The Mayor and Burgesses of the London Borough of Enfield v Charles Snell & Ors [2025] EWHC 288 (KB)

“….has the necessary legal standing to bring proceedings in its own name for the protection of the interests of the inhabitants of its area in a claim for an injunction to prevent a public nuisance, pursuant to section 222 of the Local Government Act 1972…”

“...in my judgment it was legitimate for the respondent to regulate the way in which the appellant and others occupy the river bank, land held for the benefit of the whole community, to the detriment of other uses of the land and river bank.”

“...[t]he Council is obviously entitled to take action to prevent a trespass of land belonging to it, whether or not that trespass happens to be connected with or a prelude to unlawful activity on the River Cam, which falls under the jurisdiction of a different authority.”

"(1) The High Court may by order (whether interlocutory or final) grant an injunction or appoint a receiver in all cases in which it appears to the court to be just and convenient to do so. (2) Any such order may be made either unconditionally or on such terms and conditions as the court thinks just…"

“(i) There is a compelling need, sufficiently demonstrated by the evidence, for the protection of civil rights (or, as the case may be, the enforcement of planning control, the prevention of anti-social behaviour, or such other statutory objective as may be relied upon) in the locality which is not adequately met by any other measures available to the applicant local authorities (including the making of byelaws). This is a condition which would 5 need to be met on the particular facts about unlawful Traveller activity within the applicant local authority’s boundaries. (ii) There is procedural protection for the rights (including Convention rights) of the affected newcomers, sufficient to overcome the strong prima facie objection of subjecting them to a without notice injunction otherwise than as an emergency measure to hold the ring. This will need to include an obligation to take all reasonable steps to draw the application and any order made to the attention of all those likely to be affected by it (see paras 226—231 below); and the most generous provision for liberty (ie permission) to apply to have the injunction varied or set aside, and on terms that the grant of the injunction in the meantime does not foreclose any objection of law, practice, justice or convenience which the newcomer so applying might wish to raise. (iii) Applicant local authorities can be seen and trusted to comply with the most stringent form of disclosure duty on making an application, so as both to research for and then present to the court everything that might have been said by the targeted newcomers against the grant of injunctive relief. (iv) The injunctions are constrained by both territorial and temporal limitations so as to ensure, as far as practicable, that they neither outflank nor outlast the compelling circumstances relied upon. (v) It is, on the particular facts, just and convenient that such an injunction be granted. It might well not for example be just to grant an injunction restraining Travellers from using some sites as short-term transit camps if the applicant local authority has failed to exercise its power or, as the case may be, discharge its duty to provide authorised sites for that purpose within its boundaries.”

“…such an injunction was only likely to be justified as a novel exercise of the court’s equitable discretionary power if the applicant: (a) demonstrated a compelling need for the protection of civil rights or the enforcement of public law not adequately met by any other available remedies (including statutory remedies); (b) built into the application and the injunction sought, procedural protection for the rights (including Convention rights) of those persons unknown who might be affected by it; (c) complied in full with the disclosure duty which attached to the making of a without notice application; and (d) showed that, on the particular facts, it was just and convenient in all the circumstances that the injunction sought should be made; (e) that, if so justified, any injunction made by the court had to: (i) spell out clearly and in everyday terms the full extent of the acts it was prohibiting, corresponding as closely as possible to the actual or threatened unlawful conduct, (ii) extend no further than the minimum necessary to achieve the purpose for which it was granted, (iii) be subject to strict temporal and territorial limits, (iv) be actively publicised by the applicant so as to draw it to the attention of all actual and potential respondents and (v) include generous liberty to any person affected by its terms to apply to vary or discharge the whole or any part of the injunction; and that, accordingly, it followed that the challenge to the court’s power to grant the impugned injunctions at all failed.” (i) spell out clearly and in everyday terms the full extent of the acts it was prohibiting, corresponding as closely as possible to the actual or threatened unlawful conduct, (ii) extend no further than the minimum necessary to achieve the purpose for which it was granted, (iv) be actively publicised by the applicant so as to draw it to the attention of all actual and potential respondents and (v) include generous liberty to any person affected by its terms to apply to vary or discharge the whole or any part of the injunction; and that, accordingly, it followed that the challenge to the court’s power to grant the impugned injunctions at all failed.”

“Balance of convenience - compelling justification (5) In interim injunction hearings, pursuant to American Cyanamid v Ethicon [1975] AC 396, for the Court to grant an interim injunction against a defendant the balance of convenience and/or justice must weigh in favour of granting the injunction. However, in PU cases, pursuant to Wolverhampton, this balance is angled against the applicant to a greater extent than is required usually, so that there must be a "compelling justification" for the injunction against PUs to protect the claimant's civil rights. In my judgment this also applies when there are PUs and named defendants. (6) The Court must take into account the balancing exercise required by the Supreme Court in DPP v Ziegler [2021] UK.SC 23, if the PUs' rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (for instance under Articles 10(2) and 11(2)) are engaged and restricted by the proposed injunction. The injunction must be necessary and proportionate to the need to protect the Claimants' right. Damages not an adequate remedy (7) For the Court to grant a final injunction against PUs the claimant must show that damages would not be an adequate remedy. (B) Procedural Requirements - Identifying PUs (8) The PUs must be clearly and plainly identified by reference to: (a) the tortious conduct to be prohibited (and that conduct must mirror the torts claimed in the Claim Form), and (b) clearly defined geographical boundaries, if that is possible. The terms of the injunction (9) The prohibitions must be set out in clear words and should not be framed in legal technical terms (like "tortious" for instance). Further, if and in so far as it seeks to prohibit any conduct which is lawful viewed on its own, this must also be made absolutely clear and the claimant must satisfy the Court that there is no other more proportionate way of protecting its rights or those of others. The prohibitions must match the claim (10) The prohibitions in the final injunctions must mirror the torts claimed (or feared) in the Claim Form. Geographic boundaries (11) The prohibitions in the final injunctions must be defined by clear geographic boundaries, if that is possible. Temporal limits - duration (12) The duration of the final injunction should be only such as is proven to be reasonably necessary to protect the claimant's legal rights in the light of the evidence of past tortious activity and the future feared (quia timet) tortious activity. Service (13) Understanding that PUs by their nature are not identified, the proceedings, the evidence, the summary judgment application and the draft order must be served by alternative means which have been considered and sanctioned by the Court. The applicant must, under the Human Rights Act 1998 S.12(2), show that it has taken all practicable steps to notify the respondents. The right to set aside or vary (14) The PUs must be given the right to apply to set aside or vary the injunction on shortish notice. Review (15) Even a final injunction involving PUs is not totally final. Provision must be made for reviewing the injunction in the future. The regularity of the reviews depends on the circumstances. Thus such injunctions are "Quasi-final" not wholly final”