Kayleigh Thorne & Anor v David Protheroe-Beynon [2026] EWHC 1042 (KB)

[2026] EWHC 1042 (KB)Case No KB-2026-001090
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS LIST
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 06/05/2026
Before
DEPUTY HIGH COURT JUDGE AIDAN EARDLEY KC
Between
DAVID PROTHEROE-BEYNONDefendant
Between
KAYLEIGH THORNEADELE NICOLA RAINSFORDJune Venters KC instructed (pro bono) by Venters Solicitors for ClaimantsThe Defendant appeared in person for in personHearing date 1 May 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30 am on 6 May 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................

Aidan Eardley KC :

[1]On 1 May 2026, at a “return date” hearing, I decided to extend interim injunctive relief in this case until trial or further order in somewhat different terms from the injunctions initially granted without notice. These are my reasons. Factual background[2]The Defendant is embroiled in litigation in the Family Court under the Children Act 1989 which is ongoing (the Family Proceedings). The opposing party in the Family Proceedings is represented by Venters Solicitors (Venters). The First Claimant is a relatively junior solicitor in that firm who has conduct of the case. The Second Claimant is a relatively junior barrister who was instructed by Venters to represent their client in the Family Proceedings at two hearings before the Family Court in June and July 2024. She has had no further involvement in the case.[3]The Defendant is deeply concerned about the course that the Family Proceedings are taking. He blames the Claimants for this. He believes that they have behaved unprofessionally, even dishonestly. He has made those allegations to them in correspondence. He has made complaints to their professional regulators who, to date, have declined to take any action on his complaints. He has issued civil proceedings against them which have been struck out as totally without merit. And he has filed contempt proceedings against them which, it appears, the court has refused to issue. Most recently he has threatened to “go public” with his allegations and has begun making his accusations publicly via videos uploaded to TikTok. Procedural history[4]On 2 April 2026 the First Claimant sought an interim injunction on an urgent without notice basis. The injunction was granted by Obi J that day. On 16 April 2026 Steyn J granted an interim injunction in favour of the Second Claimant, again on an urgent without notice basis. The same day she held an inter partes hearing in respect of the future progress of the First Claimant’s claim and made two case management orders, directing a return date hearing for both injunctions and giving other directions.[5]The Claimants filed a Claim Form on or about 16 April 2026 but have not yet received a sealed copy from the Court. They have therefore been unable to comply with Steyn J’s order that they serve a sealed Claim Form by 4.30pm on 20 April 2026. I have extended time for service, since this does not appear to be the Claimants’ fault.[6]The Claimants have also prepared Particulars of Claim. The Particulars of Claim describe the Defendant’s alleged course of conduct amounting to harassment in generic terms under a number of thematic headings. This does not comply with the pleading requirements for a harassment claim based on publication. CPR 53 PD B para 10.3 stipulates that “The claimant must specify in the particulars of claim (in a schedule if necessary) the acts of the defendant alleged to constitute a course of conduct which amount to (and which were known or ought to have been known by the defendant to amount to) harassment, including specific details of any actual or threatened communications”. I have directed that the Claimants serve a schedule to the Particulars of Claim that complies with these requirements and have extended time for filing a defence or acknowledgment of service so that the Defendant has proper notice of the case against him before he is required to respond. Interplay between the harassment claim and the Family Proceedings[7]The harassment claim is intimately bound up with what has been going on in the Family Proceedings. This causes difficulties for all parties, but more so for the Defendant.[8]The Claimants included in the hearing bundle, as examples of allegedly harassing conduct by the Defendant, communications to them and others in the course of which he went into detail about documents filed, or actions taken in the course of, the Family Proceedings. The Defendant, for the purposes of the hearing, sent the court a full copy of the court file in the Family Proceedings and many other documents which referred in detail to documents filed in the Family Proceedings or hearings that have taken place in private in the Family Proceedings.[9]In an email that I caused to be sent to the parties in advance of the hearing, I said that I would not consider any documents from the Family Proceedings, or any other information which can usually only be disclosed with the Family Court’s permission, unless satisfied that the Family Court had given permission, or that no permission is in fact required to use that information in the present case.[10]Having considered the matter, it was clear to me that neither party was entitled to put before me any detailed information about the Family Proceedings without the permission of the Family Court and that such permission had not been obtained.[11]Family Court proceedings are conducted in private and it is usually a contempt of court to disclose information relating to them. See the Administration of Justice Act 1960 s12 and the helpful summary of its effect given by Munby J in Kelly v BBC [2001] Fam 59, 72. Without purporting to give an exhaustive explanation of the legal limits, he said that “It suffices for present purposes to say that, in essence, what section 12 protects is the privacy and confidentiality:(i) of the documents on the court file and(ii) of what has gone on in front of the judge in his courtroom.” The identity of the children who are the subject of any proceedings under the Children Act 1989 is separately protected under s97 of that Act.[12]A number of exceptions to the general prohibitions on disclosure are set out in the Family Procedure Rules (FPR) at 12.73-12.75 and the associated Practice Directions. FPR 12.75(1)(c) permits a party to communicate information relating to the proceedings “where necessary to enable that party to make and pursue a complaint against a person or body concerned in the proceedings”. Prior to the hearing, the Defendant had contended that this permitted him to disclose information from the Family Proceedings in defence of this claim for harassment. I do not agree. By seeking to resist this injunction and to defend the claim he is not “making” or “pursuing” a “complaint” against anyone. The language of the rule concerns the initiation of complaints; it does not extend to responding to civil claims brought by others. As for the Claimants, Ms Venters did not submit that a freestanding claim for harassment against a person concerned in family proceedings amounts to a “complaint” within the rule.[13]Accordingly, at the hearing I adhered to the approach I had outlined in my email to the parties and declined to take account of any material that, it appeared, had been placed before me without the permission of the Family Court where such permission was required. I felt able to consider general information about the nature and subject matter of the proceedings and, in general terms, the Defendant’s allegation that the Claimants had conducted themselves improperly, but I ignored detailed material alleging omissions or inaccuracies in documents filed in the Family Proceedings, or particular conduct by the Claimants at or in connection with hearings.[14]Consistently with this approach, I directed that any details of evidence filed, and hearings that had taken place, in the Family Proceedings should be withheld from the public in these harassment proceedings and should not be reported in connection with these proceedings. I considered that this derogation from the open justice principle was strictly necessary in order to avoid the usual rules of privacy that apply to family proceedings being undermined.[15]Ms Venters and the Defendant sought to comply dutifully with my direction that we should not delve in to the details of the Family Proceedings at the public hearing. There were occasional inadvertent lapses. These do not invalidate the derogations from open justice that I have put in place or render permissible the reporting of anything that was erroneously said in breach of my direction: see R v Times Newspapers Ltd [2007] EWCA Crim 1925, [2008] 1 WLR 234. The Claimants’ submissions[16]Because the Particulars of Claim are presently too vague, I required Ms Venters to identify clearly each act the Claimants relied upon to support their contention that the Defendant had already engaged in a course of conduct amounting to harassment, or was likely to do so if not restrained. This was essential so that the Defendant knew the case he had to respond to.[17]In respect of the First Claimant, Ms Venters identified the following.[18]First, Ms Venters showed me a large number of communications identified in and exhibited to the First Claimant’s own two witness statements and the two witness statements of Carly Fiander, Venters’ practice manager. These were either emails directly to the First Claimant, or cc’d to the First Claimant, or communications to others (such as the Solicitors Regulation Authority) which Ms Venters said were likely to come to the First Claimant’s attention. Some of these communications included specific details about the Family Proceedings which, in accordance with the approach I have explained above, I have ignored. However, Ms Venters also drew my attention to other features of these communications which she submits are harassing in nature or, in any event, indications of the Defendant’s likely future conduct towards the First Claimant, if not restrained. I note, in particular:(1) An email to the First Claimant on 25 June 2025 in which the Defendant states, “You have 48 hours to find alternative representation from a different firm or a Mackenzie Friend for […]. I don’t say I ‘m going to release details to the public but your conduct now gives ne GROUNDS to release to the public details of gross misconduct by you…” (Ms Venters submits that this is evidence that the Defendant was seeking to force the First Claimant to cease acting for his opponent in the Family Proceedings by threatening to make public allegations of misconduct);(2) An email to the First Claimant on 27 June 2025 pasting the record of a “live chat” with the Metropolitan police in which among other things, the Defendant states “I am not stopping and by Monday its going to be worse…I am going to make life a great deal more difficult for her…That woman is going to be destroyed… a welfare check, really needs to be done on Ms. Thorne. She’s clearly very distressed and it’s going to get worse… ”;(3) An email to the First Claimant on 9 August 2025 in which the Defendant states, “I also know, Ms. Thorne the point at which I will be able to bring your actions and those of your firm to the attention of the public. Sir James Munby has been very informative on this point… the criteria for this are rooted in Case Law. It is not an attempt at extortion”(4) An email to the First Claimant dated 17 September 2025 in which the Defendant stated “…Ms Thorne, you will find I can be vindictive, patient resourceful, and unforgiving”;(5) An email cc’d to the First Claimant dated 6 December 2025 in which the Defendant stated, “I am going after all the professionals who have assisted […] mainly through the court process but in some cases I will be going public about them”;(6) An email to the First Claimant dated 16 December 2025 (apparently following the Defendant having filed a contempt application) stating “The good news is I have shared news of the contempt application with a great many people. Not the details or the details of Family Court proceedings, naturally but they do say a trouble shared and all that…”;(7) An email to the First Claimant dated 29 December 2025, expressing concern about one of the children and stating, “If I don’t see a breakthrough on this and the appropriate therapy is not offered… going public and other measures to protect […] will be put into play…You are going to feel the heat of what I am already doing. I have the means to go public. Very public…”;(8) An email cc’d to the First Claimant dated 6 January 2026 stating “Do you and your firm think I’m playing games? I can pile on even more pressure on you, not your client on you and Venter” and another email to the First Claimant the same day stating “You will not enjoy what is waiting for you when you come to work tomorrow and it’s 3 days till the weekend”;(9) An email on 14 January 2026 where the Defendant called the First Claimant an “evil, child abusing piece of crap” and suggesting that she is responsible for a child coming to harm. The same email included words such as “I’ve got something much more creative and unpleasant planned for you both. And just when you’re reeling from that I’ve got something else planned. And who can imagine what else. And when I’m finished. When you and […] are nervous wrecks I’ll be sitting in the sun …”(10) An email on 2 February 2026 to Ms Fiander cc-ing the First Claimant stating, “to date I have gone after Venters Solicitors in general and Kayleigh in particular and there’s nothing […] can do to stop me. Nothing the police can do to stop me…You fucked with […] I am going fucking ruin the pair of you, you child abusing psycho piece of crap!”;(11) An email on 2 April 2026 (Maundy Thursday) to the First Claimant stating:
“However I did ask for a truce. Mediation. So ask yourself this, How would you feel if I were to release to the public domain the truth about your part in [a particular incident involving one of the children]. Your words, your statements your signatures. Your clients name redacted. How would you feel over the weekend if information like that was in the hands of ITN. Liverpool Echo. With pictures of you. Your SRA registration… Because I do have my own outlet and I have editorial control over that. More than I do over PANORAMA, for example…Point is this is Easter weekend. If I decide to do something there will be nothing you can do until TUESDAY! By then the damage will be done to your personal reputation. Who needs a machete? Think about it…. You want to think I’m delusional. It’s wonderful what you can do with a REALLY good script and YOUR OWN news channel. Uin a weekend. Knowing that even during the week court admin staff are over worked and VERY slow to answer. It takes years to build a reputation and seconds to destroy. I have a whole WEEKEND to work on yours…Have a great weekend. I’m sure the public will want to know why you expected to get away with it. Forever. Any comments? Material goes out this weekend anyway. Have a think about it”
[19]The First Claimant also relies on two of the Defendant’s TikTok videos:(1) The first was published on or around 20 February 2026 and lasts more than 9 minutes. The Defendant presents it, speaking to camera, and it begins as an apparent discussion of the pros and cons of representing oneself in legal proceedings. However, it quickly descends into an attack on Venters and Ms Venters. In the course of it, the Defendant refers to a “rumour” that an unnamed solicitor at Venters is being sued for negligence (though stating that they should be regarded as innocent until proven guilty). The First Claimant understood this a reference to herself, having learned that the Defendant had issued civil proceedings against her of some sort;(2) The other TikTok video referring to the First Claimant was published by the Defendant on or about 21 April 2026 (so, after the interim injunctions had been put in place) and expressly in anticipation of the hearing on 1 May 2026. Again, it is a piece to camera by himself. He congratulates himself on having provoked the Claimants into suing for harassment, believing, it seems, that this well be self-defeating for them because it will lead to greater publicity of his accusations. He does not name the Claimants but tells viewers that their names can be found on the public court list. He accuses the Claimants, in unspecific terms, of incompetence and dishonesty.[20]As to the acts relied upon by the Second Claimant, Ms Venters referred me to (among other things): (1) An email to the Second Claimant’s chambers address dated 20 March 2026, which the Second Claimant later became aware of, making serious allegations of misconduct in the course of the Family Proceedings ( the details of which I must ignore for the time being) but also continuing:
“If I can’t seek redress through the court I will do so through the court of public opinion. That TikTok video is out there naming you as a dishonest barrister…”; (2) An email to Ms Fiander (but addressed to Ms Fiander and the Second Claimant) dated 29 March 2026 stating: “Time and again I’ve tried to seek lawful redress through the complaints and the court of law and been frustrated. Since none of you will meet me halfway. So I am taking this to the court of public opinion. Those videos have only just been uploaded. Name Adele and specifically accuse her of dishonesty. I will do the same to you Kayleigh.”; (3) A TikTok video that lasts 27 seconds. I do not have a precise date of first publication. The soundtrack is the Clash’s London Calling. Displayed throughout in red are the words “head of chambers and bar standards board continue to allow a barrister to practice when her honesty is called into question”
. There are screenshots of showing parts of a letter from the Bar Standards Board, and the Second Claimant’s chambers profile. It is stated that she “has a proven track record of making statements she knows from the instructing solicitor to be dishonest…” and that she will “prevent opposing counsel or the opposing litigant from presenting evidence to support their arguments”; (4) Another TikTok video, which I have not seen a recording of, but which is described in the Second Claimant’s Witness Statement, where she also exhibits some screenshots. The screenshots show a red caption saying “dishonest barristers. Would you like me to name 2?” beneath which the Second Claimant is named and pictured. Further down the screen are the words “let’s talk about lying barristers”. A second screenshot bears the words “Tactics of a dishonest barrister. Courtesy of a dishonest barrister”; (5) The Tiktok video published on or about 21 April 2026 described at [19](2) above.[21]Ms Venters submits, on behalf of both the Claimants, that a trial judge is likely to find that the Defendant has pursued a course of conduct amounting to harassment to which there is no defence (or will do so if not restrained) and that the trial judge is likely to impose final injunctive relief. She says that the balance of convenience favours the continuation of the present interim relief until those issues can be determined at trial. She points to the evidence that the Defendant’s conduct is already causing the Claimants considerable alarm and distress. She says that the evident purpose of the Defendant is to dissuade the First Claimant from continuing to act for the opposing party in the Family Proceedings and to dissuade the Second Claimant from doing so again (or to punish her for how she acted when instructed). She says that the allegations of misconduct etc all stem from the Defendant’s failure to understand the role of lawyers in litigation which is (subject to any overriding duties to the court) to represent the interests of their clients. The Defendant’s submissions[22]In clear, concise and courteous oral submissions, the Defendant submitted as follows:(1) He does not dispute sending/publishing any of the communications relied on by the Claimants; but(2) He is sincerely worried about the welfare of the children who are the subject of the Family Proceedings, and concerned that the way in which the proceedings are being conducted is exposing the children to harm or the risk of harm. He wants to protect them;(3) There are good grounds for believing that the Claimants have acted unprofessionally or dishonestly in the course of the Family Proceedings;(4) He has tried to promote settlement of the Family Proceedings through mediation, and has tried to ensure that the Claimants do not put their client in a position where the client ends up making misleading statements to the Family Court, but he has got nowhere with this;(5) He has got nowhere with his regulatory complaints, civil actions or contempt hence his decision to “go public”;(6) In the TikTok video of 20 February 2026 he did not name the First Claimant but it was accurate to say that she was being sued for negligence at the time (by him) and he was careful to say that no determination had been made;(7) In his public statements on TikTok he has been careful not to identify the children involved or to say anything else that might breach the applicable confidentiality provisions in the Family Court, he has only made high-level allegations of dishonesty and incompetence;(8) He dutifully complied with the interim injunctions requiring him to take down the TikTok videos that he had already published;(9) He has a strong ECHR Art 10 right to freedom of speech: his public statements about the Claimants are his honestly held opinions for which there is a sufficient evidential basis. They are much like online reviews that criticise a rogue builder, yet much more important because, in the present circumstances, the welfare of the children is in jeopardy. Legal Principles Threshold test for an interim injunction.[23]The orders sought by the Claimants will infringe the Defendant’s right to freedom of expression that is protected by ECHR Art 10(1). The threshold test for an interim injunction in these circumstances is that set out in s12(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998: the Claimants must satisfy me that they are likely to succeed in obtaining a permanent prohibitory injunction at trial, where “likely” ordinarily means “more likely than not”: Cream Holdings Ltd v Banerjee [2005] 1 AC 253 at [21].[24]If I were to find that the “nub” of the Claimants’ complaint is in fact their concern about damage to their reputations then I would be bound to apply the even more exacting threshold test that applies in defamation claims, often referred to as the test Bonnard v Perryman [1891] 2 Ch 269or the “defamation rule”. The fact that there is a reputational element to a claim is not decisive: the court has to ask itself what is the essential purpose of the application is: see Siddiqui v Aidiniantz [2019] EWHC 1321 (KB) at [90]-[97] (Warby J). Harassment – the substantive law[25]s1(1) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (PfHA) provides that a person must not pursue a course of conduct(a) which amounts to harassment of another and(b) which he knows or ought to know amounts to harassment of the other. And a person ought to know their course conduct amounts to harassment if a reasonable person in the possession of the same information would think it amounted to harassment. A course of conduct must involve conduct on at least two occasions.[26]The question of what amounts to harassment has been considered in a large number of appellate and first instance cases. In Hayden v Dickenson [2020] EWHC 3291 (QB) at [44] Nicklin J summarised the principles that can be extracted and his summary was approved by the Divisional Court in Scottow v Crown Prosecution Service [2020] EWHC 3421 (Admin), [2021] 1 WLR 1828. For the purposes of this case, a number of points are particularly important.[27]Harassment consists in a persistent and deliberate course of unacceptable and oppressive conduct, targeted at an individual. To qualify as such the conduct must reach a level of seriousness passing beyond the irritations, annoyances and upset that arise occasionally in everybody’s day-to-day dealings with other people. It must be of an order that would sustain criminal liability under s 2: Hayden principles (i) & (ii).[28]Harassment by publication will usually engage ECHR Article 10 and therefore the Court’s assessment must pay due regard to the importance of freedom of expression and the need for any restrictions upon the right to be necessary, proportionate and established convincingly: Hayden principles (vi)-(viii).[29]In a publication case, the harassing element is likely to come more from the manner in which the words are published than their content, and their truth or falsity is unlikely to be determinative. Repetition of material already in the public domain can qualify: Hayden principles (ix)-(xi).[30]The Court should take account of the extent to which the coverage complained of is repetitious and taunting, as opposed to being new, and prompted by some fresh newsworthy event. The imposition of liability in respect of coverage that falls into the latter category will be harder to justify: Sube v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2020] EWHC 1125 (QB), [2020] EMLR 25 at [106](2) (Warby J).[31]Where the publications are of journalistic material, nothing short of a conscious or negligent abuse of media freedom will justify a finding of harassment. Such cases will be rare and exceptional: Hayden principle (xii). Journalistic material “is to be identified by its subject matter, not its author, nor the process by which it comes to be published”: McNally v Saunders [2021] EWHC 2012 (QB), [2022] EMLR 3 at [74] (Chamberlain J). Blog posts and social media publications may therefore qualify in an appropriate case.[32]Section 1(3) sets out 3 defences that a defendant may rely on if a pf case of harassment is made out. The only relevant one for present purposes is s1(3)(c), “that in the particular circumstances the pursuit of the course of conduct was reasonable”. This raises some of the same issues as the threshold test for harassment, since a course of conduct is unlikely to amount to harassment unless it is at least prima facie unreasonable (see McNally at [86]). The test is objective: R v Sean Peter C [2001] EWCA Crim 1251. In a publication case it must be applied, like the test for harassment itself, in a manner that avoids disproportionate interference with a defendant’s ECHR Article 10 rights: Thomas v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1233, [2002] EMLR 4 at [32]-[37].[33]Statements made in inter partes correspondence in the course of and for the purposes of civil proceedings will be immune from suit in ordinary civil claims (including harassment) unless they have no reference at all to the subject matter of the proceedings. Statements in such correspondence can only be considered as a part of a tortious course of conduct if they are wholly extraneous to, and have no reference to or connection with, the proceedings: Iqbal v Dean Manson Solicitors [2014] at [59]-[76] [2014[ EWHC 2418 (QB) (Warby J), (the Iqbal Principle) recently endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Titan Wealth Holdings Ltd v Okunola [2026] EWCA Civ 138. Discussion and conclusions Applicable threshold test[34]I find that the applicable threshold test is that set out in s12(3) in the Human Rights Act 1998 and not the higher “defamation test”. The things the Defendant has published online are clearly defamatory of the Claimants at common law and the Claimants are understandably concerned in part about the reputational consequences for them if such matters remain online or are repeated. Nevertheless, their primary concern, as I understand it from their evidence, is simply to make these attacks on them stop (whether those attacks are by direct communication or by publishing information about them to others) so that they can carry on with their lives without being subjected to alarm and distress. The Claim Form and Particulars of Claim allege harassment only and expressly disavow any reliance on the law of defamation. No damages for injury to reputation (or at all) are sought. Application of the threshold test[35]On present evidence, I am satisfied that it is more likely than not that a trial judge will hold that further publications of the sort engaged in or threatened by the Defendant should not be allowed. I remind myself that I am not making findings of fact. My task is a predictive one based on the limited admissible evidence that is before me, which is incomplete and untested. I consider the position of each Claimant in turn.[36]As to the First Claimant:(1) The Defendant may be in a position to argue at trial that some or all of the emails relied on by the First Claimant are inter partes correspondence that are immune from suit on the Iqbal Principle and so could not be relied upon as individual acts contributing to a course of conduct amounting to harassment. I have made that assumption in the Defendant’s favour;(2) Nevertheless, those communications are good evidence of the Defendant’s attitude to the First Claimant and his likely future conduct if not restrained. On their face they evince a determination to “destroy her” professionally by making public allegations about her, timed in a way that will make it difficult for her to seek legal redress, and they appear to show that he is well aware of the negative psychological effect this is likely to have on her;(3) The Defendant has already alluded to these allegations of professional misconduct obliquely in his 20 February 2026 TikTok video in terms which, a trial judge is likely to find, he knew would be appreciated by the First Claimant as references to herself, and then again, more directly (although still not naming her) in the 21 April 2026 TikTok video. I have no doubt that, unless restrained, the Defendant would continue to make public statements about the First Claimant in similar and probably escalating terms;(4) A trial judge is likely to find that the TikTok publications to date (or at least the threatened future publications) would cross the threshold of seriousness set by the law of harassment and that a reasonable person in the Defendant’s position would appreciate that to be the case.[37]As to the Second Claimant, her position is somewhat stronger because:(1) The emails of 20 and 29 March 2026 are threatening in themselves and there would appear to be no available argument that they are immune from suit as protected inter partes correspondence (the Second Claimant never had conduct of the litigation and had ceased to act on instructions from Venters long ago), they could therefore be considered as part of the course of conduct;(2) As well as the 21 April 2026 TikTok video (criticising both Claimants) there are the two TikTok videos accusing her of dishonesty and professional misconduct in very bald terms.[38]As to the Defendant’s case that his actual/threatened conduct did not cross the line into harassment, or was reasonable in the circumstances, I consider that, on present evidence, this is unlikely to succeed:(1) Although the Defendant says he has good grounds for alleging dishonesty and professional misconduct in the course of the Family Proceedings, he is not presently in a position to show me evidence that could support such allegations, for the reasons I have set out above;(2) On present evidence therefore, the Defendant is seeking to repeat to the public allegations which have been looked at by the Claimants’ professional regulators and the civil courts but have been ignored or rejected summarily. He presently has no admissible evidence to suggest that those decisions were wrong;(3) More importantly, as I have explained, the law of harassment is not centrally concerned with the truth of allegations (or even whether there are reasonable grounds for asserting those allegations to be true). It is much more concerned with the tone, manner and frequency with which allegations are published. On present evidence, it seems likely that, if not restrained, the Defendant would continue to correspond directly with the Claimants in the highly offensive and threatening way he has previously done, and will continue to make bald allegations of dishonesty and professional misconduct about them via social media. A trial judge is unlikely to think that that is reasonable behaviour and likely to find that it tips into the category of oppressive behaviour that qualifies as harassment;(4) The Defendant is right to invoke ECHR Art 10 – it is clearly engaged – but his analogy with the expression of an opinion on a review site that a builder is dishonest or dangerous is inapt. A person who has some factual basis for their honestly held opinion can of course post such a review without legal consequences, but the Defendant cannot presently set out before the court any such factual basis. Moreover, he has not just given a one-off review, he has made repeated publications and threatens to make further publications with the averred aim of destroying the Claimants professionally;(5) The Defendant did not really press a case that he is in a similar position to a journalist. I think it unlikely he could do so with any conviction at a trial. He admits that he is circumscribed as to what he can say publicly by the confidentiality regime in the Family Court, so all that he can publish is a series of high level allegations of dishonesty or unprofessional conduct. That is not akin to news reporting or investigative journalism. A journalist seeking to report the Family Proceedings, or who had been tipped off about possible professional misconduct in those Proceedings, would begin by seeking legitimate access to the hearings and documents. The Defendant has done none of that and is publishing with the avowed aim of “destroying” the Claimants. It seems unlikely that a trial judge would consider that the heightened protections for truly journalistic activity are engaged in this case. It is much more likely, on present evidence, that the Defendant will be found to be someone pursuing a personal vendetta against the Claimants rather than engaged in some public interest exercise. Whether to continue the injunctions[39]The applicable threshold test for continuation of the injunctions is satisfied but there are further matters to consider. In a freedom of expression case, the HRA 1998 s12(3) test replaces the first stage of the well-known American Cyanamid principles ([1975] AC 396) but it is still necessary to consider whether damages would be an adequate remedy and whether the balance of convenience favours the grant of an injunction pending trial.[40]Damages would obviously not be an adequate remedy in the circumstances. The Claimants do not in fact seek damages at trial. Their only concern is to be left alone by the Defendant.[41]In my judgement, the balance of convenience favours the grant of an injunction. On the evidence of the Claimants, the Defendant’s current activities and threats of further publication are causing them real and immediate alarm and distress. An interim injunction (in appropriate terms – which I shall come to) will not affect his ability to defend the Family Proceedings or limit his rights to make complaints about the Claimants to their regulators or the police. The Defendant accepts that, in terms of publication to the world at large, he can only make generic allegations of misconduct. He is also not presently in a position to show the Court evidence that might support such allegations, even if expressed in the form of an opinion. An interim injunction would therefore interfere with his ECHR Art 10 rights to only a limited extent and will be a proportionate interference given the ECHR Art 8 rights of the Claimants.[42]The Defendant invites me to decline to continue the injunctions because of the Claimants’ conduct of the proceedings, including on the grounds that they have not come to court with “clean hands”. He makes a litany of complaints, including (as I understand it) that the First Claimant invited Obi J to apply the wrong legal test when seeking her without notice injunction and submitted a draft order that did not accord with the Practice Guidance on Interim Non-disclosure Orders; that neither Claimant should have gone before the court on an without notice basis; that exculpatory evidence in the hearing bundle has been unjustifiably redacted, to his detriment; that another document in the hearing bundle has been unjustifiably included without redactions so as to expose the identity of the children involved in the Family Proceedings; and that the Claimants have refused to include in the hearing bundle relevant documents that the Defendant has submitted and ought to have been included.[43]I am satisfied that, one way or another, I have seen all the evidence that I can properly take account of at this stage in the proceedings. On the basis of that evidence, I am persuaded that there should be interim injunctive relief until trial in the terms I have directed. If the Claimants have fallen short in any of the ways alleged (as to which I make no findings) then that will be a matter that can be reflected in a costs order in due course. The Defendant’s allegations of procedural errors, even if they transpire to be well founded, are not sufficient to justify the refusal of an otherwise well-deserved injunction. Terms of the injunction[44]I made some changes to the draft order submitted by Ms Venters, and comment as follows.[45]First, I was initially concerned by the proposal that the Defendant should be prohibited from contacting the First Claimant at all. The First Claimant continues to have responsibility for the conduct of the Family Proceedings on behalf of Venters’ client and the Defendant, as a party to those proceedings acting in person, must have a line of communication with the opposing legal team. Ms Venters told me that a system would be put in place whereby Ms Fiander, the firm’s practice manager, would act as the sole point of contact, passing on relevant communications to the relevant fee earners. That strikes me as a sensible, pragmatic approach. I therefore made the order in the terms sought and take it to be the common understanding of the parties that communications pursuant to the mechanism Venters are putting in place will not be regarded as falling foul of the prohibition on “indirect” communication with the First Claimant.[46]Second, I declined to include in the injunction a prohibition on the Defendant publishing material from the Family Proceedings. So far as I am aware, he has not in fact published anything to the world at large that he is prohibited from publishing by reason of the law of contempt or s97 of the Children Act 1989. He appears to understand that he must not do so and cannot do so under the guise of reporting the present harassment proceedings (a point that I have made clear in my order). So, although he has (arguably) erred in placing documents from the Family Court file before me, there is no present threat of wider publication. And while it may sometimes be appropriate to grant an injunction that reinforces the general law of contempt or the criminal law, it is not appropriate in the present case. If the Defendant does disclose information or documents in breach of his obligations, the court best placed to deal with that is the Family Court, which has a full overview of the Family Proceedings, not the King’s Bench Division, which does not.[47]Third, I declined to include the proposed provision that the Defendant be prohibited from issuing any civil claims against the Claimants alleging professional misconduct. It is hard to see how any such claims could be pursued (the Claimants act for the opposing party in the Family Proceedings and do not owe the Defendant any duty of care). However, there is a carefully calibrated scheme for making “civil restraint orders” against vexatious litigants (see CPR Pt 3 PD C) depending on the gravity of their prior conduct and, even if a litigant is restrained, the scheme permits them to apply to a judge for permission to make a claim or application. The Claimants can apply for a civil restraint order if they consider that the threshold conditions are met. The order they presently seek would be more restrictive than the statutory scheme and is unjustified.[48]Fourth, Ms Venters faintly suggested that I should widen the relief sought in the draft order to include other legal professionals who are engaged in the Family Proceedings and who are now receiving the unwelcome attentions of the Defendant. I declined to do so. As I explain below, the Court has powers to control unacceptable conduct between parties in the course of litigation. However, the present application was advanced on the specific and narrow basis that the Defendant’s conduct, if not restrained, would amount to unlawful harassment of the two named Claimants. That is how I have approached it and it would have been unfair to the Defendant to consider some broader approach of which he had not had proper notice.[49]Fifth, I have included a proviso permitting the Defendant to continue to communicate with relevant regulators and the police. Whether either or both prohibitions should be included in a final injunction can be discussed at trial (there are both factual and legal questions that arise). For present purposes however, I consider that an interim restriction on such communications would be disproportionate. Regulators and the police deal with complaints in confidence and they have their own procedures for dismissing, or taking no further action on, complaints that appear to be meritless or vexatious.[50]Sixth, I have included a proviso making it clear that the Defendant is permitted to publish reports of the public hearing before me (and other public hearings in due course) as well as this judgment (and other public judgments in due course). That is, of course, subject to the withholding order and reporting restriction order that I have put in place in relation to the identity of the children who are the subject of the Family Proceedings and other details about the Family Proceedings. Those restrictions apply to everyone but, subject to observing those restrictions and like everyone else, the Defendant is free to report on public hearings and judgments in these harassment proceedings. That proviso, I believe, dispenses with an application dated 19 April 2026 that the Defendant had made seeking “To allow the publication of identities of all parties in these proceedings…”. The only parties in these (harassment) proceedings are the two Claimants and the Defendant. Those parties’ identities have never been withheld in these proceedings and my proviso, I hope, clarifies the position. I have not made any separate order on the Defendant’s application. Conclusion and postscript[51]The threshold test for an interim injunction until trial is met and, in my discretion, I grant an injunction in the terms I have specified.[52]Ms Venters complained in strong terms about how the Defendant has acted in response to this harassment claim and the injunction applications. She says that, rather than co-operating in the agreement of a hearing bundle as directed by Steyn J, the Defendant has bombarded her firm and the court with a huge number of documents (more than 2000 pages) as well as aggressive emails. She says that the Defendant has also intensified and widened his attacks – now going after herself and her firm as well as the Claimants. She set out evidence of this in a supplementary bundle. The documents there include new complaints to the SRA and the BSB, complaints to the police, and communications indicating that the Defendant has now informed Private Eye that Ms Venters herself is the subject of a police investigation (whereas, in fact, there would appear to be no investigation and the Defendant has simply made a complaint to the police on the basis that she and the Claimants had not compiled the hearing bundle as he would have wished).[53]Parties, including litigants in person, are required to help the Court to further the overriding objective of dealing with cases justly and at proportionate cost: CPR 1.3. The Defendant has shown scant regard for this requirement to date. It took me an inordinate amount of time to plough through his many emails and attachments to identify the materials that he wanted me to consider at the hearing (many of which I ultimately felt obliged to disregard because they were provided in apparent breach of the confidentiality rules in the Family Court). I imagine that it has been a similarly draining experience for the Claimants and Ms Venters.[54]It may go beyond that. In Titan Wealth at [27]the Court of Appeal recognised that the Court has jurisdiction, in the interests of justice, to restrain any conduct by parties to litigation that is serious enough to threaten the integrity of its own process. The Claimants did not invite me to exercise this jurisdiction for now, but it is something that this Court and the Family Court will no doubt bear in mind going forward.[55]For the avoidance of doubt, although I have framed the injunction in a way that permits the Defendant to make further complaints to regulators or the police, I have not seen any admissible evidence that could reasonably support such complaints, either against the Claimants or against Ms Venters and her firm.