Tsabi Limited v Sheraz Chowdhry & Anor [2025] EWHC 2543 (KB)

[2025] EWHC 2543 (KB)Case No KB-2024-003225
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 9 th June 2025
Before
HHJ Lt Col (Retd) Siddique(sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court)
Between
TSABI LIMITEDClaimantSHERAZ CHOWDHRYFirst DefendantGURMINDER GHUMANSecond Defendant
Ms H Pugh for ClaimantThe First Defendant appeared in person for in personThe Second Defendant appeared in person for in personHearing Hearing date: 9 June 2025
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely on 9 th June 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................

HHJ SIDDIQUE :

[1]The claimant is a law firm and was the employer of the defendants until 24 October 2024. Following a breakdown of relationships proceedings followed and were concluded with a final injunction by consent in prohibitory terms providing ‘springboard’ relief. Committal proceedings followed alleging that the defendants knowingly breached the terms of the injunction for their own benefit and the benefit of their new employer, Middlesex Law Chambers.[2]The claimant now seeks to amend the existing committal application (seeking permission if it is required), to introduce a new ground 12 against the First Defendant, alleging an interference with the due administration of justice. Permission is also sought (again if it is required), to continue ground 4 against the First Defendant, given it also amounts to an interference with the due administration of justice.

Ground 12

[3]The claimant relies upon correspondence where the First Defendant threatened to report the claimant and its employees to various organisations, including the Solicitors Regulation Authority, the police, and the Legal Aid Agency, in respect of two broad matters (the ‘counter allegations’). First, for impropriety some 10 years ago in a historic case involving two individuals known as Naseem and Habib. The substance of that alleged impropriety is that false statements were made to the Legal Aid Agency regarding an issue of disclosure. Second, an allegation that the claimant’s conduct in obtaining the First Defendant’s emails amounts to a criminal offence under the Computer Misuse Act 1981.

Whether ground 12 is capable of amounting to a contempt

[4]The First Defendant submits that the email correspondence only amounts to ‘private persuasion’ between himself and the claimant, in order to dissuade the claimant within the ambit of the law from pursuing contempt proceedings because otherwise the First Defendant would have to raise the counter allegations when defending himself. He denies that the correspondence amounts to an improper threat.

The Law

[5]Attorney General v Martin [1986] unreported, involved a dispute over the flying of helicopters between a barrister, Mr Ashton, and Blue Star Ship Management Ltd (‘Blue Star’), a civil aviation company. Mr Ashton made an application for contempt proceedings against Mr Martin, a solicitor representing Blue Star. In the course of communications, Mr Martin responded with a threat to report Mr Ashton to his Inn, The Honourable Society of the Inner Temple. The question for the court was whether this amounted to an improper pressure and a threat. After reviewing the authorities, the court concluded:
‘Fourthly, to put pressure on a party to litigation or a prosecutor to withdraw his action, prosecution or defence may be, but is not always, a contempt of court. A party is entitled to take proper steps to represent himself and to seek to defeat his opponent or his client's opponent if, as in this case, he is a solicitor acting for a client. To be justifiable, in Lord Simon's phrase, the pressure must be fair, reasonable and moderate.’
[6]The court went on to refer to Lord Diplock in Attorney General v Times Newspapers [1974] AC 273, where his Lordship said: ‘Private persuasion, so long as it is unaccompanied by unlawful threats, is not, in my opinion, contempt of court.'[7]Having reviewed what was said by Mr Martin in the correspondence, the court concluded:
‘There is no doubt in our mind that what he said was a threat to report Mr Ashton to the Inner Temple authorities, admittedly not those responsible directly for Mr Ashton's professional conduct, but with a view, the implication was, to the propriety or otherwise of Mr Ashton's conduct as a professional man being considered. A threat to report any professional man if not to the professional body directly responsible for him, to a related body, with the possibility that disciplinary proceedings against him might be considered is one which is of the utmost seriousness for any professional man, however innocent he may be. It is a matter that is quite extraneous to the conduct of the prosecution against Mr Martin's clients. It cannot possibly be suggested (and I am happy that Mr Martin when the matter was brought to his attention immediately withdrew the accusation) whatever else might be said that in bringing this private prosecution Mr Ashton was acting with professional impropriety…In our view, the making of that threat by Mr Martin was wholly improper, unfair and immoderate. We are therefore of the clear view that in this respect contempt of court is proved.’

Findings

[8]At this juncture, I do not have to decide whether contempt is proved, but rather whether the First Defendant’s counter allegations are capable of amounting to contempt. It is clear from the emails sent by the First Defendant that there were threats to report the claimant to the regulatory authority, police, and to the Legal Aid Agency. Those are serious threats of the utmost professional importance and a threat of criminal proceedings. They are also, in my judgment, extraneous to the contempt proceedings that were already in place against the defendants. In those circumstances, I am satisfied they are matters that can properly be considered as capable of amounting to a contempt.

Whether permission is required

[9]The First Defendant made no submissions on this issue. Given we are still at a relatively early stage of the proceedings, in my judgment there is no prejudice from an amendment to the committal application.[10]In respect of whether permission is required, counsel for the claimant, Ms Pugh, submits permission is not required. She helpfully reminds me of CPR 81.3(5), which provides:
‘Permission to make a contempt application is required where the application is made in relation to – (a) interference with the due administration of justice, except in relation to existing High Court or county court proceedings.’
[11]As to whether proceedings are ‘existing’, Ms Pugh refers me to the various authorities in The White Book at 81.3.4, which provides:
‘The term ‘existing’ is a broad term that does not appear to be confined to pending proceedings. The exception appears to relate to a distinction between proceedings that are extant (existing proceedings), which includes matters that are not actively being pursued in those proceedings and those that have not yet commenced….Proceedings may be existing proceedings for the purposes of CPR 81.3(5)(a) even after judgment is given on the claim.’
[12]The commentary continues that rule 81.3(5)(a) distinguishes between the position where the allegation of contempt is in relation to proceedings that have come into existence and cases where the proceedings remain intended or have never come into existence.[13]Given the aforementioned, I am satisfied that proceedings, as understood by CPR Rule 81.3(5)(a) and the authorities cited therein, were ‘existing’ despite the final injunction by consent having been granted. Consequently, permission is not required.

Whether permission should be given

[14]In the event that I am wrong, and permission is required, Ms Pugh submits permission should be granted given there is a strong prima facie case, referring to Ocado Group Plc v McKeeve [2021] EWCA Civ 145 at The White Book at 81.3.10:
‘A prima facie case of sufficient strength is being presented such that, provided the public interest so requires, permission can properly be given.’
[15]Ms Pugh points to the evidence of the emails and submits they clearly include threats relating to aging matters, some 10 years old and some relatively new matters but which are extraneous. She adds that the allegations and threats to report matters to the agencies cited were serious allegations with potentially serious consequences and can only have been made to improperly dissuade the claimant from pursuing their contempt application. On that basis, she submits there was an interference with the due administration of justice.[16]The First Defendant submits that he was doing no more, effectively, than seeking to dissuade the claimants in a manner which could be said to be proper, fair, and moderate. However, in my judgment the exchange of emails strongly indicates an attempt by the First Defendant to dissuade the claimant from bringing contempt proceedings, by scaremongering and threats, where there was reference to entirely unrelated matters, some of which were 10 years old. I am not persuaded that such conduct was proper, fair, and moderate. There appears to have been no attempt to engage with the allegations made in the application for contempt. Instead, the First Defendant’s response was to make an attack on the propriety of the claimant’s behaviour generally and historically. That can only sensibly be described as an improper threat.[17]In those circumstances, I am satisfied that there is a strong prima facie case in respect of ground 12, and if permission is required, I grant it.

Ground 4

[18]Ground 4 alleges the First Defendant encouraged, enticed or assisted the Second Defendant to divulge confidential information concerning the claimant. The confidential information is described as a Magistrates’ Court portfolio sent by a Mr Bijlani to the Second Defendant in 2009. The portfolio related to at least 20 court cases. The allegation against the Second Defendant is that in October 2024 he forwarded the portfolio to the First Defendant in breach of the injunction. The allegation against the First Defendant is that by encouraging, enticing or assisting the Second Defendant to breach the injunction, he has interfered with the due administration of justice.[19]Ms Pugh submits that Mr Bijlani’s portfolio refers to various Magistrates’ Court cases which Mr Bijlani worked on when with Asghar & Co Solicitors. She submits this can only properly be described as confidential information concerning the claimant given the affidavit evidence of Mr Asghar supports the claimant having taken over the clients and files of Asghar & Co Solicitors upon becoming a limited company.[20]In response, the First Defendant submits that the portfolio does not concern the claimant but instead concerns Mr Bijlani because it was his submission for accreditation to undertake police station work. The First Defendant further submits the portfolio does not contain confidential information because names were redacted. However, this is an unpersuasive submission as it is clear from the portfolio that it is an extensive document with details of cases worked on by Mr Bijlani of clients of Asghar & Co Solicitors, which in turn were taken over by the claimant. Therefore, I find that there is a strong prima facie case that this is confidential information concerning the claimant and for those reasons I would also give permission for ground 4.

Conclusion

[21]Permission is not required in respect of bringing contempt proceedings for either grounds 4 or 12, but if required I would grant permission given both grounds give rise to strong prima facie allegations of interference with the due administration of justice. End of Judgment Transcript of a recording by Acolad UK Ltd 291-299 Borough High Street, London SE1 1JG Tel: 020 7269 0370 legal@ubiqus.com Acolad UK Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof