“but as soon as the loading was completed, the need for the temporary cover, and indeed the hole itself ceased, and it became a dangerous and unjustifiable potential trap.”
“5.5 The accident itself a. As mentioned at 3.11 above, there are unexplained features surrounding the precise circumstances of this accident. RNC submits that in this situation it is not possible for R&B to discharge its burden of proving that any breach on RNC’s part caused or contributed to the fall and injury, and that indeed it is more likely that BE himself was the sole cause. But in the absence of direct witness evidence (a frequent occurrence in such cases) the Court is fully entitled to reach a conclusion on the balance of probability by relying on the circumstantial and indirect evidence, provided it avoids mere speculation. b. It does appear probable from the photographs that at the time of the accident the hole was covered by the chipboard flooring (which fell with BE) but that the chipboard was not then supported by the battens (which were not found downstairs, and may have been stacked in the attic). In such a case, if stepped on, the unsupported chipboard is likely to have cracked (along a line previously glued, the photographs suggest) and collapsed, taking BE with it. c. How precisely this arrangement came about cannot now be explained to the civil standard. It may have been done by BE himself, though it is difficult to see why, or by R&B’s men before leaving the previous night, or by RNC’s men the next morning. To go further would be speculation.”
“d. But even without this information, it may be possible, depending on the Court’s conclusions as to the existence and extent of RNC’s duty to BE, to determine whether such a situation should have been prevented from arising at all. And as to contributory negligence, the burden of proving which is on the party alleging it, there may be some conclusions properly to be drawn about whether BE could and should have taken steps to protect himself in this situation, given that the absence of the battens would have been visible on inspection.” [Emphasis added].
“It has been said that occupiers’ liability is more concerned with the “occupancy duties” of an occupier, i.e. the static condition of the site, and negligence more with the conduct of activities on the site. (Munkman, op. cit. at 7.33). In this case there is something of an overlap, because the dangerous condition of the premises was specifically created as part of a joint decision in order to facilitate the temporary conduct of an activity. However, as indicated at 5.3 above, the crucial omission in this case, but for which the accident would not have occurred, was the failure to reinstate the flooring sooner, (or at least to prevent BE from working in that room until the reinstatement had been completed).As between RNC and R&B, RNC was the only party either entitled to effect changes to the structure of the building or in a practical position to do so; and this was because for these purposes it was in effective occupation as the main contractor. I have also found that its responsible site foreman, TH, was or ought to have been well aware at all material times of the urgent need to reinstate the floor.” [Emphasis added].
“Appellate courts have been repeatedly warned by recent cases at the highest level not to interfere with findings of fact by trial judges, unless compelled to do so. This applies not only to findings of primary fact, but also to the evaluation of those facts and to inferences to be drawn from them… the trial is not a dress rehearsal. It is the first and last night of the show.”
“… 24. In addition, there is a body of case law which emphasises the difficulty of appealing against findings of fact made in a specialist court like the TCC. The relevant authorities were gathered together for convenience at paragraphs 12-16 of my judgment in Wheeldon Brothers Waste Limited v Millennium Insurance Company Limited[2018] EWCA Civ 2403 . 25. Accordingly, for all practical purposes, in order to appeal successfully against the findings of fact made by a judge at first instance, an appellant has to show that there was no evidence to support the findings made, or there was a demonstrable misunderstanding of, or failure to consider, relevant evidence. If all the relevant evidence was considered by the judge then, even if the appellate court might have come to a different conclusion, an appeal against the trial judge’s findings of fact will fail. That is why an appeal against a trial judge’s findings of fact is such a high hurdle for an appellant to overcome.”
“during the loading period, when all four R & B men were jointly engaged and looking out for each other, the procedure was reasonably safe and practicable. Even during the intervals between loadings, when the cover was in place but unsecured by fixing its components in place, that may have been a reasonable compromise. But as soon as the loading was completed, the need for the temporary cover, and indeed the hole itself, ceased, and it became a dangerous and unjustifiable potential trap.”
“Following an admission of liability on or around9 November 2018 , on24 July 2020 , the matter was settled as between Mr Eckford and the Claimant. The settlement was by way of a Part 36 offer dated3 July 2020 . Damages were agreed in the sum of£100,000 . Mr Eckford’s costs were thereafter agreed in the sum of£31,000 . The Claimant was further required by statute to pay NHS charges in the sum of£15,199 . Copies of the relevant agreements and the NHS charges certificate are attached hereto. The Claimant further funded Mr Eckford’s rehabilitation in the sum of£14,987.15 . The Claimant’s own costs of defending the main action were£6,185.30 .”
“9.3 Rehabilitation costs have always been a familiar head of personal injury damages, and if paid out by or on behalf of the claimant would generally be recoverable as expenditure by way of treatment and indeed in mitigation of future damages. They may also be the subject of agreed interim payments. 9.4 Somewhat ironically given that it is itself an insurer, the present Defendant argues that it should not have to contribute towards this amount, because it is not “damages” properly so called. 9.5 In the absence of any specific guidance on this point, I approach it from first principles. The 1978 Act does not expressly state that the contribution shall be a proportion of any “damages” paid. Rather, its starting point is that the contributor shall be a person “liable in respect of the same damage”, and that (in this case) a person who has “made or agreed to make any payment in bona fide settlement or compromise of any claim made against him in respect of any damage…shall be entitled to recover contribution in accordance with this section…”