“Before entering court, counsel for the defendants raised with counsel for the claimant the question of recordings of expert assessments. The matter was discussed and agreement reached between respective counsel that in relation to the parties’ neuropsychological assessments the interview section of the assessments would be recorded but that the testing would not be recorded. Accordingly, at the hearing itself counsel for the defendants submitted to the Deputy Master details of that agreement and I was told that the Master expressed satisfaction with that outcome.”
“At the time I made that decision I was oblivious of the agreement at the CMC a year earlier not to record the neuropsychological testing. Had I been cognisant of that agreement, that would have swayed me into advising the claimant not to record and simply to run the risk of not having the backup of a recording.”
“I am of the opinion that the claimant has suffered psychological and neuropsychological sequelae secondary to the index event. However, her failure on tests of performance validity make it extremely difficult to determine whether she continues to have psychological or neuropsychological symptoms and if so, how severe they are. I am of the opinion that their cause is non-organic in origin.”
“The main concern from my review is the potential impact of the assessment procedures on the performance validity tests which were indicated by Professor Baker as causing concern. In my view that interpretation should be considered with caution and it is unsafe to indicate lack of effort regarding her performances. This is also taking into account that she passed the direct measurement of effort when I saw her. It seems more likely to me that there is variability in performance between assessments due to her problems with attention and factors such as fatigue effects, which are on top of neuropsychological weaknesses in everyday life. There is also the issue of whether Professor Baker’s instruction concerning filling in the symptom questionnaire may have biased her responses to indicate more problems, for example the anxiety and depression and so on. If so this could have implications when weighting the evidence in terms of brain injury versus non-organic factors. Specifically greater non-organic psychological difficulties could be used to explain more of her overall symptoms as an alternative to brain injury causation.”
“After the claimant issued her present application Professor Baker informed my firm that the Q-interactive software he uses automatically sound records the testing process and that it would be possible to retrieve that audio recording. He tells me, and I believe, that neither he nor his colleague Dr Duncan nor anyone else has retrieved, let alone listened to the recording of the claimant’s testing and there is no present intention to do so, unless it becomes necessary as a result of the outcome of this application for instance to carry out a comparison of the recordings.”
“Professor Morris does not use the Q-interactive software and there is currently no evidence that his assessment of the claimant was the subject of an audio recording and so it remains the case that there is no possibility of a level playing field being achieved where the assessment of only one party’s expert was recorded.”
“It is important to note that [it was not contended] that the manner of obtaining the recording should of itself lead to that exclusion. Counsel accepts the proposition that evidence that had been unlawfully or improperly obtained might still be admissible. What was required was that the court should consider the means employed to obtain the evidence, together with its relevance and probative value and the effect that admitting or not admitting it would have on the fairness of the litigation process and the trial. The task of the court was to balance these factors together and, having regard to the overriding objective, arrive at a judgment whether to admit or to exclude. To put it differently, the issue is whether the public policy interest in excluding evidence improperly obtained was trumped by the important but narrow objective of achieving justice in the particular case. This approach, from which Mr Grant, did not dissent, seems to me to be fully in line with the authorities to which I was referred and which I need not set out. I do, however, note that in the majority of such cases the balance has been struck in favour of admitting the evidence”