Debra Cheryl Inman v Trust Alliance Group Ltd [2025] EWHC 3217 (KB)

[2025] EWHC 3217 (KB)Case No KA-2022-000196IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICEHIGH COURT APPEALS CENTREVenue ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICEON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTYCOURT AT READING FROM THEORDER OF HHJ BLOOM DATED 25 JULY 2022Case No G01RG004Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 08/12/2025
Before
MRS JUSTICE HILL DBE
Between
DEBRA CHERYL INMANAppellant/ ClaimantTRUST ALLIANCE GROUP LTDRespondent/ Defendant
The Appellant appeared in person for in person for The Respondent did not attend and was not representedHearing Hearing date: 28 November 2025
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 2pm on Monday 8 December 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

Introduction

[1]This is a renewed application for permission to appeal, permission having been refused on the papers by Soole J on 2 March 2025. The Appellant seeks to appeal against two aspects of an order made by HHJ Bloom (“the Judge”), sitting in the County Court at Reading on 25 July 2022, namely(1) paragraph 18 of the order, whereby the Judge refused to extend the limitation period for the Appellant’s claim under the Equality Act 2010 (“the EQA”); and(2) paragraph 20, whereby the Judge dismissed three applications made by the Appellant in respect of the Respondent’s solicitors. I shall refer to these as, respectively, “appeal (1)” and “appeal (2)”, as Soole J did.[2]The Appellant represented herself at the hearing of her renewed application for permission. In order to save costs for all concerned the Respondent did not attend but provided the court with some key correspondence which set out its position.[3]The Appellant is, as the Judge observed, highly intelligent and very articulate. She has a law degree and previously worked as a tax adviser. She also has mental health difficulties. She has been diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder and Anxiety. I have seen medical evidence from Dr M Hove, Psychiatrist, to this effect. The Appellant has described how this leads to her having memory and concentration difficulties and other cognitive impairments. She has also explained how stressful she has found the proceedings, in particular certain hearings. I accept that she is a vulnerable party for the purposes of CPR PD 1A.[4]Directions were therefore given and arrangements made to assist the Appellant’s participation in the proceedings under paragraph 6 of PD1A. At her request, the hearing was given a two hour time estimate rather than the one hour normally allocated to oral renewal hearings; and was listed in the afternoon. She was given access to a quiet room near the court room before the hearing. I took as generous a view as I fairly could of the very large number of bundles and documents she had filed before the hearing: see further at [40]-[43] below. The Appellant was not required to submit copies of the authorities on which she relied beyond those she had already provided. She remained seated while making her submissions. We took regular breaks. Judicial interruptions were kept to a minimum. In the end, her submissions took nearly 2¼ hours such that it was not possible to give a judgment at the end of the hearing. Rather than convene a further hearing at which the Appellant would need to listen to and process in “real time” an oral judgment, I agreed to provide a written judgment so that the Appellant would have more time to take its contents in. She confirmed at the end of the hearing that she was content with the arrangements that had been made and repeated this in correspondence sent to the court after the hearing.

The factual background

[5]On 16 October 2020, the Appellant issued her claim in the County Court. She advanced claims against the Respondent under the EQA and the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (“the PHA”). Her claim related to her treatment by the Respondent after she contacted them on 19 July 2017 in relation to a dispute she was having with British Telecom. She contended that the Respondent had subjected her to indirect discrimination as a disabled person, failed to make reasonable adjustments for her disabilities and harassed her, causing her injury to her feelings and health. She also sought aggravated and exemplary damages. The conduct by the Respondent of which the Appellant complained ended on 30 November 2017. Thereafter the Appellant pursued a series of complaint processes about the Respondent’s conduct. In her claim, she relied on the fact that the Respondent’s own Independent Assessor had concluded that reasonable adjustments had not been made for her during their process.[6]The Appellant initially accepted that her claim under the EQA had been commenced after “the period of 6 months starting with the date of the act to which the claim relates” which is the primary limitation period for such claims: see the EQA, s.118(1)(a). She therefore applied to the court for an extension of time on the grounds that such an extension would be “just and equitable” under s.118(1)(b). Alongside her claim she served a Witness Statement/Skeleton Argument seeking an extension of time.[7]The Appellant’s claim was issued under Part 8, as it included a claim under the PHA (albeit that it was later transferred to Part 7). The Respondent responded to the claim through a detailed witness statement from Eleanor Beard, Solicitor and Head of Legal and Compliance, dated 8 December 2020. Ms Beard explained that the Respondent is a not-for-profit organisation which operates an alternative dispute resolution and redress scheme in relation to certain consumer disputes. The Respondent put the Appellant to proof of her disabilities and contended that the issue of limitation should be determined at a preliminary hearing. Reference was made to evidential difficulties the Appellant’s delay had caused to the Respondent, such as the fact that recordings had not been retained by the Respondent and the relevant Investigating Officer was no longer employed by them.[8]Various case management orders were made, and the case came before the Judge on 25 July 2022 for determination of the EQA limitation issue, consideration of any further applications that had been made and further case management.

The 25 July 2022 hearing

[9]The Appellant represented herself at this hearing. The Respondent was represented by Mr Greenwood of counsel. I have read the transcript of this hearing in full.[10]The Appellant began her submissions by taking the Judge to various authorities in respect of the discretion to extend time under the EQA, s.118(1)(b): transcript, pp.7-11. She explained that she had pursued her concerns about the Respondent’s treatment of her through the complaints process which had ended on 28 May 2018: p.11. She accepted that she had filed another claim against Aviva in relation to certain insurance monies in March 2018: pp.11-12. She said that by May 2018 her health had massively deteriorated such that she was not well enough to issue this claim: pp.12-14. She said she was not aware of the primary six months limitation period for EQA claims until June 2018, when she was advised she should have commenced the claim in August 2017: pp.13-17. She explained that she had commenced a claim against BT in the middle of 2019, but said this was a “tiny” one compared to the claim against the Respondent: p.18.[11]Prior to the hearing the Appellant had served a further Witness Statement/Skeleton Argument in which she resiled from her concession that the claim had been filed out of time. Rather, she relied on the EQA, s.118(6)(a) which provides that “[f]or the purposes of this section… conduct extending over a period is to be treated as done at the end of the period”. She contended that the Respondent’s discriminatory treatment of her had been continued by their solicitors (Weightmans) such that the limitation period had not yet expired. During the hearing, the Appellant took the Judge to the relevant caselaw on s.118(6)(a), before advancing her complaints about the conduct of the Respondent’s solicitors: pp.24-26.[12]The Respondent’s counsel responded to the latter submission by highlighting that his solicitors were not defendants to the claim: p.28. His submissions indicated that the legal framework with respect to the discretion to extend time was agreed between the parties: p.31. He argued that the last date of the alleged discrimination was 29 (or possibly 22) November 2017; but appeared to accept in submissions that a litigant in person might think that the limitation clock started to run when the complaints procedure had concluded, which was on 29 May 2018: pp.29-30.[13]The Respondent’s counsel accepted that the Appellant had been not in good health at the time of the expiry of the relevant limitation period. However, he observed that she had been well enough to bring two sets of proceedings against different defendants at the relevant time; and submitted that it was not clear why the Appellant had chosen to prioritise the other claims: pp.32-33. He argued that there was no medical evidence to establish that the Appellant had been prevented from bringing this claim at the correct time: pp.33-34.[14]Counsel also referred to a letter the Appellant had sent the Respondent dated 9 January 2018 in which she alleged she had been discriminated against contrary to the EQA. He contended that this letter showed that she had the knowledge of the components of the potential claim well within the expiry of the limitation period, bearing in mind she had a degree in law: pp.34-36. Finally, counsel referred to the prejudice that the Respondent would suffer if time was extended as described in Ms Beard’s evidence: pp.36-37.[15]In her reply submissions, the Appellant contended that there was a public interest in time being extended so that her claim would be heard at trial because the Respondent was the only ombudsman for the energy industry and yet they did not have an adequate reasonable adjustments policy for vulnerable and disabled people: p.41.[16]The Judge then took a break before dealing with the other applications that the Appellant had made. These were, respectively, applications dated 6 July 2021, 5 August 2021 and 13 March 2022. I have located them at pp.2073, 2100 and 2123 of the Appellant’s bundle 2. The 6 July 2021 application sought an order that the Respondent’s solicitors “abide by the law, rules and regulations applicable to this claim with the consequence that they will be held in contempt of court if they do not”. The 5 August 2021 application made the same request and “covers events of the past week”. In the 13 March 2022 application, the Appellant invited the court to exercise its “safeguarding responsibilities in accordance with the [Equal Treatment Bench Book] and grant an emergency hearing to deal with the unlawful behaviour of Weightmans LLP”. The Appellant contended that the behaviour in question had left her suicidal.[17]At the hearing, the Appellant argued that the Respondent’s solicitors had misused the email system, not least as she had not given them authority to contact her by e-mail; they had misled the court about the date they received the claim form; and they had wrongly contacted her at the last minute ahead of a hearing: pp.43-57. The Respondent’s counsel agreed that his solicitors would undertake to avoid corresponding with the Appellant by e-mail unless they were in the 7 day period ahead of a hearing: p.57.[18]The Judge set out the background facts and summarised the Appellant’s position, before noting that the there was no real dispute between the parties as to the law in relation to the EQA limitation position. She observed that the law indicates that the court has an “extremely wide” discretion as to whether to extend time: judgment, paras [1]-[16].[19]The Judge concluded that the first relevant date was the date on which the discriminatory act complained of took place. This was (at the latest) either 22 or 29 November 2017. She observed that it might be just and equitable to extend time if the Appellant was going through a complaints procedure and awaiting the outcome. However, here the complaints procedure had come to an end in May 2018, but the claim had not been started shortly after that. Moreover, this was a time when the Appellant knew that there had been alleged discrimination: this much was clear from her January 2018 letter: [17]-[18].[20]As to the Appellant’s arguments in relation to an alleged continuing act of discrimination, the Judge held that correspondence by the Respondent’s solicitors did not constitute acts by the Respondent. In any event the acts in question involved correspondence about a response to an application the Appellant had brought, a statement of costs and the bundle for a hearing. This was a very different scenario to cases involving, for example, ongoing victimisation: [21].[21]The Judge calculated that the Appellant was seeking an extension for a 2½ year period over and above the primary 6 months limitation period, namely from May 2018 (when the complaints procedure finished) to October 2020 (when the claim was issued): [22].[22]The Judge summarised the Appellant’s argument as being that she had been able to pursue the proceedings against Aviva and BT because they were smaller claims, and although she knew this claim was late, she was unable to progress it because she was “fighting each day to stay alive” given her deteriorating health: [23].[23]The Judge went through the medical evidence before her in some detail. She referred to medical evidence from June 2016, December 2017, various dates in 2018 and some more recent evidence from 2022: [25]-[42]. She noted the Appellant’s evidence about the impact on her mental health of the deaths of her parents in 2016 and 2017: [43].

The Judge’s key conclusions were as follows:

“44. I have no doubt at all...that this lady suffers with a very long history of depression and mental health issues. That is apparent. They go back to 2011. They pre-date the issues that have arisen in this case. They go back well before 2017. 45. There is no medical evidence that she lacked cognitive ability; there is only the assertion of the [Appellant] that she lacked cognitive ability. That is certainly her impression, however although they are not formal assessments, both the recent psychiatrist and the person who assessed her in 2018…found her cognitive abilities…to be “grossly intact” and…in July 2022…[she] was “coherent, appropriate and polite”
. That is not to say that she does not find matters difficult to deal with at all, but there is nothing in the documents before me to suggest that the disability that she is being diagnosed as suffering from in 2022 prevented her from bringing proceedings in 2018, 2019 and most of 2020. 46. Indeed, the documents and the evidence suggests the contrary, that she was able to bring proceedings, because she brought the proceedings against Aviva in March and she brought the proceedings against BT in 2018. She was plainly able to issue proceedings and conduct those proceedings, albeit I have no doubt that both the previous two proceedings and these proceedings are causing her substantial mental anguish. That is not the same as saying that she was not able due to her depression to issue these proceedings. 47. Litigation is very stressful and does cause great anxiety. There was no evidence in 2017 or 2018, when she is reporting about panic attacks, that she cannot function at all. She is in fact refusing to take antidepressants at the time, although they were suggested. When she is seen in 2019, she is saying she does not consider she was depressed at that time. She says to me now, “That was because I didn’t understand what depression was”. 48. That is not really the point. The point is whether or not the court can be satisfied that it is just and equitable to say that she should not have brought these proceedings for two and a half years after the date which she should have. I am simply not satisfied that she has demonstrated before me that the disability she suffered from was such that she could not bring these proceedings. 49. I agree with the [Respondent] that she chose to prioritise two other much more minor cases. She herself said this was the major case, but she chose to prioritise minor cases, left this one and imposed her own deadline, which was six months after the Aviva case had settled. She has given no particular reason why in 2020 at an earlier stage she could not have brought these proceedings. She appears to have taken the view she would give it six months from the Aviva case settling. 50. It is not up to the [Appellant] to decide what the limitation period is. She is a lawyer by background. She was well aware of limitation periods and what they mean. She has told me that she issued the BT claim because she knew it was near the limitation period. She therefore fully [understood] herself by summer 2018 that the limitation period had expired in relation to the Equality Act, and she made a choice, which was not to pursue that case for another two-and-a bit years. That was a choice. 51. The court does have a wide discretion but the delay here is extraordinary. It is not a matter of days, and I remind myself that in Adedeji [v University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust [2021] EWCA Civ 23, [2021] ICR D5] three days was considered to be too much. 52. This is a case where there has been over two years. She sought legal advice. It was not given until April 2018, but she was aware of the claim that she might have, and she chose not to prioritise it or pursue it for over two years. None of the medical evidence suggests there was medical reason for her not to issue these proceedings. 53. There is prejudice, in my view, to the [Respondent]. Of course, a lot turns on the recordings, but memories will have faded. They may not have faded for the [Appellant] because it is so important to her, but they of course will have faded for the [Respondent’s] witnesses, and it does cause prejudice. 54. This is very stale. Everything occurred back in 2017. The legislature imposed a relatively short limitation period in relation to these cases when the Equality Act was passed. Those limitation periods are important. The court has a discretion, but in my view to exercise it in this case would be wrong. 55. I am not prepared to exercise a discretion to allow this claim to be brought over two years after the claim should have been brought. As the [Appellant] herself recognises she has in any event her [PHA] claim. 56. She says there is a public interest in bringing this claim. With due respect to the [Appellant], if she genuinely thought that back in 2018, she could have issued the proceedings then. The same public interest applied then as it does now, but in any event this is not about the greater public interest. I am concerned as to the [Appellant’s] claim against these particular [Respondents]. There are independent assessors you can assess whether or not the [Respondent] is doing a good job or not. 57. This is not about a public interest issue; it is about whether the [Appellant] has a claim against the Respondent. She knew perfectly well what her claim was. She does have mental health issues, but at the time she was not diagnosed with depressive disorder. The view was taken that she did not have a depressive disorder but even if she did I am not satisfied it prevented her from bringing this claim. For those reasons the application to extend time is refused”.[25]At the end of the judgment the Judge said the following about the Appellant’s applications in relation to the Respondent’s solicitors:
“63…As I hope I made clear to the [Appellant] earlier this morning when we were discussing it, it is not for the court to find the solicitors to be in contempt of court. If solicitors behave in a way that is reprehensible, the court can make wasted costs orders where appropriate on application. If the court considers that Weightmans were behaving in some way that was a gross dereliction of duty, they can also make a referral to the [Solicitors Regulatory Authority] but there is nothing before me at the moment that leads me to consider that is appropriate. 64. My understanding regarding the history of the matter is that the court at the previous hearing with District Judge Harrison was satisfied as to when service had taken place. I am not satisfied there was any misleading by the [Respondent’s] solicitors. As far as the emails are concerned, it was not service of documents. It does not come within CPR Part 6, but once it was made clear that the [Appellant] did not want the [Respondent] to contact her by email, they had ceased to do so. 65…As I have made clear as well to the [Appellant], if she wants any reasonable adjustments, she needs to notify the other side first and then the court, and she should not make applications without first writing the other side, because they may agree, in which case the application is otiose”
.

The appeal

[26]The Appellant did not seek leave to appeal any aspect of the Judge’s order at the end of the hearing. The Judge’s order rightly recorded in the preamble that if the Appellant wished to appeal the order she had to do so within 21 days of the date of the hearing and that any such appeal should be to the High Court. On that basis the Respondent calculated that the 21 day period for issuing an application for permission expired at close of business on 15 August 2022.[27]The Appellant did not file her notice of appeal until 20 September 2022. Accordingly, she was 36 days late in doing so.[28]In her Notice and Grounds of Appeal the Appellant made various applications, including seeking an order giving permission for the obtaining of expert psychiatric evidence on a joint basis. She contended that this was relevant to both her EQA claim and her PHA claim, such that she anticipated this evidence, if obtained, being used in her appeal.[29]On 7 December 2022 Lavender J considered the various applications made by the Appellant. He ordered that transcripts of the hearing and the judgment be obtained at public expense and that the transcripts, Skeleton Argument and Appellant’s bundle be filed 42 days after the Appellant received the transcripts. Lavender J also refused the Appellant’s application in relation to expert psychiatric evidence on the basis that(i) if the Appellant’s EQA claim was reinstated after a successful appeal she could apply to the County Court for a direction for a joint report; and(ii) as her PHA claim was still proceeding before the County Court, an application for a direction for a joint report should be, or should have been, made to the County Court.[30]On 15 December 2022 the Respondent set out its position on the appeal in some detail. I have had regard to the contents of that letter.[31]In February and July 2023 respectively, the Appellant received the transcripts of the judgment and the hearing before the Judge, but the appeal did not progress. This was in part because the Respondent had applied for and obtained a judgment in the County Court striking out the Appellant’s PHA claim. The order of HHJ Murch striking out the claim dated 4 May 2023 also ordered that the Appellant pay the Respondent’s costs of the application and the claim, to include all costs previously reserved, on the indemnity basis, to be subject to detailed assessment. She was ordered to make a payment on account of those costs of £85,000 by 4 pm on 1 June 2023. I understand that these costs have not been paid.[32]On 22 December 2023 Cotter J made an unless order in the appeal, requiring the Appellant to comply with the order of Lavender J by 19 February 2024 and in default the appeal would be struck out.[33]On 22 February 2024 Martin Spencer J refused the Appellant’s further applications to extend time limits and declared that the appeal had been struck out under Cotter J’s order.[34]The Appellant applied to set aside Martin Spencer J’s order and Soole J heard that application on 23 April 2024. Soole J extended time for the Appellant to file copies of the transcripts with the court to 30 April 2024 and directed that she provide a Skeleton Argument limited to 25 pages by 30 May 2024. In the same order he recorded that the Appellant had confirmed that for the purposes of her appeal she only relied on her ‘Form N461 bundle’ and those bundles numbered 1, 2, 2B(1), 2B(2), 7(1), 7(2), 8, 9A and 9B.[35]The Appellant did not comply with the direction made by Soole J in respect of the Skeleton Argument. Rather, on 30 May 2024, so on the last day for filing the Skeleton, she applied for a further extension of time. She filed a long witness statement in support dated 30 May 2024. This was 39 pages long in multiple colours. Two weeks later, on 17 June 2024, she filed a further Witness Statement running to 47 pages in multiple colours.[36]On 24 July 2024 Ritchie J considered the Appellant’s application for further time to file the Skeleton. He observed that while the Witness Statements were not entitled “Skeleton Arguments” they set out her complaints about the Judge’s order, albeit that they went “far wider…[and were] not tied to the Grounds of Appeal (which themselves are unfocussed, rambling and did not comply with the requirements in CPR PD52B para 4.2(d)”. He also commented that some of the arguments made in the Grounds and Witness Statements were “irrelevant to the appeal…seek to introduce new evidence [and] many are medical assertions”. His order continued: “In my judgment the Appellant’s approach to this appeal amounts to an abuse of process and will increase the work necessary for the Judge determining the extension of time to appeal and permission to appeal issues. Any Respondent’s involvement in responding to the appeal, were permission to be granted, will be enormously, disproportionately and inappropriately increased by the way the appeal has been presented. However I am not prepared to strike out the [appeal] at this time. What I have decided to do is end the submission of documents now, 1 year and 10 months after the start of the appeal and move the appeal on by treating the Witness Statement of the Appellant filed in time (30.05.2024) as her skeleton. The number and content of the multiple applications made by the [Appellant] in the main action and…in this appeal is disproportionate to the needs of the administration of justice and the needs of the parties in this action. Instead of focusing on multiple extensions of time applications with long witness statements in support setting out her medical conditions, the Appellant is required by the rules to focus on the issues her grounds of appeal, any skeleton argument in support”.[37]The Appellant’s Witness Statement dated 30 May 2024 stated that it needed to be read in conjunction with the following further Witness Statements the Appellant had submitted on the appeal, which I have located in her bundles and reviewed: “a. WS3 submitted 31.10.23 re Medical Records History. b. WS4ii submitted 11.01.2[4] re Public Interest Element. c. WS6 submitted 19.04.24 re Procedural Errors, bias and Disability Discrimination”. c. WS6 submitted 19.04.24 re Procedural Errors, bias and Disability Discrimination”.[38]The Appellant was plainly unhappy with Ritchie J’s order. She sent a detailed letter to the court on 4 August 2024 setting out her concerns about it, but, as far as I can tell, did not seek to appeal it. However, she has not complied with Ritchie J’s order with respect to her Skeleton Argument, and his clear indication that she should “end the submission of documents now”, in the ways set out at [40] and [41] below.[39]On 2 March 2025, Soole J extended time for the Appellant to bring her appeal but refused permission.[40]Notwithstanding Soole J’s order recording, and thereby seeking to limit, the bundles to be used on the appeal, as set out at [34] above, the Appellant filed three further lever arch files of bundles for the renewal hearing, which she referred to as “AB1”, “AB2” and “AB3”. A bundle numbered 1B had also been filed, I understand, in support of the Schedule of Loss referred to at [41] below. However, the Appellant also insisted that the court determining the issue of permission also have available the bundles referred to in Soole J’s order, namely the ‘Form N461 bundle’ and those bundles numbered 1, 2, 2B(1), 2B(2), 7(1), 7(2), 8, 9A and 9B.[41]Notwithstanding Ritchie J’s order directing which document the Appellant could rely on as her Skeleton Argument to be used on the appeal, the Appellant has filed, at least, the following documents:(i) A letter to the court dated 7 October 2024, running to 15 pages, containing submissions as to the requirements for preliminary issue hearings;(ii) Submissions running to 24 pages appended to her application dated 10 May 2025, seeking an oral hearing after the refusal of permission;(iii) A detailed Schedule of Loss dated 27 June 2025, setting out the sums she seeks from the Respondent for pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss;(iv) A Case Summary dated 21 November 2025;(v) A Skeleton Argument running to 18 pages dated 25 November 2025 which she described as her “short, initial Skeleton Argument” for the renewal hearing;(vi) A Skeleton Argument running to 23 pages dated 27 November 2025;(vii) A Skeleton Argument running to 38 pages dated 28 November 2025; and(viii) A 3 page letter dated 1 December 2025 referring to further authorities, an amended version of her 28 November 2025 Skeleton Argument and a highlighted index of evidence she contended had been omitted from the Judge’s consideration, which were filed after the renewal hearing.[42]The conduct of the appeal in his way had precisely the impact on the ability to conduct the renewed hearing for permission that Ritchie J predicted. I had to have in mind that the Appellant had filed a large number of bundles and submissions which she sought to rely on without having permission to do so; and that considering them all in full would almost certainly lead to a disproportionate use of court resources on this appeal. However, I was very conscious of the difficulties in conducting this litigation which the Appellant plainly has and of the fact that this is a renewed application for permission to appeal, at an oral hearing, meaning that if the application failed, it cannot be appealed further to the Court of Appeal.[43]Given those considerations I took the view that the most fair and proportionate way forward was to focus on the arguments in the Grounds of Appeal and the Witness Statement dated 30 May 2024, but to review the documents set out at [41] above (other than the Schedule of Loss) briefly, to establish whether they amplified the points made earlier in any significant way or asserted any new ground that was arguable. If the latter occurred, consideration could be given to permitting the Appellant to, effectively, amend her initial Grounds of Appeal. I disregarded the Schedule of Loss because this would only be relevant if this appeal succeeded and a fresh decision was taken on the EQA limitation issue in the Appellant’s favour and if her substantive claim under the EQA then succeeded. Legal principles relevant to this application for permission to appeal General principles

Legal principles relevant to this application for permission to appeal

[44]Under CPR 52.6, except where rule 52.3B, rule 52.7 or Rule 52.7A applies, none of which are relevant here, permission to appeal may be given only where(a) the court considers that the appeal would have a real prospect of success; or(b) there is some other compelling reason for the appeal to be heard.[45]CPR 52.21(3) provides that the appeal court will allow an appeal where the decision of the lower court was(a) wrong; or(b) unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity in the proceedings in the lower court.[46]In CPR 52.21(3)(a), “wrong” means that the court below(i) erred in law or(ii) erred in fact or(iii) erred (to the appropriate extent) in the exercise of its discretion: White Book 2025, at paragraph 52.21.5.

The formulation of grounds

[47]Under CPR 52.21(5), at the hearing of the appeal, a party may not rely on a matter not contained in that party’s appeal notice unless the court gives permission.

Fresh evidence

[48]Under CPR 52.21(2)(b), unless it orders otherwise, the appeal court will not receive evidence which was not before the lower court.[49]In Hertfordshire Investments Ltd v Bubb [2000] 1 WLR 2318, CA, the Court of Appeal noted that CPR 52.21(2) did not retain the former requirement for “special grounds”, but concluded that the principles reflected in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489, CA remain relevant. They were:(1) the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial;(2) the evidence must be such that, if given, it would probably have an important influence on the result of the case, though it need not be decisive; and(3) the evidence must be such as is presumably to be believed; it must be apparently credible, though it need not be incontrovertible: see Denning LJ at 1491.

Appeals in cases involving judicial discretion and case management decisions

[50]When a matter of judicial discretion is engaged, before an appeal court can interfere “it must be shown that the judge has either erred in principle in his approach, or has left out of account, or taken into account, some feature that he should, or should not, have considered, or that his decision is wholly wrong because the court is forced to the conclusion that he has not balanced the various factors fairly in the scales”: Roache v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1998] EMLR 161 at 172, per Stuart-Smith LJ.[51]Put another way, the question is whether the judge’s exercise of discretion has “exceeded the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible”: Tanfern Ltd v Cameron-MacDonald (Practice Note) [2000] 1 WLR 1311, CA at [32].[52]In a similar vein, in Broughton v Kop Football [2012] EWCA Civ 1743 at [51], Lewison LJ observed as follows:
“Case management decisions are discretionary decisions. They often involve an attempt to find the least worst solution where parties have diametrically opposed interests. The discretion involved is entrusted to the first instance judge. An appellate court does not exercise the discretion for itself. It can interfere with the exercise of the discretion by a first instance judge where he has misdirected himself in law, has failed to take relevant factors into account, has taken into account irrelevant factors or has come to a decision that is plainly wrong in the sense of being outside the generous ambit where reasonable decision makers may disagree. So the question is not whether we would have made the same decisions as the judge. The question is whether the judge’s decision was wrong in the sense that I have explained.”
[53]These observations were approved by the Supreme Court in Global Torch Limited v Apex Global Management Limited (No 2) [2014] UKSC 64 at [13]; and see, to similar effect, BPP Holdings v HMRC [2017] UKSC 55 at [33].

Anonymity

[54]When the Appellant filed her claim with the County Court, by an application dated 12 October 2020, she asked for her name and address to be anonymised in the proceedings. She was informed that the application would be considered on notice at the first hearing that would otherwise be held in public. On 25 June 2021 the Appellant made a further anonymity application.[55]By order dated 20 April 2022 the Appellant’s anonymity applications were refused by DJ Harrison. The order made clear that the Appellant could renew an application orally before the Judge for specific information, such as parts of her medical records, to be kept confidential to the court and the parties, if appropriate, and that any such application could be dealt with on its merits.[56]There is nothing to suggest that the Appellant made such an application in the County Court proceedings, nor in the appeal, until shortly before the oral renewal hearing. On 16 November 2025 she made an application for anonymity by a letter to the court of the same date, supported by a Witness Statement/Skeleton Argument.[57]It was clear from the Appellant’s submissions that her primary concern was press reporting of any material about her medical conditions and this damaging her future employment prospects.[58]The King’s Bench Guide 2025 explains that: “4.11 Open justice is a fundamental principle of our court system. The general rule is that the names of the parties to a claim are included in all court documents, orders and judgments and hearings are publicly listed with the names of the parties. 4.12…Any departure from the principle of open justice should be the minimum strictly necessary in the interests of justice and for the proper administration of justice”.[59]In PMC v A Local Health Board [2025] EWCA Civ 1126 at [108], the Court of Appeal reiterated the key principles with respect to anonymity orders (“AOs”), of which the following are pertinent here: “iv)…anonymity may be necessary in view of the risks posed in the circumstances of the case. Those identified in the case law to date include:(i) risks to the safety of a party or a witness,(ii) risks to the health of a vulnerable person, and(iii) risks of a person suffering commercial ruin. AOs may also be made to protect a party to proceedings from the painful and humiliating disclosure of personal information about them where there was no public interest in its being publicised. Not all categories can be envisaged in advance… vi)…the court has to carry out a fact-specific balancing exercise. Central to the court’s evaluation will be the purpose of the open justice principle, the potential value of the information in question in advancing that purpose and, conversely, any risk of harm which its disclosure may cause to the maintenance of an effective judicial process or to the legitimate interests of others”.[60]In light of these principles I explained to the Appellant that the fact that her case involved medical information was not, of itself, sufficient to justify granting her anonymity, especially as her case had been conducted without any such anonymity in place for over five years.[61]Rather, I explained that I was content to make a very limited order to the effect that any application by a non-party for access to a copy of a statement of case, judgment or order on the court file for this appeal under CPR 5.4C(1) or any application by a non-party for a copy of any other document filed by a party, or communication between the court and a party or another person under CPR 5.4C(2), must be made on 7 days’ notice to the parties, so as to enable the Appellant and the Respondent (if so advised) to make representations to the effect that any confidential matters relating to her health should be redacted before disclosure is made.

Appeal (1): The EQA limitation issue

[62]The Appellant’s Grounds of Appeal were very diffuse, running to some 25 pages of single space text. She did not in any part of the document distil particular grounds of appeal in relation to either appeal (1) or appeal (2). I assume she intended the bold side headings in the Grounds of Appeal to perform that purpose. I have therefore adopted them below, adapting them as appropriate, and adding new points raised by the Appellant since the Grounds were filed, as appropriate. (i): Alleged procedural unfairness (Grounds of Appeal at [2]-[22])[63]Under this part of her Grounds the Appellant made a series of complaints about the conduct of DJ Harrison at the hearing on 19 April 2022, suggesting that the judge had behaved in a hostile, aggressive and biased way towards her. None of these complaints render any aspect of the Judge’s decision with respect to the EQA limitation issue arguably wrong. The Appellant contended that DJ Harrison’s behaviour had made her very unwell. She said that it had hampered her ability to prepare for the 25 July 2022 hearing before the Judge. However, she had been able to prepare extensive bundles and a Witness Statement/Skeleton Argument for the hearing and there is no suggestion from the transcript that when it came to the hearing, the Appellant asked the Judge to adjourn because she needed more time to prepare.[64]The Appellant said that on arriving at court on 25 July 2022 for the hearing before the Judge, she began sobbing and hyperventilating, as a result, she believes, of her treatment by DJ Harrison on the previous occasion.[65]The transcript at p.5 reflects the Appellant becoming tearful towards the start of the hearing. However, the Judge dealt with this sensitively. She told the Appellant that she should take her time, explaining that all her written submissions would be taken into account and that all the Appellant needed to do at the hearing was “signpost” the key points. The Appellant continued with the hearing and the transcript reflects her making clear and focussed submissions. I cannot see that at any point she told the Judge that she could not continue or sought an adjournment. Had she done so the Judge would have taken appropriate action.[66]The Appellant explained that she had spent many hours and incurred significant costs in preparing three sets of bundles for the hearing before the Judge. These ran to over 3,000 pages in 4 lever arch files. On 18 July 2022 the Judge made a case management order ahead of the hearing. She noted that the Appellant’s Skeleton had been received, referring to the 3,000 pages, but that she had not yet seen the bundles. She recorded that as the Appellant was a litigant in person the Respondent should prepare the bundle for the hearing. She directed that this only contain the statements of case, the orders made, the applications to be heard at the hearing and the statements in relation to those applications. The Appellant was very critical of the timing of this case management order. She contended that the late order, and the late arrival of the Respondent’s bundles so close to the hearing, caused her significant distress, such she did not feel well enough to even look at the bundles. She suggested that the Respondent’s bundles were, in any event, unclear in terms of their structure and content. I do not agree.[67]In her 18 July 2022 order the Judge ordered that if the Appellant wished to rely on any documents over and above those in the Respondent’s bundles, she should bring copies of them to court. The Appellant did not do this, no doubt because she had not looked at the Respondent’s bundles. At the outset of the hearing, the Appellant told the Judge that she had not looked at the Respondent’s bundles. The Judge explained to the Appellant that she would work primarily from the Respondent’s much briefer bundles. However, she made clear to the Appellant that if there was material in her bundles (which by that point had been located by the court) that she wished to take the Judge to, she should do so: transcript, pp. 5-6. In other words, the Judge did not in any way exclude the Appellant’s evidence: she merely took the sensible case management step of managing the hearing by reference to one set of bundles, but explained that the Appellant could highlight additional evidence in her own bundles if she wished. There was no procedural unfairness in this course.[68]In her Witness Statement dated 30 May 2024 the Appellant contended that HHJ Bloom had not made adequate reasonable adjustments for her during the hearing. The Appellant has amplified this argument in her more recent documents, by reference to extensive citations from the Equal Treatment Bench Book of which she was very complimentary. I cannot see that this argument was raised in terms in the Appellant’s Grounds which focussed, instead, on the allegedly poor conduct of DJ Harrison. On that basis the Appellant would need the court’s permission to pursue this new argument, pursuant to CPR 52.21(5).[69]However there would be no purpose in granting such permission because I do not consider this new point arguable. The Appellant is right to highlight that in some, but not all, cases a ground rules hearing can assist. This was not a case where it was arguably wrong not to have held one. The transcript makes clear that the Judge recognised that the Appellant was in difficulties and took regular breaks during the hearing. She took time to explain the procedure to the Appellant. Although there was a certain amount of intervention during the arguments about the Appellant’s applications with respect to the Respondent’s solicitors, judicial interruptions during the Appellant’s submissions on the EQA limitation issue were quite limited and not inappropriate.[70]In the Appellant’s Skeleton Argument dated 27 November 2025 the Appellant contended for the first time that the hearing before the Judge should have been conducted with an assessor under the EQA, s.114(7). The section provides that the power to sit with an assessor on the determination of a claim under the EQA must be exercised unless the judge is satisfied that there are good reasons for not doing so. I know of no authority to the effect that this section applies to a preliminary issue trial on limitation in EQA proceedings, rather than the trial on the merits, but even if it does, it can be seen that s.114(7) does not set out a mandatory requirement to sit with an assessor. Again, therefore, I would refuse the Appellant permission to add this ground under CPR 52.21(5).[71]For these reasons I do not consider that any of the various procedural concerns advanced by the Appellant rendered the Judge’s decision arguably wrong. (ii): The Judge’s approach to the Appellant’s legal knowledge (Grounds of Appeal at [23]-[26])[72]The Appellant contends in this part of her Grounds that the Judge erred by imbuing her with legal knowledge she did not have. She has emphasised that she graduated with her law degree in 1989 and chose to become a tax adviser, primarily working in the accountancy profession with some time at a private bank. She observes that the Civil Procedure Rules were introduced in 1997 after she graduated. She submitted that the HMCTS guidance on the internet did not make clear to litigants in person that they should follow the CPR (although I do not accept this).[73]I do not consider this an arguable ground of appeal. The Judge had been provided with detailed written and oral submissions from the Appellant, which she was able to assess. The transcript makes clear that the Appellant took the Judge to the appropriate authorities on the EQA limitation issue. It was also agreed that the Appellant had filed two other claims during the currency of the limitation period of this claim. In those circumstances the Judge was entitled to regard the Appellant as someone with some knowledge of both substantive law and procedure, more so than many litigants in person who appear in the courts. This was directly relevant to the question of whether the Appellant had acted reasonably in electing not to bring this claim within the limitation period or not. There was no arguable error in the Judge’s approach on this issue. (iii): The Judge’s approach to the medical evidence (Grounds of Appeal at [27]-[48])[74]In this part of her Grounds the Appellant argues that the Judge ignored certain aspects of the medical evidence. She sets out a series of extracts from the medical evidence which she contends shows how unwell she was as a result of the Respondent’s conduct, and how this explains why she was simply too unwell to bring her EQA claim any earlier. These submissions, amplified in her Witness Statement dated 30 May 2024, her Skeleton Argument dated 25 November 2025 and various other documents, effectively re-argue the position the Appellant adopted before the Judge. They do not illustrate that the Judge’s assessment of the medical evidence was wrong.[75]As I have indicated at [23] above, the Judge conducted a thorough assessment of what she considered to be the key parts of the medical evidence. The Judge then factored the conclusions of that assessment into her overall determination of whether it would be just and equitable to extend time under the EQA. The Judge did not arguably err in this respect.[76]During the hearing the Appellant took me to several examples of documents relating to her medical issues which she contended the Judge had not taken into account, from her bundle 8. These comprised(i) evidence showing that in March 2018 she had to cease attending therapy she had been receiving at the Bridewell Mental Health Therapy Centre since the death of her father in November 2017;(ii) a letter from her GP dated 6 August 2018 asking that her significant mental health issues be taken into account in her application for legal aid;(iii) a letter from the Legal Aid Agency dated 20 September 2018 confirming that she had been granted Exceptional Funding for her claim against Aviva in part based on medical evidence;(iv) a letter from a community psychiatric nurse dated 5 November 2018 indicating that they had discussed the possibility of the Appellant “letting go of some of her legal disputes” but the Appellant saying she did not feel able to do this;(v) documentation relating to a police welfare check on her on 27 November 2018 given her then suicidal state; and(vi) a letter she had written to the County Court on 18 December 2019 asking for the audio recordings of the 15 February 2019 and 20 May 2019 hearings in the Aviva claim, as she considered that her memory was failing her.[77]The Appellant was highly critical of the Respondent for excluding these documents from its bundles for the hearing. However, she accepted that they had been in her bundles. Given the Judge’s express indication to the Appellant that she was permitted to refer to her own bundles as set out at [67] above, it is not clear to me why she did not take the Judge to these documents, if that was indeed the case. This was, after all, the Appellant’s application to extend time under the EQA, to the extent necessary. It was therefore her responsibility to take the Judge to the evidence that she contended supported her position on the limitation issue. It cannot be said that the Judge’s decision was arguably wrong because it did not include consideration of medical evidence which the Appellant had not taken her to. In any event none of these documents show any fundamental flaw in the Judge’s assessment of the medical evidence, as part of her overall decision as to whether the exercise the discretion to extend time, not least because with the exception of document (vi) they focus on her mental state in 2018 and not 2019 and January-October 2020, when the EQA limitation period was still running.[78]In her Witness Statement dated 30 May 2024 the Appellant advanced a new overarching argument to the effect that the Judge did “not understand…the difference between cognitive capacity and intelligence”. To the extent necessary I decline permission to the Appellant to rely on this argument under CPR 52.21(5) because I do not consider it arguable: read as a whole the Judge’s judgment makes clear that she took care to distinguish between the Appellant’s intelligence and her cognitive functioning: see, for example, her findings set out at [45] of her judgment, at [24] above.[79]In her letter to the court dated 1 December 2025, the Appellant sought to rely on the Employment Tribunal decision in Mrs M Fabry (as Personal Representative of the Estate of Mr K Fabry) v Statham Gill Davies Solicitors and S Chamberlain (Case No 2204809/2019 and 2203791/2023). This is a first instance decision that does not establish any new legal principles. It was decided on its own facts. The Tribunal considered that it was appropriate to extend time after 3½ years delay because otherwise the applicant’s access to justice would be denied due to a “bizarre combination of an obscure and highly technical legal issue, inefficiencies in the Tribunal administrative processes exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic, and the health [and] safety emergency that befell on London Central Employment Tribunal in December 2020”, noting that there was “little, if any, prejudice to the respondent”: [68]-[69]. Those facts are very different to the facts in this case. For these reasons the decision in Fabry does not illustrate that the Judge’s decision in this case was arguably wrong. (iv): The applications to submit fresh evidence on appeal (Grounds of Appeal at [49]-[72] and Witness Statement dated 30 May 2024 at [12])[80]In her Grounds, the Appellant sought to admit fresh evidence in her appealnamely(i) a Department for Work and Pensions (“DWP”) capability assessment covering the period 7 May 2018 to 30 October 2018; and(ii) a Notice to Quit served on her by her landlord on 23 September 2019 which required her to leave her property by 29 November 2019 and which she contended thereby rendered her homeless.[81]The Appellant contended that at the time she wrote her second Witness Statement/Skeleton Argument for the hearing before the Judge, she was still suffering the side-effects of the anti-depressants which she had recently been prescribed; and was still processing the diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder which she had recently received. She argued that that these matters together with her pre-existing memory and cognition difficulties meant that she simply forgot to refer the Judge to the fact that during the period of time when the EQA claim should have been lodged, she had been subjected to two other stressors, namely a difficult capability assessment process with the DWP and being evicted from her home.[82]Although the DWP evidence and Notice to Quit are apparently credible items of evidence, I do not consider that either satisfies criteria(1) or(2) from Ladd v Marshall, as set out at [49] above.[83]As to criteria (1), this evidence was available to the Appellant before the hearing. There is no medical evidence to support the Appellant’s assertions about her state of mind in the weeks preceding that hearing. She had certainly been well enough to prepare a detailed Witness Statement/Skeleton Argument and bundles. Moreover, I suspect that any reasonable clinician would struggle to give evidence to the effect that her mental state was such that she was capable of remembering certain things but not others. If in fact her eviction was as significant a life event as she says, it is perhaps all the more surprising that she did not mention it.[84]However, even if criteria(1) is met, I do not consider criteria(2) is. The Judge was well aware of the health difficulties the Appellant was facing between May 2018 and October 2020. However, there were other factors which ultimately led the Judge to decide not to extend time, including the fact that the Appellant had chosen to prioritise her other litigation, the length of the extension she required relative to the primary time limit, the prejudice that would be caused to the Respondent if time was extended and the fact that she had another overlapping, in time, claim namely that under the PHA. In those circumstances, I do not consider that evidence of additional difficulties in the Appellant’s life at the material time would probably have had an important influence on the Judge’s conclusion.[85]In her Witness Statement dated 30 May 2024 the Appellant referred to the UK Commission on Bereavement report dated 26 October 2022 which recognises that in the absence of the support they need, some adults suffer from clinical depression and suicidal ideations following bereavement. She effectively also applied to admit this as fresh evidence on the appeal. While this report would meet Ladd v Marshall criteria(1) and (3), it would also fail to meet(2) for the reasons given in the preceding paragraph: whatever be the (probably non-controversial position) regarding the general potential impact of bereavement on people, the Judge had to look at the impact of multiple bereavements on this Appellant, in the context of all the medical evidence about her, and all the other factors relevant to the EQA limitation issue. I do not therefore consider that the UK Commission on Bereavement report would probably have had an important influence on the Judge’s conclusion.[86]The same is true of the additional evidence from, for example, the Covid 19 Inquiry dated 13 June 2023 and Transparency International UK dated 30 January 2024 included in the Appellant’s bundle 2B under the heading “public interest/whistleblowing claims”; the various reports about the energy sector and the Respondent included in the Appellant’s bundle 7(2) of “public interest evidence”; and the further items of evidence said to be relevant to the public interest referred to in the Appellant’s 61 page Witness Statement 4ii, submitted on 11 January 2024. I observe that some of these reports would also fail Ladd v Marshall criteria (1) as they pre-date the hearing before the Judge; and that no application to admit any of this material as fresh evidence on appeal was explicitly made. (v): Allegedly unreasonable behaviour of the Respondent’s solicitors amounting to a continuing act (Grounds of Appeal at [73]-[91])[87]In this part of her Grounds the Appellant repeated her novel argument that although the alleged discrimination by the Respondent had ended in November 2017, the conduct of the Respondent’s solicitors after they were instructed had the effect of amounting to a continuing act of discrimination.[88]The Appellant was correct in referring to several legal principles about the broad concept of agency in this context; and the fact that in certain circumstances a Respondent’s conduct of litigation can itself be an act of victimisation or merit an award of aggravated damages.[89]However, in my judgment there was nothing arguably wrong in the reasoning the Judge gave for rejecting the Appellant’s argument on this issue. In particular, the Judge was right to focus on the fact that the Respondent’s solicitors were not Defendants to the claim, which I consider to be the fundamental flaw in the Appellant’s continuing act argument. That is because the word “conduct” in s.118(6)(a) relates to the conduct of the Defendant, because the purpose of that subsection is to inform s.118(1)(a), which refers to “the act to which the claim relates”, ie. the act of the Defendant on which the Claimant is suing. This does not, in my view, extend to the acts of a Defendant’s solicitor unless they are made a Defendant to the claim, in their capacity as purported agent. (vi): The Appellant’s telephone recordings (Grounds of Appeal at [92]-[95])[90]The Appellant provided the court with two recordings of calls with the Respondent which she contended amounted to essential evidence that the Judge below had not taken into account. Although she strictly had no permission to rely on this evidence in her appeal I listened to both recordings.[91]The first recording file name is “08.09.17 11.06am”, which I assume reflects the call taking place on 8 September 2017 at 11.16 am. It is just under 11 minutes long. This was a call between a male caller and the Respondent. The caller stated that he was ringing on behalf of someone else (ie. the Appellant) and provided the relevant reference number. During the call he indicated that the way in which the Respondent was communicating with the Appellant was making her unwell and that she was very vulnerable. He asked for this information to be passed on.[92]The second recording file name is “29.11.17 16.23pm”, which I assume reflects the call taking place on 29 November 2017 at 11.23 pm. It is just under 39 minutes long. The Appellant was the caller. She explained how disappointed she was with the Respondent’s service. She said that she had filed an official complaint about one member of the Respondent’s staff, who had caused her significant harm. She provided the tracking reference number to confirm her posting of the complaint. The Appellant was very frustrated to be told that she had sent the complaint to the wrong address, such that it could not be located, and that she needed to re-submit it. The Respondent’s member of staff explained how the Appellant could lodge a complaint about service via their website. The Appellant expressed concern that a final decision was being made the following day when she had not yet provided all the information she wanted to.[93]The central period of time with which the Judge was concerned for the purposes of the EQA limitation issue was May 2018 to October 2020, for the reasons set out at [21] above. Accordingly, while these recordings may have been relevant to any trial of the merits of the Appellant’s EQA or PHA claims, and in particular to the Appellant’s contention that the Respondent’s conduct had made her very unwell, they were not directly relevant to the EQA limitation issue, which related to events which post-dated 29 November 2017.[94]It follows that even if this evidence was admitted into the Appellant’s appeal, it does not illustrate any arguable error by the Judge with respect to appeal (1). (vi): The public interest issue (Witness Statement dated 30 May 2024 at [74])[95]In her Witness Statement dated 30 May 2024 at [74] the Appellant advanced a further new point to the effect that the Judge had erred in her assessment of the public interest issue in her claim, as part of her consideration of whether to extend time. Her submissions on this issue repeated the point she had made to the Judge about the Respondent being the only ombudsman for the energy industry and yet not making adequate provision for vulnerable and disabled people, set out at [15] above. The Appellant plainly disagrees with the Judge’s assessment of the extent to which her claim raises wider public interest issues but that does not generate unarguable ground of appeal. However, the weight to be attached to particular factors was a matter for the first instance judge. An appeal court will only interfere if the judge’s assessment was plainly wrong in the Broughton sense. That was not the case with respect to this issue, such that again I would refuse the Appellant permission to take this new point under CPR 52.21(5). (vii): The decision to determine the EQA limitation issue as a preliminary issue (Appellant’s letter to the court dated 7 October 2024)[96]In her letter to the court dated 7 October 2024, the Appellant contended that she had only just become aware of the principles underpinning the court’s power to order the trial of a preliminary issue under CPR 3.1(2(j). She cited several lengthy extracts from the relevant cases. The Appellant is right to highlight that, in summary, the caselaw establishes that caution needs to be exercised in ordering a trial of a preliminary issue especially where there are significant disputes of fact and/or where ordering a preliminary issue trial will not ultimately save time or resources. She contended that it was wrong for the EQA limitation issue to have been determined as a preliminary issue in this case.[97]This is not a further potential ground of appeal in relation to the HHJ Bloom’s order dated 25 July 2022, but rather an attempt to appeal the earlier order of DJ Harrison ordering that the EQA limitation issue be determined as a preliminary issue. That order is dated 20 April 2022. Accordingly, the Appellant is well over 3 years out of time to appeal that decision. The Appellant alluded to an argument that might address this issue, to the effect that HHJ Bloom had erred by continuing with the trial of a preliminary issue in this case, notwithstanding DJ Harrison’s order.[98]However, I do not consider it arguable that either Judge erred. While the Appellant is right that EQA limitation issues often involve factual matters, it is not uncommon for them to be determined as preliminary issues because if the application for an extension of time fails there will be no need for a trial and thus a saving of time and resources.[99]Further, contrary to the Appellant’s assertion, Larkfleet Ltd v Allison Homes Eastern Ltd [2016] EWHC 195 (TCC), a Technology and Construction Court case, is not authority for the proposition that a preliminary issue trial must proceed by way of a Schedule of Assumed Facts.[100]Here, it would not have been feasible to seek to agree the central factual dispute on the EQA limitation issue, namely whether or not the Appellant’s mental health and functioning had prevented her from bringing this claim any earlier. Rather, the Judge performed the entirely appropriate judicial exercise of considering the evidence and making findings on this issue, before factoring those findings into her overall assessment of whether to extend time.

Conclusion on appeal (1)

[101]As the Judge recognised s.118(1)(b) afforded her a broad discretion as to whether to extend time on “just and equitable” grounds. The Judge took into account all the factors placed before her by the Appellant and explained why she did not consider it appropriate to extend time in a detailed judgment. While she afforded due regard to the Appellant’s medical issues, there were a series of other factors which led her to conclude that it was not appropriate to extend time.[102]For the reasons set out above, I am not persuaded that any of the grounds or potential grounds advanced by the Appellant are arguable. There is no arguable basis for contending that the Judge erred in any of the ways set out in Broughton, noted at [52] above. I therefore refuse permission on appeal (1).

Appeal (2): The Appellant’s applications in relation to the Respondent’s solicitors

[103]At section 5 of the Appellant’s Notice, the Appellant indicated that the Appellant sought to appeal the Judge’s order in respect of these applications.[104]At section 9, which asks “What are you asking the appeal court to do?” the Appellant wrote as follows: “I apologise to the court for pointing out the obvious, but this section is a prime example that the Justice system in England still cannot accommodate LIP and disabled LIPs in particular. I am not qualified to draft Court Orders therefore the following has been phrased in layman’s terms: …To Allow my Equality Act 2010 claim under the just and equitable provision contained in section 118(1)(b) of the Equality Act 2010. …To rule the behaviour of Mr McWilliams [the Respondent’s solicitor] unreasonable and a further act of indirect discrimination, amounting to a continuing act of discrimination on behalf of the [Respondent]”.[105]By completing section 9 as she did the Appellant had made very clear what she wanted the court to do in respect of her appeal (1). However, section 9 was silent as to appeal (2). The wording of section 9 suggested that the real relevance of the conduct of the Respondent’s solicitor before the Judge, as far as the Appellant was concerned, was because it contributed to her continuing act argument under appeal (1), addressed at [87]-[89] above.[106]This theme has permeated the Appellant’s further submissions. None of the Grounds of Appeal appended to the Appellant’s Notice or her further submissions have specifically addressed appeal (2) other than repeating various assertions about the conduct of the Respondent’s solicitor.[107]To the extent that the Appellant really does intend to appeal the Judge’s dismissal of the applications relating to the Respondent’s solicitors’ conduct as a discrete ground, rather than relying on it as part of her continuing act argument under appeal (1), I refuse permission.[108]I do so because I agree with Soole J that the transcript shows the care with which the Judge listened to the arguments advanced by the Appellant in respect of the alleged conduct of the Respondent’s solicitors and explained why she was dismissing these unusual applications. The further reasons given in her judgment set out at [25] above explain her rationale perfectly sensibly. There is no basis for concluding that this case management decision was flawed in any of the ways set out in Broughton. The Judge’s dismissal of the Appellant’s application to add claims in respect of psychiatric injury and loss of earnings[109]The Appellant’s Case Summary dated 21 November 2025 raised, for the first time, the suggestion that the Appellant was in fact trying to appeal the Judge’s dismissal of a separate application dealt with at the hearing, namely her application dated 8 July 2022 to add additional claims in respect of psychiatric injury and loss of earnings. The Judge dismissed that application at [19] of the order.[110]It is now over 3 years since the Judge made that decision and I cannot see that it has featured in the key submissions in the appeal at all. Insofar as an application to extend time to appeal this order and advance this ground was made, I would not grant it, primarily because I cannot discern any arguable error in the Judge’s approach to this application.[111]The Judge dismissed this application for the reasons given in her judgment at [59]-[63]. She explained that there were two primary reasons for this:(i) the Appellant had not yet been able to formulate what the claim was and to the extent that the Appellant was seeking to bring a claim for a breach of duty of care leading to psychiatric injury that would need to be properly formulated; and(ii) the medical evidence currently before the court did not show that the Appellant’s Major Depressive Disorder as diagnosed in 2022 had been caused directly by the Respondent’s acts: rather the focus of the evidence appeared to be on the fact that the various sets of litigation in which the Appellant had been involved were exacerbating her pre-existing difficulties.[112]Further, the Judge made clear that if the Appellant was able to obtain evidence that showed a clear link between her current mental health and the Respondent’s actions and was able to draft some sort of claim, then the court would consider a fresh application to amend, albeit that the Appellant would need to consider the issue of limitation. On that basis, the Judge had left open the option of the Appellant reverting to the court at this issue. It would therefore be premature and inappropriate to seek to appeal this decision.

The draft judgment process

[113]The parties were provided with a draft of this judgment just before 2 pm on Tuesday 2 December 2025, with an indication that the judgment would be handed down at 2 pm on Monday 8 December 2025. On Wednesday 3 December 2025 the Appellant indicated that she would need a month to respond to it. I extended time for the provision of any proposed typographical amendments to 10.30 am on Monday 8 December 2025.[114]Accordingly, the Appellant was afforded three full working days, and a weekend, to provide any typographical errors she had identified in the draft. This is longer than the usual timescale set out in PD40E, paragraph 2.3, which indicates that the draft judgment will be provided “by 4 p.m. on the second working day before handing down”.[115]In submissions filed at 9.45 pm on Sunday 7 December 2025 the Appellant contended that she had not had sufficient time to respond to the draft judgment due to the stress of the hearing which had left her feeling unwell, such that she could only work on the draft judgment for 10 minutes at a time. No medical evidence to support these assertions was provided. The Appellant was nevertheless well enough to provide a 4 page document advancing a series of submissions and observations, dated Sunday 7 December 2025. These advanced arguments in support of an application for permission to appeal my order to the Court of Appeal or Supreme Court, as to which, see [118] below.[116]In all the circumstances I concluded that it was appropriate to proceed to the handing down of the judgment. If any genuine factual errors are identified at a later stage, an application can be made for a correction to the judgment under the slip rule in CPR 40.12. The Appellant has been advised of this.

Conclusion

[117]For all these reasons, I refuse permission to appeal. The appeal would have no real prospects of success and there is no other compelling reason for the appeal to be heard.[118]Permission to appeal having been refused, this decision is final and cannot itself be appealed to the Court of Appeal. If the Appellant nevertheless wishes to make an application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal, she will need to provide fresh bundles.[119]In respect of the costs of this appeal, in her Appellant’s Notice, the Appellant sought an order “reserving the costs of the appeal to be costs in the case, in accordance with CPR 52.19(3)”. The nature of the order sought by the Appellant was not entirely clear to me. The phrase “reserving the costs of the appeal to be costs in the case” suggested to me that she somehow sought to link the costs of the appeal with the costs of her underlying claim. Such an order would not generally be appropriate and certainly not here when the underlying claim has been struck out. CPR 52.19 is not really applicable to this case. In my judgment the Respondent was right to contend, as it did in its 15 December 2022 letter, that the normal rules as to costs should apply.[120]However, application of those normal rules does not lead me to conclude that any costs order should be made on this appeal. Despite the length of this appeal process, ultimately it has not proceeded beyond the permission stage. The Respondent has very sensibly limited its costs exposure, has not filed a Respondent’s Notice and did not attend the renewal hearing. In those circumstances it is appropriate to make no order for costs, meaning the Appellant will bear her own costs and the Respondent will bear theirs.[121]The costs orders made in the County Court stand.[122]Accordingly, I will make an order to the effect that(1) any application by a non-party for access to a copy of a statement of case, judgment or order on the court file under CPR 5.4C(1) or a copy of any other document filed by a party, or communication between the court and a party or another person under CPR 5.4C(2), must be made on 7 days’ notice to the parties;(2) permission to appeal is refused; and(3) there is to be no order for costs on this appeal.