Desmond Campbell v PC Craig & Ors [2025] EWHC 1899 (KB)

Neutral Citation Number: [2025] EWHC 1899 (KB)Case No KA-2023-000164Case No KA-2024-000184Case No KB-2024-003683Case No KB-2024-003687Case No KA-2025-000032
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate Thursday 24 July 2025
Before
MRS JUSTICE EADY
Between
DESMOND CAMPBELLClaimant(1) PC CRAIGDefendants(2) PC LUKE HAMMONDDefendant(3) PC RACHEL HOPKINSDefendant(4) THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE FOR THE METROPOLISDefendant
Desmond Campbell (Claimant) in person for in personRobert Talalay (instructed by Weightmans LLP) for DefendantsHearing Hearing dates: 18 July 2025
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 2pm on 24 July 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................
[1]In this judgment I refer to the parties by their titles (claimant; first, second, third or fourth defendant) in the claims before the King’s Bench Division.[2]The agenda for this hearing was set by the order of Mrs Justice Tipples, seal dated 9 May 2025, where it was directed that the following applications would be listed for determination:(1) the second and fourth defendants’ application dated 6 December 2024, that claim no. KB-2024-003683 (“the Hammond claim”) be struck out;(2) the third and fourth defendants’ application dated 6 December 2024, that claim no. KB-2024-003687 (“the Hopkins claim”) be struck out;(3) the defendants’ application for a general civil restraint order from the High Court;(4) the claimant’s applications for permission to appeal against the GCROs made by the County Court (appeal nos. KA-2023-000164 and KA-2024-000184) and, if permission is granted, then the hearing of the claimant’s appeals against the GCROs.[3]It is relevant for me to further record that, in her order, Tipples J dismissed the claimant’s application for permission to appeal out of time in KA-2025-00032, against the order of Master Dagnall dated 20 December 2024, marking that application as having been totally without merit. The claimant sought to appeal against that order, but his application was dismissed by Peter Jackson LJ and again certified as being totally without merit.[4]I also note that the King’s Bench office made me aware shortly prior to the hearing before me that the claimant has recently issued seven more claims in the High Court, apparently relating to incidents involving the police on two further dates to those referenced below. So far as I am aware, these have not yet been released for service and I have not had sight of the proposed claims.

Preliminary issue

[5]During the course of the hearing, the claimant made clear that he considered he would be prejudiced if his appeals in KA-2023-000164 and KA-2024-000184 were to be determined at this hearing. This was because the bundles he wished to rely on had not reached me and were not available to Mr Talalay. The claimant considered that this omission was due to failings on the part of the defendants and/or the court. Although I was able to find one of the two bundles on the digital case management system, the other was not available in digital form and was plainly too large to be copied during the course of the hearing. In the circumstances, I considered it necessary to accede to the claimant’s application for the hearing in respect of these appeals to be adjourned, with directions being given so as to avoid a further abortive hearing in this respect (see my order seal dated 21 July 2025).

The strike out applications

[6]By application notices of 6 December 2024, the defendant has applied for the claims in KB-2024-003683 (the Hammond claim) and KB-2024-003687 (the Hopkins claim) to be struck out. The applications are put on the basis that the claims are an abuse of the process of the court/fall to be struck out in accordance with the principle of res judicata.[7]Before addressing the defendant’s arguments in support of these applications, it is necessary to set out the litigation history relevant to both claims.

The Hammond claim (KB-2024-003683)

[8]The Hammond claim arises from an incident on 2 March 2019. By his claim, issued on 8 November 2024 and brought against the second and fourth defendants, the claimant seeks damages for(a) trespass to property,(b) trespass to goods,(c) false imprisonment, and(d) assault, torture and attempted murder.[9]In the particulars of claim, the claimant explains that this claim arises from an incident on 2 March 2019, when PC Hammond attended his home, initially with two other officers (PC Craig and PC Hughes), making a false allegation of theft against him. The claimant goes on to contend that:(1) PC Hammond made “false submissions in his witness statement” of 2 March 2019, in that he said the claimant had been informed he was to be arrested, which the claimant says is untrue;(2) this amounted to an unlawful trespass;(3) the claimant was assaulted by PC Hammond;(4) after calling for more officers to attend, PS Hughes lied to those officers, saying the claimant had been arrested, when that was not true (as PC Hammond knew);(5) other officers then effected an unlawful entry to the claimant’s home, restrained the claimant and then assaulted him;(6) the claimant was put into leg restraints, which amounted to a false imprisonment;(7) another officer, PC Jerrett, tried to suffocate the claimant, and that PC Hammond, along with PC Stockdale and PC Jerrett, subjected him to torture and attempted murder (the attempt to kill the claimant continuing once he was in the police van);(8) subsequently, PC Craig unlawfully charged the claimant with theft and three counts of common assault so as to prevent him issuing civil proceedings against PC Hammond (the claimant having sent a letter before claim to PC Hammond on 9 May 2019).[10]By application of 6 December 2024, those acting on behalf of the second and fourth defendants applied for the Hammond claim to be struck out as an abuse of the court’s process and for a general civil restraint order to be made against the claimant. The bases for the defendants’ application are set out in the accompanying witness statement of Mr Matthew Foden, solicitor; in summary:(1) the claim is entirely duplicative of County Court claim no. L15ZA059 and thus an abuse of the court’s process;(2) the claim arises from the same factual matrix and closely resembles five other claims brought by the claimant against the fourth defendant and others of his officers, four of which have been struck out, three as an abuse on the same basis as relied on as this application, and this new claim was similarly an abuse of the court’s process and/or res judicata pursuant to the rule in Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100;(3) the claimant had failed to serve his statement of case on the second defendant.[11]On this third point, the defendants rely on emails sent to the claimant on 9 and 31 October 2024, in which it is stated that neither the fourth defendant’s Directorate of Legal Services nor Weightmans have agreed to accept service of a claim brought against an individual police officer, Nonetheless, by email of 14 November 2024, sent to the fourth defendant’s Directorate of Legal Services, copying in the defendants’ solicitor at Weightmans, the claimant purported to serve the Hammond claim on both defendants. The claimant takes issue with this statement, referring to email correspondence from Mr Foden in 2019, which suggested that all documentation relating to individual officers should be sent to the legal representatives for the fourth defendant.[12]As for the claimant’s prior claims in respect of the incident of 2 March 2019, the record of the relevant litigation history is as follows:12.1 Claim no. H48YJ993, a claim against PC Craig only (“the Craig claim”). This claim was issued on 28 September 2021 and concerned the arrest of the claimant on 2 March 2019 and the subsequent decision to charge him. The causes of action pursued were12.1.1 It is relevant to note that, in relation to this claim, at a hearing on 24 May 2022, not attended by the claimant but at which the defendant was represented by counsel, HHJ Luba QC made a general civil restraint order against the claimant, restraining him from issuing any claim in the county court, from the date of the order until 24 May 2024 (“the Luba GCRO”); see order seal dated 9 June 2022.12.1.2 The claimant applied to have the Luba GCRO set aside, and this application was heard by HHJ Luba on 19 July 2023, when the claimant attended in person and the defendant was again represented by counsel. The claimant’s application being dismissed, the Luba GCRO remained in force until 24 May 2024. The Luba GCRO is the subject of the claimant’s appeal in KA-2023-000164.12.1.3 Subsequently, by order dated 19 August 2024, a further GCRO was made by HHJ Richard Roberts, restraining the claimant from issuing any claim or application in any county court until 18 August 2027 (“the Roberts GCRO”). The Roberts GCRO is the subject of the claimant’s appeal in KA-2024-000184.12.1.4 Returning to the Craig claim, by order of DJ Cridge, on 19 December 2022 the fourth defendant was substituted as the defendant and the claimant was given permission to amend his claim to include elements from the Hughes, Jerrett 1, and Stockdale claims that had been struck out (see further below), subject to specific directions given by DJ Cridge as to the format of the amended particulars of claim.12.1.5 At a further hearing before DJ Cridge on 31 August 2023, at which the claimant appeared in person and the fourth defendant was represented by counsel, the amended particulars of claim, and therefore the claim, was struck out pursuant to CPR 3.4(2)(c) as the amended particulars of claim were found to be in breach of the order of 19 December 2022. Counsel’s note from that hearing records DJ Cridge’s reasoning, as follows: “[District Judge Cridge] accepted that C had “entirely failed to avail himself of that extra chance” that he had given C on the 19th December 2022 “to properly set out his claim in a way that complied with the Civil Procedure Rules, in particular CPR 16.4” and that “[a]ll he has done is set out Amended Particulars of Claim which on their face make little sense” and which “cannot be read alone. No judge not aware of the background facts of this case could make head nor tail of the Amended Particulars of Claim. They do not properly set out causes of action; they do not set out particulars that found those causes of action. In and of themselves, they disclose no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim.”(a) trespass,(b) assault,(c) trespass to goods, and(d) the tort of deceit.12.2 Claim no. F64YJ375, a claim brought against the fourth defendant, issued on 21 May 2019.12.2.1 Although this also related to incidents said to have occurred in 2017 and 2018, at paragraphs 46-68 of the Particulars of Claim, the claimant alleged that PC Hughes, PC Craig, PC Hammond and other officers forced entry into his property (a trespass), unlawfully assaulted him, and then falsely imprisoned him. The cause of action pursued in respect of the 2 March 2019 incident was harassment.12.2.2 On 12 December 2019, this claim was consolidated with claim no. F24YJ318 and the amended particulars of claim no longer referred to the incident of 2 March 2019.12.3 Claim no. H50YJ105, a claim against PC Hughes only (“the Hughes claim”).12.3.1 This claim was issued on 5 October 2021 and again concerned the events of 2 March 2019, the causes of action pursued being: (a) trespass, (b) assault, (c) trespass to goods, and (d) false imprisonment.12.3.2 This claim was subsequently struck out, along with the Jerrett 1 and Stockdale claims (again, see below), by DJ Cridge on 19 December 2022, pursuant to CPR r 3.4(2)(b), as being an abuse of process, albeit the DJ gave C permission to amend the Craig claim (with D4 substituted as the D) to include elements from the other claims).12.4 Claim no. J04YJ426, a claim against PC Jerrett only (“the Jerrett 1 claim”).12.4.1 This claim was brought on 14 December 2021 and concerned the events of 2 March 2019 and the causes of action pursued was (a) trespass, (b) assault, and (c) false imprisonment.12.4.2 The Jerrett 1 claim was subsequently struck out on 19 December 2022, as being duplicative of the Craig claim and thus an abuse of process.12.5 Claim no. J08YJ641, a claim against PC Stockdale only (“the Stockdale claim”).12.5.1 This claim was issued on 25 February 2022 and concerned the events of 2 March 2019 and the causes of action pursued was (a) trespass and (b) assault.12.5.2 This claim was subsequently struck out on 19 December 2022, as being duplicative of the Craig claim and thus an abuse of process.12.6 Claim no. L15ZA059, a claim brought in the County Court against the same defendants as in the Hammond claim now before me (the second and fourth defendants).12.6.1 This claim was issued on 4 September 2024 and again concerned the events of 2 March 2019; the causes of action pursued being (a) assault; (b) trespass to property; (c) trespass to goods, (d) false imprisonment,12.6.2 Although the face of the claim would appear to confirm that it was issued on 4 September 2024, the claimant says that in fact the County Court failed to issue this claim and it was due to this failure that he determined to issue his claim in the High Court.12.6.3 After the defendants’ 6 December 2024 application to strike out the Hammond claim, on 20 December 2024, the claimant discontinued the proceedings in L15ZA059. The claimant says, however, that this discontinuance was simply because by the time the County Court had issued his claim, he had already determined to proceed in the High Court.(e) assault, torture and attempted murder, and(f) article 3 ECHR.12.7 KB-2024-003683 (the Hammond claim), which is now before me, was issued on 8 November 2024.

The Hopkins claim (KB-2024-003687)

[13]The Hopkins claim arises from an incident on 25 June 2020. By his claim, also issued on 8 November 2024 but on this occasion brought against the third and fourth defendants, the claimant seeks damages for(a) trespass to property,(b) assault;(c) torture;(d) false imprisonment;(e) trespass to goods.[14]In the particulars of claim, the claimant explains that this claim arises from an incident on 25 June 2020, when he alleges PC Hopkins, with other officers including PC Jones, forcibly entered his home, falsely stating that they were doing so on the basis of information from an informant which gave rise to a concern for another party suspected to be in the address and that weapons were involved. The claimant alleges that(1) the forced entry was unlawful and amounted to trespass;(2) he was tortured by another officer (PC Jones) who was continuously discharging a taser into the claimant;(3) PC Hopkins assaulted him;(4) he was detained without grounds, which amounted to false imprisonment;(5) PC Hopkins and other officers proceeded to search his home, which amounted to trespass to goods;(6) he was arrested based on a lie, such that his arrest was unlawful.[15]By application of 6 December 2024, those acting on behalf of the third and fourth defendants applied for the Hopkins claim to be struck out as an abuse of the court’s process, and for a general civil restraint order to be made against the claimant (asking that this application be heard alongside that made in the Hammond claim). The bases for the defendants’ application were again set out in an accompanying witness statement of Mr Foden; in summary:(1) the claim arises from the same factual matrix and closely resembles two other claims brought by the claimant against the fourth defendant and others of his officers, one of which has been struck out as an abuse on the same basis as relied on as this application, and this new claim was similarly an abuse of the court’s process and/or res judicata pursuant to the rule in Henderson v Henderson;(2) the claimant had failed to serve his statement of case on the third defendant.[16]On the second point, I again note the defendants’ reliance on the emails sent to the claimant on 9 and 31 October 2024 (supra). Nonetheless, by email of 18 November 2024 to the fourth defendant’s Directorate of Legal Services, the claimant purported to serve the Hopkins claim on both defendants.[17]In his submissions in support of the strike out application in respect of the Hopkins claim, Mr Talalay has explained that the claimant is currently litigating precisely the same incident in the County Court under claim no. H63YJ940, providing the following history of that, and other related claims, as follows:17.1 Claim no. H63YJ940 was issued on 22 December 2021, with the sole defendant being PC Jerrett (referred to as the “Jerrett 2 claim”). 17.1.1 This was a claim against PC Jerrett, brought in trespass, assault, and false imprisonment, relating to the incident of 25 June 2020.17.2 Claim no. H61YJ680 had been issued by the claimant on 8 December 2021 (so, pre-dating Jerrett 2) but the defendants say that this was only served on the defendant after the Jerrett 2 claim. This claim was brought against PC Jones (“the Jones claim”), but also related to the incident on 25 June 2020 (PC Jones was, in fact, the arresting officer); in it, the claimant claimed damages for trespass, assault, trespass to goods, unlawful arrest and false imprisonment, and negligence.17.2.1 The claimant disputes the order in which it is said the two claims were served, taking me to the notices of issue in respect of these claims, which state that the Jones claim was deemed to have been served on 13 December 2021, and the Jerrett 2 claim on 30 December 2021.17.2.2 In any event, by two orders dated 21 August 2023, DJ Cridge:17.2.3 On 15 September 2023, the defendant filed and served an amended defence to the Jerrett 2 claim.17.2.4 On 8 July 2025, HHJ Bloom made a further order in H63YJ940; this related to an application by the claimant for permission to appeal in respect of the orders of DJ Cridge of 21 August 2023. HHJ Bloom found, however, that an application by the claimant for permission to appeal against this order had already been determined on its merits by HHJ Roberts, when, by order dated 19 August 2024, it was refused and marked totally without merit. A further application by the claimant for permission to appeal against the order of 21 August 2023 was then put before HHJ Bloom for determination but refused on the papers on the basis that it had already been disposed of; HHJ Bloom also marked the application as being totally without merit.(a) struck out the Jones claim;(b) substituted the fourth defendant as the sole defendant in the Jerrett 2 claim;(c) set aside default judgment;(d) dismissed two applications by the claimant as being totally without merit;(e) allowed the claimant to incorporate part of the Jones claim within the Jerrett 2 claim;(f) gave permission to the fourth defendant to amend his defence;(g) transferred the matter to the County Court at Central London; and(h) made orders for costs against the claimant.17.3 KB-2024-003687 (the Hopkins claim) was issued in the High Court on 8 November 2024.

The defendants’ applications to strike out – relevant legal principles

[18]There is no dispute that the power to strike out a claim is an aspect of the court’s case management powers; as provided by CPR rule 3.4(2)(b), that power may be exercised where it appears to the court that a claim is an abuse of the court’s process. It is this contention that lies at the heart of the defendants’ applications to strike out the Hammond and Hopkins claims, which, they say, amount to an abuse of the process of the court, being contrary to the principle of res judicata.[19]The authoritative statement of the overlapping protections provided by the principle of res judicata is provided in the judgment of Lord Sumption (with whom the rest of the Supreme Court agreed), in the lead case of Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd v Zodiac Seats UK Ltd [2014] AC 160 at [17]. Having observed that “Res judicata is a portmanteau term which is used to describe a number of different legal principles with different juridical origins”,Lord Sumption proceeded to define the different ways in res judicata might apply, identifying (relevantly for present purposes):
“... first ... that once a cause of action has been held to exist or not to exist, that outcome may not be challenged by either party in subsequent proceedings. This is “cause of action estoppel”
. It is properly described as a form of estoppel precluding a party from challenging the same cause of action in subsequent proceedings ....” “... Fourth, there is the principle that even where the cause of action is not the same in the later action as it was in the earlier one, some issue which is necessarily common to both was decided on the earlier occasion and is binding on the parties: .... “Issue estoppel” was the expression devised to describe this principle ....” “Fifth, there is the principle first formulated by Wigram V-C in Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100, 115, which precludes a party from raising in subsequent proceedings matters which were not, but could and should have been raised in the earlier ones.”

Further observing that there is:

“...the more general procedural rule against abusive proceedings, which may be regarded as the policy underlying all of the above principles ...”
. Further observing that there is:[20]In Henderson v Henderson, Wigram V-C provided the following statement of principle, explaining how res judicata is to be seen as a means of ensuring that the process of the court is not abused (see p 115):
“... where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points on which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time.”
[21]In Johnson v Gore Wood & Co (a firm) [2002] 2 AC 1 the House of Lords similarly approached the res judicata principle as being part of a broader purpose to prevent a party (and the court) being vexed twice by the same issue; thus, in the speech of Lord Bingham at p 31. “... The underlying public interest is the same: that there should be finality in litigation and that a party should not be twice vexed in the same matter. This public interest is reinforced by the current emphasis on efficiency and economy in the conduct of litigation, in the interests of the parties and the public as a whole. The bringing of a claim or the raising of a defence in later proceedings may, without more, amount to abuse if the court is satisfied (the onus being on the party alleging abuse) that the claim or defence should have been raised in the earlier proceedings if it was to be raised at all. I would not accept that it is necessary, before abuse may be found, to identify any additional element such as a collateral attack on a previous decision or some dishonesty, but where those elements are present the later proceedings will be much more obviously abusive, and there will rarely be a finding of abuse unless the later proceeding involves what the court regards as unjust harassment of a party. It is, however, wrong to hold that because a matter could have been raised in earlier proceedings it should have been, so as to render the raising of it in later proceedings necessarily abusive. That is to adopt too dogmatic an approach to what should in my opinion be a broad, merits-based judgment which takes account of the public and private interests involved and also takes account of all the facts of the case, focusing attention on the crucial question whether, in all the circumstances, a party is misusing or abusing the process of the court by seeking to raise before it the issue which could have been raised before.” And in the speech of Lord Millett at p 59:
“... these various defences are all designed to serve the same purpose: to bring finality to litigation and avoid the oppression of subjecting a defendant unnecessarily to successive actions. While the exact relationship between the principle expounded by Sir James Wigram V-C and the defences of res judicata and cause of action and issue estoppel may be obscure, I am inclined to regard it as primarily an ancillary and salutary principle necessary to protect the integrity of those defences and prevent them from being deliberately or inadvertently circumvented.”
[22]Accordingly, the approach I am required to take is to make a broad merits-based assessment of whether the whole case could and should have been brought at the same time in the first action, such that the successive action is properly to be characterised as an abuse of process; the onus in this regard being on the party alleging abuse.[23]For completeness, however, it is clear that the parties do not have to be identical for Henderson abuse to be made out, although that can be a relevant factor when carrying out the required broad merits-based assessment; see per Thomas LJ (with whom the other members of the court agreed) at paragraphs 10 and 26 Aldi Stores Ltd v WSP Group plc [2007] EWCA Civ 1260. The potential relevance of the different identities of the defendants was acknowledged by Clarke LJ in Dexter Ltd v Vlieland-Boddy [2003] EWCA Civ 14, at paragraphs 49-53, in particular where he identified that “there may be many entirely legitimate reasons for a claimant deciding to bring an action against B first and, only later (and if necessary) against others” (such reasons including, for example, the costs of proceedings against more than one defendant; see per Clarke LJ at para 51).

Strike out – the claimant’s case

[24]In relation to the Hammond case, the claimant says that the strike out application must fail because he had applied for judgment in default and an administrative officer in the King’s Bench enquiries team had confirmed this had been “processed” on 5 December 2024, which (the claimant says) necessarily brought the claim to an end. As there was no continuing claim when the defendants made their application of 6 December 2024, there could be nothing against which the application to strike out could bite, a strike out being part of the court’s case management powers, which (as the term suggests) requires there to be a extant case (see paragraph 54 Terry v BCS Corporate Acceptances Ltd and ors [2018] EWCA Civ 2422).[25]In support of this submission, the claimant has taken me to an exchange of emails with the court office in late November/early December 2024. By email of 29 November 2024, the court responded to the claimant’s request for judgment to be entered in default, advising that he would first need to file a certificate of service. The claimant appears to have done that by email of 30 November 2024, and, on 5 December 2024, an administrative officer responded to say:
“I can confirm I have processed your request for judgment on this case and it is now with the Master awaiting directions. Once the Master comes back with their response, I will let you know.”
In the alternative, the claimant says that the defendants’ application should be dismissed as an abuse of process as it was made absent any acknowledgement of service or defence; the claimant says that the defendants should not be permitted to proceed with such an application without having themselves complied with the rules.[26]In the further alternative, the claimant says he has not raised any matter against any defendant which has been raised against the same defendant in an earlier claim; rather, in each claim, he has brought his whole case against each defendant, taken individually. As he has not sought to bring a second claim against any defendant, the claimant says there can be no estoppel and no abuse of process. More specifically, the claimant says the facts of each case is different: he has relied on different facts in respect of each different defendant; at no stage has he pursued a vexatious claim whereby a particular defendant has been vexed by the same claim more than once.[27]As for the substance of the claims, the claimant says the reason why the individual officers have not entered any defences to his claims is because they cannot do so. In this regard he relies on findings upholding complaints he has made against the police in respect of the incident on 2 March 2019; it is the claimant’s case that the defendants are seeking to strike out these claims so as to silence him and prevent him bringing legitimate claims that would hold the officers in question to account. He further contends that he was unable to bring the Hammond claim earlier because the outcome of his police complaints were not available until late 2023 (it was, he explains, only in the re-investigation report of 11 October 2023 that it was apparent that PC Hammond had not heard the claimant being arrested and cautioned, which supported his claim in respect of the unlawful nature of PC Hammond’s conduct on 2 March 2019).[28]For completeness, the claimant further says that it cannot be said that this claim has previously been struck out for an abuse of process, because the striking out of the amended particulars of claim in the Craig claim was on the basis that that pleading was incapable of being understood; that is not the position with the Hammond claim.[29]Turning then to the Hopkins claim, it is the claimant’s contention that a fundamental error was made in the County Court proceedings when the Jones claim was struck out as being res judicata. In fact, 13 December 2021 was the date of deemed service in the Jones claim, 30 December 2021 in the Jerrett 2 claim; thus the Jones claim pre-dated the Jerrett 2 claim and could not therefore be said to be an abuse of process. That, the claimant submits, undermines the defendants’ application in relation to the Hopkins claim, as that was premised on entirely the wrong claim before the County Court.[30]More substantively, the claimant contends that this is not a case of cause of action estoppel given that there has been no adjudication upon any claim; nor has he sought to bring a second action against any defendant.[31]The claimant went on to make the general point that it could not be said that an abuse arose from the fact that he had earlier and/or on-going claims against the fourth defendant, when that was not what he had done at any stage prior to the proceedings before the High Court; it was the County Court, on the invitation of the defendants, that had substituted the fourth defendant for the individually named police officers that the claimant had sought to sue in their own right. In this regard, the claimant submits that it is not an answer to say (as the defendants sought to do) that the fourth defendant is the correct defendant pursuant to section 88 Police Act 1996 (whereby the fourth defendant is liable for the acts and omissions of his officers acting in the course of their duties): until the proceedings in the High Court, he had brought his claims against each police officer as an individual. Strike out - analysis and conclusions The Hammond claim – KB-2024-003683

Strike out - analysis and conclusions

[32]Addressing first the claimant’s objection that the defendants’ strike out application must fail because his request for default judgment had already been processed by before 6 December 2024, this is an obviously bad point. As the claimant’s exchange of emails with the court office make clear, all that had occurred by 5 December 2024 is that the request for default judgment had been referred to a Master (the administrative officer had processed the request by referring it to a Master, not by issuing judgment in default). The Master was then entitled to direct a hearing of the request for default judgment (and not simply to grant it), see Edward v Okeke [2023] EWHC 2932 (KB); and, as the claimant is aware, when the request was considered by Master Dagnall, he declined to make the order sought at that stage (see Master Dagnall’s order of 20 December 2024). The claimant’s subsequent application for an extension of time to appeal, and for permission to appeal, against that order was refused by Tipples J and marked as being totally without merit (see her order of 8 May 2025). The claimant’s further application for permission to appeal against Tipples J’s order – in which he made the same assertion as he has made before me, namely that “his request for judgment had been processed by the Court Officer on or before 5 December 2024” – was dismissed by Peter Jackson LJ, and again certified as being totally without merit. No default judgment had been entered prior to the defendants’ strike out application of 6 December 2024 and the claimant’s continued attempt to go behind the order of Master Dagnall, notwithstanding the orders of Tipples J and Peter Jackson LJ, is properly to be characterised as vexatious.[33]In reaching his decision, Master Dagnall had assumed, in the claimant’s favour, that there had been valid service of the claim. That, however, was (and remains) disputed insofar as PC Hammond was concerned (the same is also true in relation to PC Hopkins and the Hopkins claim), and the claimant’s reference to emails from 2019 does not answer the point made by the defendants arising from the clear communications in 2024 of the need to effect service on the individual officers. Again, this is a point that Master Dagnall addressed when dealing with the claimant’s request for default judgment in December 2024.[34]The criticism of the defendants for filing the application to strike out prior to any acknowledgement of service similarly seeks to go behind the order of Master Dagnall (again, notwithstanding the orders of Tipples J and of Peter Jackson LJ). The court had not considered the claimant’s request for default judgment as at 6 December 2024 and, when it came to do so (at the hearing before Master Dagnall later that month), directions were given for the filing of an acknowledgement of service.[35]Turning then to the substance of the strike out application in relation to the Hammond claim, as the defendant has observed, this represents the seventh occasion that the claimant has brought proceedings in respect of the same incident; it is the defendants’ submission that this is a paradigm example of a case where the claimant could, and should, have brought (and arguably in fact did bring) this claim in his earlier litigation. I agree. In my judgement the Hammond claim brought before this court is properly to be described as an abuse of the process; this is a claim that both could and should have been pursued in the earlier proceedings in the County Court.[36]There may be an argument that a cause of action estoppel arises, given that:(1) precisely the same claim was brought against the same parties in L15ZA059, and/or(2) pursuant to the order of DJ Cridge of 19 December 2022, the same claim was pursued against the same party in the Craig claim, where the fourth defendant was substituted as the defendant before the case was subsequently struck out. As such, insofar as this claim brings the same claim against the same defendant, Mr Talalay says that the claims for trespass to the person, assault, and trespass to goods would all fall to be struck out as falling within the principle of cause of action estoppel. And, even allowing that it might be argued that a separate cause of action was raised in the Hammond claim, under article 3 ECHR (being a claim made pursuant to section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (“HRA”), the defendants contend that, in any event, any such claim (a) is out of time and falls to be struck out pursuant to section 7(5) HRA, and (b) falls to be struck out as falling within the principle of issue estoppel.[37]The claimant argues, however, that no cause of action, or issue, estoppel can arise, in circumstances where the claims were initially brought against different defendants. Moreover, to the extent that any part of his claim has been brought out of time, he submits that an extension of time should be allowed. As for any argument that this, more generally, amounts to an abuse of the process of the court, he objects that:(1) the Craig claim was not struck out on its merits, and(2) it could not be said that the current claim was vexing the same parties twice with the same claim.[38]In my judgement it is clear that the Hammond claim both could, and should, have been pursued as part of the Craig claim before the County Court. It arises out of precisely the same events, on the same date, involving the same parties, and giving rise to identical causes of action (this overlap is all the more obvious when it is appreciated that the claimant had been given permission to amend the Craig claim to incorporate the cases he had otherwise separately brought in the Hughes, Jerrett 1, and Stockdale claims). The fact that the claimant had not initially brought his claims in the County Court against the fourth defendant is irrelevant given that, by order of 19 December 2022, the fourth defendant had been substituted as the sole defendant to the Craig claim (and, of course, proceedings in L15ZA059 were straightforwardly brought against the second and fourth defendants from the start).[39]Even if not properly to be characterised as giving rise to a cause of action, or issue, estoppel, it is clear that the commencement of separate proceedings in the High Court in the Hammond claim amounted to an abuse of the court’s process. Had each claim in the County Court been permitted to proceed alongside each other, and the Hammond claim, each would have required its own separate case management, with the inevitable consequential increase in workload and costs; each would have been listed separately for trial, with all the defendants having to appear as witnesses in each of the trials; and each would then have had to be separately determined. Even if the different County Court claims had been consolidated for trial (effectively what DJ Cridge’s order of 19 December 2022 allowed, permitting the claimant to amend the Craig claim to incorporate the allegations made in the struck out Hughes, Jerrett 1 and Stockdale claims), then bringing a further claim, arising from the same incident etc, in the High Court would inevitably have given rise to two sets of proceedings, being case managed and determined by different judges on each occasion.[40]Thus considering the inevitable implications of the claimant’s conduct of the proceedings, it is obvious that this amounts to an abuse of the process: it is contrary to the rule in Henderson v Henderson, because the claimant has failed to bring forward all matters that might be included in the first of the claims (the Craig claim); more generally, it is clear misuse of the process of the court, given the claimant’s repeated bringing of claims, relating to the same acts on the same date, against each individual officer present on that occasion, and raising near identical issues that plainly ought to have been raised before.[41]Making this point does not, as the claimant argues, demonstrate an attempt on the part of the defendants to silence the claimant or to avoid facing the consequences of their actions. The claimant had been permitted to amend his pleadings in the Craig case to incorporate the allegations that had been made in the (struck out) Hughes, Jerrett 1 and Stockdale claims; had he then complied with the order of DJ Cridge of 19 December 2022, all matters could have proceeded to trial to be determined on the full evidence relating to events on 2 March 2019. Those proceedings could, moreover, have been amended to add the second and fourth defendants, and to place reliance on the findings in respect of the complaints that the claimant had pursued in relation to this incident. Furthermore, the abusive nature of the Hammond claim is not diminished by the fact that the Craig proceedings were ultimately struck out. The position remains that the defendants are again being vexed by the same issues being raised in relation to the same incident, notwithstanding the previous striking out of this claim against him.[42]This is, moreover, not a case where the different identities of the defendants provides a justification for the different claims (per Dexter Ltd v Vlieland-Boddy, supra). First, given that, pursuant to section 88 of the Police Act 1996, the fourth defendant is responsible for the acts and omissions of his officers acting in the course of their duties, the actions of the second defendant were also included within that earlier litigation. Second, and more generally, although there can be circumstances in which it would not be an abuse to pursue the same claims in different proceedings against a different defendant, there is no sensible justification for the claimant’s failure to include his claim against the second defendant in the earlier proceedings. Certainly, the fact that he did not have the investigation report in relation to his complaints against the police would not have prevented him including the second defendant as a party (the majority of the allegations made in the Hammond claim requiring no reference to the investigation report), and it would, in any event, have been open to him to apply to amend to include reference to that report. The short point is, that it is simply an abuse to seek to revive the earlier proceedings, struck out due to the claimant’s failure to comply with the orders of the court, by issuing a fresh claim as opposed to appealing the order striking out the Craig claim.[43]I am, furthermore, satisfied that the claimant has made a deliberate and tactical decision to now commence proceedings in the High Court so as to avoid the consequences of the orders that have been made against him in the County Court. Most obviously, he is seeking to avoid the consequence of the striking out of the Craig claim by making the same allegations in respect of the same incident, albeit nominally bringing in a new, individually named officer, in the Hammond claim. It is also apparent, however, that the claimant is frustrated by the consequences of the Roberts GCRO, that impacts upon his ability to make applications and further claims in the County Court (indeed, he has been explicit in his response to the defendants’ applications stating: “If the County Court would treat my applications relating to the GCRO as they should; there would be no need for me to issue claims in the High Court”).[44]Although not determinative, for completeness I should also add that I consider there is merit in the defendants’ objection that PC Hammond has never been properly served. Whatever might have been the position at an earlier stage of the claimant’s long-running litigation, in October 2024 it was made clear to him that the fourth defendant’s legal advisers would not accept service of proceedings against individual police officers. By then purporting to serve the claim against PC Hammond on the fourth defendant’s directorate of legal services, the claimant cannot be said to have served PC Hammond.[45]For all the reasons identified, I find the Hammond claim amounts to an abuse of the process of this court; I duly allow the defendants’ application to strike out the claim in KB-2024-003683 and certify that the bringing of this claim, duplicative of L15ZA059 and of the Craig claim, was totally without merit.

The Hopkins claim – KB-2024-003687

[46]As for the Hopkins claim, which relates to the events of 25 June 2020, the defendants object that the claimant has brought two previous pieces of litigation relating to the same events, resulting in one being struck out and the other being allowed to continue with the fourth defendant being substituted as the correct defendant. For the same reasons as the Hammond claim, the defendants thus say the Hopkins claim should be struck out. In addition, however, the point is made that those proceedings are still extant and, to the extent that the claimant seeks to add another defendant, the proper course would be to apply to amend his pleadings in claim no. H63YJ940.[47]The claimant’s principle objection to the striking out of the Hopkins claim is that the wrong claim was struck out by the County Court: as the Jones claim had been issued and (deemed to have been) served first, then it should not have been struck out as res judicata. That, however, is an objection purely of form, not substance. I am not concerned with an appeal against DJ Cridge’s order of 21 August 2023 (by which the Jones claim was struck out and the Jerrett 2 claim allowed to continue (DJ Cridge permitting the claimant to amend the Jerrett 2 claim to incorporate any additional points relied on in the Jones claim)), but with the question why a further claim, against the same defendant (the fourth defendant having been substituted as the sole defendant to the Jerrett 2 claim), raising the same complaints about the same incident, should now be permitted to proceed in the High Court.[48]The claimant contends that the Hopkins claim cannot be said to give rise to a case of cause of action or issue estoppel, given there has been no adjudication upon the Jerrett 2 claim by the County Court. That is true, but does not avoid the abusive nature of the pursuit of duplicative proceedings in the High Court; should the Hopkins claim be permitted to continue, it will run along a parallel line to County Court proceedings in the Jerrett 2 claim, requiring a duplication of resources on the part of the defendant and the courts, and leading to trials of the same issues, relating to the same incident, before two different judges.[49]The claimant again argues that it is a valid point of distinction that he brought claims against different defendants, arguing that he should not be restricted in his ability to bring a separate claim against the fourth defendant by the decision made by the County Court in the Jerrett 2 claim to substitute the fourth defendant as the sole defendant in those proceedings. That, however, is to confuse the issue before me – whether the Hopkins claim in the High Court amounts to an abuse of the court’s process – with arguments that might have been made on an appeal against DJ Cridge’s order of 21 August 2023. Even if I were to assume that there might have been a proper basis for challenging that order (and I am far from convinced that that is so), the fact is that both sets of proceedings are now being pursued against the same defendant. In any event, for similar reasons to those discussed in relation to the Hammond claim, the point is a bad one. By virtue of section 88 of the Police Act 1996, the fourth defendant is responsible for the acts and omissions of his officers acting in the course of their duties, and thus the actions of the individually named officers (including the third defendant) will already be in issue in the on-going Jerrett 2 claim; there is no sensible justification for the claimant to now seek to embark upon another claim, in a different court, when, to the extent it was necessary, he could simply apply to amend to add any distinct allegation relating to the third defendant’s conduct in the County Court proceedings.[50]Again, for completeness, I also consider there is merit in the defendants’ objection that PC Hopkins has never been properly served. As the claimant had been told, in October 2024, that the fourth defendant’s legal advisers would not accept service of proceedings against individual police officers, by then purporting to serve PC Hopkins via the fourth defendant’s directorate of legal services, the claimant cannot be said to have served PC Hopkins.[51]For all the reasons identified, I find that the Hopkins claim amounts to an abuse of the process of this court; I allow the defendants’ application to strike out the claim in KB-2024-003687 and certify that the bringing of this claim, duplicative of the on-going County Court proceedings in the Jerrett 2 claim, was totally without merit. The defendants’ application for a General Civil Restraint Order (“GCRO”) The relevant legal principles

The defendants’ application for a General Civil Restraint Order (“GCRO”)

[52]In considering whether to make a GCRO, or to extend such an order, the test is that identified by the Court of Appeal in Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary v Gray [2019] EWCA Civ 1675 at [14] (approving the questions identified by Stuart-Smith J (as he then was) in the High Court), that is, whether:
“... an order (or its extension) ... [is] necessary in order (a) to protect litigants from vexatious proceedings against them and/or (b) to protect the finite resources of the Court from vexatious waste.”
[53]Practice Direction 3C (made pursuant to CPR r. 3.11) provides that a GCRO may be made:
“4.1 ... where the party against whom the order is made persists in issuing claims or making applications which are totally without merit, in circumstances where an extended civil restraint order would not be sufficient or appropriate.”
[54]At least three unmeritorious claims or applications are required to prove “persistence” (see Courtman v Ludlam [2009] EWHC 2067 (Ch) at [9], White Book [3.11.2]); albeit an order does not have to say that the claim or application was totally without merit on its face for the court to be satisfied for these purposes that the claim was, in fact, totally without merit; the court is entitled to infer that a claim or application is totally without merit when it is clear from the context, even if those words are not used (see Kumar v Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs [2007] 1 WLR 536 at [66-68], White Book [3.11.2]).

Submissions

[55]It is the defendants’ submission that the claimant’s conduct of litigation is rightly to be characterised as purposeful, manipulative and knowingly vexatious. In this regard, the defendants point out that the claimant has been warned on multiple occasions by the courts that his approach to litigation is unsustainable, confusing, and contrary to the rules of the court (see, by way of example, the observations made by HHJ Saggerson in the Central London County Court, in an earlier judgment striking out claims brought by the claimant against the fourth defendant, as being “manifestly unsustainable ... and ... an abuse of the process of the Court”). The claimant had, however, persisted in(a) bringing multiple claims arising from the same incident,(b) making multiple totally without merit (“TWM”) applications within each claim, and(c) regularly appealing case management orders. The defendants have estimated that at least 14 claims or applications made by the claimant have been marked as being TWM by the courts (most recently, in the order of Tipples J of 8 May 2025, and the refusal of permission ruling of Peter Jackson LJ of 2 July 2025), albeit the defendants would submit that many more were in fact TWM. The defendants point out that the claimant is not deterred by the possibility of costs orders being made against him (I am told that the claimant has yet to pay any of the some £41,931.37 costs that have been awarded against him in claims against the defendants), and contend that no order short of a GCRO is sufficient given the widespread nature of the claimant’s litigation (underlined by his recent issuing of a further seven claims in the High Court).[56]The claimant seeks to resist the application, which he contends is further evidence of the defendants’ wish to silence him and to prevent him from exposing the police and their criminal conduct. He says that none of the claims he has brought can properly be characterised as vexatious, abusive, or as amounting to harassment of the defendants. He also contends that he has not been permitted to challenge the decisions made in most of the applications that have been marked TWM, arguing that it had been wrong to refuse him permission to appeal the Tipples J order of 8 May 2025 when that had been wrong (Tipples J had not understood that default judgment had been entered on 5 December 2024 in respect of the Hammond claim and that, therefore, Master Dagnall’s decision was of no effect). In seeking to make good this point, the claimant further referred to the order of HHJ Bloom of 8 July 2025, which had marked his application for permission to appeal as TWM, when there had in fact never been any adjudication upon the merits of his application.

Analysis and conclusions

[57]I have considered first whether it can properly be said that the claimant has persisted in making claims or applications that are TWM. In this regard, I do not need to look behind earlier rulings, to see whether it might be appropriate to infer that a particular claim or application was TWM notwithstanding that term not being used in the relevant order; in the claimant’s case, there is a lengthy history of TWM rulings that evidences a persistent pattern of conduct in this regard.[58]In an earlier statement in the County Court proceedings relating to the Jerrett 2 claim, Mr Foden provided a table listing previous orders which had marked various applications made by the claimant as TWM, as follows:58.1 On 25 September 2019, DJ Cridge had dismissed an application made by the claimant to strike out a defence in case F24Y318, deeming the application to have been TWM.58.2 On 13 December 2019, in a consolidated hearing before DJ Cridge relating to multiple claims, six applications made by the claimant across three of the claims were dismissed as TWM and a limited CRO imposed.58.3 After the Luba GCRO had been imposed on 24 May 2022, on 29 March 2023, in relation to the Craig claim, DJ Cridge dismissed as TWM the claimant’s application for permission to issue an application to strike out a strike out application made by the defence.58.4 On an appeal to the High Court in the Craig claim, on 12 April 2023, Lambert J dismissed as TWM various applications by the claimant (albeit she treated one application as an appeal against the Luba GCRO).58.5 On 21 August 2023, when making orders in relation to the Jerrett 2 and Jones claims, DJ Cridge dismissed applications made by the claimant as TWM and also struck out the Jones claim as being an abuse of process and TWM.58.6 On 19 January 2024, Popplewell LJ dismissed as TWM the claimant’s application for permission to appeal against Lambert J’s order of 12 April 2023.[59]As I have already recorded, the Roberts GCRO was imposed on 19 August 2024. Although that would seem to have had some effect in the County Court proceedings (albeit a further TWM ruling was made by HHJ Bloom on 8 July 2025), it does not extend to the High Court or Court of Appeal, where the claimant has persisted in his vexatious conduct. As I have found, he has brought claims (KB-2024-003683 and KB-2024-003687) that are abusive of the process of the court, and has pursued applications for permission to appeal that have been certified as TWM (the order of Tipples J of 8 May 2025, and that of Peter Jackson LJ of 2 July 2025).[60]From my consideration of the relevant history, I am satisfied that the claimant has persistently pursued and/or conducted litigation before the courts that is properly to be described as vexatious. Asking myself whether a restraint order is necessary in these circumstances, I am further satisfied that it is, both in order to protect the defendants from that conduct and, more generally, so as to protect the finite resources of the courts from vexatious waste. In reaching this conclusion, I have noted that the claimant:(1) continues to seek to go behind earlier court orders, arguing (for example) that I should treat the orders of Tipples J and Peter Jackson LJ as having been wrongly decided;(2) is singularly undeterred by the risk of adverse costs consequences; and(3) adopts a tactical approach to his litigation, whereby unnecessarily separate and duplicative claims are brought against different defendants, and proceedings are commenced in the High Court expressly to avoid the consequences of a GCRO imposed in the County Court. The fact that the claimant has recently sought to issue a further seven claims in the High Court only serves to emphasise the need for a restraint order to be made.[61]Before acceding to the defendants’ application for a GCRO, however, I have further considered whether adequate protection might be afforded by the imposition of an Extended GCRO. Given the lengthy history of different proceedings brought by the claimant, however, I cannot see that this would provide the protection required. That history, in my judgement, also supports the imposition of an order for three years.[62]For the reasons provided, I therefore allow the defendants’ application for a GCRO, which is imposed on the claimant for a period of three years, commencing 24 July 2025.

Disposal

[63]No order was made in respect of the claimant’s appeals in KA-2023-000164 and KA-2024-000184; the hearing in relation to those appeals was postponed as directed by order dated 21 July 2025.[64]The defendants’ strike out applications are allowed, the claims in KB-2024-003683 and KB-2024-003687 are duly struck out.[65]The defendants’ application for a GCRO to be made for a period of three years is allowed; pursuant to the separate order made in this regard, the claimant is subject to a GCRO for a period of three years commencing 24 July 2025.[66]The claimant’s claims in these proceedings having been struck out, the defendants are entitled to their costs. Given, however, that those costs will relate to the entirety of the proceedings in KB-2024-003683 and KB-2024-003687 (not merely the hearing on 18 July 2025),(1) I have not made a separate costs order in respect of the GCRO, and(2) it is directed that those costs are to be the subject of detailed assessment if not agreed.

Cited in 1 later judgment