“ … it is considered that the temporary siting of the single unit mobile home for use as a welfare unit and secure store in connection with the capital works taking place on the land is ‘permitted development’ by virtue of Schedule 2, Part 4,Class A of the General Permitted Development (England) Order 2015 and is therefore not a breach of planning control.”
“ … Other thing, which is odd is that a planning application will be forthcoming in matter of days. This is 4th June and Mrs Cutts has checked and there is no application on the system. When taking all of this together there is a strong suspicion why caravan is on the land. Not unusual while offices are closed. Because of pandemic, the council offices are closed. Makes it an ideal time to breach planning control. Addressing the without notice application – the council fears the intention to change the use, if notice was given, development would be undertaken and then it is difficult for council to enforce planning control once occupation is taken up.”
“Because of size of land it may be other mobile homes brought on with several other agricultural workers. Mrs Cutts sets out in paragraph 23 why change of use will result in harm – because site is in open countryside and in Kent Downs, which is protected and will cause significant visual hardship, urbanising elements are at odds with landscape.”
“In this Order the Land means the land known as “Land at Bonnington Court, Bonnington” (also known as Land at Park Field, New Road Hill, Bonnington, Kent, TN25 7BA”) registered at HM Land Registry under Title Number K707048, as more particularly shown on the plan attached to this Order, edged black. Until planning permission is granted for development prohibited in this order, or further order, the First and Second Defendants (and each of them) UNDERTAKE (and each promise below is a separate enforceable undertaking) with immediate effect, not to do the following without planning permission (whether express or by development order) or to permit, instruct or encourage others to do the same: 1. Undertake residential occupation of the caravan/mobile home currently situated on the Land. 2. Change the use of the Land or any part of the Land from agricultural to residential use (including by stationing of further caravans and/or mobile homes on the Land). 3. Bring any further caravans and/or mobile homes for the purposes of human habitation or residential occupation on to the Land. 4. Erect on the Land any building capable of or intended to be put to residential use. 5. Take any other steps intended to prepare the Land for residential use (including by the stationing of caravans and/or mobile homes on the Land, spreading hardcore on the Land, and installing septic tanks).”
“The mobile home hereby permitted shall be for a limited period being the period of 3 years from the date of this decision. On or before the expiry of this period, the use of the mobile home hereby permitted as a dwelling shall cease, and all buildings, structures, materials and equipment brought onto, or erected on the land, or works undertaken to it in connection with the use of the mobile home shall be removed, and the land restored to its former condition.”
“The law is non-contentious. The following general principles can be distilled from the relevant authorities by way of summary as follows: i) The duty of an applicant for a without notice injunction is to make full and accurate disclosure of all material facts and to draw the court’s attention to significant factual, legal and procedural aspects of the case; ii) It is a high duty and of the first importance to ensure the integrity of the court's process. It is the necessary corollary of the court being prepared to depart from the principle that it will hear both sides before reaching a decision, a basic principle of fairness. Derogation from that principle is an exceptional course adopted in cases of extreme urgency or the need for secrecy. The court must be able to rely on the party who appears alone to present the argument in a way which is not merely designed to promote its own interests but in a fair and even-handed manner, drawing attention to evidence and arguments which it can reasonably anticipate the absent party would wish to make; iii) Full disclosure must be linked with fair presentation. The judge must be able to have complete confidence in the thoroughness and objectivity of those presenting the case for the applicant. Thus, for example, it is not sufficient merely to exhibit numerous documents; iv) An applicant must make proper enquiries before making the application. He must investigate the cause of action asserted and the facts relied on before identifying and addressing any likely defences. The duty to disclose extends to matters of which the applicant would have been aware had reasonable enquiries been made. The urgency of a particular case may make it necessary for evidence to be in a less tidy or complete form than is desirable. But no amount of urgency or practical difficulty can justify a failure to identify the relevant cause of action and principal facts to be relied on; v) Material facts are those which it is material for the judge to know in dealing with the application as made. The duty requires an applicant to make the court aware of the issues likely to arise and the possible difficulties in the claim, but need not extend to a detailed analysis of every possible point which may arise. It extends to matters of intention and for example to disclosure of related proceedings in another jurisdiction; vi) Where facts are material in the broad sense, there will be degrees of relevance and a due sense of proportion must be kept. Sensible limits have to be drawn, particularly in more complex and heavy commercial cases where the opportunity to raise arguments about non-disclosure will be all the greater. The question is not whether the evidence in support could have been improved (or one to be approached with the benefit of hindsight). The primary question is whether in all the circumstances its effect was such as to mislead the court in any material respect; vii) A defendant must identify clearly the alleged failures, rather than adopt a scatter gun approach. A dispute about full and frank disclosure should not be allowed to turn into a mini-trial of the merits; viii) In general terms it is inappropriate to seek to set aside a freezing order for non-disclosure where proof of non-disclosure depends on proof of facts which are themselves in issue in the action, unless the facts are truly so plain that they can be readily and summarily established, otherwise the application to set aside the freezing order is liable to become a form of preliminary trial in which the judge is asked to make findings (albeit provisionally) on issues which should be more properly reserved for the trial itself; ix) If material non-disclosure is established, the court will be astute to ensure that a claimant who obtains injunctive relief without full disclosure is deprived of any advantage he may thereby have derived; x) Whether or not the non-disclosure was innocent is an important consideration, but not necessarily decisive. Immediate discharge (without renewal) is likely to be the court's starting point, at least when the failure is substantial or deliberate. It has been said on more than one occasion that it will only be in exceptional circumstances in cases of deliberate non-disclosure or misrepresentation that an order would not be discharged; xi) The court will discharge the order even if the order would still have been made had the relevant matter(s) been brought to its attention at the without notice hearing. This is a penal approach and intentionally so, by way of deterrent to ensure that applicants in future abide by their duties; xii) The court nevertheless has a discretion to continue the injunction (or impose a fresh injunction) despite a failure to disclose. Although the discretion should be exercised sparingly, the overriding consideration will always be the interests of justice. Such consideration will include examination of i) the importance of the facts not disclosed to the issues before the judge ii) the need to encourage proper compliance with the duty of full and frank disclosure and to deter non-compliance iii) whether or not and to what extent the failure was culpable iv) the injustice to a claimant which may occur if an order is discharged leaving a defendant free to dissipate assets, although a strong case on the merits will never be a good excuse for a failure to disclose material facts; xiii) The interests of justice may sometimes require that a freezing order be continued and that a failure of disclosure can be marked in some other way, for example by a suitable costs order. The court thus has at its disposal a range of options in the event of non-disclosure.”