service - and therefore a jurisdiction - point. But such an application is unnecessary if the claimant has already unsuccessfully raised with the court the question of service, and therefore jurisdiction: see Robertson at [73].”
[38]In this case, the Defendant made the Jurisdiction Application a week after the Claimant had served the Claim Form (out of time and by an invalid method of service). The application was supported by evidence in the form of a witness statement from the Defendant’s solicitor, Rupert Cowper-Coles. The Claimant was therefore on notice of the jurisdiction challenge from the outset and it was supported by evidence (in the same way as an application made under CPR 11.1). There has been no prejudice to the Claimant from the Defendant not serving an AoS and Robertson and Bellway Homes make it clear that serving an AoS is not a necessary precondition for challenging jurisdiction if there has been no valid service of the Claim Form in the first place.[39]In the circumstances, I do not consider that any relief from sanction is required in a case where there has been no valid service, the requirement to file an AoS has not been triggered and the defendant has challenged jurisdiction in a prompt and proper way, albeit not under Part 11. If a defendant is not required to serve an AoS and can simply challenge jurisdiction by way of argument (as in Robertson), or by an application for strike out (as in Bellway Homes), it is clear that the defendant here can challenge jurisdiction by way of a promptly brought application notice supported by evidence.[40]If relief from sanction is required, however, the requirements of CPR 3.9 and of Denton are clearly met. This was not a serious or significant failure; there was no requirement to serve an AoS or proceed under Part 11 given that no valid service had taken place. There was in truth no default, the procedural issue arose because of the Claimant’s failure to serve a valid claim form. There has been no prejudice to the Claimant because the Defendant challenged jurisdiction promptly in an application supported by evidence. Accordingly, there is no procedural impediment to the Defendant proceeding with its Jurisdiction Application. The Jurisdiction Application The importance of serving a Claim Form

The Jurisdiction Application

[41]Serving a valid Claim Form is the first and fundamental step in civil litigation as it founds the court’s jurisdiction over the defendant. This point was emphasised by Carr LJ in R(Good Law Project Limited) v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care [2022] EWCA Civ 335, [2022] 1 WLR 233 at [83]:
“The procedural rules as to service are clear, as was the SSHSC’s nominated address for service. Compliance with the rules is part of the overriding objective in CPR r1.1. The availability of e-mail communications does not lessen the importance of strict compliance, although it may mean that even greater care when it comes to service formalities needs to be taken. It is important to emphasise (again) that valid service of a Claim Form is what founds the jurisdiction of the court over the defendant. Parties who fail, without good reason, to take reasonable steps to effect valid service, in circumstances where a relevant limitation period is about to expire, expose themselves to the very real risk of losing the right to bring their claim.”
[42]Accordingly, failures to serve a valid Claim Form are treated differently from ordinary procedural failures in civil litigation. Most procedural failures can be remedied by the courts exercising powers of case management under CPR 3.10 (general power to rectify errors of procedure) or CPR 3.9 (relief from sanction). But a failure to serve a Claim Form on time cannot be rectified by an extension of time under CPR 3.9 or CPR 3.10: Robertson at [16]. Failures to serve claim forms on time have to be addressed under the rules specific to the service of claim forms; the court’s general powers of case management cannot come to the rescue of a non-compliant claimant. It follows that either the claimant succeeds under the CPR provisions specific to service of claim forms addressed below, or the claim fails.

CPR 7.6 (extension of time for serving a claim form)

[43]The ordinary starting point for a failure to serve a Claim Form in time is CPR 7.6, the specific rule empowering the court to extend the time for service of a claim form. However, the Claimant has not applied for an extension of time under CPR 7.6. There is therefore little to say about CPR 7.6 except to note that as the Claim Form was not served within the 4-month period required by CPR 7.5, if there had been such an application the claimant would need to have satisfied the criteria in CPR 7.6(3), namely that the claimant had taken all reasonable steps to comply with CPR 7.5 but had been unable to do so and that the claimant had acted promptly in making the application.[44]The Claimant did not take “all reasonable steps” to comply with CPR 7.5 in this case. The Claimant did not in fact take any step to comply with CPR 7.5 – he allowed the 4-month deadline of 30 September 2025 to pass before belatedly trying to serve the Claim Form by email on 6 November 2025, over a month out of time and without the prior agreement of the Defendant. For this reason, I would not have granted the Claimant an extension under CPR 7.6, even if an application had been made under that rule and made promptly. CPR 6.15 (service of the Claim Form by an alternative method or at an alternative place)[45]The Claimant relies on CPR 6.15, which in material part provides as follows:
“6.15(1) Where it appears to the court that there is a good reason to authorise service by a method or at a place not otherwise permitted by this part, the court may make an order permitting service by an alternative method or at an alternative place. (2) On an application under this rule, the court may order that steps already taken to bring the Claim Form to the attention of a defendant by an alternative method or at an alternative place is good service.”
[46]In my view, the Claimant’s reliance on this rule is misplaced. The Claimant is trying to use CPR 6.15(2) to persuade the court to retrospectively authorise service of the Claim Form by email even though the Claim Form had expired by that point in time. CPR 6.15 empowers the court to authorise service of the Claim Form by an alternative method or at an alternative place e.g. in a media case if the only known contact for a defendant is an X account, the court might authorise service of a Claim Form by posting it to that X account, this being a different method from the prescribed forms of service in CPR 6.3. But there is no power under CPR 6.15 retrospectively to authorise service of a Claim Form that was served out of time in breach of CPR 7.5. That power exists exclusively under CPR 7.6, which the Claimant has not invoked and would not avail the Claimant in any event.[47]In addition, the Claimant is unable to satisfy the “good reason” requirement in CPR 6.15(2) even if it did apply. Barton v Wright Hassall LLP [2018] UKSC 12; [2018] 1 WLR 1119 illustrates the strict approach taken by the courts as to what constitutes “good reason” under CPR 6.15. That case also involved a litigant-in-person who tried to serve the Claim Form by email on the last day before it expired, without having secured the prior agreement of the defendant to service by email (as required by CPR 6.3 and CPR PD 6A, para 4). The Supreme Court held that the key factors in evaluating “good reason” were whether the claimant had taken reasonable steps to serve in accordance with the rules, whether the defendant and their solicitors had known the contents of the Claim Form when it expired and the prejudice a defendant would suffer by validation. The Supreme Court by a majority held that there had been “no good reason”: the Claimant was an experienced litigant-in-person who knew that not all solicitors accepted service by email; he hadn’t checked whether that was the case but assumed that they did; the defendant’s solicitors were not playing technical games and the claimant had courted disaster by leaving service until the final day.[48]Here the Claimant argues that the Defendant had actual notice of the proceedings, the Defendant had actually received all the documents, the Defendant reviewed and relied on the documents and the Defendant suffers no prejudice arising from the manner or timing of service. These points do not assist the Claimant. First, the Defendant only had notice of these proceedings once the Claim Form had already expired. Secondly, mere receipt of documents is not a substitute for service in accordance with the CPR. Thirdly, the Defendant reviewed and relied on the documents only for the purpose of making its Jurisdiction Application. Fourthly, the Defendant would be severely prejudiced now by the court validating service under CPR 6.15 (if it had the power to do so – which in my view it does not) when the Claim Form had already expired and no extension of time has been sought under CPR 7.6(3).[49]There is no good reason for the Claimant’s failure to serve this Claim Form in the ordinary way. First, the Claimant was aware of the Defendant’s actual address from at least 27 May 2026, as the address is set out on the Claim Form itself. The Claimant could and should have served the Claim Form by post to that address within the 4-month period prescribed by CPR 7.5. Secondly, the Claimant knew that the Defendant had to agree in writing to service of the Claim Form by email as he specifically asked for such agreement when purporting to serve the Claim Form on 6 November 2025, but that consent was not forthcoming. Thirdly, the fact that a Claimant is a litigant in person “will not usually justify applying a lower standard of compliance with rules or orders of the court”, including the rules relating to service of claim forms: Barton v Wright Hassall LLP [2018] 1 WLR 1119 at [18].

CPR 6.16 (power of court to dispense with service of the claim form)

[50]CPR 16.1 so far as material provides as follows:
“The court may dispense with service of a Claim Form in exceptional circumstances.”
[51]CPR 16.1 is a rule of general application which empowers the court to dispense with service of a Claim Form both prospectively and retrospectively. In Godwin v Swindon Borough Council [2002] 1 WLR 997 the Court of Appeal considered how this discretion should be exercised where the court is asked to dispense with service of a Claim Form retrospectively. Considering CPR 6.9 (the predecessor to CPR 6.16) the Court of Appeal held that this rule could not be relied on after the period for service in circumstances where to do so would circumvent CPR 7.6(3). As May LJ put it at [50]:
“The heart of the matter, in my view, is that a person who has by mistake failed to serve the Claim Form within the time period permitted by rule 7.5(2) in substance needs an extension of time to do so. If an application for an extension is not made before the current time period has expired, rule 7.6(3) prescribes the only circumstances in which the court has power to grant such an extension. Just as Vinos v Marks & Spencer plc [2001] 3 All ER 784 decides that the general words of rule 3.10 cannot extend to enable the court to do what rule 7.6(3) specifically forbids, I do not consider that rules 6.1(b) or 6.9 can extend to enable the court to dispense with service when what would be done is in substance that which rule 7.6(3) forbids. If rule 6.9 did so extend, it would be tantamount to giving the court a discretionary power to dispense with statutory limitation provisions.”
[52]The Claimant accepts the relevance of Godwin, but in his skeleton argument he argues that it can be distinguished on its facts. He submits that the principle in Godwin applies where a claimant has simply failed to serve the Claim Form in an ordinary case. He argues that the present claim is different – the proceedings were not an ordinary adversarial claim in which service was attempted and failed. Rather they evolved through a court-ordered without-notice process, bilateral engagement did not arise until directed by the court on 23 October 2025, and the Defendant had complete actual notice and suffered no prejudice.[53]These submissions highlight the fact that the Claimant did not serve the Claim Form because he wanted the court to consider his Norwich Pharmacal application on a without-notice basis. It seems that the Claimant was concerned that service of the Claim Form would tip the Defendant off to an application the Claimant wanted to keep secret. But there was no justification whatsoever for the Claimant to proceed without notice. There was no risk of the Defendant taking any step to frustrate any order the Court might ultimately make in this case, so proceeding without notice on the Norwich Pharmacal application was a misuse of the court’s process. This claim was a normal adversarial claim to which all of the rules of the CPR applied. It seems that Master Gidden was simply unaware that the Claim Form had not been served when he made his order for directions – this did not indicate any kind of approval for the Claimant’s approach.[54]There are no exceptional circumstances here which would justify the Court retrospectively authorising service. The Claimant did not even attempt to serve the Claim Form within the 4-month period prescribed by CPR 7.5. He did so out of a misguided belief that he was justified in proceeding without notice, when the Norwich Pharmacal application should always have been on notice to the Defendant. The Claimant did not apply for permission to extend time under CPR 7.6, whether promptly or at all. Granting permission to the Claimant to dispense with service would undermine the whole scheme of rules 7.5 and 7.6, contrary to the guidance in Godwin. The courts are entitled to demand strict adherence to the rules on service of claim forms, including from litigants-in-person, given the fundamental role that service of a Claim Form plays in civil proceedings.

Outcome

[55]For all of these reasons, the Defendant’s Jurisdiction Application succeeds and I shall grant the Defendant judgment on the claim.