Health and Home (Essex) Limited v Essex County Council & Ors [2026] EWHC 1247 (KB)

[2026] EWHC 1247 (KB)Case No KB-2025-003443
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 22/05/2026
Before
MASTER SULLIVAN
Between
(1) Health and Home (Essex) LimitedClaimantsAndreas StavrinidesClaimant(3) Decolace Properties LtdClaimant(1) Essex County CouncilDefendants(2) Southend City CouncilDefendant(3) Care Quality CommissionDefendant(5) Lynn ScottDefendantSue EastDefendant(7) Karen PetersDefendant(8) Simon GriffithsDefendant(9) Jane NorrisDefendantGeorgia ChimbariDefendant(11) Emma BundyDefendant(12) Alison ClarkDefendant(13) Adella MartinDefendantLouise Broddle LoDefendant(15) Anne LewisDefendant(16) Debbie GreenDefendant(17) Victoria RoseDefendantGemma JacksonDefendant(19) Micelle LoveDefendant
Mr Deacon (instructed by SBP Law) for First ClaimantMr Bithell (instructed by Essex County Council) for First DefendantMr Holborn (instructed by Southend City Council) for Second DefendantMr Waite (instructed by Kennedys) for Third DefendantHearing Hearing dates: 23 March 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 2pm on 22 May 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................MASTER SULLIVAN

Master Sullivan :

[1]The First and Second Defendants have made applications for strike out and/or for summary judgment in respect of the claims.[2]Health and Home (Essex) Limited (“Health and Home”) was, at the relevant times, a provider of care homes for people with mental health problems and dementia. It operated four different care homes. Mr Stavrinides is a director of Health and Home and the Third Claimant. The Third Claimant is a company registered in the British Virgin Islands which owns the care home properties.[3]Essex County Council (“Essex”) and Southend City Council (“Southend”) have duties to provide care for certain people in need. They can do so through placements in care homes run by the council or in care homes such as those run by Health and Home. The Care Quality Commission (“CQC”) is the regulator for care homes.[4]The individuals named as the 4th to 19th Defendants work for either Essex, Southend or CQC. Insofar as they remain defendants, representations were made on their behalf by their employers and I do not deal with them separately.

Relevant procedural history

[5]The claim was issued in the Commercial Court on 31 March 2025. The claim form was not served on the fourth, sixth, seventh, tenth, and 14th to 19th Defendants. Health and Home made an application for an extension of time to serve those Defendants which was refused by Mr Justice Jacobs on 5 August 2025. Those Defendants therefore play no part in these proceedings.[6]The claim was transferred to the King’s Bench Division by order dated 5 August 2025.[7]The claim form was served by Health and Home on the other defendants but I have found that they were not served by Mr Stavrinides or the Third Claimant at all and I have refused an application for retrospective permission for alternative service in an extempore judgment prior to the hearing of the strike out applications. Therefore Mr Stavrinides’ claims, in his own capacity, and the Third Claimant’s claims fall away.[8]The CQC has not made any application, but it is common ground that if the claims against Essex and Southend are struck out, or summary judgment is given in their favour, the claim against the CQC, must fail on the same grounds. The CQC made submissions during the hearing.[9]The application by Essex was issued on 11 September 2025. It is for strike out or alternatively an order staying proceedings. Southend’s application was made on 1 December 2025 and is for strike out or summary judgment.

Summary of the claims

[10]Health and Home bring a number of claims against the Defendants. Against Essex, a claim in contract that sums owed for services provided have not been paid (a claim for approximately £430,000), against Southend a claim for fees due in the sum of approximately £9,500 and against all Defendants claims in lawful, and unlawful means conspiracy, misfeasance in public office, and tort.[11]In outline, Health and Home’s case is that in the period from 2019 to 2022, Essex, Southend and the CQC, acting through the other named Defendants, conspired to raise false safeguarding alerts against the Claimant’s care homes, which they then did not properly investigate, in order to take enforcement action against Health and Home and effectively shut down the care homes. The total claim against Essex is in excess of £1.7 million. The claims against the other Defendants are also for substantial sums.[12]The Defendants’ position is that the claim as pleaded does not set out the factual matters required for the causes of action of lawful/unlawful means conspiracy and misfeasance in public office to be made out, and no other tortious claims are made out. They further submit that in the absence of any pleading or matters to show that those defects could be made good, and the time that has passed since the applications were made, no further opportunity should be given.[13]The claims in contract are on the basis that Health and Home in fact provided care to residents for which Essex and Southend have failed to pay.[14]The Defendants apply to strike out on the basis that the claim has not been pleaded properly. Alternatively, Essex seeks a stay of this part of the claim. A similar claim was made against Essex, again initially issued in the commercial court but transferred to the county court in 2022; Claim no K00CM285. That claim was struck out on 13 December 2024 and Health and Home were ordered to pay Essex’s costs of £16,500 by 10 January 2025. Those costs remain unpaid. Essex seeks a stay until the cost are paid.[15]Southend’s application for summary judgment is in addition on the basis that it had a contractual right to move its residents from the care homes run by Health and Home at any time, and no contractual obligation to place them in those homes, and there is no realistic prosect of proving otherwise.[16]Mr Deacon on behalf of Health and Home accepts that the pleadings need some amendments but submits there is enough in them that is pleaded correctly to make out the causes of action. He submits that these are serious allegations against regulatory bodies and I should therefore be circumspect before striking them out. In respect of misfeasance there are factual disputes as to the state of mind of the officers, which are matters quintessentially for trial.[17]Mr Deacon also identifies in his skeleton that there is a claim for breach of duty including failure to follow proper safeguarding/legal processes, acting irrationally or disproportionality and in breach of statutory and common law duties and complaints about inspections, safeguarding and funding decisions. It is pleaded that the Defendants owed duties under the Care Act in paragraph 10 of the particulars of claim. It is accepted there is no Caparo analysis dealing with foreseeability, proximity and whether it is fair just and reasonable. Essex and Southend had not identified any claim in breach of duty in their analysis. The CQC deny that they, as an independent statutory regulator, can owe any private law duty to the Claimant. The Law 18. Strike out

The Law

[18]There is no real issue between the parties on the law. In respect of strike out, the issue is whether the claim discloses a reasonable cause of action. In assessing whether it does, I should take the Claimant’s pleading at its highest, that is to say that the facts pleaded are made out. If it does not disclose a reasonable cause of action, I must consider whether to allow amendments to make good any defects. I should not do so if there is no basis on which to consider that the defects can be made good. Summary judgment[19]In respect of summary judgment, the test is that set out in Easy Air v Opal Telecom Ltd [2009] EWHC 339(Ch); the question is whether a claim has a realistic as opposed to fanciful prospect of success. A realistic claim is one that carries some degree of conviction. I must not conduct a mini trial in reaching my conclusion. I must take into account the evidence in the application and evidence that can reasonably be expected to be available at trial. On the other hand I need not take the evidence before me without analysis; it may be that there is no real substance to factual assertions made particularly if contradicted by contemporaneous documents. Unlawful means conspiracy[20]In order to succeed in a claim for unlawful means conspiracy, a claimant must prove(i) an agreement or combination between a defendant and one or more others,(ii) an intention to injure the claimant, which need not be the predominant intention,(iii) unlawful acts carried out pursuant to the agreement or combination as a means to injure the claimant, and(iv) causing loss to the claimant.[21]It is not unusual that there is no direct evidence of the agreement or combination or the intention to injure– it would be a poor set of conspirators who noted their conspiracy in a memo and left it to be found by the victim of the conspiracy, and so the agreement and intention to injure can be inferred. Lawful means conspiracy[22]In lawful means conspiracy, the combination must be to effect an unlawful object (by lawful means) and injury to the claimant must be the predominant purpose. Misfeasance in public office[23]The legal elements of the tort of misfeasance in public office are that the defendant must be a public officer and have exercised power as a public officer. They must have so acted with malice or bad faith either with the intention of harming the claimant or being aware of the risk of such injury, or without the honest belief that their conduct was lawful (untargeted malice). The conduct must have caused the claimant material injury or damage of a sort foreseen by the defendant. The claimant must prove that the defendant must have reasonably known their conduct was unlawful or that they were subjectively reckless as to unlawfulness and that the defendant had knowledge of probability of damage. Pleading of conspiracy and misfeasance[24]The requirements for pleading dishonesty are set out in Sofer v Swiss Independent Trustees SA [2020]EWCA civ 699 (see 23-24):
“(i) Fraud or dishonesty must be specifically alleged and sufficiently particularised, and will not be sufficiently particularised if the facts alleged are consistent with innocence: Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No.3) [2003] 2 AC 1.” (ii) Dishonesty can be inferred from primary facts, provided that those primary facts are themselves pleaded. There must be some fact which tilts the balance and justifies an inference of dishonesty, and this fact must be pleaded: Three Rivers at [186] (Lord Millett). (iii) The claimant does not have to plead primary facts which are only consistent with dishonesty. The correct test is whether or not, on the basis of the primary facts pleaded, an inference of dishonesty is more likely than one of innocence or negligence: JSC Bank of Moscow v Kekhman [2015] EWHC 3073 (Comm) at [20]-[23] (Flaux J, as he then was). (iv) Particulars of dishonesty must be read as a whole and in context: Walker v Stones [2001] QB 902 at 944B (Sir Christopher Slade). 24. To these principles there should be added the following general points about particulars: (i) The purpose of giving particulars is to allow the defendant to know the case he has to meet: Three Rivers at [185]-[186]; McPhilemy v Times Newspapers Ltd [1999] 3 All ER 775 at 793B (Lord Woolf MR) (ii)When giving particulars, no more than a concise statement of the facts relied upon is required: McPhilemy at 793B. (iii)Unless there is some obvious purpose to be served by fighting over the precise terms of a pleading, contests over their terms are to be discouraged: McPhilemy at 793D.”
[25]There was some reference to the impact of disclosure in cases such as this and the difficulty of pleading specific facts prior to disclosure. As Cockerill J (as she then was) stated in King v Steifel [2021 EWHC 1945 (Comm) at 368:
“Where particulars are required it is not permissible to avoid the need for giving particulars by saying that particulars will be given at a later stage.”
Warby J in Duchess of Sussex v Associated Newspapers [2020] EWHC 1058 (Ch), [2020] EMLR 21 stated, at [59]:
“The suggestion, …. that particulars cannot be provided or should not be expected until after disclosure is contrary to the long-standing principle that a party alleging misconduct must give particulars before obtaining disclosure (see, for instance, Zierenberg v Labouchere [1893] 2 Q.B. 183, 188 (Lord Esher MR)). It is also bad on the facts. The complaint has two aspects. The first is an allegation of improper conduct towards the claimant’s father. Such allegations should not be made, if the claimant cannot give details of what was done and when.”

The parties’ respective submissions on strike out

[26]The Defendants submitted that the claim should be struck out. The elements of the relevant claims were not made out. The claims for conspiracy and misconduct in public office are, if not claims of dishonesty, akin to such claims. Where inferences have to be drawn in such cases, they must be drawn from allegations of primary fact, and there are insufficient primary facts pleaded to do so in the claim.[27]In respect of the conspiracy claims, no facts relating to agreement or combination are pleaded. Simply stating, as the particulars of claim do, that the Defendants “ganged up” together is not enough. The fact that all were involved in the reporting of and investigation of safeguarding complaints is not enough where they have to do so as part of their statutory duties. For example, it is pleaded that the CQC embarked on a strategy of carrying out regular inspections of the care homes to support the actions taken by the Councils. The CQC’s functions require inspections. There is no pleading as to whether the inspections were lawful or unlawful and, if unlawful, why they were unlawful.[28]The Claimant pleads that Essex “raised or procured the issue of a number of false safeguarding alerts”. It is right that there is an allegation of falsity but not how the reports were false, who knew they were false and no information to give rise to an inference of conspiracy.[29]There is no pleading of facts which could form unlawful means. There are pleadings of a breach of contract, which could be unlawful means, but the Claimant has not pleaded what contractual terms were breached, and insofar as it is in relation to the non-payment of fees, a claim for that has been struck out. Essex’s position, which has been fully pleaded in a defence in that claim, is that they have paid.[30]Even if it is accepted that the payment of fees will be a term of the contract and that the allegation is that it has not been paid, there is no factual pleading as to how this founds the conduct element of conspiracy or misfeasance. The Defendants stopped paying fees when they cancelled the contract due to their safeguarding obligations.[31]For lawful means conspiracy there is no pleading that the sole or predominant purpose of any acts was to injure the Claimant. Paragraph 31 of the particulars of claim pleaded “as an extra pressure on the First Claimant to force him out of business…stopping payments to the First Claimant was the first part of their advanced and abusive strategy” (I note that the “they”, is the Councils). This is an assertion not a pleading of fact from which inferences can be drawn.[32]In respect of the misfeasance claims, the same conduct is complained of. When safeguarding complaints are raised, Essex and Southend have an obligation to investigate and refer to the CQC. The CQC has an obligation to consider those and take any necessary enforcement action. The individual employees do the acts to comply with statutory obligations. No facts have been pleaded on which misfeasance could be found as nothing is pleaded which is more likely to be dishonest than innocent.[33]The Claimant’s position is that there are sufficient facts pleaded. In a strike out application, the pleadings must be taken at face value and the allegations pleaded must be assumed to be factually correct. It was submitted that in paragraph 7 of the particulars of claim, it is pleaded that the 8th to 13th Defendants, staff members of Essex, were preparing false reports. Mr Deacon accepted the pleader will need to say in what respect they were false, but the pleading that they were should be accepted as true for the purposes of the application. It is pleaded that these actions caused harm to the Claimant and it is pleaded that the Defendants acted maliciously and knowingly in a conspiracy to inflict harm on the Claimants and in bad faith. That is the basis of a conspiracy to inflict harm. Paragraph 6 pleads the same for the staff of Southend.[34]It is said that paragraph 14 of the particulars of claim pleads that the Defendants were ganging up to cause harm to the Claimants, that is something from which the court can say there is pleading of conspiracy to injure and that injury is the predominant purpose of their action.[35]The pleading in paragraph 19 sets out that prior to investigating the safeguarding allegations, the Spot contract was cancelled for an improper purpose. The cancellation of the contracts followed by the removal of the residents shows an intention to injure. It is submitted that paragraph 20(a), which states that the removal of residents was without going through a proper process, is a fact from which conspiracy or malice could be inferred.[36]Paragraph 21 again pleads that the reports produced as a result of the inspection were flawed and relied on false and inaccurate information by the Councils. It is pleaded the inspections by CQC were not carried out as part of their duty and that is a fact on which the malice can be inferred.[37]The allegation in paragraph 26 that the Defendants prevented any admissions, which includes private admissions, into the care homes is a fact on which conspiracy and misfeasance can be inferred. Paragraph 28 pleads that the Defendants spread and passed on rumours that the care homes were shutting down. That is an allegation which, if proved, would support the claim.[38]Paragraph 78 of the particulars was described as a key allegation. Its states that “the First and Second Defendants deliberately, knowingly and intentionally produced false reports or reports based on flawed information for the purpose of causing harm and injuring the Claimants. The First and Second Defendants took decisions and actions against the interest of the Claimants knowing that the information they based their decisions is flawed”. Paragraph 81 pleads that “the Second Defendant is known to have been paying the care homes it owns and runs two or three times it has been paying independent providers such as the First Claimants.”[39]In respect of the CQC, paragraph 90 pleads that the team selected by CQC “was trained to manipulate with their findings and present a false and damming picture of the state of affairs of the service purported to be inspected.” Contract claim[40]Mr Deacon submits that the claim for fees due is a contract claim for the use of Health and Home’s services. The claim is that the residents were there and the Councils did not send the fees. It is not a claim which stands to be struck out. It is a freestanding contractual claim. Decision 42. The conspiracy and misfeasance claims.[41]It is clear that where a cause of action is based on fraud or dishonesty, which conspiracy and misfeasance claims are, the facts which are alleged to amount to the dishonesty must be pleaded. It is not permissible simply to assert that there was dishonesty, or that something was done dishonestly.

Decision

[42]The pleadings in respect of conspiracy and misfeasance as currently pleaded, in my judgment, do no more than make assertions of dishonesty. For example, the pleading that there were false safeguarding reports. That is an assertion, not a pleading of fact. There is no attempt to engage with which reports were false, when they were made, who they were made by, in what way they were false, or who knew they were false. In respect of those reports, Health and Home would have knowledge of the reports as it would have seen them at the time, and would therefore be able to particularise in what way they are said to be false.[43]The allegation that the contracts were cancelled without proper purpose does not deal with why the contract was terminated, why it was purported to be terminated and why that reason was either false or improper.[44]There is an allegation that the Defendants prevented private admissions to the homes. Which admissions were prevented, by what means and when? There is an allegation that the Second Defendant coerced families. Which families? Who did the coercing and in what form?[45]The Defendants are alleged to have spread and passed rumours to close the homes down. What rumours, who spread them and to whom were they spread?[46]CQC is alleged to have produced flawed reports, in what way were they flawed?[47]This issue permeates the pleadings. I reject the submission that as there has been a pleading of falsity, I must take that at face value for the purposes of the strike out application. The law is clear that the underlying facts on which an allegation of falsity is based must be pleaded.[48]In Mr Stavrinides’ third witness statement, he explains the purposes of a Part 18 request is to unearth facts which would show the fraudulent conspiracy. That is not the way in which the authorities approach the requirements of pleadings. The relevant primary facts must be pleaded, there is no proper basis to commence a claim as a fishing exercise.[49]There is in my judgment insufficient pleading of fact from which it can be inferred that any of the allegations of dishonesty have a real prospect of success. That flaw infects all of the elements of the conspiracy claims and the dishonesty aspects of misfeasance. As currently pleaded they are simply allegations with no factual foundation. Contract claims[50]In respect of the contract claims, there is no proper pleading setting out what the relevant terms of the contract were, when payment was due, when payments were not made in respect of particular service users, and why that is a breach of a particular term of the contract.[51]Paragraph 19 of the particulars pleads a denial that the “spot contract” was the contract between the parties, but asserts it was small part of the whole. It does not go on to plead what the full terms of the contract were. There are pleadings referring to various implied terms, but not by what means those were implied. The pleading of breach of contract is that the removal of residents was done without going through a proper process of cancelling the individual placement contract. There is no pleading of what the requirements for cancellation were said to be and what parts of those requirements were not complied with. The only relevant contractual term asserted is an implied term that termination could only take place if it was established that Health and Home were no longer able to manage the individual needs of the service user. There is no pleading as to why that term was to be implied and it is difficult to see what the basis of such an implied term would be.[52]That is especially so as the Defendants’ position is that there was a written contract (the spot contract which the Claimant appears to accept as part, or a small part of the whole, of the contractual terms) which includes a term that the Council may terminate the contract on 28 days notice. That was also the contractual term relied upon in the previous claim.[53]The schedule of payments due for services provided does not give sufficient information to identify which service user it is referring to. The sums are similar to, but not the same as, the sums claimed in respect of unpaid fees in the claim that was struck out. I understand there is an overlap in the figures. The previous claim did identify the amounts claimed by reference to each resident, but not the periods.[54]Insofar as the claim is made for payments for service in the future that were not made, the particulars of claim plead that there was no obligation on either Council to provide business to them. It cannot therefore have a real prospect of success.[55]In my judgment the contract claim is incoherent and discloses no reasonable cause of action. Tortious claim[56]As accepted by Mr Deacon, the claim for breach of duty does not properly identify the basis on which a duty of care was owed by the First and Second Claimants and what the scope of that duty might be. In respect of the Third Defendant, it is correct that they cannot owe a duty of care to Health and Home, who they regulate, to compensate for pure economic loss caused in the exercise of statutory functions. There is no real prospect of success in arguing against that proposition of law.

Should amendments be allowed?

[57]Mr Deacon was frank in accepting that the pleadings needed amendment. His submission was in the context of such serious allegations, time should be allowed to amend, and if in fact proper amendments could not be made, it was the claim would then fall to be struck out. I note Mr Deacon was only recently instructed and there is no criticism of him for not having prepared a draft amended pleading.[58]In respect of the contract claim, substantially the same claim was pleaded against Essex in K00CM285 which was struck out on 13 December 2024. I note that in the application for strike out, one of the bases for the application was that the pleadings did not set out the factual or legal basis for the claim. That had been pointed out in the defence and by the time of the application it was said 12 months had passed without the claimant trying to rectify the issue.[59]The same is said in this application. The application was made by Essex on 15th September 2025 and by Southend on 1 December 2025. No amended pleadings had been provided by the time of the hearing. No witness statement in response dealing with the factual matters that might be raised that would make the pleading good has been provided.[60]I also note that the Claimant also initially challenged the CQCs enforcement action in the First Tier Tribunal, but withdrew that appeal before it was heard. That was the first, and proper, forum to challenge the enforcement action and the Claimant chose not to do so.[61]Pleading fraud is a serious matter. It should only be done when there is proper evidence to do so. Given the history of this dispute, which includes a First Tier Tribunal in which allegations of dishonesty were made by Mr Stavrinides, the previous claim which was struck out and the time that has passed since the applications, which clearly set out the deficiencies in the pleadings, in my judgment it is not appropriate to allow another bite at the cherry of making such serious allegations.[62]I also have no basis on which to think the Claimant will be able to properly plead such allegations. The Claimant has already had two opportunities to plead the contractual claim properly and has not done so. I cannot see that there is a real prospect of any claim based on a duty of care being owed to the Claimant by the Defendants. There is no other good reason for the claim to continue.[63]In those circumstances the claim is struck out as having no real prospect of success and totally without merit.