Rochdale Metropolitan Borough Council v Persons Unknown [2026] EWHC 1214 (KB)

[2026] EWHC 1214 (KB)Case No QB-2017-005202
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 21/05/2026
Before
Mr Jeremy Brier KC
Between
ROCHDALE METROPOLITAN BOROUGH COUNCILClaimant(90) PERSONS UNKNOWN (BEING MEMBERS OF THE TRAVELLING COMMUNITY WHO HAVE UNLAWFULLY ENCAMPED WITHIN THE BOROUGH OF ROCHDALE)Defendants(93) PERSONS UNKNOWN forming unauthorised encampments in the Metropolitan Borough of RochdaleDefendant
Ms Natalie Pratt (instructed by Sharpe Pritchard) for ClaimantThe Defendants (persons unknown) being unrepresentedHearing Hearing date: 15 th May 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on Thursday 21 st May 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................

MR JEREMY BRIER KC (sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court):

[1]This is an application by the Claimant, Rochdale Metropolitan Borough Council (“the Borough” or “the Council”),for the renewal of a so-called “Traveller Injunction”, which seeks to prohibit unauthorised encampments and the depositing of waste on specified sites within the Borough (“the Application”).[2]The “Traveller Injunction” was first granted by Butcher J on 11 June 2024 (“the 2024 Injunction”) against, inter alios,the 90th and 93rd Defendants, each comprising a category of persons unknown (“Persons Unknown”). The 2024 Injunction against the Persons Unknown requires annual renewal.[3]The 2024 Injunction against the Persons Unknown was so renewed by Garnham J for 12 months by an Order dated 16 May 2025 (“the Injunction”). The Application now seeks further renewal, absent which the Injunction will expire at 00:00hrs on 8 June 2026.[4]The 2024 Injunction additionally bound 56 Named Defendants (“the Named Defendants”) for a period of 5 years, expiring on 7 June 2029. The Named Defendants thus remain bound by the 2024 Injunction and the Application is not in respect of them.

Service

[5]The Injunction is not borough-wide as against the Persons Unknown (although the 2024 Injunction is borough-wide against the Named Defendants). In relation to the Persons Unknown, the Injunction applies to 334 specified sites in the Borough which equates to approximately 9.7% of the land in the Borough.[6]The Borough rightly acknowledges that, following the decision of the Supreme Court in Wolverhampton City Council & Ors v London Gypsies and Travellers & Ors [2023] UKSC 47; [2024] 2 WLR 45 (“Wolverhampton”), an injunction against newcomer Persons Unknown is technically always sought and granted on a without notice basis (see [139] and [143](ii) of Wolverhampton).[7]There is, accordingly, an obligation to take all reasonable steps to draw the application and any order made to the attention of all those likely to be affected by it (see Wolverhamptonat [167(ii)] and [226-229]). This may include through lines of communication with Traveller and Gypsy communities and those representing them; along with attempting to give notice by such methods as email, social media, advertisements (Wolverhampton at [227]).[8]The Injunction specifically provides at paragraph 5 that, pursuant to CPR 6.26 and 6.27, it shall be deemed served on the Persons Unknown when a copy of the Injunction is affixed as a laminated copy or in a transparent envelope in a prominent position on all 334 sites defined therein. At paragraph 7 of the Injunction, it provides that any application for renewal of the Injunction and any evidence must be filed and served in accordance with paragraph 5 therein by 4pm on 24 April 2026.[9]Having reviewed the evidence, I am satisfied that the Application has been served on the Persons Unknown in accordance with the Injunction. It has also been served on the Appellants in Wolverhampton (namelythe following traveller groups: London Gypsies and Travellers; Friends, Families and Travellers; and the Derbyshire Gypsy Liaison Group).[10]In my judgment, the obligations relating to service have all been met.

Background

[11]Between January 2015 and September 2017, the evidence of the Council is that 133 unauthorised encampments were formed in the Borough, many of which had aggravating features such as deposits of untreated waste; and threats and intimidation to local inhabitants. There were associated financial harms such as damage to local businesses, green spaces and clean-up costs.[12]By way of a Claim Form dated 21 December 2017, the Borough sought injunctive relief to restrain the formation of unauthorised encampments in the Borough and acts of fly-tipping (“the Claim”). The relief was sought by the Borough in the discharge of its public functions and in its capacity both as the local planning authority for the Borough (such that it is responsible for breaching planning control) and as the local highway authority. It sought the injunctive relief in the discharge of its public functions pursuant to section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and section 222 of the Local Government Act 1972 (set out further below) in order to restrain breaches of planning control and to promote or protect the interests of the inhabitants of their administrative areas.[13]Interim injunctive relief was granted by Garnham J on 19 February 2018, on a Borough-wide basis against Named Defendants and in relation to 325 specified sites against Persons Unknown. In 2021, a further 9 sites were added to the Claim, such that relief was sought in relation to 334 sites.[14]The Claim was thereafter caught up procedurally with other, similar claims. In October 2020, the Claim was subsumed into the litigation concerning Barking and Dagenham (later reported as London Borough of Barking & Dagenham & Ors v Persons Unknown & Ors [2022] EWCA Civ 13 [2023] QB 295) (“Barking and Dagenham”) which culminated in the appeal to the Supreme Court in Wolverhampton. The Borough was one of the successful respondents in that appeal.[15]While Barking and Dagenham was progressing, the Court in this matter continued to give directions towards a final hearing. The Claim was listed for final hearing on 22 November 2022. However, the Supreme Court granted permission to appeal in Barking and Dagenham litigation on 25 October 2022 and the final hearing of the Claim was thus adjourned by the Judge on the morning of the hearing.[16]Following judgment in Wolverhampton, the Borough was able to proceed to a final hearing of the Claim before Butcher J on 21 May 2024 (the relief being ‘final’ only in respect of the Named Defendants, following Wolverhampton).[17]As outlined above, Butcher J handed down judgment and made the 2024 Injunction on 11 June 2024. The judgment of Butcher J which relates to the 2024 Injunction can be found at [2024] EWHC 1653 (KB) (“the 2024 Judgment”). A power of arrest was attached to the prohibitions at paragraphs 1(a) to 1(e) (inclusive) of the Injunction.[18]On 16 May 2025, the injunction against Persons Unknown in the 2024 Injunction was renewed by Garnham J for a further 12 months (defined above as “the Injunction”). The judgment of Garnham J which relates to the Injunction can be found at [2025] EWHC 1314 (KB) (“the 2025 Judgment”). A summary of the relevant facts can be found at paragraphs [6] to [28] of the 2025 Judgment.[19]In short, the Injunction prohibits the forming of unauthorised encampments and the depositing of controlled waste (i.e. fly-tipping) in relation to the 334 specified sites. The Borough argues that it “carefully selected” the 334 sites by reference to its analysis of the sites that were frequently targeted by unauthorised encampments. Those sites include sensitive and vulnerable sites (such as schools and other public amenities). Members of the Travelling community are not prohibited from entering the Injunction sites or encamping lawfully on those sites, nor are they in breach of the Injunction should they form an unauthorised encampment away from the Injunction sites (unless they are a Named Defendant).[20]At this renewal hearing, the Borough says, in summary, that throughout the course of the interim relief, unauthorised encampments continued to form in the Borough (and on the specified sites). However, they have formed less frequently than prior to the relief being granted and they are of a more limited size and duration. The Borough submits there are many good reasons to renew the Injunction and no reasons not to renew it, as further addressed below.

The evidence

[21]The factual evidence in relation to the Application is set out in two witness statements:(1) the third witness statement in these proceedings of Mr Stuart Morris dated 23 April 2026; and(2) the fifth witness statement in these proceedings of Mr Anthony Johns dated 24 April 2026. I summarise that evidence below.

The evidence of Mr Morris

[22]Mr Morris is the Head of Strategic Housing (Property) employed by the Borough, whose responsibilities include all property-related aspects of housing across the Borough, including permanent and temporary stopping provision for Gypsies and Travellers. His evidence is that the Council is required to make provision for Gypsy and Traveller accommodation within the Borough, as well as monitoring the provision of it by way of the Greater Manchester Gypsy and Traveller Accommodation Assessment (“the GMGTAA”).[23]The GMGTAA was last updated in December 2024 with a published final report setting out the projected pitch need to 2040/41, taking into account a new and expended definition of Gypsies and Travellers (which is more inclusive than previously).[24]In terms of permanent provision since 2014, the Council has provided 27 plots at its own site at Roch Vale and a site leased from the council known as Heritage Park (which was operational until 2022). The needs analysis in the GMGTAA identifies that the Council requires a further permanent 5 pitches by 2027/28.[25]In 2025, two further sites, one privately-owned and one Council-owned, were identified to create potentially 8 additional permanent pitches in total.[26]As of April 2026, at the privately-owned site was still going through the planning process, with potential for up to 4 additional permanent pitches. The Council-owned site has been granted the relevant planning permission and is being adapted to create 4 additional permanent pitches. It is anticipated that this will meet the increased need for pitch provision as set out in the GMGTAA and the projected shortfall of 5 pitches.[27]In terms of transit pitches, the Borough met and exceeded the requirement between 2014 and 2019 and, although it lost some capacity in 2019, interim arrangements were put in place, including a policy of toleration towards short-term encampments.[28]A replacement site was thereafter identified and configured to form 6 plots with the capacity to accommodate 12 caravans and associated vehicles on site. The site has been offered for use to individuals from the Gypsy and Traveller community forming unauthorised encampments. The site was last used in March 2024 with a licence granted for a two-week occupation. The site remains ready to occupy and demountable units are delivered as the need arises.[29]Mr Morris says that since the Injunction (and indeed since the 2024 Injunction) the unauthorised encampments in the Borough have been almost exclusively on “the most inappropriate and often unsafe locations”, including road verges alongside busy highways; industrial and business premises; car parks serving public facilities; and public open spaces including park land and children’s recreational areas.[30]The Council adopts an approach, says Mr Morris, of “engagement and negotiation” which has operated effectively to control unauthorised encampments. This has included serving the appropriate group of Travellers with a copy of the Injunction and giving the group a chance to consider their position and agree a reasonable departure time.[31]Since the Injunction, unauthorised encampments have continued to occur in the Borough. These are more fully detailed in the evidence of Mr Johns, which I address below. However, Mr Morris is clear that the 2024 Injunction and the Injunction have had the effect of being “preventative and prohibitive tools which have successfully reduced both the amount and duration of unlawful encampments”.[32]Mr Morris says that the situation in the 2025/26 period is broadly similar to the 2024/25 period such that that a need for effective injunctive relief remains. It has wider and immediate deterrent effects. By way of illustration, Mr Morris says that in 2019 there were 129 encampment days, whereas this has now reduced to 10 days, such reduction being achieved by utilising the injunction to disperse the unauthorised stopping within 24 hours of each encampment, which has prevented establishment of an unlawful site and the negative issues arising therefrom. Mr Morris says that the improvement by significant reduction of the number of unauthorised encampments and the duration of them whilst the injunction has been in place is “significantly correlative”.

The evidence of Mr Johns

[33]Mr Johns is the Service Manager for Environmental Action and Enforcement for the Council and he has specific responsibility for enforcement of the Injunction (and indeed for the 2024 Injunction). He has extensive experience of working with members of the Traveller community and he has a team which (amongst other duties) attends unauthorised encampments in the Borough; attempts to assess whether the groups have any needs or welfare requirements that need to be considered and, where necessary, responds to complaints related to those encampments.[34]Mr Johns describes his team taking a “constructive and educational” approach when visiting unauthorised encampments, including advising those Travellers about the Injunction and explaining the power of arrest to them. He says that this approach has been effective. Although the power of arrest has never been used and is “a last resort”, Mr Johns says that it is “what makes the Injunction so effective”.[35]Mr Johns explains that the reason why the injunctive relief was first needed was in response to the Borough experiencing a very high volume of unauthorised encampments between January 2015 and September 2017, many of which caused significant harm to the Borough and had or were associated with aggravating features (such as noise, anti-social behaviour, threats of violence towards members of the public and fly-tipping).[36]The Injunction covers 334 sites, as outlined above, which Mr Johns explains were chosen because they were sites were encampments could be “especially harmful”, including sites such as schools, green spaces and business parks. As set out in the original Claim, encampments were often associated with significant community tensions and threats of violence made towards members of the public who sought to use the amenities and space encamped upon. They were also associated with the depositing of waste, including fly-tipping and the depositing of untreated human excrement. There was often a significant clean-up operation required, at great expense to either the Council or the landowner.[37]The 334 sites comprise only 9.7% of the Borough and so unauthorised encampments can be formed by Persons Unknown in 90.3% of the Borough without a breach of the Injunction being committed. Mr Johns says that this shows the Borough is striking an appropriate balance between the protection of the rights of local inhabitants and respect of way of life for the Traveller community.[38]Mr Johns has further given significant evidence to show the effectiveness of the injunctive relief granted in 2018 and onwards.[39]First, there has been a clear reduction in the number of encampments formed in the Borough following the grant of injunctive relief, as summarised below:(1) 2015 – 28 encampments(2) 2016 – 40 encampments(3) 2017 – 69 encampments(4) 2018 – 21 encampments (following the interim injunction being granted on 19 February 2018)(5) 2019 – 10 encampments(6) 2020 – 13 encampments(7) 2021 – 9 encampments(8) 2022 – 10 encampments(9) 2023 – 12 encampments(10) 2024 – 6 encampments (the 2024 Injunction was granted on 11 June 2024)(11) 2025 – 6 encampments; and(12) 2026 to date – 4 encampments.[40]Second, the duration of the encampments has significantly decreased since the Injunction. In 2015, the average duration for each encampment was 4.6 days; in 2016, 3.85 days; in 2017, 6.28 days; and in 2018, 1.09 days. In 2023, the average duration was 1.16 days, but for all the other years between 2019 and 2025 it was below 24 hours.[41]Third, the net effect of the above has significantly reduced fly-tipping in the Borough which was previously “on a commercial scale”. This has hugely reduced clean-up costs which were approximately £25,419 in 2015; £23,199 in 2016; £87895 in 2017; £944 in 2018; and thereafter are described as “so small.. that they have been treated as negligible”.[42]Fourth, Mr Johns has also set out the improvements to public health, including the fact that since the Injunction there have been no instances of untreated human waste being left at sites upon vacation by an encampment.[43]Fifth, Mr Johns sets out the reduced frequency and duration of encampments in the business parks and industrial areas reducing the harms caused there, with a corresponding improvement to the wealth and prosperity of the Borough.[44]Sixth, Mr Johns sets out the reduction in threats, intimidation and community tensions. He says that since 2024 he has “not experienced any threatening or intimidating behaviour from those forming unauthorised encampments, nor have I received any reports from members of the public of such behaviour.” He puts this reduction in harm down to the reduced frequency of encampments, and also to the reduced duration of encampments, “as there simply is not time for significant interaction between the Travelling community and the public before encampments are moved on from the 334 sensitive and vulnerable sites around which those tensions typically arise.”[45]Seventh, Mr Johns says that since the Injunction there has been a reduction in recorded instances of property damage (such as the breaking of locks, fencing and gates) as well as a reduction in damage to grassed surfaces and green spaces from vehicles driving across those areas.[46]Mr Johns acknowledges, however, that since his fourth witness statement (25 April 2025), there have been 11 reports of unauthorised encampments in the Borough. He has set these out in detail in his fifth statement. As it transpires, it appears that at least one of these reports related to homeless persons living in tents; one related to vehicles associated with a travelling fun fair; and one was a wild camper. It seems to me that none of these should properly be considered within the ‘encampment’ statistics. Of the 8 new unauthorised encampments, just 5 of these were on sites covered by the Injunction.[47]In light of the above, there is evidently a much lower frequency of new encampments than had occurred prior to the injunctive relief being in place. The picture also compares favourably with neighbouring areas which are not so protected by the injunctive relief in place. For example, Mr Johns says that Wigan Council has reported 27 encampments in the borough in 2025; and Bolton Council has reported experiencing 9 encampments between April 2025- April 2026.[48]Mr John’s evidence is that absent the Injunction, the Council apprehends that unauthorised encampments formed by Persons Unknown will attend the Borough with greater frequency and duration, in line with the pre-injunction statistics, causing significant harm to the Borough and local inhabitants. Further, the alternative methods of managing and controlling unauthorised encampments are not effective or efficient enough to prevent the harm or reduce it to a manageable level.[49]There is, he says, a continuing need for relief against Persons Unknown because the Travellers’ nomadic way of life means that there is “a revolving cast of people passing through the Borough who are forming encampments” making it impossible for the Council to know who will in fact visit the Borough and form an encampment. Further, when an unauthorised encampment is formed, the Council is not always able to identify those who form the encampment (with a view to naming them on an injunction) and, Mr John says, “it is very common for those who form encampments to refuse to give their name when asked by Council officers, or they will give only a first name, family name or nickname by which they are known.”[50]Since April 2024, no Named Defendants have been identified as forming unauthorised encampments in the Borough and all encampments have been formed by ‘Persons Unknown’.

The law

[51]I now turn to the relevant legal principles. These are as follows:(1) The Court’s power to grant injunctive relief in these circumstances;(2) the approach to be taken in relation to such applications against persons unknown; and(3) the correct test to be applied on renewal applications, such as this. (1). The Court’s powers to grant injunctive relief in such circumstances[52]The Court’s power to grant injunctions is wide-ranging, and is derived from the Senior Courts Act 1981, s37(1), which provides:
“The High Court may by order (whether interlocutory or final) grant an injunction or appoint a receiver in all cases in which it appears to the court to be just and convenient to do so.”
[53]The Town and Country Planning Act 1990, section 187B (“section 187B”) provides:
“(1) Where a local planning authority consider it necessary or expedient for any actual or apprehended breach of planning control to be restrained by injunction, they may apply to court for an injunction, whether or not they have exercised or are proposing to exercise any of their powers under this Part. (2) On an application under subsection (1) the court may grant such an injunction as the court thinks appropriate for the purpose of restraining the breach. (3) Rules of court may provide for such an injunction to be issued against a person whose identity is unknown. (4) In this section “the court” means the High Court or the county court.”
[54]The underlying cause of action in a claim brought under section 187B is a breach of planning control.[55]Pursuant to section 57(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, planning permission is required for the carrying out of any development of land. ‘Development’ is defined to include the carrying out of any building operations “on, over or under land, or the making of any material change in the use of any … land” (section 55(1)). The depositing of refuse or waste materials on land involves a material change of use if the superficial area of the deposit is extended or the height of the deposit is extended and exceeds the level of the land adjoining the site (section 55(3)(b)). Planning permission may be obtained by way of express grant, or by way of deemed grant through permitted development rights. Carrying out development without the required planning permission constitutes a breach of planning control (section 171A(1)).[56]The breaches of planning control complained of in these proceedings are primarily the material change of use of the relevant land to a temporary Traveller site, and by the depositing of refuse or waste materials, without the requisite planning permission.[57]Unusually, the cause of action that underlies a claim brought pursuant to section 187B is not one upon which the court can adjudicate; the court is not entitled to reach its own independent view on the planning merits of the case. The decision as to whether something is or is not a breach of planning control is a matter for the local planning authority, or the Secretary of State on appeal, and not the court: see South Buckinghamshire District Council v Porter & Anr [2003] UKHL 26;[2003] 2 AC 558(“Porter”) at [11], [20], [29] and [30].[58]Nevertheless, the court’s power to grant an injunction under section 187B is discretionary one, albeit that discretion is not unfettered (see Porter [28]-[29]). The discretion must be exercised judicially meaning, in this context:
“…that the power must be exercised with due regard to the purpose for which it was conferred: to restrain actual and threatened breaches of planning control. The power exists above all to permit abuses to be curbed and urgent solutions provided where these are called for. (Porter at [29] per Lord Bingham).”
[59]Further, section 222 of the Local Government Act 1972 provides (“section 222”):
“1. Where a local authority consider it expedient for the promotion or protection of the interests of the inhabitants of their area – a) they may prosecute or defend or appear in any legal proceedings and, in the case of civil proceedings, may institute them in their own name, and b) they may, in their own name, make representations in the interests of the inhabitants at any public inquiry held by or on behalf of any Minister or public body under any enactment.” a) they may prosecute or defend or appear in any legal proceedings and, in the case of civil proceedings, may institute them in their own name, and b) they may, in their own name, make representations in the interests of the inhabitants at any public inquiry held by or on behalf of any Minister or public body under any enactment.”
[60]This section does not create a cause of action but gives local authorities the power to bring proceedings to enforce obedience with public law, without the involvement of the Attorney General (Stoke-on-Trent City Council v B&Q (Retail) Ltd [1984] AC 754).[61]The guiding principles as to the exercise of the court’s discretion under section 222 are identified in City of London Corporation v Bovis Construction Ltd [1992] 3 All ER 697 at 714 (per Bingham LJ), and include:
“…the essential foundation for the exercise of the court’s discretion to grant an injunction is not that the offender is deliberately and flagrantly flouting the law but the need to draw the inference that the defendant’s unlawful operations will continue unless and until effectively restrained by the law and that nothing short of an injunction will be effective to restrain them: see Wychavon DC v Midland Enterprises (Special Events) Ltd (1986) 86 LGR 83 at 89.”
[62]Where an injunction is granted under section 222, a power of arrest may be attached to the injunction pursuant to section 27 of the Police and Justice Act 2006. Section 27(2) provides that a power of arrest may be attached to a provision of an injunction if the injunction prohibits conduct which is capable of causing “nuisance or annoyance to a person”, provided that section 27(3)applies (i.e. that the conduct referred to in section 27(2) “consists of or incudes the threatened use of violence” or “that there is a significant risk of harm to the person mentioned in the subsection”). (2). The law relating to “persons unknown”[63]In Wolverhampton, the Supreme Court, (Lords Reed, Briggs and Kitchin with whom Lords Hodge and Lloyd-Jones agreed), considered a number of conjoined cases in which injunctions were sought by local authorities to prevent unauthorised encampments by Gypsies and Travellers.[64]The appeal raised the question whether (and if so, on what basis, and subject to what safeguards) the court has the power to grant an injunction which binds persons who are not identifiable at the time when the order is granted, and who have not at that time infringed or threatened to infringe any right or duty which the claimant seeks to enforce, but may do so at a later date, a class of persons referred to as “newcomers”.[65]The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and found that injunctive relief can be granted against newcomer persons unknown, albeit it held that such an injunction, in its operation against newcomers, is neither interim nor final, and is instead a form of without notice relief ([139]).[66]At [167] the Supreme Court set out the following:
“These considerations lead us to the conclusion that, although the attempts thus far to justify them are in many respects unsatisfactory, there is no immoveable obstacle in the way of granting injunctions against newcomer Travellers, on an essentially without notice basis, regardless of whether in form interim or final, either in terms of jurisdiction or principle. But this by no means leads straight to the conclusion that they ought to be granted, either generally or on the facts of any particular case. They are only likely to be justified as a novel exercise of an equitable discretionary power if: (i) There is a compelling need, sufficiently demonstrated by the evidence, for the protection of civil rights (or, as the case may be, the enforcement of planning control, the prevention of anti-social behaviour, or such other statutory objective as may be relied upon) in the locality which is not adequately met by any other measures available to the applicant local authorities (including the making of byelaws). This is a condition which would need to be met on the particular facts about unlawful Traveller activity within the applicant local authority’s boundaries. (ii) There is procedural protection for the rights (including Convention rights) of the affected newcomers, sufficient to overcome the strong prima facie objection of subjecting them to a without notice injunction otherwise than as an emergency measure to hold the ring. This will need to include an obligation to take all reasonable steps to draw the application and any order made to the attention of all those likely to be affected by it (see paras 226-231 below); and the most generous provision for liberty (ie permission) to apply to have the injunction varied or set aside, and on terms that the grant of the injunction in the meantime does not foreclose any objection of law, practice, justice or convenience which the newcomer so applying might wish to raise. (iii) Applicant local authorities can be seen and trusted to comply with the most stringent form of disclosure duty on making an application, so as both to research for and then present to the court everything that might have been said by the targeted newcomers against the grant of injunctive relief. (iv) The injunctions are constrained by both territorial and temporal limitations so as to ensure, as far as practicable, that they neither outflank nor outlast the compelling circumstances relied upon. (v) It is, on the particular facts, just and convenient that such an injunction be granted. It might well not for example be just to grant an injunction restraining Travellers from using some sites as short-term transit camps if the applicant local authority has failed to exercise its power or, as the case may be, discharge its duty to provide authorised sites for that purpose within its boundaries.” (i) There is a compelling need, sufficiently demonstrated by the evidence, for the protection of civil rights (or, as the case may be, the enforcement of planning control, the prevention of anti-social behaviour, or such other statutory objective as may be relied upon) in the locality which is not adequately met by any other measures available to the applicant local authorities (including the making of byelaws). This is a condition which would need to be met on the particular facts about unlawful Traveller activity within the applicant local authority’s boundaries. (ii) There is procedural protection for the rights (including Convention rights) of the affected newcomers, sufficient to overcome the strong prima facie objection of subjecting them to a without notice injunction otherwise than as an emergency measure to hold the ring. This will need to include an obligation to take all reasonable steps to draw the application and any order made to the attention of all those likely to be affected by it (see paras 226-231 below); and the most generous provision for liberty (ie permission) to apply to have the injunction varied or set aside, and on terms that the grant of the injunction in the meantime does not foreclose any objection of law, practice, justice or convenience which the newcomer so applying might wish to raise. (iii) Applicant local authorities can be seen and trusted to comply with the most stringent form of disclosure duty on making an application, so as both to research for and then present to the court everything that might have been said by the targeted newcomers against the grant of injunctive relief. (iv) The injunctions are constrained by both territorial and temporal limitations so as to ensure, as far as practicable, that they neither outflank nor outlast the compelling circumstances relied upon. (v) It is, on the particular facts, just and convenient that such an injunction be granted. It might well not for example be just to grant an injunction restraining Travellers from using some sites as short-term transit camps if the applicant local authority has failed to exercise its power or, as the case may be, discharge its duty to provide authorised sites for that purpose within its boundaries.”
[67]The practical application of the principles affecting an application for a newcomer injunction, and the safeguards that should accompany the making of such an order, were considered in detail in Wolverhampton at [188]-[237].[68]In particular at [225], the Supreme Court said that the need for “strict temporal and territorial limits is another point of consideration” and that “we have considerable doubt as to whether it could ever be justifiable to grant a Gypsy or Traveller injunction which is directed to persons unknown, including newcomers, and extends over the whole of a borough or for significantly more than a year. It is to be remembered that this is an exceptional remedy, and it must be a proportionate response to the unlawful activity to which it is directed. Further, we consider that an injunction which extends borough-wide is likely to leave the Gypsy and Traveller communities with little or no room for manoeuvre …. Similarly, injunctions of this kind must be reviewed periodically … and in our view ought to come to an end (subject to any order of the judge), by effluxion of time in all cases after no more than a year unless an application is made for their renewal. This will give all parties an opportunity to make full and complete disclosure to the court, supported by appropriate evidence, as to how effective the order has been; whether any reasons or grounds for its discharge have emerged; whether there is any proper justification for its continuance; and whether and on what basis a further order ought to be made.”[69]Thus, following Wolverhampton at [225], Traveller injunctions such as the 2024 Injunction are subject to an annual review (with some limited exceptions: see for example MBR Acres Limited & Ors v Curtin & Persons Unknown [2025] EWHC 331 (KB) where the review is scheduled to take place after 2 years (“MBR”)). (3). Renewal applications[70]The next question is: what is the test is that the Court should apply when applications are made to renew injunctions against persons unknown? The relevant authorities were reviewed at paragraphs [43] to [50] of the 2025 Judgment. I do not repeat it all here, save to cite the very succinct and helpful conclusion of Garnham J at [51]-[52]:
“51. In my judgment the correct approach is dictated by the Supreme Court’s judgment in Wolverhampton and in particular [225]. This is not a “tick box” exercise, but the matters on which evidence should be adduced and argument focussed are (i) how effective the order has been; (ii) whether any reasons or grounds for its discharge have emerged; (iii) whether there is any proper justification for its continuance; and (iv) whether and on what basis a further order ought to be made. The parties should give full disclosure, supported by appropriate evidence, directed towards those questions. 52. There will be cases, such as Basingstoke [Basingstoke v Loveridge [2024] EWHC 1828 (KB)], where an issue has emerged, whether at the original hearing or in preparation for the renewed hearing, which needs to be addressed expressly at that renewal hearing. Whether that necessitates an expanded renewal hearing or … a de novo hearing will depend on the facts. The position may also be different where the application for further injunctive relief is not made during the currency of the previous order, but after it has expired. But the guiding light will always be the Supreme Court's judgment in Wolverhampton.”
[71]I should further note that where a Claimant seeks precautionary relief, the court should ordinarily have regard the test set out by Marcus Smith J in Vastint Leeds BV v Persons Unknown [2019] 4 WLR 2 (“Vastint”), as approved by Vos MR in Barking & Dagenham.[72]At paragraph 31 of Vastint, Marcus Smith J set out a two-stage test, namely two questions which must be answered in the affirmative for injunctive relief to be granted, as follows:
“(a) First, is there a strong possibility that, unless restrained by an injunction, the defendant will act in breach of the claimant’s rights? (b) Secondly, if the defendant did act in contravention of the claimant’s rights, would the resulting harm be so grave and irreparable that, notwithstanding the grant of an immediate interlocutory injunction (at the time of the actual infringement of the claimant’s rights) to restrain further occurrence of the acts complained of, a remedy of damages would be inadequate?”
[73]Marcus Smith J set out multiple factors relevant to the assessment of these questions.[74]However, at paragraph 78 of the 2025 Judgment, Garnham J considered that the test in Vastint has now been “subsumed into the Wolverhampton framework”.[75]Ms Pratt submits that following Wolverhampton the conventional approach is now to apply the test from the Supreme Court in relation to newcomer persons unknown, with Vastint being reserved for named defendants only. She also submits that whilst the Vastint requirements are essentially built-into the Wolverhampton test, the court may choose to have regard to the Vastint multi-factorial test, as it did in Basingstoke (in both 2024 and 2025) and as Butcher J did when granting the original 2024 Injunction.[76]In light of the above, I will adopt the approach of Garnham J who considered that the test in Vastint could provide a “useful double check”in a case such as this, notwithstanding it had been subsumed into the Wolverhampton framework.

Has there been a material change in circumstances?

[77]The first question I must consider then is whether there has been a material change of circumstances that might necessitate an expanded renewal hearing or a de novo question.[78]I am satisfied on the evidence before me and in the light of the submissions that I have read and heard from Ms Pratt that there has been no material change of circumstance since the grant of the Injunction, nor is there any other good reason at this time to take this Application outside of the norm and conduct a full Wolverhamptonassessment.[79]Accordingly, I now consider the Application by reference to the four-part test suggested by Garnham J at paragraph 51 of the 2025 Judgment, namely by asking the following questions:(1) How effective has the order been?(2) Are there any reasons or grounds for its discharge that have emerged?(3) Is there any proper justification for its continuance? and(4) Whether and on what basis should a further order be made? (1). How effective has the order been?[80]I am satisfied that the Injunction has been very effective. There are still unauthorised encampments that form in the Borough (and on Injunction sites) but, as outlined above, Mr Johns has provided compelling evidence that the frequency and duration of those encampments have been greatly reduced during the period of the Injunction and the resulting harms have been significantly ameliorated.[81]As Ms Pratt submitted, the reduction in the threat to the Borough is not evidence that the threat has dissipated, but rather evidence that the Injunction is having its intended effect. This seems to me to be borne out by the evidence I have read including the data from neighbouring boroughs.[82]In short, the Injunction seems to have fulfilled its intended purposes. (2). Are there any reasons or grounds for discharge of the injunction that have emerged?[83]I do not know of any such reasons or grounds for discharge of the Injunction and none have been presented to me in evidence. (3). Is there a proper basis for continuance of the injunctive relief?[84]It seems quite clear in the light of the evidence I have summarised above that there is a proper basis for continuance of the Injunction. In summary:(1) First, there remains a considerable threat to the Borough from unauthorised encampments. They continue both within the Borough and in neighbouring areas.(2) Second, were the Injunction discharged, it appears highly probable that more unauthorised encampments will locate in the Borough and their duration may be longer.(3) Third, since the Injunction has been in place, the number and duration of the unauthorised encampments are both being reduced.(4) Fourth, this has brought significant benefits to the Borough including reduced fly-tipping, reduced clean-up costs and reduced community tensions. (4). Whether and on what basis any further order should be made?[85]In the light of the above, I am asked to renew the Injunction for a further 12 months and I am satisfied that is the appropriate order that I should make.

Miscellaneous points arising from Wolverhampton

[86]As I stated above, a full Wolverhampton assessment is not necessary. However, I have considered the following points (which derive from that case) for completeness. I factor them into my general assessment of whether the relief is just and convenient under the Senior Courts Act 1981.(1) First, the intended respondents to an application must be defined as precisely as possible, identified and enjoined where possible and, if the order is sought against newcomers, the possibility of defining the class of persons by reference to conduct and/or intention should be explored and adopted if possible: see Wolverhampton [221]. I am satisfied this has been done in the Application.(2) Second, such an injunction must be clear and precise and in “every day terms” and its terms should correspond closely to the unlawful conduct complained of: see Wolverhampton[222]-[224]. I am also satisfied this has been complied with in the Application and the wording of the attached order.(3) Third, in my judgment a cross-undertaking is not required here. The order is not an interim order and it is not in any sense holding the ring until the final determination of the merits of the claim at trial. Further, this is an application by a public body acting in pursuance of public duty: see Wolverhampton [234].[87]I also reiterate the following points when considering if it is just and convenient to grant the relief sought:(1) I have read considerable and compelling evidence suggesting there is a continuing need for the Injunction. The Borough has complied with its obligations to consider and provide lawful stopping places for Travellers; has considered alternatives means of controlling unauthorised encampments and has sought to engage with Gypsy and Traveller communities.(2) There are strict territorial and temporal limitations in the order. It is not Borough-wide and the sites have been carefully chosen. It is limited to 12 months of operation after which it will expire unless renewed.(3) As per the Injunction, the order I will make will include generous liberty to apply provisions and an obligation to take all reasonable steps to bring the application and any order to the attention of those who may be affected by any order made. In particular, provision is made for (alternative) service of the order and any subsequent continuation application.[88]Finally, I referred above to the Vastinttest providing a useful “double check”. For the reasons set out above, in my judgment that “double check” is readily satisfied in this case.

Full and frank disclosure

[89]Ms Pratt specifically drew my attention in her written and oral submissions to two specific matters of full and frank disclosure. I now briefly address them.[90]First, Ms Pratt refers to the decision of Nicklin J in MBR and how that decision has been treated in subsequent Persons Unknown injunctions. That case concerned a protestor injunction and not a Traveller injunction, although the injunctive relief is still grounded in the Wolverhampton jurisdiction. The judgment is notable for two reasons:(1) Nicklin J granted a true contra mundum order, and found that Persons Unknown did not need to be, and ought not to be, defined in any way (see [356] and [362] of the judgment); and(2) Nicklin J included within the contra mundum order a requirement that the court’s permission must be obtained before a contempt application could be made (see [390] of the judgment).[91]Ms Pratt submitted that no variation should be made to the Injunction in these proceedings to make it a true contra mundum order. She submitted that modifying the injunction to make it a true contra mundum order expands significantly the scope of reach of the order, for which there is no justification. Ms Pratt further submitted that no variation should be made to the Injunction to include such a requirement concerning contempt, not least because it would be at odds with the power of arrest.[92]I accept these submissions. It seems to me that the Nicklin J was responding to the specific and different circumstances of that case (and in particular to an earlier contempt application against a former person unknown, which he considered to be totally without merit) which do not arise in relation to the present proceedings. In particular, as Ms Pratt submits, there is no reason to suspect that, in this case, the Borough will seek to bring vexatious or ill-founded contempt applications, especially as it has never in fact sought to enforce by way of contempt proceedings or by exercising the power of arrest. I am also alerted to London City Airport Ltd & Ors v Persons Unknown [2025] EWHC 2223 (KB) where Bourne J also rejected the need for a permission requirement at [23] and Esso Petroleum Company Ltd & Ors v Persons Unknown [2025] EWHC 1768 (KB) where Sweeting J did likewise at [29].[93]Second, Ms Pratt submits that, as outlined above, following the December 2024 update to the GMGTAA, the Borough requires a further 5 permanent pitches to meet the assessed needs. I have referred to this above in relation to the evidence provided by Mr Morris. As I summarised above, the Borough has already taken steps to identified and progress sites which can meet the shortfall. In relation to the site owned by the Council, planning permission for 4 pitches has already been obtained. It therefore appears that the shortfall may be only short-lived and minimal. Further, I would note that this assessed need relates to pitches for permanent residence by members of the Travelling community (i.e. those who are settled, or wish to settle, in the Borough) whereas the Injunction is intended to capture those persons who are transiting through the Borough forming temporary encampments in inappropriate and harmful places. In any event, in my judgment, this should not affect whether the Injunction should be continued.[94]Insofar as I can judge, the Borough has complied with the duty of full and frank disclosure throughout its evidence and submissions.

Conclusion

[95]For all of the above reasons, it is necessary for the Injunction to continue and it is just and convenient for it to do so.[96]The Borough will be granted a one-year continuation of the Injunction as against the 90th and 93rd Defendants, the Persons Unknown.