KKK v Elena Tsirlina [2025] EWHC 2963 (KB)

[2025] EWHC 2963 (KB)Case No KB-2024-001978
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate Monday 10 th November 2025
Before
DUNCAN ATKINSON KC(Sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court)
Between
KKKClaimantELENA TSIRLINADefendant
MR PAUL FISHER (instructed by Strata Solicitors Limited trading as Caytons) appeared for DEFENDANTThe Claimant appeared in person for in personHearing Hearing date: 11 th September 2025
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on Monday 10 th November 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................DUNCAN ATKINSON KC

DUNCAN ATKINSON KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge:

[1]On or around 25 June 2024, the Claimant brought a claim against Defendant "for breach of contract and confidentiality" which he alleges "resulted in significant financial and emotional harm, and endangerment to his family and witnesses".[2]On 2 October 2024, Master Davison granted an anonymity application in relation to the Claimant. This judgement is drafted to reflect the terms of that Order.[3]On 27 November 2024, the Defendant made an application for reverse summary judgment pursuant to CPR 24.3 or, alternatively, for the claim and particulars of claim to be struck out pursuant to CPR 3.4(2). That application was listed before me on 17 March 2025. The Claimant did not attend that hearing. For reasons set out in my judgment of 30 April 2025 (from paragraph 12 onwards), to which I shall return below, I determined to proceed with the hearing in his absence, pursuant to CPR 23.11.[4]Judgment was handed down on 30 April 2025. It had been circulated to the parties in draft sometime earlier than that. On 26 April 2025, shortly before the judgment was handed down, the Court received and sealed an application made pursuant to CPR 39.3 for the decision that had not yet been handed down to be set aside. Given that the judgment to be handed down related to an application made at the hearing on 17 March 2025, which required a determination, the Court proceeded to hand down that judgment on 30 April 2025 and then to entertain an application to set aside the judgment that had been handed down. That application is the primary matter which this judgment seeks to address.[5]However, also on 26 April 2025, the Court received a series of additional applications on behalf of the Claimant. It is right to say that some of those applications had been alluded to as drafts before that date and there is some uncertainty as to whether in fact some of them had been provided to the Court earlier by the Claimant, or, if they had, whether they had been issued at that time. The question of whether these applications had been issued or sealed is one to which I will return. In summary, those applications amounted to:(a) an application for the Claimant to be treated as a litigant's friend for his children, by reference to a Form N235, pursuant to CPR Part 21;(b) an application for Caytons Solicitors, the Defendant’s solicitors, to be added as a defendant in the proceedings;(c) an application for the proceedings to be conducted pursuant to the Closed Material Procedure in CPR Part 82;(d) an application to appeal the anonymity order of Master Davison on 2 October 2024 (hereafter the ‘Davison Order’);(e) The Claimant also refers to an application, by reference to a Form N244, for protective measures for a minor. In fact, that appears to be another document relating to the Davison Order, rather than an application to add the child as a claimant or to seek other relief for the child.[6]On 17 May 2025, the case was listed before me primarily to allow for the Claimant to make his application for the Court to set aside its judgement of 30 April 2025. I was also invited to deal with these other applications. I determined that it was appropriate, first, that the status of each of these applications should be clarified, in terms of whether and if so when they had been issued. It was, secondly, also appropriate that both sides were able to present comprehensive evidence and submissions in relation to these various applications. I therefore adjourned the case until 11 September 2025, with a detailed Order as to the preparation I considered necessary for that hearing.[7]Those directions included a requirement that the Claimant serve issued versions of his applications, or evidence of the steps he had taken to issue those applications, together with a consolidated witness statement and skeleton argument in advance of the hearing on 11 September 2025. It is right to say that the Claimant has failed to comply with any of those Orders. He has also not sought relief from sanctions for that breach. There is an issue as to whether a packet of material, including a witness statement, was sent to the Court but lost.[8]Although not referred to at the hearing on 14 May 2025, my attention has now also been drawn to an application, dated 15 August 2024, for an Order that the Defendant file her Defence within prescribed time. Like the other applications, I shall return to this application below.[9]On 11 September 2025, the Claimant presented a detailed “Position Statement”, which he read to the Court before providing an English translation of it in writing. Contrary to the Court’s order of 14 May 2025, that Position Statement had not been served in advance of the hearing. He was, nevertheless, permitted to present it. The Claimant both in that Position Statement and in his oral submissions made a complaint as to the handling of his written applications by the Court, including the majority of the above applications. In short, he alleges that his applications were lost by the Court. In addition, he complained that a packet of sensitive material addressed to the Court in support of his CPR Part 82 application had been lost by the Court. At the conclusion of his reply to the Defendant’s submissions, he alleged that this packet had been lost by me, and he applied that I should recuse myself from the determination of the case as a result. I return to this application below.[10]It is argued on behalf of the Defendant that the only sealed application to be considered by this Court is the application, dated 26 April 2025, to set aside its judgment of 30 April 2025. The Defendant accepts, however, that it is appropriate to consider the merits of each of the other applications that the Claimant advances, both for certainty going forward and because of their potential impact on the Court’s judgement of 30 April 2025. This judgment seeks to address all of these various applications. If any have merit, it is right that they be considered. If they do not, it is important that this is made clear.

The core issue in the proceedings brought by the Claimant

[11]In his Position Statement, the Claimant asserts “this claim is not about compensation; it is a claim concerning the threat to the life of the Claimant, his wife and his children”. It is important, in assessing this assertion, and for that matter in considering the Claimant’s application for the Court to set aside its judgement of 30 April 2025, to consider the context.[12]In December 2014, the Claimant engaged the Defendant’s legal services in relation to his claim for asylum in the UK. The letter of engagement was dated 11 December 2014. In the context of that application, the Claimant completed a detailed witness statement, dated 28 September 2015, in which he detailed the reasons for his departure from his country of origins and his treatment by the state authorities there. He did not suggest any issues with his ability to provide that witness statement. He did not separately enumerate any separate threat to his children, who he named. The asylum claim was successful.[13]Thereafter, the Claimant further engaged the Defendant’s legal services to act for him in the preparation and submission of a claim to the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter ‘ECtHR’), and a second retainer was entered into for this purpose on 18 March 2016. This second instruction was not successful, and resulted in a complaint by the Claimant to the Legal Ombudsman (hereafter ‘LeO’), in relation to a failure to submit the claim before the relevant deadline. It is important to note that the Provisional Decision addressed specifically the failure to meet the deadline for submission to the ECtHR, which was provisionally identified as unreasonable service by the Defendant.[14]As the Claimant rightly points out, the complaint to the LeO also included the assertion that “the defendant breached confidentiality rules by releasing information to the Home Office”. In that context, the Provisional Decision noted that the Claimant had said “…that the firm guaranteed the protection of evidence and witness testimonies involved in the case. However, without his knowledge, the firm surrendered his testimony, including his address and witness details, to a […] government representative. He said this led to horrific consequences such as the […] secret services knowing his exact home address. [The Claimant] explained that he was forced to sell his home for £50,000 less than the value and quickly move his family. He said that one of the witnesses on his asylum case has gone missing after agents of the […] government conducted a search in his home.”[15]The LeO responded to these allegations in the Provisional Decision in the following terms:
“In response to these comments, I am sorry to hear of the allegation that the firm surrendered [the Claimant’s] personal details to the Russian government. There is no dispute that this could lead to terrible consequences. However, I am unable to comment on this allegation as it’s not a service complaint which we have accepted for investigation.”
It follows that, contrary to the Claimant’s assertion in his Position Statement on 11 September 2025, the LeO did not find that “the child’s rights had been gravely violated”. Moreover, the Provisional Decision makes it abundantly clear, again contrary to the Claimant’s assertion, that his allegation that “the Defendant violated the child’s right to a safe refuse by disclosing his personal data…” was not “among the matters investigated” by the LeO.[16]That this is the case is further demonstrated by the LeO’s Final Decision. On 28 December 2023, the Claimant accepted the Provisional Decision of the LeO, and on 12 February 2024, the LeO issued its Final Decision in relation to the Claimant’s complaints. It found that “The firm failed to submit the application by the deadline required by the court”. It did not make a finding of breach of contract or a breach of confidentiality in relation to the Claimant’s allegation relating to the passing of his personal details, and that matter was not addressed at all in the Final Decision.[17]Indeed, that was recognised by the Claimant in his Particulars of Claim for the present matter, which states (at paragraph 11):
“The only subject considered by the Legal Ombudsman was the violation of the contract by the Defendant failing to submit the complaint within the required 6 month deadline. No other violations were considered by the Ombudsman, including the disclosure of confidential information.”
That also accords with the Court’s judgment of 30 April 2025 (at paragraph 47) that there was no binding determination by the LeO that precluded the Claimant from bringing a claim for breach of confidentiality, because the LeO had not made a determination on that issue. The LeO, rather, found that the failure to meet the deadline represented unreasonable service and proposed a financial remedy. A payment of £50,000 was accepted by the Claimant as a full and final settlement of his complaints.[18]The present proceedings were issued against the Defendant on or around 25 June 2024. The Claimant seeks £2,431,658.97 from the Defendant “for breach of contract and confidentiality” which he alleges “resulted in significant financial and emotional harm, and endangerment to his family and witnesses”. The Claim Form was in the Claimant’s name, and included his Cobham address. In the Claim Form there was no suggestion of a risk to the Claimant. On the contrary, although he did refer to the need for privacy in the proceedings, he said that this was “due to the potential presentation of security-related information”. In answer to the question as to whether the claim included any issues under the Human Rights Act 1998, the Claimant ticked the “no” box. There was, therefore, no allegation then of a breach of any of Articles 2, 6, 8 or 13 of the ECHR as there is now. The Claimant did not seek to add his children as parties to the proceedings, or to address either harm or risk to them.[19]The accompanying Particulars of Claim made clear that the claim related to the allegation, earlier addressed by the Claimant to the LeO, that the Defendant had disclosed the Claimant’s address, and that of his children, to her legal representatives in the context of the LeO complaint, and to other third parties. The third parties identified, beyond the Defendant’s legal representatives, are the Home Office and the ECtHR. The Claimant asserted that the disclosure, “put the lives of the Claimant and his family at risk”. He also stated:
“The Claimant would like to notify the court and the parties that the Claimant's witness statement, which is the primary evidence of the Claimant in this case, contains information that may significantly impact the safety of the Claimant, the Defendant, and the witnesses involved in this case, as well as implicate issues of national security for the United Kingdom, involve medical data, and information about minors, and pertain to certain other judicial processes of significant public interest. Accordingly, we hereby notify the court that such evidence is not attached to this claim.”
[20]At paragraph 27 of the Particulars of Claim, the Claimant makes a series of requests of the Court. The first is to “recognise that the Defendant disclosed the Claimant's confidential information without his consent and in breach of the law”. The third is to adjudge the compensation necessary as a result and, as the Claimant has pointed out in his Position Statement of 11 September 2025, it is at point 6 that he requests that the Court “order the Defendant to pay the Claimant £2,431,658.97”. These same requests appear at the end of the Particulars of Claim at paragraph 84. I shall return to aspects of the Particulars of Claim below. On the face of the claim, contrary to the Claimant’s Position Statement, this is a claim that is about compensation.It is also right to note that no application was made either to add the Claimant’s children to his claim, or to add Caytons’ Solicitors as a defendant at that time.[21]On 16 July 2024, the Claimant signed a Form N244 seeking for the hearing of his Claim to be undertaken in private. The “primary reason” for this request was “the need to protect sensitive information that could significantly impact the safety of the Claimant, the Defendant and the witnesses involved in the case”. The Form N244 set out the reasons for this application, which in addition to the above included “the witness statements include medical data and information about minors that require special protection”. It is important to note that the Claimant did not, at that time, make an application that the proceedings be conducted in accordance with the Closed Material Procedure (hereafter ‘CMP’), pursuant to CPR Part 82. Moreover, he did not apply to add his children to the Claim or assert that there was a risk of harm to his children.[22]On 2 October 2024, Master Davison granted an Order (‘the Davison Order’) in response to the Claimant’s application and also directed that documents in these proceedings be anonymised. The Claimant has been identified as ‘KKK’ since that Order was made, save, it is right to note, in some correspondence and applications by the Claimant himself. The wording of the preamble to the Order makes it clear that Master Davison was acting on the above application notice. The following aspects of the preamble are also relevant. Master Davison made the Order following consideration of “the Article 8 rights of the claimant for private and family life” and “it appearing that non-disclosure of the identity of the Claimant ais necessary to secure the proper administration of justice and in order to protect the interests and safety of the claimant and his family.”[23]In his Position Statement of 11 September 2025, the Claimant observes that the Anonymity Order was made without application. This is strictly correct, but it is right to note that the Order was made in response to an application that the proceedings needed to be in private and that Order gave effect to that application. The Claimant also asserts that the Order was made “in the interests of the Claimant’s minor child”. As is clear from the preamble, Master Davison took account of the Claimant’s right to family life pursuant to Article 8, ECHR which included the protection of his family. Whilst that included, of course, the protection of the Claimant’s children, it was not based on a specific threat to those children or a specific need to protect them separate from him.[24]Master Davison included a note of reasons which stated:
“I have directed that the claimant’s claim is to be heard in private and this will be the default position for future hearings. But (and I wish to emphasise this) this is a default position and it will be for the judge on each future occasion that this case comes before a court to decide whether the hearing / all of the hearing is to be in private or whether the open justice principle is [sic] prevail. That will depend very much on the matters which are to be discussed. In the event that the defendant seeks to strike out the claim, the claimant will have the right to file evidence, including a witness statement from himself, in response. There is no need for a witness statement at the present time. If there is no strike-out application, directions will be given for a witness statement from the claimant, which would usually be after the parties have exchanged relevant documents.”
[25]Master Davison also retrospectively extended the time for the service of the Defence to the claim to 12 September 2024. The Defence had been served on 11 September 2024. It noted, at paragraph 2:
“This Defence is served pending determination of an application for an order extending time for service of the same, dated 6 August 2024. It is filed and served in accordance with the request for an extension of time for filing and service to 4pm on 12 September 2024. This request was made necessary in circumstances where the Claimant refused to entertain an extension of time.”
This was the context for the application, to which the Claimant refers in his Position Statement, seeking an Order that the Defendant file her Defence within the prescribed time (application dated 15 August 2024). The Claimant criticises the Court for not addressing this application on 17 March 2025, or in its judgment of 30 April 2025. He asserts that “at the hearing the Defendant’s barrister did not even raise the issue; the judge on his own initiative, without discussion, simply gifted this ruling to the Defendant”. In fact, the matter had already been addressed by Master Davison, at a hearing at which the Claimant was present. The Claimant’s application of 15 August 2024 has been overtaken by the Davison Order of 2 October 2024.[26]The Claimant produced an application, dated 5 October 2024, for the Davison Order to be set aside. This included a challenge to the retrospective extension of time for the service of the Defence. That extension was granted on proper grounds, and in no way either obstructed the proceedings or prejudiced the Claimant, who was able to respond to it. In his application to set the Davison Order aside, the Claimant also contended, in particular, that Master Davison declined to hear an application (not included in the application served on the Court) for the use of the CMP (pursuant to CPR Part 82), and that the Claimant had been prevented from the service of witness statement evidence by the Davison Order.[27]In his Position Statement of 11 September 2025, the Claimant asserts that this application to set aside was “ignored” by the Court in the judgment of 30 April 2025. That is not correct. It was addressed in terms at paragraph 9, as follows:
“I would observe that no proper application had been made in accordance with CPR Part 82 in relation to CMP at the time that the matter was before Master Davison, and that it is clear from the reasons given by Master Davison that he was not preventing the Claimant from serving witness statement evidence. His observations were as to the timing of such evidence, not the fact of it. These draft applications are, therefore, misconceived.”
That remains my view.

Loss of documents and issue of applications

[28]In his Position Statement, the Claimant expresses considerable concern that a number of documents which he says have been submitted to the Court have not been sealed and/or forwarded to the Judge hearing his case. He states that “the Claimant had filed with the Court more than 30 separate documents: materials supporting the Claimant’s position in the case, procedural applications concerning violations of his rights, and applications regarding breaches of the anonymisation order that directly affect the safety of the Claimant and his family”. He complains that the Court has not responded to any of these documents, and that none of these were referred to in the Court’s judgment of 30 April 2025. He further asserts that these documents have been “ignored” by the Court, and adds “by ‘the Court’ the Claimant here means both the judge and the clerks, as he has no access to the internal case management system of the court office”.[29]Certainly, it is correct to say that the majority of the applications to which the Claimant made reference, and which are listed at paragraphs 5 and 8 above, do not appear to have issued in accordance with CPR Part 23, so as to be sealed by the Court. This is an issue that has been the subject of communication between the parties for some time, and this history is set out in a second witness statement from the solicitor for the Defendant, John Leathley, dated 25 June 2025. For example, on 28 February 2025, the Claimant wrote to the Court making reference to his Form N244 application for urgent relief and his CPR Part 82 Application, and asserted that each “had been duly filed and granted fee remission certificates”. The Defendant requested copies of these certificates on 4 March 2025. In his response, the Claimant said that the court was in possession of such certificates. On 10 March 2025, the Claimant referred again to these applications and his Form N161 application to set aside the Davison Order, and stated “the Claimant possesses all Royal Mail First Class postal receipts and corresponding emails to the court clerks and the Defendant”.[30]By the Court’s Order of 14 May 2025, the Claimant was directed to serve “all issued versions of the Claimant’s applications, or, alternatively, evidence that all necessary steps were taken to issue the Claimant’s Applications…”. It is accepted by the Claimant that he has not complied with that Order. He asserts, in his Position Statement of 11 September 2025, that he has requested the issued versions of his applications to be provided by the Court but has been ignored. However, even if that is correct, and no evidence of these requests has been provided, the Claimant had asserted in March 2025 that he had evidence of the submission of his applications, for example postal receipts, and yet this has not been produced either. The only documents of this type he has provided relate to the properly issued and sealed application for the Court to set aside its 30 April 2025 judgement, by reference to a Form N244, rather than any earlier applications. In the absence of such evidence, in contravention of the Court’s Order, it is difficult for the Court to be assured that the applications that the Claimant now seeks to raise have been issued.[31]The rules in this regard are there for good reason, namely to ensure certainty and fairness to all parties. In this regard, I again note the observations of Lord Sumption, to which I referred in a different context in the 30 April 2025 judgment (at paragraph 40), in Barton v Wright Hassall LLP [2018] UKSC 12 at paragraph 18:
“The rules provide a framework within which to balance the interest of both sides. That balance is inevitably disturbed if an unrepresented litigant is entitled to greater indulgence in complying with them than his represented opponent. Any advantage enjoyed by a litigant in person imposes a corresponding disadvantage on the other side, which may be significant if it affects the latter’s legal rights, under the Limitation Acts for example. Unless the rules and practice directions are particularly inaccessible or obscure, it is reasonable to expect a litigant in person to familiarise himself with the rules which apply to any step which he is about to take.”
[32]The Claimant submits that he has complied with the relevant procedural requirements and points in this regard to an email from an Administrative Officer in the King’s Bench Listing Department, dated 30 April 2025, in which, in a response to the list of applications set out at paragraph 5 above, she said “I confirm receipt of all your applications. They have been sealed and referred to the Judge for consideration”. As this makes clear, the applications had been received and provided to the Court as at 30 April 2025, rather than at any earlier date, and in particular, for example, before the hearing on 17 March 2025. However, in light of that email, and noting that he is a litigant in person, fairness to the Claimant requires the Court now to take account of each of those applications and to consider their potential impact on the 30 April 2025 judgment.[33]In any event, it is not right to say that the Court ignored the applications of which it was aware as at 17 March 2025. In fact, despite the uncertainty as to their status, as paragraphs 9 and 17 of the Court’s judgment of 30 April 2025 make clear, the Court expressly considered those applications of which it was aware, namely the application for use of the CMP (CPR Part 82), the application to set aside/appeal the Davison Order, and the application to join Caytons Solicitors as a defendant. Moreover, as was made clear in the Court’s further Order of 14 May 2025, the Court was anxious to resolve all outstanding applications, having first achieved certainty as to what they were and to allow both sides the opportunity to make all pertinent submissions in writing and then orally. Although the Claimant has not complied with the Court’s directions of 14 May 2025, the Defendant has been able to address a response to each, and there is no disadvantage or unfairness in the Court considering the applications despite uncertainty as to their status. It is clearly desirable that this should happen to achieve certainty for the future.[34]It is right to note in passing, in terms of things that are absent, that the Claimant argues that the Court’s judgment of 30 April 2025 is undermined because there is no transcript of the hearing on 17 March 2025, as there should have been. As was explained by the transcribers in an email dated 28 March 2025, “the audio has white noise and buzzing throughout”. It follows that there was no deliberate decision not to record the hearing. Fortunately, the Defendant provided extensive written submissions for the hearing, and the Court has provided a detailed judgement, so that it is clear for the Claimant’s benefit what was submitted, and what the Court concluded. In any event, given that the hearing on 11 September 2025 represented a re-hearing of the application, the Claimant was put at no disadvantage.[35]In this context, it follows that the Court can reject the Claimant’s submission that his right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 6, ECHR has been breached. He has not been denied the opportunity to present his evidence, to make any relevant submissions or to have an oral hearing of his case. He has been afforded each of these at each stage. Moreover, the Court can reject that the Claimant has been denied an effective remedy, in breach of Article 13, ECHR. He has been given the opportunity through a rehearing both to advance his various applications and to reverse the judgment against him of 30 April 2025.

The packet

[36]A particular area of concern for the Claimant is that a packet of sensitive information, and a witness statement from the Claimant, appears to have gone missing having been posted to the Court. In June 2025, the same Administrative Officer in the King’s Bench Listing Office sent an email identifying which applications the Court intended to address at the hearing on 11 September 2025. The email also included the following:
“The Claimant should be reminded that he was required to serve a single consolidated witness statement and any other witness evidence by 4/6/25, an (sic) is noted that the Claimant has served material on the court that he identifies as being sensitive from disclosure to the defendant. The defendant is asked whether the court should review that material in advance of the hearing.”
That email was sent in response to an email from the Claimant, dated 4 June 2025, in which he said “I have sent materials addressed to the Judge under CPR Part 82 in a sealed envelope. I am once again compelled to write and respectfully ask that you forward this email directly to the Judge.”[37]In addition, the Court had by then had sight of a further email from the Claimant, dated 2 June 2025, stating that he had sent a packet for my attention which he said “…contains materials which, in my respectful submission, fall under the provisions of CPR Part 82 (restricted access) and must not be disclosed to the Defendant unless and until the Court makes an informed decision on the necessity of such disclosure.” Attached to the email was a postal receipt showing that the packet had been sent to the Royal Courts of Justice. It is therefore clear, taking the email correspondence together, that the Court’s June 2025 query in relation to the sensitive material that the Claimant had sent to the court was prompted by the Claimant saying he had sent it, rather than by the Court having had sight of it or having received it. As has been made clear to the Claimant, the Court has not had sight of the material in the packet.[38]The Claimant in oral submissions on 11 September 2025 stated that he did not have copies of any of the material that had been included in the packet, or of the witness statement that he had written and had included therein. As the Defendant correctly identifies, there is no evidence before the Court as to any of those assertions, or as to the contents of the packet, as there could and should have been in a witness statement from the Claimant. There is no third party witness statement to show that the Claimant has taken any step to investigate the loss of the packet, which would have included contact with the police or security services if its content was, as the Claimant asserts, sensitive by reference to national security. There is, moreover, no evidence before the Court to address why, and in what respects, the content of this packet was relevant to the issues that the Court has now to resolve.[39]The Claimant seeks now to rely on email correspondence with an officer of Surrey Police Counter Terrorism Policing to support his assertion that he had previous dealings with the security services. I will consider that material further below. That correspondence highlights, however, in the present context that the Claimant could obtain material from third parties to support both his claim and his position in relation to the packet of evidence. In an email on its face dated 11 August 2025, he said “I kindly request confirmation of my contact with representatives of the UK security services. I am not seeking any secret or classified information — a simple confirmation that such contact has taken place would be sufficient.” Just such “simple” confirmation could clearly be obtained by him that would overcome to at least some extent any issue with the loss of the packet of material. Indeed, in the correspondence that followed the officer that the Claimant contacted offered to liaise to secure just that.[40]It is also no answer to this absence of evidence that the Court had not yet addressed the Claimant’s application for CMP pursuant to CPR Part 82. As the Court found in its 30 April 2025 judgment (paragraph 79):
“Whilst the Claimant may have needed to be circumspect … before the Davison Order, the in camera measures in place by virtue of that order have removed any such need for circumspection. The Claimant could have provided a statement in response to the present application in this regard, but has not done so. In that regard, I have noted that in his response to the listing of the present application, the Claimant asserted that he could not respond to the Defence application until his Part 82 CMP application had been granted, but I agree with the defence submission that the Davison order affords the Claimant sufficient protection to address in necessary detail both the national security issues to which he alludes and the risk to himself and his family which is essential to his Claim. In his application for CMP he asserts that he is bound by the Official Secrets Act, but again no material has been provided either by him or on his behalf from any relevant third party to that effect.”
[41]Whilst the loss of this packet, if it be a failure by the Court’s administration, is regrettable, I am entirely satisfied that the Court can and should reach a determination of the present applications on the basis of the material that is before it, and that the Claimant is at no disadvantage in the Court doing so on that basis. In his oral submissions, particularly in reply to those of the Defendant, the Claimant was capable of giving details relating to the matters to which he says that sensitivity applies.[42]The email to Surrey Counter Terrorism Police quoted above also shows that the Claimant could have sought confirmation of his position from third parties. In his Position Statement, he criticised the Court for cutting short his explanation at the hearing on 14 May 2025 as to “why CPR 82 must be applied”. He thereby acknowledges that he was able to speak about these matters in a private hearing. The issue in that regard both on 14 May and 11 September 2025 was that the Claimant had not set that material out, as he was required to, in a witness statement. There was no prohibition on the proper presentation of such material, and the Davison Order protected such presentation. It follows that the Claimant could have placed that which he was willing to say in private in a witness statement to be considered in private, and that his failure to do so in accordance with the Court’s directions is a matter of choice by him.

Recusal

[43]The Claimant, at the conclusion of the hearing on 11 September, and without prior written notice, made an application that I recuse myself from hearing this case because he alleged that I had lost the packet of sensitive material identified above. He relied for this allegation on the email in June 2025 from an Administrative Officer in the King’s Bench Listing Office which is quoted at paragraph 36 above. I directed that this application should be reduced to writing with directions to focus its length, and expedite its resolution. Although in his written submissions in response the Claimant submits that the Court acted unfairly in giving him limited time to produce this document (48 hours), it is right to note that the Claimant in fact served his written submission on the day of the hearing, and was therefore clearly not presented with any difficulty by the deadline. He also supplemented it with a further longer document. Although the latter was provided in clear breach of the Court’s direction, giving him latitude as a litigant in person, it has also been considered.[44]The Claimant also complains of an inequality of arms between himself and the Defendant as to the time given for their written submissions. However, there is no inequality of arms where different allowances of time are given to the party making an application, who can be presumed to have considered the application and the basis for it in advance of making it orally at the hearing, and the party who has to respond to that application who has had no notice of it and would also need time to take instructions in relation to it. The Claimant’s further submission, provided in breach of the Court’s Order, addresses the Defendant’s submissions, and so again the Claimant has been put at no disadvantage by limitations imposed on him by the Court’s directions, which in any event were aimed at securing the expeditious final resolution of the Claimant’s various applications.[45]Turning to the substance of the Claimant’s application, he states “more than 30 procedural documents have disappeared from the case file, including 4 sealed applications and the Claimant’s witness statement submitted in a sealed envelope. Official letters from the Court Office expressly confirm that these documents were sealed and transmitted to Judge Atkinson. Nevertheless the Judge has stated that he has bever seen them. In these circumstances there are strong grounds to conclude that the Judge has lost critically important documents.” As the analysis of the factual position, including by reference to the correspondence from the Court Office on which the Claimant relies demonstrates, this submission is predicated on a misunderstanding of how the Court operates, and what its correspondence has said. In relation to the Claimant’s various applications, each has been considered by the Court as and when it was drawn to its attention, and all were considered on 11 September 2025. This occurred despite the Claimant’s failure to comply with the Court’s Order of 14 May 2025 to serve all issued applications or evidence of the steps taken to issue them.[46]In relation to the sealed package, the Court has never confirmed that any such documents were provided to me, nor were they. The email in June 2025 from an Administrative Officer in the King’s Bench Listing Office on which the Claimant relies, and quoted at paragraph 36 above, was a response to the Claimant’s assertion that he had sent the package, rather than an acceptance by the Court that it had been received. The email did not state that any such package has been passed to me, nor had it been. As the Defendant correctly submits, there is no evidence as to what the packet contained, what relevance its contents had to the issues this Court has to resolve, or why that which had been sent could not be provided again.[47]The Claimant further submits that “the Judge has ignored applications concerning threats to the Claimant’s child and breaches of an existing court order, in violation of Articles 2, 6, 8 and 13 ECHR”. These matters are further addressed elsewhere in this judgment, but what this judgment in combination with those handed down on 30 April 2025 and delivered on 14 May 2025 amply demonstrate is that none of these issues, raised by the Claimant, have been ignored. On the contrary, all that the Claimant has chosen to advance has been considered with care. It is clearly desirable that the Court that has considered all of these issues should reach a resolution of them unless there is good reason to the contrary.[48]The Claimant then complains of the directions given as to the service of his written recusal application, which I have already addressed, and then concludes “the cumulative circumstances undermine confidence in the administration of justice and fall squarely within the test in Porter and Magill [2001] UKHL 67”. The test to which he refers is that set out by Lord Hope at paragraph 103 of that decision, when he stated:
“The question is whether the fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased.”
[49]In terms of the facts that a fair-minded observer would consider here, as the analysis above makes clear, the following properly reflects the position:(a) No application by the Claimant has been lost, in the sense that all the applications on which he now relies have been seen and considered by the Court, even though the Claimant breached the Court’s Order as to his provision of the issued versions of those applications, and even though the Claimant has not sought any relief from sanctions for those breaches;(b) The Court has not ignored any issue relied on by the Claimant, but on the contrary can be seen to have considered them carefully;(c) The is no evidence that any packet sent by the Claimant ever reached the Judge dealing with his case. Anyone considering the circumstances would take account not only of the lack of such evidence, with a proper reading of the Court’s communications, but also the reality that correspondence even if addressed to a Judge dealing with a case does not go straight to them but is addressed and managed by the Court Office.[50]As the Defendant rightly submits, the Claimant has not set out any basis for any alleged bias by the Court, and relies on a cumulative assessment of issues which do not, individually or collectively, demonstrate such bias. No fair-minded observer here would consider there to be any real possibility of bias. On the contrary, they would consider that the Court has extended every latitude to the Claimant, has considered his every application and submission, despite his failure to comply with either the CPR or Court Orders, and that the Court as presently constituted is best placed to determine that which is required in these proceedings in a fair, just and expeditious manner. I am satisfied that the Claimant’s recusal application is wholly without merit, and I reject it.

The position of the Claimant’s children

[51]As a further preliminary before dealing with the application to set aside the Court’s judgment of 30 April 2025, the Claimant submits that the Court must first address his application to appoint him as a litigation friend to his children. He submits that otherwise “any subsequent steps are a nullity, as they violate the rights of the minor”. His application was made pursuant to CPR 21.3(4), which states:
“Any step taken before a child or protected party has a litigation friend has no effect unless the court orders otherwise.”
[52]It is necessary to consider that provision in its proper context. As the terms of both CPR Part 21 and Practice Direction 21 make clear, they concern the position of a child or protected person who is a party to the proceedings. For example, the Practice Direction at paragraph 1.2 begins “In proceedings where one of the parties is a child…” That is why, at CPR 21.2, a litigation friend is usually necessary “to conduct proceedings on their behalf”. Once that context is understood, it becomes clear why there is a limitation to what steps can be taken in litigation before a litigation friend is required, at CPR 21.3, and why the Court’s approval is required for any settlement of such proceedings, pursuant to CPR 21.10.[53]It is important to note that the Claimant’s application that he be appointed as a litigation friend, using Form N235, is dated 26 April 2025. It therefore post-dates the hearing on 17 March 2025, to which 30 April 2025 judgment relates, and the application for reverse summary judgment that was addressed at that hearing. Whilst he points to a Form N244 requesting protective measures for a minor, that in fact appears to be part of his challenge to the Davison Order, rather than an explicit application that his children be added as Claimants, or other explicit application that the Court could have addressed on 17 March 2025, had it been aware of it. As the Defendant points out, there is no evidence that any such application was issued or sealed before the 17 March 2025 hearing. There was no relief claimed for the protection of a minor when the Claimant submitted his claim, in his Particulars of Claim or in his response to the Defence. There was no such application to Master Davison.[54]In any event, it is not a nullity to proceed to judgment on the basis of the material available at the time of the application, and a later application does not alter that. Moreover, CPR 21.3(4) prevents further steps being taken in proceedings where a child is a party to those proceedings and a litigation friend is yet to be a party. CPR 21.3(4) does not render it a nullity to proceed without a litigation friend where a child is not a party to those proceedings and is therefore not entitled to one.[55]The Claimant’s application describes his child as “claimant” and asserts “Their rights and interests are directly affected by these proceedings, as the case involves serious breaches of data confidentiality, including the disclosure of their personal information, such as the country of asylum, exact residential address, and other highly sensitive personal data that directly impact their safety. This creates an immediate threat to their life and wellbeing. An anonymisation order was issued by Master Davison on 2 October 2024, confirming the involvement of the minor in the case and the sensitive nature of these circumstances.”[56]There are a number of serious flaws in the Claimant’s approach. First, and most important amongst them, by reference to the proper reading of CPR Part 21, is that the Claimant’s children are not parties to the proceedings. There is therefore no party to the proceedings in relation to whom the Claimant can act as a litigation friend. The Claimant has had every opportunity either to bring proceedings in the name of his children as well as himself, or to have added them as parties to the proceedings, for example when he raised other issues before Master Davison or at any point between then and the hearing on 17 March 2025. He has not done so. Indeed, not only has the Claimant not done so, neither has his older child who is over 18, and thus entitled to act on their own behalf. That failure itself speaks as to the level of actual perceived risk to the Claimant’s family.[57]Secondly, as the review of the Davison Order at paragraphs 22-23 above makes clear, Master Davison did not “explicitly reference the involvement of a minor” as the Claimant suggests. He dealt with the rights of the Claimant and his family from the perspective of the Claimant, rather than from the separate perspective of his children, who were not parties to the proceedings before him. On the material before him, any interference with their rights was as an adjunct to such interference with the rights of the Claimant under Article 8, ECHR. Similarly, again contrary to the Claimant’s submission, the LeO did not “explicitly” acknowledge “the violation of the minor’s right”. As the review of both the Provisional and Final Decisions of the LeO at paragraphs 14-17 above shows, the LeO explicitly chose not to make any determination as to the allegation relating to confidentiality, or any impact that this may have had on the Claimant’s children.[58]Thirdly, the Claimant’s contentions as to the involvement of his children in these proceedings are as dependent as his own on his claim being made out as to the fact of disclosure in breach of contract or her duty of confidentiality by the Defendant , and/or proof of loss as a result. The Court considered that the Claimant had no real prospect of success in establishing either allegation. It follows that the Court in its 30 April 2025 judgment found there to have been no violation of the rights not only of the Claimant but of his family by any disclosure by the Defendant, and that no loss had been occasioned to them, or risk posed to their safety, by the actions of the Defendant. On that basis, an application now to add the Claimant’s minor child as a party would fail because there is no claim with a real prospect of success to which the child could be added.[59]In his Position Statement of 11 September 2025, the Claimant gives information as to the allocation of assets by the Claimant and his wife to their children on their achieving majority under “the prenuptial agreement and property management and division agreement, dated 19 September 1998”. He submits by reference to this that the children’s rights were therefore infringed by the freezing of assets in the country from which the Claimant claimed asylum, and those rights were therefore also infringed by the late submission of the ECtHR application by the Defendant. There had been no reference to these agreements or their implications in the Claimant’s Particulars of Claim or response to either the Defence or the Defendant’s Request for Further Information. Moreover, neither agreement is produced, or addressed in any witness statement. This is not, therefore, information on the basis of which the Court can now act. It is, however, material that the Claimant could have chosen to rely on when bringing his claim, or in an application to amend that claim at an earlier stage when no such application was made.[60]The Court will review its conclusions in its consideration of the application to set aside its 30 April judgement below, but if that judgement is upheld then it follows that the basis for consideration of allegations of violation of the child’s rights similarly falls away. In the same way, if the Court’s judgment of 30 April 2025 is upheld, it clearly involves no breach of either Article 2 or Article 8, ECHR. The determination reached involves a finding that on the evidence before it, no action of the Defendant imperilled the lives or the family life of the Claimant or his family, and thus involved no violation of either Article.

The Application to set aside the 30 April 2025 judgement

[61]The Claimant, by a sealed application dated 26 April 2025, applies for the Court to vary or set aside the judgement handed down on 30 April 2025 granting reverse summary judgment on the Claimant’s claim against the Defendant for breach of contract and breach of confidentiality. The parties agree that this application is properly before the Court, and falls to be decided. (a). CPR 39.3[62]The Claimant makes that claim pursuant to CPR 39.3, which is headed “Failure to attend the trial”. It states:(1) The court may proceed with a trial in the absence of a party but – (a) if no party attends the trial, it may strike out the whole of the proceedings; (b) if the claimant does not attend, it may strike out his claim and any defence to counterclaim; and (c) if a defendant does not attend, it may strike out his defence or counterclaim (or both).(2) Where the court strikes out proceedings, or any part of them, under this rule, it may subsequently restore the proceedings, or that part.(3) Where a party does not attend and the court gives judgment or makes an order against him, the party who failed to attend may apply for the judgment or order to be set aside .(4) An application under paragraph (2) or paragraph (3) must be supported by evidence.(5) Where an application is made under paragraph (2) or (3) by a party who failed to attend the trial, the court may grant the application only if the applicant – (a) acted promptly when he found out that the court had exercised its power to strike out or to enter judgment or make an order against him; (b) had a good reason for not attending the trial; and (c) has a reasonable prospect of success at the trial.”[63]It follows that CPR 39.3 addresses the orders that a Court may make where a party fails to attend a trial. The hearing on 17 March 2025, which the Claimant did not attend, was not a trial and on that basis CPR 39.3 does not relate to the judgment the Court handed down following that hearing. Moreover, it is of note that CPR 39.3(5) only permits the Court to revisit a decision reached at trial in a party’s absence where there was good reason for the party’s absence and they have a reasonable prospect of success. Contrary to the Claimant’s submission in his Position Statement of 11 September 2025 an issue as to the service of notice of the hearing is not itself a reason to set aside a decision reached in the absence of a party unless it represents a good reason for their non-attendance.

(b) Absence on 17 March 2025

[64]As to the reasons for the Claimant’s absence, he asserts in his Position statement and in the statement that accompanied his CPR 39.3 application, that there were good reasons for his absence. In its judgment of 30 April 2025, the Court determined (at paragraph 25) that the Claimant had failed to attend the hearing on 17 March 2025 without good reason, and despite being fully aware of that listing, the reasons for it, and the need to make proper application to adjourn if that was the course he wished to pursue.[65]The Claimant asserts that this conclusion was in error. This assertion appears to be advanced for the following reasons. First, the Court did not have sight of an email from the Claimant to the Defendant, dated 3 January 2025, in which he asserted that he could not attend a hearing until his CPR Part 82 application had been determined. Secondly, he submits that the date of the hearing was arranged without his involvement, and the Court was misled as to his availability. Third, he had made clear to the Court that he was not available for work reasons until June 2025. In fact, each of those issues relating to his absence on 17 March 2025 was considered by the Court, as a reading of paragraphs 13-25 of the 30 April 2025 judgment demonstrates, and each was rejected for the reasons carefully there set out.[66]In particular, on a proper analysis, the Claimant had been notified in good time of the hearing on 17 March 2025, albeit that no formal notice of the hearing was provided to him, so that he could in turn have addressed difficulties of his attendance in good time. He had, as he said in an email on 28 February 2025 to the Court, seen the email correspondence in which the hearing date was canvassed. Bundle C for the hearing of 11 September 2025 contains considerable correspondence before that date between the parties in which the date for the hearing was discussed. Moreover, the second witness statement of John Leathley on behalf of the Defendant sets out the details of this correspondence which shows this to be the case. On 3March 2025, the Claimant was told in terms by the King’s Bench Listing Office that he needed to make a formal application to adjourn the 17 March hearing, and he did not do so.[67]The Claimant asserts that his work commitments prevented any attendance on 17 March 2025, and, in that regard, he had said that his work schedule did not permit his attendance before 22 June 2025. Despite this, it is of note that he was able to attend the hearing on 14 May 2025, and did not raise any issue in doing do.[68]In so far as his objection to 17 March 2025 was that his CPR Parts 82 application was outstanding, this is an objection without substance. The combination of the grant of anonymity, and the hearing of the case in private pursuant to the Davison Order permitted the Claimant to provide evidence to address the sensitive issues that might otherwise have required use of CMP, and to adduce evidence as to the threat that he faced as a result of any alleged disclosure by the Defendant. That did not need to await a resolution of his CPR Part 82 application. It remains clear, therefore, that the Claimant did not have a good reason for not attending the hearing. (c). CPR 23.11[69]In fact, however, the Court decided to proceed in the Claimant’s absence at the hearing to determine the Defendant’s application to strike out the claim or to enter reverse summary judgment pursuant to CPR 23.11. That rule addresses attendance at the hearing of an application, which correctly describes the listing of the case on 17 March 2025. CPR 23.11 states:
“(1) Where the applicant or any respondent fails to attend the hearing of an application, the court may proceed in their absence. (2) Where – (a) the applicant or any respondent fails to attend the hearing of an application; and (b) the court makes an order at the hearing, the court may, on application or of its own initiative, re-list the application.”
[70]As is made clear by CPR 23.11(2), the court may relist the application “ on application or of its own initiative" without any requirement that the Claimant’s absence was for good reason, or taking account of the prospects of success of his case. It is, therefore, a more favourable basis to the Claimant for the consideration of his application than CPR 39.3. I determined on 14 May 2025 that I would treat the Claimant’s application to revisit the Court’s judgment of 30 April 2025 as an application under CPR 23.11(2), and that remains my decision.[71]It is therefore necessary to consider the Claimant’s grounds for contending that the judgment of 30 April 2025 was in error or failed to take into account relevant matters which, had he been present, the Claimant could have advanced. This involves, as Mr Fisher for the Defendant correctly put it, considering whether any of the matters now raised by the Claimant are sufficient to overcome the matters found by the Court when it acceded to the Defendants application for reverse summary judgment. In considering this question, I have had regard to each of the statements provided by the Claimant in support of his various applications and draft applications, the content of the bundles he has provided, his Position Statement of 11 September 2025, and his oral submissions at that hearing. I have, in that regard, also taken into account the submissions he has included in a premature application he has made to appeal the Court’s judgment of 30 April 2025 (and for that matter its decision to adjourn on 14 May 2025).[72]The reasons for the decision to accede to the Defendant’s application for reverse summary judgment are set out in detail in the 30 April 2025 judgment. In brief summary, the Court found that the Claimant had no real prospect of succeeding on his claim, so that reverse summary judgement should be given pursuant to CPR 24.3 because:(a) He had failed to demonstrate that the Defendant had breached her contact with the Claimant (ground A in the Defendant’s application) or the duty of confidentiality she owed to him (ground B);(b) He had failed to demonstrate that any breach had been causative, in the sense that it put the Claimant or his family at risk so as to cause him loss (ground C), or that there had in fact been any consequent loss (ground D).[73]The Court also found that the Claimant’s Claim Form and Particulars of Claim should be struck out, pursuant to CPR 3.4(2) because his claim was time-barred (ground F), and involved a failure of compliance with the CPR (ground G). It is important to note (as was noted at paragraph 27 of the 30 April 2025 judgment) that the Defendant’s grounds were each self-standing, and so even if some call to be reconsidered in the light of the Claimant’s further submissions, the Court’s decision may still stand on the basis of other grounds that remain clear and compelling.

(d) Procedural issues

[74]The Claimant raises a number of procedural issues by reason of which he submits that the Court’s judgement of 30 April is flawed. He submits that because the Claimant was absent, the Court did not have all of the Claimant’s documents before it. He also submits that the Court was required to determine the Claimant’s other applications before it could properly address the Defendant’s application for reverse summary judgment. Contrary to these contentions, the Court had the advantage of a wealth of material from and submissions by the Claimant to consider, including the detailed Particulars of Claim, Reply to the Defence, and Response to the Request for Further Information, which set out the Claimant’s case in some detail. In addition, the Court had the Claimant’s applications to set aside the Davison Order, for the use of CMP, for Caytons Solicitors to be joined as a Defendant and to appeal the Davison Order. Each of these was accompanied by a statement from the Claimant. Each of those applications documents and each of those applications was referred to in terms in the 30 April 2025 judgment.[75]There was, and indeed there remains, doubt as to whether a number of the Claimant’s applications had been properly issued. If they were not, then the Court was not required to consider them. However, as is clear from the terms of the 30 April 2025 judgment, the applications, whether issued or not, were taken fully into account. It is correct to say that others of the Claimant’s applications, such as his application to name the Claimant as an unnamed minor’s litigation friend were not before the Court on 17 March 2025. However, for reasons that are developed below, the interests of, and the potential of risk to the Claimant’s family were matters raised by the material considered by the Court, and those interests and risks were themselves considered. In any event, as the 11 September 2025 hearing was a re-hearing of the Defendant’s application, any lack of information at any earlier stage was cured by the Claimant being able to ensure that all he wished to submit, and any documents he wished the Court to consider, were before the Court at that hearing.

(e) Failure to make out breach

[76]In that regard, I have considered again whether the Claimant is able to establish a case that any disclosure was made by the Defendant which put the Claimant and/or his family at risk, or caused him or them consequential loss. As was recognised in the Court’s judgment of 30 April 2025 (at paragraph 49), the starting point is the Claim Form which seeks compensation for “breach of contract and confidentiality. This breach resulted in significant financial and emotional harm, and endangerment to his family and witnesses”. By reference to the Particulars of Claim, the Claimant alleges that confidential information relating to the country and address of residence of himself and his family were disclosed in the context of the asylum application, and then the ECHR application, and that the Defendant also breached her duty to him by disclosures made to her solicitors, Caytons Solicitors, in the context of his complaint to the LeO against her.[77]In the Court’s judgment of 30 April 2025 (at paragraph 59), the Court concluded that the Claimant has not established evidence of any disclosure which resulted in any endangerment of the Claimant or his family, and further that he has not established evidence as to the consequences of any breach, even if he could demonstrate one. In particular, this conclusion was based on the following:(a) There was no evidence that the Defendant had been aware of the address in Bagshot which the Claimant alleges that he sold as a reaction to the Defendant’s disclosure, and there was no evidence that she had disclosed that address (see paragraphs 51-55, 30 April 2025 judgment);(b) The evidence showed the Claimant had himself shared that address with others (see paragraphs 56-58);(c) That the Defendant’s standard terms of business, to which the Claimant can be found to have assented, permitted her to share information that she had as to his state and address of residence with relevant Government agencies and third parties (see paragraph 63), and no oral agreement as to non-disclosure has been established in evidence (paragraph 64);(d) In addition, there was an implied waiver of confidentiality between the Claimant and the Defendant to permit the latter sharing information with her solicitors in response to a complaint by the former (see paragraph 74);(e) Moreover, the Claimant had failed to establish a causative link between any disclosure by the Defendant and any loss suffered by him, or his family (see paragraphs 77-83).[78]I have considered with care whether the Claimant has now provided any evidence that undermines those conclusions, or shows him to have an arguable case to the contrary. In his Position Statement of 11 September 2025, he points to “internal Home Office documents disclosing the personal data of the Appellant, his spouse and their minor children”. However, the documentation produced represents correspondence between the Home Office and the Claimant in his name and at his address in the context of the asylum claim. In that context, the sharing of his contact details and country of residence with the Home Officer were both inevitable and permitted by the Defendant’s conditions of work. For example, the Claimant asserted that a letter to the Defendant from the Home Office communicating its asylum decision, dated 29 October 2015, which included the names and dates of birth of his family, proved that there had been a breach of confidentiality. On the contrary, however, it showed the sharing of the essential information necessary for an asylum application between the body tasked with deciding the application and those acting for him to make the application. The necessity for the Home Office to be provided with the Claimant’s address is underlined by the requirement for him to provide the address at which he was now living on a number of forms that he has now provided in purported support of his claim.[79]Moreover, that documentation, which dates from 2015, uses the Esher address which was noted to be the address provided to the Defendant, rather than the Bagshot address which the Claimant avers he was forced to sell because of disclosure of his address. It follows that this correspondence supports the Defendant’s argument that a breach cannot be established, rather than the Claimant’s case. Similarly, the further applications that the Claimant made listed at paragraph 5 above, and the correspondence with the Court on which he now relies shows that he was prepared to include his later Cobham address, his actual name (and his name within his email address). He did so also in the correspondence with Surrey Counter Terrorism Police that he relies on to support his submission that he is under threat. These factors support the Court’s earlier conclusion that his willingness to use his actual address and other identifying information undermined his assertions as to the need for secrecy as to his identity or location.[80]The Claimant relies on the first instance decision of Mitting J in TLT v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWHC 2217 (QB). He submits that in this decision the Court ruled “…that such disclosure exceed the permissible threshold and that revealing information about any family member in asylum proceedings can constitute a violation of the rights of other family members”. That case concerned the accidental publication by the Home Office of raw data relating to unsuccessful asylum applicants. Mitting J rejected the Home Office’s argument that members of the families of lead applicants whose details had been revealed did not also have a claim because their identities could also be discerned from that which had been published. The publication misused their personal data just as it did that of the lead applicant from their family. As Gross LJ found when the case was the subject of appeal ([2018] EWCA Civ 2217, at paragraph 31), the family members of the lead applicant “…had a reasonable expectation of privacy and confidentiality in respect of their information in the spreadsheet.”[81]The same issues do not arise in this Claimant’s case. The Claimant’s case is that the Defendant deliberately revealed information as to his address that put him and his family at risk. There was here no inadvertent disclosure by the Home Office of information that the Claimant and his family shared a reasonable expectation would remain confidential. In TLT that was accepted. If there were such disclosure here, then the Claimant’s action would be against the Home Office not the present Defendant. Here, that which was shared with the Home Office was the fact of residence in the UK and the address in the UK of an applicant for asylum in the UK. Such disclosure was unavoidable, and undertaken in accordance with the Defendant’s terms of work. There is, despite the Claimant’s assertions, no evidence that that information was inadvertently shared with any third party, or for that matter with the government of the country from which he had come to make his asylum application. In particular, there is no evidence of any such sharing by the Defendant.[82]In this regard, the Claimant also seeks to argue that the conclusion of the Court that his claim to breach of contract and breach confidentiality had no real prospects of success was reached in defiance of the LeO’s determination. Again, by reference to the proper analysis of that determination at paragraphs 14-17 above, that contention is untenable. The LeO specifically did not reach a determination as to breach of contract or breach of confidentiality in relation to any disclosure of the Claimant’s personal data, and there is therefore no decision of the LeO to bind this Court.[83]There is no material now before the Court, moreover, to show that the Claimant has a real prospect of success in demonstrating that he or his family were in fact put at risk, or that he or they suffered loss as a result of any action by the Defendant. Even making every allowance for the loss of the packet of sensitive material that has been addressed above, there remains a lack of evidence of threat to the Claimant or his family caused by any action of the Defendant.[84]The Claimant submits that such evidence is provided by email correspondence between the Claimant and an officer of Surrey Police Counter Terrorism Policing. She made clear at the outset of her correspondence with the Claimant that she was not privy to his contact with others in investigative and security agencies. I have reviewed the correspondence. This has not been straight-forward as the emails are not all dated, or dated correctly, however the chronology appears to be as follows:(a) On an uncertain date, but by reference to an email that bears the date 11 August 2025, the Claimant contacted an officer of Surrey Police Counter Terrorism Policing to ask that she provide “confirmation of my contact with representatives of the UK security services”.(b) In an email, on its face dated 27 August 2025, he sent a data protection request to the same officer “to request access to any and all personal data held about me by Surrey Police / Counter Terrorism Policing South East.”(c) It appears that the Claimant had been receiving annual meetings to review his “personal security situation”, with a colleague of his correspondent in Surrey Police Counter Terrorism Policing and, in May 2023, she offered to arrange another. There was further correspondence in relation to arranging such a meeting either with the particular colleague or another relevant officer. In May 2023, the officer offered the Claimant a series of dates for a meeting between them, and such a meeting was arranged for June 2023.(d) In June 2023, the Claimant wrote to the officer of Surrey Police Counter Terrorism Policing to report that he had been taken ill having eaten some food provided by his new neighbours.(e) In April 2025, the Claimant wrote to the officer of Surrey Police Counter Terrorism Policing asking her to forward to her colleagues a letter from the Claimant in which he complained of a lack of protection for the safety of his family from threat. He also referred to information that he had provided to those officers at an earlier stage, which accords with some of what the Claimant told the Court on 14 May and 11 September 2025.(f) The officer replied describing herself as acting as “a local point of contact between you and the relevant government departments”, as well as seeking to provide necessary protection for the Claimant and his family. The officer offered to continue to act as an intermediary with others, including the security services.[85]Accordingly, taking it at is highest, the material now relied on by the Claimant does show that he had received personal security meetings with an officer of Surrey Police Counter Terrorism Policing since his arrival in the UK. It includes assertions by him as to information had had previously provided to such an officer, and concerns about threats to him. The Claimant in his oral submissions both on 14 May and 11 September 2025 referred to both assistance he had provided, and threats he had suffered. There was no evidence to support these assertions, even in a witness statement from himself, although by the latter hearing such evidence had been directed in the Court’s Order of 14 May 2025. This correspondence, on even the most generous reading, does not provide confirmation either of such information-passing or such threats. What it does do, however, is show that there was a route by which such confirmation could have been obtained.[86]Whilst the Claimant could argue that such confirmation would have been provided by the lost packet of material, he has not actually identified that such confirmation was provided by its content, or why if so that confirmation could not have been obtained again after the packet went missing. More fundamentally, even if such material had been provided it would not have altered the lack of any arguable connection between any threat and any disclosure by the Defendant, or between any disclosure and a breach by her of either contract or confidentiality.[87]In his oral submissions and Position Statement on 11 September 2025, the Claimant submitted that the Court had ignored his complaint as to “breaches of the anonymisation order” through the possibility that his real named could be traced through case numbers and case names on the court database. In fact, this was not ignored by the Court in its 30 April 2025 judgment. Rather, as paragraph 57 of that judgement shows, the fact that such a linking through the Court database was possible “underlines the significant of the Claimant issuing his claim in his own name and with his address, and undermines his assertion of the need to protect both”. Indeed, the Claimant’s continued use of his own details in applications to the Court, and correspondence with Surrey Police Counter Terrorism Policing, underlines that.[88]It follows that it remains the case, as the Court found on 30 April 2025, that the Claimant has not demonstrated a causative link between any disclosure made by the Defendant and any loss suffered by the Claimant or his family. It also remains the case that there is no proper evidence to conclude that he or his family have suffered loss which should be compensated as a result of the present claim, or, for that matter, which gives rise to any other remedy for himself or his family by reference to that claim. It also follows that the Claimant’s claim involves no breach of either Article 2 or Article 8 of the ECHR. The determination reached involves a finding that on the evidence before it, no action of the Defendant imperilled the lives or the family life of the Claimant or his family, and thus involved no violation of either Article.

(f) Limitation Act 1980

[89]In relation to the Court’s decision that the Claimant’s claim should be struck out as being time-barred, the Claimant advances a number of submissions relating to the Limitation Act 1980, and periods thereunder. The Defendant had submitted that the claim was time-barred pursuant to sections 2 of the Limitations Act 1980 because a claim for breach of contract or for breach of confidentiality needs to be brought within 6 years of the cause of action having arisen.[90]First, the Claimant submits that the first act of data disclosure occurred no earlier than 20 September 2018, and that this was the date of disclosure of confidential information relating to the Claimant and his children, rather than the date on which he first learned that such disclosure had occurred. It is important to consider what the Claimant’s claim actually relates to and when, if it happened, this could have happened. He alleges a breach of contract and/or confidentiality in relation to the passing of information by the Defendant to third parties in relation to the applications she was instructed to make on his behalf. The third parties identified as those to whom information was passed are the Home Office and the ECtHR. He points, as evidence of such disclosures, for example, to correspondence addressed to him from the Home Office , dated 29 October 2015. By reference to his Particulars of Claim, the Claimant further asserts that he terminated the Defendant’s engagement in relation to his second instruction of her, for the ECtHR claim, on 22 September 2016. It follows that any such disclosure, and thus any cause of action, arose before that date, and is therefore more than 6 years before the present proceedings were issued.[91]Similarly, according to the Claimant’s own pleaded case, the initial breach was committed when the Defendant transferred unparticularised documents to her lawyers, Reynolds Porter Chamberlain LLP. This occurred on 17March 2017, after the Claimant made his original claim against the Defendant on 24 August 2016. Again, that date is more than 6 years before the present proceedings were issued.[92]In relation to the 20 September 2018 date, as the Court found in its 30 April 2025 judgment (at paragraph 35):
“At paragraph 47 of his Reply, the Claimant asserts that the 6 years is rather to be calculated from the date on which there was a refusal to perform the contract pursuant to the retainer on 20 September 2018. However, this assertion is contrary to the Claimant’s primary case that there had been a breach of the Defendant’s duty of confidentiality during the currency of the retainer. It would be necessary for it to do so for it to represent, as he alleges, a breach of contract. That retainer came to an end, as his own Particulars of claim make clear, on 22 September 2016. The date on which he focuses is not the date that the cause of action arose, but the date on which the Claimant is entitled to assert that he became aware that it had done so.”
[93]As that judgment makes clear, the Court also considered whether the later date of knowledge of the Claimant altered the limitation position, by reference to section 14A, Limitation Act 1980. However, that does not assist the Claimant because, as the Court found at paragraph 36 of the 30 April 2025 judgment:
“section 14A(4)(b), extends the period, where it is longer than the 6 years from the cause of action having arisen, to a period of 3 years from the acquisition of knowledge. It follows that if the limitation period is calculated, by reference to section 14A, as 3 years from 20 September 2018 then his claim is still time-barred as this only extends the limitation period up to 20 September 2021.”
[94]The Claimant submits that this obstacle is overcome by virtue of section 32, Limitation Act 1980, which provides for the postponement of limitation in cases of fraud, concealment or mistake. Section 32(2)(b) more particularly addresses the deliberate concealment of a breach of duty in circumstances in which such breach was unlikely to be discovered. The Claimant asserts, for example in his grounds of appeal to the Court of Appeal, that “the Respondent actively and continuously withheld disclosure of the identity of data recipients”. This appears to be a reference to his applications for disclosure from the Defendant to show to whom she disclosed personal data of the Claimant and/or his children, and when. He refers both to Article 15(1)(c) of the General Data Protection Regulations and section 170, Data Protection Act 2018.[95]It is necessary to understand what these provisions relate to in the present context.

(c) states:

"The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller [...] information as to the recipients or categories of recipient to whom the personal data have been or will be disclosed."
Section 170 makes it an offence to obtain, disclose or retain personal data without permission. The focus here is on potential disclosure of personal data. Although the Claimant raises section 170, he made clear in his Position Statement on this issue that he did not allege the commission of a criminal offence. It follows that it is the alleged breach of Article 15 that is in fact that which falls to be considered in this regard.[96]In so far as I have been able to identify, this application was raised by the Claimant when on 3 October 2024 he applied for urgent relief. He did so the day after the hearing before Master Davison at which this matter does not appear to have been raised. It follows therefore that what the Claimant is seeking to argue is that the Defendant has failed to make disclosure to him of those to whom his personal information was disclosed after he has brought the claim for breach of contract and confidentiality against the Defendant. It further follows that any such failure of disclosure did not prevent the bringing of the claim, or conceal from him the fact, as he alleges it, of inappropriate disclosure. In other words, any non-compliance with article 15 has not involved concealment that prevented the earlier bringing of the claim.[97]In any event, as was noted at paragraph 62 of the 30 April 2025 judgment, the handling of the Claimant’s personal information by the Defendant was also regulated by the latter’s terms of business. The engagement letters between the parties, sent to the Claimant on 11 December 2014, made clear that his “…continuing instructions will amount to acceptance of our terms and conditions of business” . These permitted the sharing of his personal data with “private and governmental agencies”, and disclosure to third parties where this was “necessary in connection with legal proceedings or regulatory requirements”. The disclosures alleged against the Defendant by the Claimant were governed by those terms. Moreover, the correct body to address any disclosure of the Claimant’s personal data is the Home Office rather than the Defendant given the Claimant’s allegations as to material being passed by the Home Office to others.[98]The potential application of section 32, Limitation Act 1980 was considered by the Court at the 17 March 2025 hearing. No evidence or submission now advanced alters the following conclusion in this regard (as set out at paragraph 38 of the 30 April 2025 judgment): “The Defendant here, on the Claimant’s own case, disclosed information to third parties, identified as the Home Office and the European Court of Human Rights quite explicitly and with the Claimant’s knowledge. Such disclosure was a necessary part of the applications for asylum and for appeal that the Claimant instructed the Defendant to make. Moreover, as the Claimant accepts, this matter was drawn to his attention by those acting on the Defendant’s behalf, and thus far from concealing it, they disclosed it to him”.[99]It follows that it remains the case that there is no fraud or concealment so as to engage section 32, Limitation Act 1980.[100]The Claimant now also raises section 28, Limitation Act 1980. This provides, in so far as is relevant, at subsection (1):
“…if on the date when any right of action accrued for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act, the person to whom it accrued was under a disability, the action may be brought at any time before the expiration of six years from the date when he ceased to be under a disability … notwithstanding that the period of limitation has expired.”
The Claimant’s son would be under such a disability as an infant, by reference to section 38(2). However, that provision and its effect on limitation relates to an action brought by that child. No such action was brought when these proceedings were initiated. Rather, the action was brought solely by the Claimant. That was his decision.[101]The Claimant could also have brought the action on behalf of his children, with those children named as claimants. Though in that context, section 28(2), Limitation Act 1980 would have been relevant, which makes clear “This section shall not affect any case where the right of action first accrued to some person (not under a disability) through whom the person under a disability claims.”[102]Accordingly, despite the further submissions of the Claimant, it remains clear that the Claimant’s claim was brought out of time, and his Claim Form and Particulars of Claim should be struck out, pursuant to CPR 3.4(2).

Conclusion as to the application to set aside the 30 April judgment

[103]It follows from the analysis above that neither the further submissions nor the further materials provided by the Claimant have altered the Court’s view:(a) That it was appropriate for the Court to hear the Defendant’s application for reverse summary judgment and/or the striking out of the Claimant’s Claim in the Claimant’s absence on 17 March 2025;(b) That the Claimant has not demonstrated that he has any real prospects of succeeding with his claim, which on the analysis set out in detail both in the Court’s judgment of 30 April 2025 and again here, is wholly without merit. I therefore uphold my decision of 30 April 2025 to accede to the Defendant’s application for reverse summary judgment, pursuant to CPR 24.3;(c) That even if I had not acceded to that application, I would have upheld the Court’s decision to strike out the claim for the reasons given both on 30 April and here, pursuant to CPR 3.4(2).

Remaining applications

[104]The only applications submitted by the Claimant which I have not yet addressed are 2 that do not appear to have been issued or sealed, namely his application for alleged breach of Article 15(1)(c), GDPR and his application to add Caytons Solicitors as a defendant in these proceedings. Given the lack of evidence that either application has been properly issued, I am not required to resolve them. I repeat that I have considered the basis advanced by the Claimant for each application in assessing the merits of his application to set aside the 30 April 2025 judgment.[105]Had I been required to determine these applications, I would have found the GDPR application to be misconceived and effectively a “fishing” exercise by the Claimant to bolster his existing unsubstantiated claim. Given that I have given summary judgment against him, there is no claim to which to add Caytons Solicitors as a defendant. But in any event, there is no draft amended Claim Form or Particulars of Claim for the Court to consider, or any enunciated basis for this firm to be added to this claim.

Anonymity

[106]I have considered again the Defendant’s application to lift the Anonymity Order granted by Master Davison. That anonymity is predicated on there being a need to protect the Claimant’s identity for the protection of himself and his family. On the analysis of the material before me, it remains my view, as set out in paragraph 88 of the 30 April 2025 judgment, that the Claimant has failed to establish any substantive foundation for that protection to be required. Given the lack of evidential support, I have concluded that it is appropriate to revoke the Anonymity Order made by Master Davison. This revocation will come into effect as part of the Order consequential on this judgment being handed down.