“Hazard (something with potential to do harm): - running machinery Control (measure to reduce hazard): - Do make sure that the equipment is turned off - Isolate machinery before any maintenance cleaning or adjustment.”
“Where any person suffers damage as the result partly of his own fault and partly of the fault of any other person or persons, a claim in respect of that damage shall not be defeated by reason of the fault of the person suffering the damage, but the damages recoverable in respect thereof shall be reduced to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage…”
“… “fault” means negligence, breach of statutory duty or other act or omission which gives rise to liability in tort or would, apart from this Act, give rise to the defence of contributory negligence.”
“(a) Was there fault on the part of the claimant? (b) If so, did the damage or injury that he suffered result partly from that fault? (c) If so, what was the extent of his responsibility for that damage or injury? (d) Having regard to the answer to (c), what is the reduction in the damages recoverable that is just and equitable?”
“Negligence depends on breach of duty, whereas contributory negligence does not. Negligence is a man’s carelessness in breach of duty to others. Contributory negligence is a man’s carelessness in looking after his own safety. He is guilty of contributory negligence if he ought reasonably to have foreseen that, if he did not act as a reasonable prudent man, he might be hurt himself…”
“In determining responsibility, the law eliminates the personal equation. It takes no notice of the views of the particular individual or others like him, it requires everyone to exercise all such precautions as a man of ordinary prudence would observe…”
“Although contributory negligence does not depend on a duty of care, it does depend on foreseeability. Just as actionable negligence requires the foreseeability of harm to others, so contributory negligence requires the foreseeability of harm to oneself. A person is guilty of contributory negligence if he ought reasonably to have foreseen that, if he did not act as a reasonable, prudent man, he might hurt himself; and in his reckonings he must take into account the possibility of others being careless.”
“..If the standard of the conduct of “an ordinary prudent man” is preferred, I do not think that his own conduct fell below it. Almost every workman constantly, and justifiably, takes risks in the sense that he relies on others to do their duty, and trusts that they have done it. I am far from saying that everyone is entitled to assume, in all circumstances, that other persons will be careful. On the contrary, a prudent man will guard against the possible negligence of others when experience shows that such negligence to be common. Where, however, the negligence is a breach of regulations, made to secure the safety of workmen, which may be presumed to be strictly enforced in the ordinary course of a ship’s discipline, I am not prepared to say that a workman is careless if he assumes that there has been compliance with the law…The courts have long recognised that in some circumstances an omission to make sure for oneself that others have done what they ought to have done is not negligent.”
“…the care to be expected of the plaintiff in the circumstances will vary with the circumstances; and that a different degree of care may well be expected from a workman in a factory or a mine from that which might be taken by an ordinary man not exposed continually to the noise, strain and manifold risks of a factory or mine. I agree with the statement of Lawrence J. in Flower v Ebbw Vale Steel, Iron and Coal Co., Ltd…“I think of course that in considering whether an ordinary prudent workman would have taken more care than the injured man, the tribunal of fact has to take into account all of the circumstances of work in a factory, and that it is not for every risky thing which a workman in a factory may do in his familiarity with the machinery that a plaintiff ought to be held guilty of contributory negligence…”
“The degree of want and care which constitutes negligence must vary with the circumstances…It is not a matter of uniform standard. It may vary from place to place, from time to time….It must be a question of degree. The jury have to draw the line where mere thoughtlessness or inadvertence or forgetfulness ceases and where negligence begins…”
“…this is the sort of accident which can happen by inadvertence and that is one of the reasons why the regulations made under this statute are made, because workmen who are concentrating on doing a job may inadvertently get their hands in a position of danger by reason of a dangerous part of the machine, and that is why the law requires the dangerous part to be fenced…”
“In my view it is quite impossible to dissent from the judge's finding that this accident was partly caused by the plaintiff's negligence in standing too near. He was a very experienced man who had been doing this job for years and years and he must have known that the only safe thing to do was to stand so far away that, whatever happened (unless, of course, the chain itself broke and flew off in pieces) he would be out of range. This he plainly did not do otherwise he would not have been hit. Mr. Davies's submission to us was that the act of the plaintiff in standing where he did was a mere act of inadvertence done in the furtherance of his job and in his employers' interest. He referred us, of course, to the well-known authority of Caswell v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd. and he asked this court to say that in these circumstances, even though the accident could not have happened without the action that the plaintiff took it should not be ascribed to him as being an act of negligence. I cannot accept this submission. It is plain that the plaintiff knew that there was a risk. It is plain that he knew that it was dangerous to stand within range, and it is also plain on the evidence that the accident was easily avoidable. There was plenty of room where he was working for him to retreat to a completely safe distance. In those circumstances I am quite sure that the judge was right in coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence.”
“…once contributory negligence has been established, the court must take into account both the extent of the claimant’s responsibility for his injury and damage and the blameworthiness of his conduct as opposed to that of the defendant in deciding on the reduction in damages that is just and equitable. The decision as to the appropriate reduction in the claimant’s damages is to be dealt with in a broad, jury-like and common sense way…”
“The court has to weigh both the causative potency of the conduct of the defendant and claimant as well as their respective blameworthiness.”
“…in this corner of the law the results of decided cases are inevitably very fact-sensitive. Both counsel nevertheless at times invited your Lordships to compare the facts of the present case with the facts of other decided cases. This is a sterile exercise. Precedent is a valuable stabilising influence in our legal system. But, comparing the facts of and outcomes of cases in this branch of the law is a misuse of the only proper use of precedent, viz to identify the relevant rule to apply to the facts as found.”