“In the Judgment, I held that my Orders as to the Defendant having to provide some, but only some, Further Information by way of amendment might require reconsideration in the light of whatever eventually transpired by way of amendment and therefore that my consequent order would only be Provisional.”
“This Order (being provisional in accordance with the Judgment) shall not be sealed until further direction of the Court.”
“the question whether the Provisional Order as sealed should stand (but subject to the other provisions of this Order including as to relief from sanctions) [is] adjourned to the hearings to be listed on14 May 2026 and20 May 2026 … to be dealt with by the Judge(s) conducting those hearings”
“(a)… that the party has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim, defence or issue; and (b) there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at a trial.”
“(2) An application underCPR 3.4 (2)(a) calls for analysis of the statement of case, without reference to evidence. The primary facts alleged are assumed to be true. The Court should not be deterred from deciding a point of law; if it has all the necessary materials it should ‘grasp the nettle’: ICI Chemicals & Polymers Ltd v TTE Training Ltd[2007] EWCA Civ 725 , but it should not strike out under this sub-rule unless it is ‘certain’ that the statement of case, or the part under attack discloses no reasonable grounds of claim: Richards (t/a Colin Richards & Co) v Hughes[2004] EWCA Civ 266 [2004] PNLR 35 [22]. Even then, the Court has a discretion; it should consider whether the defect might be cured by amendment; if so, it may refrain from striking out and give an opportunity to make such an amendment. (3) Rule 3.4(2)(b) is broad in scope, and evidence is in principle admissible. The wording of the rule makes clear that the governing principle is that a statement of case must not be ‘likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings’. Like all parts of the rules, that phrase must be interpreted and applied in the light of the overriding objective of dealing with a case ‘justly and at proportionate cost’. The previous rules, the Rules of the Supreme Court, allowed the court to strike out all or part of a statement of case if it was ‘scandalous’, a term which covered allegations of dishonesty or other wrongdoing that were irrelevant to the claim. The language is outmoded, but I agree with [Counsel for the defendant] that the power to exclude such material remains. Allegations of that kind can easily be regarded as ‘likely to obstruct the just disposal’ of proceedings. (4) ‘Abuse of process’ is a sub-set of category (b). An abuse of process is a significant or substantial misuse of the process. It may take a variety of forms. Typical examples are proceedings which are vexatious, or attempts to re-litigate issues decided before, or claims which are ‘not worth the candle’ (Jameel v Dow Jones & Co Inc[2005] EWCA Civ 75 [2005] QB 946 ). But the categories are not closed.”
“i) The court must consider whether the [defendant] has a ‘realistic’ as opposed to a 'fanciful' prospect of success … ii) A ‘realistic’ [defence] is one that carries some degree of conviction. This means a [defence] that is more than merely arguable … iii) In reaching its conclusion the court must not conduct a ‘mini-trial’… iv) This does not mean that the court must take at face value and without analysis everything that a [defendant] says in [her] statements before the court. In some cases it may be clear that there is no real substance in factual assertions made, particularly if contradicted by contemporaneous documents … v) However, in reaching its conclusion the court must take into account not only the evidence actually placed before it on the application for summary judgment, but also the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be available at trial … vi) Although a case may turn out at trial not to be really complicated, it does not follow that it should be decided without the fuller investigation into the facts at trial than is possible or permissible on summary judgment. Thus the court should hesitate about making a final decision without a trial, even where there is no obvious conflict of fact at the time of the application, where reasonable grounds exist for believing that a fuller investigation into the facts of the case would add to or alter the evidence available to a trial judge and so affect the outcome of the case … vii) On the other hand, it is not uncommon for an application under Part 24 to give rise to a short point of law or construction and, if the court is satisfied that it has before it all the evidence necessary for the proper determination of the question and that the parties have had an adequate opportunity to address it in argument, it should grasp the nettle and decide it. The reason is quite simple: if the respondent's case is bad in law, he will in truth have no real prospect of succeeding on his claim … Similarly, if the applicant's case is bad in law, the sooner that is determined, the better. If it is possible to show by evidence that although material in the form of documents or oral evidence that would put the documents in another light is not currently before the court, such material is likely to exist and can be expected to be available at trial, it would be wrong to give summary judgment because there would be a real, as opposed to a fanciful, prospect of success. However, it is not enough simply to argue that the case should be allowed to go to trial because something may turn up which would have a bearing on the question of construction …”
“21. The authorities therefore make clear that in the context of summary judgment the court is by no means barred from evaluating the evidence, and concluding that on the evidence there is no real (as opposed to fanciful) prospect of success. It will of course be cautious in doing so. It will bear in mind the clarity of the evidence available and the potential for other evidence to be available at trial which is likely to bear on the issues. It will avoid conducting a mini-trial. But there will be cases where the Court will be entitled to draw a line and say that - even bearing well in mind all of those points - it would be contrary to principle for a case to proceed to trial. … 27. When considering an application to strike out however the facts pleaded must be assumed to be true and evidence regarding the claims advanced in the statement of case is inadmissible. This is noted in Terry Allsop v Banner Jones Limited[2021] EWCA Civ 7 by Marcus Smith J (giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal) at [7], citing the judgment of Arnold LJ in Libyan Investment Authority v King[2020] EWCA Civ 1690 , at [96]: “In contrast with the applications underCPR 3.4 (2)(b), the applications underCPR 3.4 (2)(a) andCPR 24.2 are concerned with the merits of the claim, specifically whether the claim meets the (low) threshold of what I shall call ‘reasonable arguability’. Although it can be said that there is no material difference between the test applied by these two provisions, there is an important distinction betweenCPR 3.4 (2)(a) andCPR 24.2 , in that an application underCPR 24.2 can be supported by evidence, whereas an application underCPR 3.4 (2)(a) should not involve evidence regarding the claims advanced in the statement of case.” “In contrast with the applications underCPR 3.4 (2)(b), the applications underCPR 3.4 (2)(a) andCPR 24.2 are concerned with the merits of the claim, specifically whether the claim meets the (low) threshold of what I shall call ‘reasonable arguability’. Although it can be said that there is no material difference between the test applied by these two provisions, there is an important distinction betweenCPR 3.4 (2)(a) andCPR 24.2 , in that an application underCPR 24.2 can be supported by evidence, whereas an application underCPR 3.4 (2)(a) should not involve evidence regarding the claims advanced in the statement of case.”
“(1) it is a defence to an action for defamation for the defendant to show that the imputation conveyed by the statement complained of is substantially true. (2) Subsection (3) applies in an action for defamation if the statement complained of conveys two or more distinct imputations. (3) If one or more of the imputations is not shown to be substantially true, the defence under this section does not fail if, having regard to the imputations which are shown to be substantially true, the imputations which are not shown to be substantially true do not seriously harm the claimant’s reputation.”
“The Claimant sexually assaulted the Defendant, causing her to feel unsafe having any interaction with the Claimant. The seriousness of the Claimant’s criminal conduct was such as to leave the Defendant traumatised and subjected to suicidal thoughts in the immediate aftermath of the assault.”
“On a summary judgment application the burden of proof rests on the applicant to establish that the respondent has no real prospect of success and that there was no other reason for a trial of the claim or issue. If an applicant adduces credible evidence in support of its application, then the respondent becomes subject to an evidential burden of proving some real prospect of success or some other reason for a trial. The standard of proof upon the respondent is not high.”
“Although there is a single and unvarying standard of proof in civil proceedings, the evidence which is required to satisfy it may vary according to the circumstances. In re D[2008] 1 WLR 1499 at [27] Lord Carswell approved what had been said by Richards LJ in R (N) v Mental Health Review Tribunal (Northern Region)[2006] QB 468 at [62] who had said, ‘Although there is a single civil standard of proof on the balance probabilities, it is flexible in its application. In particular, the more serious the allegation or the more serious the consequences if the allegation is proved, the stronger must be the evidence before a court will find the allegation proved on the balance of probabilities. Thus the flexibility of the standard lies not in any adjustment to the degree of probability required for an allegation to be proved (such that a more serious allegation has to be proved to a higher degree of probability), but in the strength or quality of the evidence that will in practice be required for an allegation to be proved on the balance of probabilities.’ [Emphasis in the original]” ‘Although there is a single civil standard of proof on the balance probabilities, it is flexible in its application. In particular, the more serious the allegation or the more serious the consequences if the allegation is proved, the stronger must be the evidence before a court will find the allegation proved on the balance of probabilities. Thus the flexibility of the standard lies not in any adjustment to the degree of probability required for an allegation to be proved (such that a more serious allegation has to be proved to a higher degree of probability), but in the strength or quality of the evidence that will in practice be required for an allegation to be proved on the balance of probabilities.’ [Emphasis in the original]”
“It would need more cogent evidence to satisfy one that the creature seen walking in Regent's Park was more likely than not to have been a lioness than to be satisfied to the same standard of probability that it was an Alsatian.”
“The question is what would the words convey to the mind of the ordinary, reasonable, fair-minded reader? The natural and ordinary meaning of words is not determined by any meaning that the law may attach to the same words. Words may acquire a specific meaning in law that an ordinary person would not understand the words to bear and consequently the same words could be found to have a meaning in a libel claim that is different from their technical legal meaning. Whether they do so is a question of fact that turns on the application of the principles of interpretation.”