AA & Ors v Emory Andrew Tate [2026] EWHC 1416 (KB)

[2026] EWHC 1416 (KB)

Case No KB-2023-004649

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KING'S BENCH DIVISION

Venue Royal Courts of Justice

Date Wednesday, 6 May 2026

Strand

London WC2A 2LL

MRS JUSTICE LAMBERT

Between

AAClaimant

BBClaimant

CCClaimant

DDClaimant

EMORY ANDREW TATEApplicant

CHIEF CONSTABLE OF HERTFORDSHIRE CONSTABULARYRespondent

Ms ANNE STUDD KC and Mr DAVID MESSLING for Claimant

Ms VANESSA MARSHALL KC and Mr PATRICK WISE-WALSH for Defendant

Mr GERARD BOYLE KC and Mr AARON RATHMELL for Respondent

JUDGMENT

Hearing Hearing dates: 5 May 2026

Digital Transcription by Epiq Europe Ltd,

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[1]This judgment follows the hearing on 5 May 2026 of the defendant’s application for the proceedings to be stayed for at least 12 months to permit the Hertfordshire Police to undertake a further investigation into allegations against Andrew Tate made by claimants AA, BB, and CC. Following submissions, I informed the parties that I intended making an Order adjourning the application with liberty to restore and vacating the trial listed to start on 22 June 2026. I informed the parties that reasons would be provided. These are those reasons.

[2]I set out the background facts only shortly. The claimants allege that between 2013 and 2015 they were, at various times, raped, sexually assaulted, physically assaulted and subject to other coercive and controlling behaviour by the defendant. Three of the claimants (AA, BB and CC) reported the allegations to Bedfordshire Police at that time, in or around June or July 2015. The investigation was handed over to the Hertfordshire Police who investigated the claims (Operation Sercial) and, as part of that investigation, the defendant was arrested and interviewed on three occasions. On 11 November 2019, the claimants were informed that the Crown Prosecution Service was taking no further action in connection with the allegations and that the defendant would not be charged with any criminal offence. These decisions were reviewed by the Crown Prosecution Service which, on 29 September 2025, informed the claimants that no reason to overturn the earlier decision not to authorise charges had been identified. The letters from the Crown Prosecution Service to each of the claimants confirming the decision provided some, albeit short, explanation for the decision referring to a number of messages obtained from electronic devices which, it was said, undermined the claimants’ allegations. The claimants sought a review under the Victims’ Right to Review Scheme on 14 October 2025.

[3]Meanwhile, on 7 December 2023, these civil proceedings were commenced. Particulars of Claim were served on 18 June 2024. In August 2024, the defendant filed a detailed defence responding to the various allegations against him. On 14 November 2025, witness statements were exchanged. On 26 January 2026, the defendant made an application for non-party disclosure from the Chief Constable of Hertfordshire Police under s. 34 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 and CPR 31.17. The application sought disclosure of a variety of process materials (eg. crime reports) and evidential material obtained by the Hertfordshire Police during the course of Operation Sercial. Ms Marshall KC, who represents the defendant, informed me that in the light of correspondence between the defendant’s solicitors and the Hertfordshire Police which preceded the application, it had not been anticipated that the application for disclosure would be opposed or that it would present any procedural difficulties.

[4]The disclosure application was reviewed by Detective Superintendent Sally Phillips of the Hertfordshire Police Public Protection Command. In her Officer's Report of 24 March 2026 she recorded that the application had been “exceptionally complicated by the wide range of requests made by the defendant, as well as by the nature, age, and quality of the potentially relevant criminal investigations.” Seven devices which she understood belonged to the defendant and three from the claimants AA, BB and CC had been obtained in 2015 and their contents downloaded. The downloaded material had to be sifted and then reviewed for the purpose of the application. She reported that she had already reviewed 500 items of material and had prepared schedules of documents which she considered to be directly engaged by the requests made by the defendant. There were also interview recordings and custody records. In her second Officer's Report (26 March 2026) DS Phillips reported that, as her review of the material had progressed, she had become increasingly concerned about the quality and completeness of the police investigation and the adequacy of the information provided to the Crown Prosecution Service. She reported that, in conjunction with the Assistant Chief Constable for Crime and Public Protection, she had made a decision that there should be a reinvestigation of the allegations made by claimants AA, BB and CC.

[5]This was the position at the time of the hearing of the defendant’s disclosure application and case management hearing on 30 March 2026. I therefore adjourned the application. I directed that a further statement from DS Phillips setting out the anticipated scope and timescale of the reinvestigation be provided following liaison with the Crown Prosecution Service and directed further submissions from the parties concerning the future course of this litigation in the light of that information.

[6]DS Phillips’ third Officer Report is dated 23 April 2026. She explained that the reinvestigation was to be taken over by Major Crime on 11 May, that the terms of reference were sensitive and should not be disclosed to the parties but that the subject matter of the reinvestigation significantly overlapped with the issues in the civil claim. DS Phillips reported that the reinvestigation was to be heavily “digitally focused” with particular emphasis on reviewing and analysing existing electronic material and data from the 10 devices which have been obtained in 2015. She re-stated that the total volume of data was vast. She believed that it might take as long as one week per device to undertake an initial sift of the data and a further 3 to 4 weeks per device for a comprehensive review of the data from each device.

[7]DS Phillips expressed a preference that the civil proceedings should be stayed pending the outcome of the criminal reinvestigation and any proceedings which followed. She noted, uncontroversially, that criminal proceedings usually come first in time, with civil proceedings following. She was concerned that the civil proceedings may “create a risk to the integrity of the criminal reinvestigation and our responsibilities to protect sensitive information during the course of an ongoing investigation.” She continued: “..Disclosure of evidence at this stage may give the potential defendant in the criminal proceedings advance notice of evidence issues, suspects, and witnesses which have yet to be fully identified and engaged with by police…. As it stands, my assessment is that there is likely relevant evidence that exists, but which has yet to be identified or realised properly. This means that if the civil proceedings went ahead before the major crime investigation is completed, then there would be a real risk that relevant material, either capable of supporting the complaints advanced or capable of undermining them, would not be before the High Court for the purposes of its trial of the civil proceedings."

[8]The application for a stay was issued by the defendant on 30 April, with prior notice having been given on 27 April. The application was supported by a statement from Mr Ford, the defendant’s solicitor, and a skeleton argument from counsel. Notwithstanding the observations which have been made by DS Phillips in her officer's report, Mr Boyle adopts an essentially neutral stance, recognising the high hurdle which must be overcome by any party seeking to stay civil proceedings pending the outcome of a criminal trial.

[9]The legal framework for this application is common ground. It was recently summarised in One Unique LLC v Kambiz Babaee & Ors

[2026] EWHC 717 (Comm)

where the court observed that:a. the power to order a stay should only be granted where a stay is in the interests of justice (see Athena Capital Fund v Secretariat of State of the Holy See

[2022] 1 WLR 4570

at paragraph 59 per Males LJ);

b. a claimant in civil proceedings normally has a right to have his claim 'processed and heard and decided.' Ordering a stay is an interference with those rights. The circumstances of the case must justify an interference with those rights and the burden of establishing that justification lies with the party seeking the stay (most commonly of course, the Defendant but the applicant may be the prosecutor) see Jefferson v Bhetcha

[1979] 1 WLR 898

;

c. the power to order a stay must be exercised with great care and only where there is a real risk of serious prejudice which may lead to injustice. It is incumbent on the applicant to point to 'a real and not a notional risk of injustice' (Panton v Financial Institutions Services Limited

[2003] UKPC 8

)

[10]Ms Marshall made a number of submissions in support of her application. When brought into focus they distilled into the following points.a. The continuation of the civil trial would be, or may be, prejudicial to the defendant in any future criminal trial because the outcome of a civil trial (if against the defendant) would be likely to influence a jury. A judgment of the High Court would be very memorable and it would be unlikely that members of a jury would be able to put it out of their minds.

b. In criminal proceedings, the defendant has a basic right against self-incrimination. The defendant has already provided a 70-page witness statement in these civil proceedings, and an application may yet be made by the police for access to this document. The privilege against self-incrimination may lead the defendant in these civil proceedings to exercise the right not to answer questions particularly given that the terms of reference have not been disclosed and are not coterminous with the issues in the civil trial.

c. It is not possible to have a fair civil trial until there has been disclosure of material from the criminal investigation. Although some disclosure has been given by the claimants, the defendant does not yet have, for example, the full suite of texts and other messages which were sent by the claimants and others which have, or which may have, a bearing on the allegations made.

d. Further, Ms Marshall draws my attention to the third report of DS Phillips in which she states that there is likely to be relevant material that exists, but which is yet to be identified or properly realised. It is, submits the defendant, therefore unfair for the civil trial to proceed as there may yet come into existence material undermining the claimants’ allegations. In these circumstances, a trial should not take place.

[11]I informed the parties at the conclusion of submissions yesterday afternoon that I was not prepared to grant the defendant’s application for these proceedings to be stayed pending the ongoing police investigation but that I intended to adjourn the application and vacate the trial due to commence on 22 June 2026. I set out the reasons below.

[12]I am not persuaded that, currently, there is a real, as opposed to a fanciful or theoretical, risk of serious prejudice to the defendant which might lead to serious injustice justifying a stay of the civil proceedings pending the outcome of the criminal investigation. I accept that it is possible that at some point in the future such a risk may exist, but at present it does not. In response to the defendant’s main points:a. I am not persuaded that the publicity associated with a civil trial will mean that it is impossible to swear a jury in any future criminal trial. Jurors take an oath or affirmation to try the case on the evidence alone. They will be directed to put out of their minds any prior knowledge of the defendant. There will be the usual questioning of the jury panel to identify those who feel unable to put what they know out of their minds. Setting these points to one side, on a conservative estimate, any trial of these allegations will take place many years in the future, not least because the defendant, who currently lives overseas, faces criminal charges in Romania and 10 charges of sexual assault in this jurisdiction. Although an extradition warrant has been issued, I am informed by Mr Boyle that it will not be executed until the proceedings in Romania have been concluded. I have no timescale for the Romanian proceedings. I am informed by Ms Marshall that the defendant is currently in the USA but intends to return to Romania when required. Given that two sets of criminal proceedings will precede any criminal trial of the allegations raised by these claimants, any publicity which may be attracted by these proceedings will be eclipsed in the time interval between the civil action and the criminal trial. I doubt that the findings of a civil court are likely to be present, let alone foremost, in the mind of any potential juror.

b. I am not persuaded that the existence of the defendant’s right to avoid self-incrimination in a criminal trial, in itself, amounts to a real risk of serious prejudice. The defendant has already made a statement running to over 70 pages. He gave three full comment interviews in 2015 when he was arrested. I accept that the defendant may judge it appropriate to invoke his right not to answer questions in the civil trial if the terms of reference of the criminal investigation are not provided but that should not prevent him answering questions which focus upon the issues in these proceedings.

c. DS Phillips refers to the possibility of new information or new evidence coming to light which may be relevant to the civil claim. This is inherent in any reinvestigation. At present, the mere possibility of new evidence coming to light is not a sufficient basis for me to impose a stay on the proceedings. It does not lead to a real, as opposed to theoretical or notional, risk of injustice.

[13]In the event of new evidence coming to light which cannot be disclosed pending the outcome of the criminal investigation or if, as the reinvestigation continues, other reasons emerge for arguing the presence of a real rather than a fanciful risk of injustice, then this application can be restored. At its best however, this application is premature and a reflex reaction to the decision to reinvestigate which fails to address the test which the court must apply.

[14]I am however satisfied that it would be unfair to the defendant to proceed to trial in June given the outstanding disclosure application which has not yet been the subject of a substantive response. Ms Studd for the claimants, realistically, does not oppose such a course. At present it is known that there is relevant material in the data downloads from 2015 which has not been disclosed. By way of example only, I understand from Ms Marshall that some of the emails which were referred to by the CPS in their review letters have not been disclosed. There is no realistic prospect of the disclosure exercise being completed in sufficient time for a trial in June 2026. At my request the respondent has agreed to prioritise the interrogation of data downloads relevant to the complainants. I urge the police team to work with a degree of urgency, not least given the number of years during which these matters were the subject of investigation by the police between 2015 and 2019. There will be a further case management hearing of this action in July 2026, by which time I hope the court will be in a position to determine when the disclosure exercise will be completed and whether, given the ongoing criminal investigation, there are any obstacles to the disclosure sought. Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE Email: civil@epiqglobal.co.uk