Mannings Organisation Limited & Anor v Joseph Henry Manning [2026] EWHC 1344 (KB)
[2026] EWHC 1344 (KB)Case No KB-2025-004435
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING’S BENCH DIVISION
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 3 June 2026
Before
ANDREW KINNIER K.C.Sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court
Between
JOSEPH HENRY MANNINGDefendant
Between
MANNINGS ORGANISATION LIMITEDMANNINGS AMUSEMENTS LIMITEDRichard Power K.C.(instructed by Greenwoods Legal Services Limited) for ClaimantsThomas Grant K.C. and Hugh Jeffery (instructed by Boodle Hatfield) for DefendantWritten submissions: 22 May 2026Draft circulated to parties: 1 June 2026Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely on 3 June 2026 at 3.30 pm by circulation to the parties or their representatives by email and released to the National Archives.ANDREW KINNIER K.C. sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High CourtIntroduction
[1]This judgment is concerned with consequential matters following my judgment, handed down on 14 May 2026, in which I continued elements of the injunction first made by Foster J on 2 December 2025 and dismissed the discharge application. This judgment deals with the three remaining questions: costs; further case management directions and matters touching upon proceedings before the Showmen’s Guild of Great Britain (“the Guild proceedings”).[2]For the sake of consistency and clarity, this judgment adopts the abbreviations used in the earlier judgment. References to “the order” are to the order made on 18 May 2026 following the judgment.[3]I gave the parties a choice between a hearing to decide consequential matters or a determination on the basis of written submissions. They opted for the latter and exchanged written notes on 22 May 2026. Neither party lodged submissions in response. Costs The Claimants’ submissions
Costs
[4]Mr Power KC, counsel for the Claimants, submitted that Joseph Senior should pay their costs of the injunction and the discharge applications to be assessed forthwith if not agreed. They also asked for a payment on account of £120,000 (approximately 60 per cent of their statement of costs.) As to the injunction application, it is said that Joseph Senior fought its continuation “root and branch”, served voluminous factual evidence and challenged, at length, the question whether there was a serious issue to be tried. In short, he fought and lost. In respect of the discontinuation application, Mr Power KC argued that Joseph Senior is in no different position to a respondent to a freezing injunction application who failed to persuade the court that the applicant had not effectively discharged its duty of full and frank disclosure. In such a case, the position is that the unsuccessful respondent pays the applicant’s costs: Cancrie Investments v. Haider [2024] EWHC 2302 (Comm). Joseph Senior’s submissions[5]On behalf of Joseph Senior, Mr Grant KC and Mr Jeffery contended that the costs of a contested return date should be reserved until the determination of the substantive issue: Richardson v. Desquenne et Giral UK Ltd [2001] FSR 1; Wingfield Digby v. Melford Capital Partners (Holdings) LLP [2021] 1 WLR 1553. In cases (such as the present) where the court had concluded that it had been neither possible nor necessary to resolve the underlying merits and the purpose of the injunction was to “hold the ring” pending trial, it would be wrong to make a substantive costs order when the substantive issues had yet to be resolved. Pertinently, it was also contended that the Claimants’ proposed undertakings of 16 January 2026 are irrelevant. Joseph Senior’s solicitors sought but never received clarification as to whether the proposed undertakings were intended to be interim pending trial or a final settlement of the claim. No separate submissions were made in relation to the costs of the discharge application but, absent any contrary submission, I have assumed that Joseph Senior asks that these be reserved as well. Discussion[6]Although their subject-matter is linked, the injunction application and the discharge application are separate and, for the reasons set out below, different costs-related considerations apply to them.[7]As to the former, the question at trial will be whether the Claimants have established a course of conduct by Joseph Senior against individuals with the aim of persuading the Claimants to transfer their exclusive rights to the Winterland and Winter Wonderland events to him. In this vigorously contested claim, the answer can only be fairly and fully reached after evidence has been heard and tested (not least in relation to the question whether the Claimants knowingly gave misleading evidence about the extent of their rights in relation to the Winterland and Winter Wonderland events.) I also concluded that para. 3 and (subject to some revision) para. 4 of the injunction should continue so as to preserve the position pending trial. In these circumstances and to adopt Morritt LJ’s words in the Desquenne case, there were no successful or unsuccessful parties. Accordingly, it would be unjust to make any adverse costs order and the costs of the injunction application are reserved to the trial judge.[8]As to the latter, Joseph Senior forcefully pursued but lost the application. I accept Mr Power KC’s submission that, by contending that the Claimants failed to give full and frank disclosure at the 2 December 2025 hearing, Joseph Senior is in no different position from a party who has run and lost the same point at the return date of a freezing injunction application. In the circumstances, there is no good reason why costs should not follow the event. The Claimants are, therefore, entitled to their costs of the discharge application to be assessed on the standard basis if not agreed.[9]In support of their application for a payment of costs on account, the Claimants have served a statement of costs “for the hearing on 10-11 February 2026 interim application.” The statement does not distinguish between the costs of the injunction and discharge applications. Although the Claimants are entitled to a payment on account of costs, I am unable to assess the sum that should be allowed. In the circumstances, the Claimants shall file and serve a statement of costs in relation to the discharge application by 4 p.m. on 3 June 2026 and Joseph Senior shall file and serve brief written submissions (limited to five sides of A4; 12-point font; 1.5 spacing) on the sum to be paid on account of costs and the date by which it should be paid by 4 p.m. on 5 June 2026. The question shall then be decided on the papers. Further case management directions The Claimants’ submissions
Further case management directions
[10]Mr Power KC’s submissions were succinct: the parties should provide disclosure of any known adverse documents and any further documents on which they intend to rely within 28 days. As to witness evidence, Mr Power KC submitted that Joseph Senior’s account will have to be put to the Claimants’ witnesses in cross-examination. For that reason, it would be preferable for the Claimants’ response to be put forward ahead of trial in the form of witness statements and not to emerge in examination-in-chief (if permitted) or cross-examination. To that end, the parties should be allowed to serve any further witness evidence within 56 days. It is implicit in the Claimants’ submissions that the case should be transferred from Part 8 to Part 7.
Joseph Senior’s submissions
[11]Mr Grant KC and Mr Jeffery made detailed submissions on case management. In relation to the trial date, their overarching point was that the court had agreed with the parties’ joint position that there should be an expedited trial in July 2026 and the court “should follow through on this reasoning in its consequential directions to trial.” As the availability of the parties’ current leading counsel would mean that the trial could not be heard until October 2026, both parties will need to instruct alternative leading counsel, a proposal which would cause little particular prejudice to either side.[12]Joseph Senior submits that there should be no further disclosure or witness evidence. First, CPR 65.28(1)(b) requires a claim under s. 3 of the Act to be started under Part 8 to ensure that it is swiftly resolved and at a proportionate cost. Secondly, a transfer to Part 7 is usually prompted by the need for pleadings but I am told that the parties agree that statements of case are not required. In any event, a formal order transferring a claim under the Act to Part 7 is usually rendered unnecessary by directions, under CPR 8.6(2) and (3), for oral evidence and cross-examination. Thirdly, the parties have had ample opportunity to file witness evidence under CPR 8.5. Indeed, the Claimants have had two opportunities to provide the evidence on which they rely and have had the “last word” by way of reply evidence. Fourthly, if the claim remains within Part 8 and a party wishes to serve further evidence, an application (effectively for relief from sanctions) would be required under CPR 8.5(8) and 8.6(1)(b). No such application has been made; there is no good reason why no application has been made and none is offered. Fifthly, there is no need for additional disclosure because the parties have exhibited all the material upon which they wish to rely. Finally, there have been no incidents since the return date hearing that could be relevant to the alleged course of conduct relied upon by the Claimants. There is no suggestion that Joseph Senior has breached the injunction and so there is no need for any updating evidence.
Discussion
[13]The first point to resolve (or, perhaps more accurately, to confirm) is the trial date. Both parties had agreed and I ordered that there should be an expedited trial in July 2026 subject to availability unless the court ordered otherwise. Since the order was made, it has become apparent that neither side’s leading counsel’s commitments would allow the trial to be heard in July 2026. It is unfortunate that in advocating a trial date at the end of the Trinity term the parties do not appear to have checked whether, and liaised to ensure, that their respective leading counsel’s diaries allowed them to appear at such a trial.[14]The position remains that an expedited trial is justified: first, the parties agreed and continue to agree that an early trial of the final claim for an injunction is necessary, a position with which I agreed and is reflected in the order; secondly, an early trial in July 2026 was one reason which I found would limit any prejudice that Joseph Senior would suffer should the injunction be continued; thirdly, as the order recognised, counsel’s availability is a secondary concern in listing trials and the agreed objective of an early final resolution of the claim would be frustrated were the trial not to be heard until sometime in the Michaelmas term; fourthly, as Mr Grant KC and Mr Jeffery submitted, requiring the parties to instruct new leading counsel in this case is unlikely to cause them much prejudice. Mr Power KC made no contrary submission.[15]Therefore, the trial shall be heard on the first available date after 20 July 2026 with an agreed time estimate of 4 days and judicial reading time of 1 day.[16]As to disclosure, the Claimants have not demonstrated a need for further directions. The parties have already provided significant material upon which they wish to rely. That is particularly so in relation to the Claimants who have had two opportunities to file and serve their evidence (including any documents.) The Claimants have not identified any additional documents that may be relevant beyond the material already provided. Mr Power KC’s written submissions identify no issue to which disclosure may be required or any particular document or class(es) of documents that may be relevant to that issue. There is no detailed explanation of why, given the materials disclosed thus far, standard disclosure is necessary. No specific disclosure request is indicated even in outline. Absent any meaningful detail from the Claimants, the case for further disclosure directions has not been made out.[17]As to witness evidence, the Claimants argue that it would be preferable for their response to Joseph Senior’s evidence to be set out in statements served before the trial. However, the submission ignores the fact that the Claimants have already had and seized the opportunity of lodging reply evidence under para. 1(b) of the consent order, approved by Cavanagh J, on 8 December 2025. Mr Power KC’s note does not identify any particular evidence to which the Claimants would wish to respond and, importantly, was not addressed by the Claimants’ statements in reply served in January 2026. The Claimants seek a third bite of the evidential cherry but have not articulated a good reason for allowing them to do so. The agreed position is that Joseph Senior has not breached the injunction since it was made on 2 December 2025 and the parties communicate by their solicitors. There is therefore no need for any updating evidence.
Directions
[18]I am told that the parties agree that no further statements of case beyond the Part 8 Claim Form are required. Given the incidents relied upon by the Claimants are pleaded in the Claim Form and Joseph Senior has set out his response in evidence, I am content that there is no need for any additional round of pleadings.[19]The only additional evidence-related directions that are required are under CPR 8.6(2) and (3). To that end, except for the evidence served by the parties’ solicitors, all those who have given an affidavit or witness statement in these proceedings are required to attend the trial to give oral evidence and to be cross-examined. The claim therefore remains governed by Part 8.[20]As to trial preparation:(a) The index to the proposed trial bundle shall be agreed by 4 p.m. on 26 June 2026. The Claimants shall provide copies of the trial bundle to the Defendant as soon as reasonably practicable thereafter.(b) The Claimants are to lodge the trial bundle 7 days before the first day of trial.(c) There shall be no requirement to file listing questionnaires or pre-trial checklists unless the listing office requires otherwise.(d) Skeleton arguments are to be filed and served by 4 p.m. not less than 7 days before the date fixed for the expedited trial.(e) The expedited trial shall take place in London before a High Court Judge (including a Deputy Judge), to be entered into the General List, Category C.(f) The expedited trial shall have a time estimate of 4 days together with an additional 1 day for the court’s pre-reading and shall be fixed in a window starting on 20 July 2026.
The Guild proceedings
[21]Following the incident on 16 October 2025, Joseph Senior started the Guild proceedings which seek a decision on three principal questions: whether he has personal rights under the Guild rules to participate at the Winterland event; whether the Claimants have failed to give effect to any personal rights and, if so, what is the appropriate sanction. The Claimants have made a cross-complaint in which the Guild’s jurisdiction is recognised but it is denied that they should be the subject of any sanction.[22]Mr Grant KC and Mr Jeffery say in their note that Joseph Senior has been informed by unidentified current officers of the Guild that it is adopting an unofficial policy of deferring resolution of the Guild proceedings pending determination of this claim, the proprietary estoppel claim and the unfair prejudice claim. Mr Grant KC and Mr Jeffery ask if I might clarify, in a recitation to the consequential order or in this judgment, that “nothing in the terms of the Interim Injunction or the litigation itself, precludes the Guild from determining the question whether Joseph Sr had established rights pursuant to the Guild Rules and from giving effect to its own disciplinary procedures.”[23]Although I understand why the request has been made, I am not persuaded that it is appropriate to provide the clarification sought. The better course would be for Joseph Senior to make his representations to the Guild, the Claimants to respond and the Guild’s officers to decide how best to manage the Guild proceedings in light of the three sets of High Court proceedings in which the parties are involved. If Joseph Senior is dissatisfied with the Guild’s decision, no doubt he will seek advice on the appropriate response.
Permission to appeal
[24]No draft grounds were provided to the Claimants before the exchange of written submissions. Mr Power KC’s note could not therefore address any potential challenge to my judgment except to say that it contained no error of law and an appeal would have no prospect of success. No supplemental note has been served in response to the grounds briefly set out in Mr Grant KC and Mr Jeffery’s note.[25]I have set out my summary response to the proposed grounds in form N460 which has been provided to the parties with this judgment. In short, those grounds have no real prospects of success and there is no other compelling reason to grant Joseph Senior permission to appeal.
Conclusion
[26]I should be grateful to the parties if they could provide a draft order which reflects my conclusions. Finally, I wish to thank counsel once more for their assistance.