Roger Monk & Ors v Cape Intermediate Holdings Limited & Anor [2026] EWHC 1273 (KB)

[2026] EWHC 1273 (KB)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
CIVIL
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 29/05/2026
Before
MR JUSTICE COTTER
Between
(1) Roger MonkClaimant(2) Lynn Joan Page (Executrix of the Estate of Reginald Stephen Page)Claimant(3) Elvara Back (Executrix of the Estate of Michael Back)Claimant(4) Doris Crossman (Personal Representative of the Estate of Peter Davies)Claimant(5) Barbara Mason (Executrix of the Estate of Kevin Mason)Claimant(6) Morag Whittingham (Executrix of the Estate of Trevor Whittingham)Claimant(1) Cape Intermediate Holdings LimitedDefendant(2) Cape Building Products LimitedDefendant
Harry Steinberg KC (instructed by Hugh James) for AppellantJayne Adams KC (instructed by Horwich Farrelly) for RespondentHearing Hearing dates: 08 May 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 29 May 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................MR JUSTICE COTTER

Introduction

[1]This is a “rolled-up” hearing in an appeal against a case management order made by Master Eastman on 16th December 2025 in a personal injury action. I therefore have to decide whether permission to appeal should be granted and, it if should be, to determine the appeal.[2]The Appellants are five (formerly six) Claimants in asbestos product liability claims. The remaining claims are all fatal accident claims in respect of the death of workers (“the Deceased”) in the building and allied industries who, it is alleged, worked with Asbestolux, a proprietary asbestos insulation board manufactured by the Defendants.[3]The relevant time period for the Deceaseds’ exposure is from 1964–1983; broken down as follows a) Mr Page used Asbestolux boards to box in boilers and pipes and to construct cupboard doors, partition walls and ceilings between 1974 and 1983. b) Mr Back worked with Asbestolux to construct soffits and to line fire doors between 1964 and 1972. c) Mr Davies worked with Asbestolux for fireproofing including boxing in pipework and constructing partitions from 1975/6 until the late 1970s. d) Mr Mason used Asbestolux to construct soffits between 1967/68 and 1974. e) Mr Whittingham worked with Asbestolux in the course of his work as a carpenter between 1972 and 1977/78.[4]The Deceased all developed pleural mesothelioma.[5]The First Defendant manufactured Asbestolux itself between 1951 and 1960. Thereafter Asbestolux was manufactured by various subsidiary companies, including the Second Defendant. The Second Defendant, which is now a dormant company, began manufacturing Asbestolux from the Uxbridge factory in 1974.[6]The claims against the Defendants are based on the central allegation that they manufactured and sold a dangerous product. The claims have not been made against an employer as it usually the case because no insurer for the employers could be identified. Leading Counsel for the Claimants, Mr Phillips KC, explained at case management hearing on 27th October 2025:
“So we really do sue Cape as a last resort because these product liability claims are not as straightforward, as you’ll appreciate, as the employment claims…”
And “...they are certainly not bog standard mesothelioma claims.”[7]The Claimants’ case is that the Defendants were negligent because they failed to;(1) give any or sufficient warning of the dangers involved in the use of Asbestolux without adequate precautions, such as the wearing of suitable and sufficient respiratory protection;(2) withdraw the product from the market sooner; or(3) manufacture and supply a non-asbestos alternative before 1976.

Proceedings

[8]The proceedings were issued on 7 July 2025.[9]The total value of the claims was said to be £2.1 million.[10]There was a hearing on 27th October 2025. Mr Phillips KC explained to the Master Eastman (a very experienced Master and one of the four Masters who take the Asbestos List cases) that the Claimants were not seeking judgment at the show cause stage and had taken the deliberate decision not to disclose witness statements as they wanted simultaneous exchange after disclosure. Unusually the Master decided that the costs should be the subject of costs case management (a step that he stated he had not taken before in an asbestos case) as he did not want costs “running all over the place”. The hearing was adjourned without full directions having been given.[11]There can be no doubt that following this hearing the Master was well aware of the fact that the claims were not standard mesothelioma employer liability cases and that there was no precedent for product liability claims involving asbestos.[12]Before the further case management hearing on 16th December 2025 the Claimants sought a direction that the trial estimate should be 15 days whereas the Defendants proposed 5 days. That dispute is at the heart of this appeal.

The Hearing

[13]At the outset of the hearing the Master was informed that there were only two matters in dispute as regards directions; the exchange of schedules and the trial length.[14]Ms Akram had produced a trial timetable extending to 15 days broken down as follows:(a) Two days reading in(b) Two days lay witness evidence(c) Six days evidence from the two liability experts(d) A one day break(e) Four days of submissions[15]The Master started by expressing the view this 15 day time estimate was “with the greatest of respect, ridiculous”.[16]Ms Akram who appeared for the Claimants at that hearing referred to the case of Wormleighton (KB-2024-000425) which she submitted involved very similar issues, involved four Claimants and was listed by Mrs Justice Hill for 10 days and that “No High Court Judge would thank us for trying to rush the claim”[17]The Master noted that it was unlikely the Court would hear evidence on exposure from a living Claimant, so there would be no cross-examination upon the usual issues in contested employers liability exposure cases (the case of the sole living Claimant has now settled). So the Master indicated that in his view there would be little to challenge in the liability statements.[18]Ms Akram stated that the Claimant intended to call 5 other witnesses to cover the general knowledge concerning asbestos of those working in the building trade at the time. As I have set out these witness statements were not before the Master. As it has transpired only four witness statements have been served to cover this issue with two having accompanying Civil Evidence Act notices. These statements are not in the Appeal bundle.[19]Mr Lindsey, the solicitor with conduct of the claims on behalf of the Defendants gave his overview of the likely lay witness evidence at trial (liability and quantum); “What the claimants do is they call other random people who have no connection to these litigants to describe their exposure to Asbestolux. That evidence is of almost no value at all, it’s not going to involve lengthy cross-examination because their experience of the material is not relevant to the individual claim. So, to suggest that that would take three days is it’s just it’s a day, I would suggest. And as to quantum, the reality is on quantum that that’s unlikely to take up much time at all because quantum will gravitate towards a number of distinct issues. And some of the issues are unlikely to be controversial at all. So, quantum is unlikely to take up much time. Where the claimants appear to have become excessive in there, particularly excessive, is theengineering expert evidence. My friend ran through a whole list of issues, but in fact, they're not issues that are controversial. The question of whether soffits or whether Asbestolux was used for soffits and in what percentage, the experts are likely to agree on that. The experts are likely to agree on certain aspects of data knowledge. And in that respect, it's particularly notable Judge,that all of these six claimants, all of them were exposed to asbestos after 1965. So, the data knowledge arguments that might have been raised in earlier cases have been largelyextinguished by Maguire v Harland & Wolff Plc. All the claimants, apart from one, were exposed to asbestos after the asbestos regulations 1969. But the question of data knowledge is largely extinguished here. The experts are likely to agree on most of the aspects of this case. The controversial issues outstanding really are that which relates to the parent company control andwhether there was, as between the parent companies, a difference of knowledge. And inparticular, the question about whether there's contributory negligence. But that isn't going to takesix days, I would suggest it's only at most going to take two days because the experts largely, as with quantum, they tend to gravitate to a number of key areas. And I would suspect the experts in this case would largely agree about a great deal of aspects of this case. Again, on the question of submissions, the claimants put three days for defendants’ submissions and three days for the claimants submissions. That just seems to me to be excessive by a significant extent. And as you’ve indicated, indeed, as happened in the previous cases involving these issues, judgments reserved the parties filed detailed submissions in advance. And I would suggest it was unlikely to take more than a day for submissions in these cases. So, the 15-day time estimate just seems wholly excessive, frankly. We suggest five days…”[20]Ms Akram challenged Mr Lindsay’s overview and pointed out the limited extent of the concessions in the defence as regards date of knowledge at paragraph 11:
“(d) To the extent that there was knowledge that low levels of exposure to asbestos dust gave rise to a foreseeable risk of mesothelioma, knowledge to that effect was not available until the mid 1960s at the earliest. (e) To the extent that such knowledge was available, it was understood to be a consequence of exposure to crocidolite. Any risk of injury to health from the use of Asbestolux (which did not contain crocidolite at any time) in a construction industry setting was neither understood nor known at the material time and so not reasonably foreseeable.”
Mr Akram described the paragraphs as “not an admission. It’s carefully drafted by very experienced folk”.[21]Mr Lindsey said of his estimate; “… we suggested five days, I’ll accept that that would be a squeeze, frankly. But then 15 days we would be sitting around by the end, but it impacts upon the later discussions today on the question of costs, which is why perhaps we need to try and hone it down to something quite accurate.”[22]The Master ordered that the Claimants jointly and the Defendants jointly each have permission to rely on the expert evidence of a single occupational hygienist or engineer (with permission to give evidence at trial). The Master provided no provision for the Defendants to obtain medical evidence, but the facility to ask Part 35 questions. He did not give permission for the medical experts to give oral evidence.[23]The Master determined that the trial should be 8 days broken down as follows:(a) Lay witness – 2 days(b) Expert evidence – 3 days(c) Submissions – 3 days[24]His reasoning was as follows:
“ I am quite satisfied that 15 days, as I said at the outset, is a ridiculous time estimate, Ms Akram. Things will shake down before this gets anywhere near trial, particularly in respect of what the experts are going to be arguing about. I am not satisfied that three days is going to be needed for lay witness evidence. The quantum side of this case is the least important and he least difficult, and I rather suspect that quantum subject to liability will end up being pretty near admitted by the time it gets to trial. In my experience, that is what happens in these cases. I do not think that a total of six days, sorry, one, two, three, four, five days is needed for the experts to be cross-examined. At the end of the day, what this case is ultimately arguing about is the old chestnut about whether the parent company bears responsibility for companies further down the food chain within the group. That is what this is about; it is the same story we have heard within asbestos litigation before. I do not accept either that five days of submissions are going to be needed at the end of it to get this through to a trial. I think 15 days is quite out of order, frankly. I have been trying to work out what I think is the right time estimate allowing to do justice to this trial. I am quite satisfied that lay witness evidence can be dealt with in two days or probably less in my judgment, experts at three at the most. Submissions either side, bearing in mind that there will be lengthy, no doubt, and comprehensively written submissions. Maybe a total of three days. I do not need to build in a day for pre-reading as part of the trial, that gives me eight days and that is what I am going to allow. I am not going to allow 15 days, so the trial estimate will be eight days.”
[25]As I have already indicated since the application for leave to appeal was made the case of Monk has settled. Four (not five) witness statements have been served in relation to general knowledge in the industry and disclosure has been given by the Defendants (there has been no disclosure by the Claimants). Ms Adams indicated that disclosure consisted of 103 documents; which ran to a “several thousand” pages.[26]I turn to the grounds of appeal. They can be briefly put;

Ground 1

[27]The learned judge was wrong to base the trial estimate on the assumption that the issues in dispute would narrow significantly and that no judicial pre-reading would be required. There was no basis to assume that the Defendants would, before trial, concede issues which had been clearly identified as in dispute in the Defence.

Ground 2

[28]The learned judge was wrong to allow just eight days given the evidence to be heard/matters to be determined.

Submissions

[29]Mr Steinberg KC submitted that the Master made a fundamental error as to the nature and extent of the issues which would need to be determined at trial. He argued that the only occasion on which similar issues have been tried by an English Court was in the course of the six-week ‘Concept 70’ trial in 2017 which settled before judgment. In Cape Intermediate Holdings v Dring [2019] UKSC 38, Lady Hale gave a brief history of that case:
“3. Cape Intermediate Holdings Ltd ("Cape") is a company that was involved in the manufacture and supply of asbestos. In January and February 2017, it was the defendant in a six-week trial in the Queen's Bench Division before Picken J. The trial involved two sets of proceedings, known as the "PL claims" and the "CDL claim", but only the PL claims are relevant to this appeal. In essence, these were claims brought against Cape by insurers who had written employers' liability policies for employers. The employers had paid damages to former employees who had contracted mesothelioma in the course of their employment. The employers, through their insurers, then claimed a contribution from Cape on the basis that the employees had been exposed at work to asbestos from products manufactured by Cape. It was alleged that Cape had been negligent in the production of asbestos insulation boards; that it knew of the risks of asbestos and had failed to take steps to make those risks clear; indeed, that it obscured, understated and unfairly qualified the information that it had, thus providing false and misleading reassurance to employers and others. Cape denied all this and alleged that the employers were solely responsible to their employees, that it did publish relevant warnings and advice, and that any knowledge which it had of the risks should also have been known to the employers. 4. Voluminous documentation was produced for the trial. Each set of proceedings had its own hard copy "core bundle", known as Bundle C, which contained the core documents obtained on disclosure and some documents obtained from public sources. The PL core bundle amounted to over 5,000 pages in around 17 lever arch files. In addition, there was a joint Bundle D, only available on an electronic platform, which contained all the disclosed documents in each set of proceedings... 5. After the trial had ended, but before judgment was delivered, the PL claims were settled by a consent order dated 14 March 2017 and sealed on 17 March 2017. The CDL claim was also settled a month later, before judgment.”
[30]Mr Steinberg KC argued that very similar issues arise in these claims and it is anticipated that a similar volume of documents, both disclosed and publicly available, will be relied upon by the parties. The only other relevant case, Wormleighton, had been listed for a 10-day preliminary issue trial on liability in January 2025.[31]He also argued that it is apparent from the pleadings that the following key issues are in dispute:(1) Each of the Claimants is put to proof as to whether the Deceased were exposed to asbestos as alleged (see Defence para 10);(2) The Defendants do not agree that the Deceased worked with Asbestolux and instead allege the name was used as a generic term to describe asbestos insulation boards which were not manufactured by the First Defendant or its subsidiaries (see Defence para 2);(3) The First Defendant denies that it owed a duty of care to the Deceased in respect of Asbestolux because it was a product manufactured by its subsidiaries (see Defence paras 4 to 9 and para 17);(4) The Defendants’ date of knowledge as to the risks of asbestos exposure is not agreed – the Court will be required to determine when the Defendants knew that exposure to asbestos, in particular amosite, as a result of working with Asbestolux was unsafe and gave rise to a significant risk of fatal injury (see Defence paras 11, as set out above and 12-16);(5) Whether suitable and sufficient respiratory protection was required to safely work with Asbestolux (see Defence para 14);(6) The Defendants allege contributory negligence (see Defence paras 17 and 21);(7) The Defendants allege that the Deceased’s employers failed to comply with their own obligations as to their health and safety (see Defence paras 17 and 21);(8) The Defendants deny breach of duty, in particular there is a dispute as to whether the Defendants were required to warn of the dangers involved in the use of Asbestolux and whether the Cape group provided such warnings (see Defence para 19);(9) Whether the Defendants should have manufactured and supplied a non-asbestos alternative insulation board before 1976 (see PoC para 53).[32]Mr Steinberg KC argued that the Appellant’s concern was as articulated in Hua She Asset Management v(1) Kei Kin Hung(2) Sparkle Roll Capital [2023] EWHC 2445 (Comm) where His Honour Judge Pelling KC stated that an under estimate for a hearing (which that case resulted in a last minute adjournment) “…is unacceptable too because underestimates of this sort are likely to lead to attempts to cram within an inadequate time limit a vast amount of submission delivered in a manner which will border on unfairness and possibly even result in unfairness.”[33]Mr Steinberg KC also argued that the Master fell into error by refusing to allow any time for pre-reading, despite the clear indication to the Court that the volume of documentation would be substantial and the skeleton arguments and expert reports are likely to be lengthy. He relied on the guidance of the Judges in Charge of the Commercial Court and the London Circuit Commercial Court, dated 28 September 2020: “We write to raise an issue regarding the noticeable increase in both courts in the number of applications and trials for which inaccurate reading and hearing time estimates have been provided. This is an issue which previous judges in charge have raised; it has again become a real concern. The lists are always very busy and judges have very limited time available. Inaccurate time estimates adversely impact the ability of judges to deal efficiently and fairly with listed business - both as regards the case in question and other court users' cases. They are unfair on those litigants who do provide accurate time estimates. We would therefore like to highlight the following points:  Pre-reading: Estimates need to assume that:(i) the judge is not familiar with the case and(ii) this reading will allow them to gain an understanding of the issues. Facts and arguments cannot be absorbed at a "skim read" pace. … A realistic approach needs to be taken to what is to be covered in the hearing time, the pace at which documents/authorities can be taken and the time needed for oral argument on the issues raised. We would therefore like to highlight the following points:

 Pre-reading:

[34]This note was followed by a revision to the Commercial court Guide which now states; D.16.1 At the Case Management Conference an estimate will be made of the minimum and maximum lengths of the trial (inclusive of reading time). The estimate should be set having regard to the requirements of a trial timetable (J5.4(b)). The trial estimate will appear in the pre-trial timetable and will be the basis on which a date for trial will be fixed. … D.16.3 A confirmed estimate of the minimum and maximum lengths of the trial, signed by the advocates who are to appear at the trial, should be attached to the pre-trial checklist. D.16.4 The provisional estimate and (after it is given) the confirmed estimate must be kept under review by the advocates who are to appear at the trial. If at any stage an estimate needs to be revised, a signed revised estimate (whether agreed or not) should be submitted by the advocates to the Commercial Court Listing Office.[35]Mr Steinberg KC said that the Appellants were also conscious of repeated warnings from the courts of the need for realistic time estimates, see e.g. Breeze v Chief Constable of Norfolk [2025] EWHC 2684 (KB); in which I stated; “Before, and also at the outset of the trial, I expressed my concern about the parties’ inadequate assessment of the amount of the reading in time required. I was given unmanageable reading lists in a case which was, not surprisingly given the age of its subject matter, heavily document driven. Fortunately I was able to create some additional reading time within the trial time estimate, but it was still inadequate. This meant that throughout, and after, the hearings I have still been reading documents with a consequential knock on effect on time available for other cases (during a long trial issues arise in relation to other cases which have to be addressed and other cases need to be listed after it ends) and also other judicial work. The parties are required to help the Court to further the overriding objective which includes allotting to their case an appropriate share of the court’s resources, while taking into account the need to allot resources to other cases. To comply with this duty parties must be realistic and give early and accurate assessments about required reading in time.”[36]As regards the need for a break to be built into the timetable Mr Steinberg KC referred to the comment of Mr Justice Garnham in Abbott & others -v-MOD [2026] EWHC 941 after hearing test cases and a number of generic issues in claims for Noise Induced Hearing Loss claims by Claimants who had been in the military; In future group litigation in disease cases, particularly those with a greater number of test cases, it seems to me essential that adequate provision is made in the timetable not only for the consideration of each test case and each generic issue, but also for breaks to enable the parties to present the evidence properly and for the Court to analyse it as the matter proceeds. There will be cases where an issue-by-issue process, with submissions and rulings on each, might prove most advantageous.[37]In helpful and focussed submissions on behalf of the Defendant Ms Adams KC, argued that the Master’s decision was well within his discretion. All the arguments advanced by Mr Steinberg had been put to the Master and he was well aware of the issues between the parties. The facts and issues in the present case was not on all fours with those in Concept 70 which concerned indemnity issues in relation to policies and between insurers.[38]Ms Adams KC submitted that in Wormleighton there had been a significant measure of agreement between the experts. Also that regard must be had in the present case to the dates of exposure which were post the mid 1960s with statutory regulation before Parliament in May 1969 although the regulation only came into force a year later.

Analysis

[39]The Court has a very wide discretion in relation to case management decisions and a party applying for permission to appeal from such a decision must cross a high threshold. In Royal Sun Alliance-v-T& N [2002] EWCA Civ 1964;

Lord Justice Chadwick stated:

“37…As I have said, we indicated in the course of the hearing that we were minded to grant both applications for permission to appeal. We were reminded, properly, by counsel for T & N that these are appeals from case management decisions made in the exercise of his discretion by a judge who, because of his involvement in the case over time, had an accumulated knowledge of the background and the issues which this Court would be unable to match. The judge was in the best position to reach conclusions as to the future course of the proceedings. An appellate court should respect the judge's decisions. It should not yield to the temptation to “second guess” the judge in a matter peculiarly within his province. 38..I accept, without reservation, that this Court should not interfere with case management decisions made by a judge who has applied the correct principles, and who has taken into account the matters which should be taken into account and left out of account matters which are irrelevant, unless satisfied that the decision is so plainly wrong that it must be regarded as outside the generous ambit of the discretion entrusted to the judge. It is pertinent to have in mind, in the present case, that the judge was well aware of the need for caution when considering whether to direct a trial of issues on assumed facts; and was well aware that there were dangers in the course which he decided to take. The judge appreciated that there was a risk that his decision would lead to delay and to wasted costs. If his approach to the evaluation of the risk was correct, I would not think it right to substitute my own view for the conclusion that he reached.”
[40]That there may be additional factors to be taken into account when considering an appeal from a case management decision is reflected with CPR PD 52A: Appeal in relation to case management decision 4.6 Where the application is for permission to appeal from a case management decision, the court dealing with the application may take into account whether –(a) the issue is of sufficient significance to justify the costs of an appeal;(b) the procedural consequences of an appeal (e.g. loss of trial date) outweigh the significance of the case management decision;(c) it would be more convenient to determine the issue at or after trial. Case management decisions include decisions made under rule 3.1(2) and decisions about disclosure, filing of witness statements or experts’ reports, directions about the timetable of the claim, adding a party to a claim and security for costs. However, given that this is a rolled up hearing none of these factors now applies in this appeal.

Appeal in relation to case management decision

[41]This case has now been given a hearing date of 8th March 2027. The practical effect of the appeal were it to be successful and the trial length extended to 10 days or more, and then relisted in the ordinary way, would be a further delay of 6-9 months (as at 1st April the HMCTS website set out that a trial of up to 10 days to 4 weeks could be accommodated in the window 4 October 2027 to 21 December 2027).[42]When assessing the trial length at a case management hearing the starting point is CPR 1 which sets out the overriding objective of enabling the Court to deal with cases justly and at proportionate cost Subsection (2) provides, as is relevant for this appeal: (2) Dealing with a case justly and at proportionate cost includes, so far as is practicable – .. (b) saving expense; (c) dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate –(i) to the amount of money involved;(ii) to the importance of the case;(iii) to the complexity of the issues; … (d) ensuring that it is dealt with expeditiously and fairly; (e) allotting to it an appropriate share of the court’s resources, while taking into account the need to allot resources to other cases; f) promoting or using alternative dispute resolution;[43]CPR 1.3 provides that the parties are required to help the court to further the overriding objective. CPR 1.4 provides that The court must further the overriding objective by actively managing cases which includes: “(a) encouraging the parties to co-operate with each other in the conduct of the proceedings; (b) identifying the issues at an early stage; (c) deciding promptly which issues need full investigation and trial and accordingly disposing summarily of the others; (d) deciding the order in which issues are to be resolved; … (f) helping the parties to settle the whole or part of the case; (g) fixing timetables or otherwise controlling the progress of the case; (h) considering whether the likely benefits of taking a particular step justify the cost of taking it; ... (l) giving directions to ensure that the trial of a case proceeds quickly and efficiently.[44]A trial date not only sets the amount of the limited resources of the Court to be allocated to the claim, which necessarily requires a consideration of proportionality and the effect on other court users, it is also a basis for assessing a proper budget.[45]The touchstone when estimating trial length is realism as to what will need to be determined. This will often necessarily involve not only judgment upon what is known, but also an element of educated guesswork. If trial lengths were to be fixed on the basis that every conceivable issue between the parties that has arisen on the pleadings, or could arise, will be fully fought out then there would be likely to be considerable over-estimates as a matter of course and consequential delay across the civil Court system.[46]It need not be expressly stated by a Judge faced with the setting of a trial length that he/she recognises that providing a lesser amount of time than that requested may risk injustice and that a trial length which is too short can cause very significant difficulties (and even to the trial date being vacated) any more than it needs to be stated that by providing a shorter trial the Court may ensure the case is resolved quicker, proportionately and more efficiently as minds are focussed on using the time available. Such factors are so well understood that they do not require to be set out.[47]A very large part of the rationale behind the retention of asbestos litigation in the Royal Courts of Justice (and the designated list) is the experience of the Masters in this specialised field. This Master is highly experienced and sought to bring that experience to bear to achieve the aims of the overriding objective.[48]It seems clear that the Master took into consideration:(a) That cross-examination of the Claimant’s lay witnesses as to liability issues was likely to be limited given that they gave no direct evidence of working conditions.(b) He had given no provision for the Defendants to obtain, or the Claimants to adduce oral evidence from, medical experts.(c) That liability issues were likely to narrow given the long history of asbestos litigation and the issues that have already been decided in other cases.(d) A very high proportion of quantum issues are compromised.(e) That the trial judge will have read the papers and is likely to wish to dispense with an opening address of any length.(f) The trial estimate did not have time built in for consideration and delivering of an extempore judgment. This was an obviously sensible approach given the nature and extent of the issues to be covered if the case remained contested.[49]Mr Steinberg KC’s submissions focused on (c) and to a lesser extent (d). He submitted that the Master fell into error by:(1) Failing to take into account that these cases are atypical.(2) Failing to adequately take into account the issues on the pleadings.(3) Making unreasonable assumptions.[50]I do not accept that the Master fell into error because he failed to recognise that the case was atypical for cases in the Asbestos list. He well knew it was as this was the first time (in his many years as a Master) he had cost budgeted an asbestos claim. He was also very well aware of what the issues were on the basis of the pleadings as he was taken to them.[51]In my view the gravamen of Mr Steinberg KC’s submissions was that in the exercise of his wide discretion the Master made assumptions as to the liability issues which would remain to be determined at trial; including “the same old chestnut” about corporate responsibility, which he was not entitled to make given what was in dispute on the pleadings, that the case was without precedent and what had happened in the Concept 70 case. The root cause may have been familiarity bias and/or simply a failure to engage with the extent of the issues. In any event his approach was wrong and affected the exercise of his discretion.[52]In my Judgment there was no fundamental error in the Master’s approach and he was entitled to view Concept 70 and Wormleightoncases, whilst helpful guides, as far from exact templates. Indeed had the Claimants believed that to be the case with the former they would have a requested an even longer trial given that the trial lasted 30 days.[53]It was an entirely reasonable approach for the Master to adopt, given his experience managing Asbestos cases; albeit that this was an atypical one, to assume that the areas of dispute between the experts were likely to narrow given the number of reports, articles and decided case that have established core facts in relation to the percentage composition of products, exposure levels and date of knowledge (a fortiori given that this case concerns exposure after mid 1960s). As a result he was properly able to proceed on the basis that arguments/evidence upon the issues which remained in dispute could be fully presented with an 8 day trial.[54]Further as determination of the remaining issues in the case is highly likely to be very largely document driven the Master was entitled to assume, and factor into his assessment, that that those documents would be carefully marshalled by the experts and the respective teams of lawyers pre trial. To the extent that this impacted on pre-reading the Master was not dealing with that issue. The Master did not say that reading in time was not necessary; rather he stated “I do not need to build in the day for pre-reading as part of the trial”. The Master clearly envisaged that reading time would be addressed at a future stage. Mr Steinberg KC referred to the practice in the commercial Court. However the Commercial Court Guide does not apply to Kings Bench Cases such as this. Reading in time will ordinarily be a matter for a PTR, or pre-trial correspondence if there is no PTR. It is for the parties to assist the Court in this regard.[55]The Master’s approach to quantum issues was also a reasonable approach which was properly open to him. The issues raised are not unusual in these types of case. Also I have no doubt that the Master had in mind that in a worst case scenario the trial could proceed solely to determine liability issues (so the 8 days would not be wasted). With some hesitation Mr Steinberg KC suggested that 10 days (net of reading in time) may be sufficient for liability alone.[56]Indeed given the additional length of time it would have taken for a significantly longer case to be listed there may well not be any additional delay in recovery if the trial proceeds only on liability issues on the current date if the outstanding quantum issues could be listed quickly after judgment before the same Judge rather than taking their place in the general list.[57]In my view the Master was clearly entitled to take a holistic view of matters and factor in the likelihood of issues narrowing and that the time allowed would allow the cases to be properly presented. He did not fail to take any relevant factors into account. He did not adopt the Defendants’ suggestion of 5 days and clearly carefully weighed up the relevant factors before arriving at an 8 day estimate excluding reading in time; as opposed to the 13 days requested by the Claimants net of reading in time. It is not for me to substitute my view; rather, mindful of what was stated in Chadwick LJ in Royal Sun Alliance-v-T& N to consider whether the Master acted outside the generous ambit of his discretion. In my Judgment he did not.[58]As it has transpired there are now five and not six Claimants (one claim having settled) and only four witnesses statements have been served in relation to industry knowledge (22 statements were served in all with 11 in relation to liability).[59]I grant permission to appeal, but as a result of the matters set out above the Appeal fails on the grounds advanced.[60]There is however one aspect of the order where my view differs from the Master. Given the arguments before him as to trial length, the potential scope of the issues and also the need for a realistic assessment of required reading in time it is my view that there should be a Pre-Trial review in this case. At the PTR consideration can be given as to whether it is necessary to hive off quantum issues.