Solicitors Regulation Authority Ltd & Ors v Zakir Khan [2025] EWHC 1378 (KB)

[2025] EWHC 1378 (KB)Case No KB-2025-BHM-000005
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
BIRMINGHAM DISTRICT REGISTRY
Venue Birmingham Civil and Family Justice Centre
The Priory Courts, 33 Bull Street,
Venue Birmingham B4 6DSDate 12 June 2025
Before
HHJ EMMA KELLY(Sitting as a Judge of the High Court)
Between
Solicitors Regulation Authority LimitedClaimantsSecretary of State for JusticeClaimantDepartment of Work and PensionsClaimantDepartment for Business and TradeClaimantThe Home OfficeClaimantMinistry of Housing, Communities and Local GovernmentClaimantMr Zakir KhanDefendant
Ms Elizabeth Hodgetts and Connor Wright (instructed by Capsticks LLP and TLT LLP) for ClaimantsMr Zakir Khan (acting in person) for in personHearing Hearing date: 29 April 2025
APPROVED JUDGMENT

HHJ Emma Kelly:

[1]The first claimant is the regulatory body for solicitors. The second to sixth claimants are or represent various government departments or agencies.[2]All of the claimants have been named as respondents to failed claims brought by Mr Zakir Khan (‘the defendant’) in the Employment Tribunal of England and Wales (‘the ET’) and, in some instances, appeals to the Employment Appeal Tribunal of England and Wales (‘the EAT’). The claimants submit that there is a common theme to the defendant’s claims in that he alleges a failure by a given respondent to make reasonable adjustments pursuant to the Equality Act 2010, in relation to job applications he made or claimed he wanted to make.[3]This judgment deals with: i) The claimants’ part 8 claim, dated 10 January 2025, for a General Civil Restraint Order (‘GCRO’), alternatively for an Extended Civil Restraint Order (‘ECRO’). [This judgment will refer to the claim as ‘the CRO Application’.] ii) The defendant’s application, dated 1 April 2025, to(a) strike out the claim and(b) for other miscellaneous relief, including various declarations and damages (‘the Defendant’s Application’).

Procedural background

[4]The claimants seek an order to restrain the defendant from issuing or presenting a claim in the ET or an appeal in the EAT without permission of the court, in respect of any job application made or asserted to have been made by the defendant, or in relation to any job application process whether or not the defendant made an application in that process. Whilst their original claim form categorised such an order as a GCRO, they now recognise it may be better described as an ECRO.[5]The claimants rely on the following witness statements: i) Sophie Hayward, solicitor for the second to sixth claimants, dated 29 October 2024; ii) James Powell, solicitor for the first claimant, dated 7 November 2024 and 22 April 2025; iii) Stephen Ellerby, solicitor for the second to sixth claimants, dated 9 January 2025, 26 February 2025, 13 March 2025, and 17 March 2025.[6]By order dated 18 January 2025, the time for the defendant to file and serve any written evidence in response to the claim was extended to 13 February 2025. The defendant failed to comply with that direction.[7]The claim was listed for hearing on 25 March 2025. On that occasion, I granted the defendant’s application for an adjournment, accepting his submission that his participation in the hearing that day was at risk of being disadvantaged by virtue of his being on his 26th day of fasting during the Ramadan period. I further extended the time for him to file and serve any evidence in response to the claim to 8 April 2025.[8]Following the hearing on 25 March, the defendant filed a series of application notices, each with the benefit of fee exemption. Not all of the application notices were filed with accompanying witness evidence. Various attachments followed later. No draft orders were filed. This did not make it easy to understand the applications. At the hearing on 29 April 2025, the defendant confirmed he had made three applications in the following chronological[9]The Defendant’s Application can be divided into two main parts. The defendant seeks: i) The striking out of the CRO Application. ii) A document attached to the N244 application notice particularises what is said to be a ‘counter appeal or counter claim’. By that document, the defendant seeks a variety of miscellaneous relief. The defendant states he is seeking: a) To ‘overturn the decisions of the ET (and or other levels) and rule in favour my case’. b) A variety of declarations including as to ‘the impropriety of the [claimants] have engaged in’; as to ‘the injudiciousness of the judges’ (presumably in the ET and/or EAT); as to the ET being ‘systematically perverse in its conduct towards [the defendant]’; and as to the ‘the legal team responsible for the [claimants’] improper and unconscionable conduct…’. c) Damages for injury to feelings, victimisation, loss of amenity, aggravated damages, damages for psychiatric injury, a ‘(new) enhanced award for psychiatric harm’, damages for distress by way of improper and unconscionable conduct, punitive damages, compensation ‘for a severe (new and enhanced damages) in the domain of aggravated damages’, further aggravated damages for taking advantage of the injudiciousness of the judges’, and ‘damages for the C’s abuse of process in bringing a GCRO or any other kind of order’. d) In addition, the defendant makes a complaint that the ET did not instruct a medical expert to evaluate his situation.[10]The defendant has since filed and served: i) An unsigned and undated witness statement running to 69 pages and 344 paragraphs. ii) A 3149-page bundle of documents. The bundle has an index and partial pagination within different non-consecutive lettered sections. [I am grateful to the claimants’ legal representatives for putting the document into an electronic, fully paginated bundle.] The defendant also brought further documents to the hearing on 29 April 2025.[11]For the reasons given in an ex tempore judgment at the hearing on 29 April 2025, I dismissed the defendant’s application of 29 March 2025 for permission to rely on expert evidence. The claimants took no issue with the defendant’s late filing and serving of evidence, and I indicated I was prepared to take account of all the documents he had filed. As such, the applications relating to extensions of time for filing evidence became redundant. The hearing proceeded on the basis that the defendant could rely on all of the documents he had filed and served, including those brought to court on the day of the hearing. The defendant’s application seeking a longer time estimate for the hearing was adjourned to see what progress had been made within the existing one-day time estimate. It became redundant as submissions concluded within the day, as envisaged, and judgment on the CRO Application and the Defendant’s Application was reserved.[12]I am grateful to the claimants’ counsel for their helpful skeleton argument, chronology, and bundle of authorities.

Factual Background

[13]The defendant is a prolific litigant who, since 2017, has issued a large number of claims in the ET. In some of his claims, he has also requested reconsideration of decisions and/or attempted to appeal to the EAT. The size of the hearing bundles for these applications, totalling more than 6000 pages, gives some insight into the extent of the defendant’s litigation activity. The paperwork generated by the claims includes not only the claim documentation one would expect to see in any ET claim, but also copious amounts of often lengthy emails sent by the defendant to the ET, the parties, and, since the issue of this claim, the court.[14]The task of identifying all of the defendant’s ET claims is not an easy one. The claimants’ witness evidence collates information about claims known to them. Many of those are claims against the claimants, but there are also other claims against different respondents. The defendant does not take issue with the claimants’ list of claims, although he disputes that any of his litigation lacks merit. The claimants’ evidence, largely from Ms Hayward and Mr Powell, identifies the following 42 ET claim numbers presented by the defendant. The last 4 digits of each claim number indicate the year in which the ET claim was issued. ET claims made by the defendant. 1300893/2017 against Mills & Reeve LLP 1301775/2017 against Bevan Brittan LLP 1302121/2018 against Weightmans LLP 1302191/2018 against the Solicitors Regulation Authority (‘SRA’) 1303814/2018 against the SRA 1303809/2018 against Shoosmiths 1303959/2018 against Irwin Mitchell LLP 1304056/2018 against Irwin Mitchell LLP 1304236/2018 against Irwin Mitchell LLP 1301225/2018 against the Crown Prosecution Service (‘CPS’) 1302334/2018 against the Home Office 1304025/2018 against ACAS 2201295/2019 against the CPS 1301052/2021 against the SRA 2201553/2021 against the SRA 1302664/2021 against the Secretary of State for Justice (‘SSJ’) 221200/2021 against the Department for Work and Pensions (‘DWP’) 2203772/2021 against the SSJ 1302798/2021 against the SSJ 1302745/2021 against the SSJ 1303503/2021 against the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (‘DBEIS’) amended to Department for Business and Trade (‘DBT’) 2204644/2021 against the Home Office (‘HO’) 1303726/2021 against the DBT 1304341/2021 against the SSJ 1301491/2022 against the HO 1301561/2022 against the DWP 1301299/2022 against the SRA 1301513/2022 against the SRA 1303609/2022 against the Department for Levelling Up, Housing & Communities (‘DLUHC’) 1308505/2022 against the CPS 1302099/2023 against the SRA 1302695/2023 against the CPS 1302157/2023 against the Care Quality Commission (‘CQC’) 1302989/2023 against the DBEIS 1303023/2023 against the CPS 1304183/2023 against the SRA 1305134/2023 against the SRA 1305634/2023 against the SRA 1306646/2024 against the SRA 6006308/2024 against the SRA 6008884/2024 against the SRA 6008874/2024 against the SSJ sued as His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunal Service[15]Such is the scale of the defendant’s litigation, the ET has often grouped together claims against common respondents to assist with case management. That process gave rise to what are known as the Group 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 claims. The Group 1 and 5 claims are against the SRA. The Group 2 claims are against the SSJ. The Group 3 claims are against miscellaneous government departments. The Group 4 claims are against the CPS and CQC.[16]The nature of each of the claims is similar. The defendant applies for a job with a given respondent. The defendant states in his applications that he has a law degree and LLM in commercial law. When he is unsuccessful in a job application, he relies on sections 20, 21, and 39 of the Equality Act 2010 to allege a failure on a given respondent’s part to make reasonable adjustments to the recruitment process to accommodate his disabilities. The defendant relies on a number of disabilities: Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, depression, anxiety, and Obsessive Compulsive Personality Disorder. In some instances, the defendant does not even get as far as making an application for the job and alleges the application process was discriminatory, such that he could not apply.[17]The reasonable adjustments the defendant asserts he is entitled to vary from claim to claim but common themes include one or more of: replacing written competency-based application forms with assessed work experience; permitting the defendant to sit a written test to assess hypothetical examples in lieu of demonstrating competencies by already acquired experience; permitting the defendant to bypass a particular stage of the application process; being permitted to engage in post-application correspondence; ignoring grammatical errors in application forms; lowering the minimum competency threshold for jobs; not imposing a word limit on applications; obtaining evidence from an occupation psychologist; providing advance notification of the form of online tests; awarding the defendant higher marks at a particular stage of the application process and, perhaps most optimistically, providing a scholarship for him to undertake the then solicitors’ Legal Practice Course.[18]The defendant’s success rate in the ET is poor. There is no evidence before the court that any of the 42 claims have succeeded before an Employment Judge (‘EJ’). The Group 1, 2, 3 and 4 claims and a variety of claims issued prior to the introduction of group case management stand struck out. The majority of those have been struck out under rule 37(1) of the Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2013 (‘the ET Rules 2013’) as disclosing no reasonable prospect of success. [With effect from 6 January 2025, the ET Rules 2013 were replaced by the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 (‘the ET Rules 2024’). However, all the relevant ET decisions were made before the commencement date for the new rules.] Some of the defendant’s claims were made the subject of deposit orders under rule 39(1) of the ET Rules 2013, on the basis that the claim has little prospect of success, and have subsequently been struck out when the defendant failed to pay the deposit. The Group 5 claims have yet to be determined, and some of the more recent 2024 claims which are not yet within a group, and two other claims which were not the subject of strike out applications, are stayed pending the outcome of the CRO Application. The claimants understand from comments made by the defendant at a preliminary hearing in the Group 4 claims in September 2024, that only two of his claims have yielded any success, with two solicitors’ firms settling claims on the making of nuisance value payments of £700 and £1000.[19]Throughout the progression of the ET claims, the defendant repeatedly made applications to adjourn hearings, usually on medical grounds. His applications to adjourn invariably failed.[20]The defendant has attempted to challenge various adverse ET decisions. This has included requests for reconsideration under rule 71 of the ET Rules 2013. Such applications have been refused. The defendant has also tried to appeal or threatened to appeal various ET decisions. On 25 May 2024, Eady J concluded that the defendant’s attempt to appeal a refusal of the ET to postpone a hearing of the Group 2 claims disclosed no arguable question of law. The defendant has since applied for an oral permission hearing, which is listed on 11 June 2025. Legal Framework 21. Strike out

Legal Framework

[21]By Civil Procedure Rule (‘CPR’) 3.4(2), the court “may strike out a statement of case if it appears to the court-(a) that the statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending the claim;(b) that the statement of case is an abuse of the court’s process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings; …”[22]CPR Practice Direction (‘PD’) 3A, para. 1.2 gives “examples of cases where the court may conclude that particulars of claim… fall within rule 3.4(2)(a)” as including “those which are incoherent and make no sense” and “those which contain a coherent set of facts but those facts, even if true, do not disclose a legally recognisable claim against the defendant.” At para. 1.3 a claim may fall within 3.4(2)(b) if it is “vexatious, scurrilous or obviously ill-founded.”[23]For the purpose of the application to strike out, the facts as alleged by the claimant are assumed to be true: Morgan Crucible Company plc v Hill Samuel & Co Ltd & others [1991] Ch 295 at [314B].[24]It is inappropriate to strike out a claim unless the court can be certain a claim is bound to fail: Hughes v Colin Richards & Co [2004] EWCA Civ 226 Peter Gibson LJ held at [22]. Civil Restraint Orders[25]The court has an inherent power to protect its process from abuse: Bhamjee v Forsdick (Practice Note) [2003] EWCA Civ 1113 at [11] – [15].[26]CPR 3.11 and CPR PD 3C provide a procedural framework for civil restraint orders (singular ‘CRO’ or plural ‘CROs’), which operate alongside the court’s inherent jurisdiction. The procedure provided by the CPR will almost invariably be adopted rather than the court seeking to rely on its inherent powers: R (Kumar) v Secretary of Statefor Constitutional Affairs)[2006] EWCA Civ 990 (‘Kumar’) at para. 62.[27]By virtue of s.1(1) of the Civil Procedure Act 1997, the provisions of the CPR apply only to the procedure in the Civil Division of the Court of Appeal, the High Court, and the County Court. The claimants’ application seeks protection of processes in the ET and EAT, both of which are tribunals and are not governed by the CPR.[28]Neither the ET Rules 2013, nor successor provisions under the ET Rules 2024, make provision for civil restraint orders akin to those found in the civil jurisdiction. Whilst the ET has no power to make a CRO or equivalent order, the High Court can make such orders to protect tribunals, including the ET: Nursing and Midwifery Council vHarrold[2015] EWHC 2254 (QB) (‘Harrold’) at [20] – [23] and [37]. That power extends to making orders to protect the EAT: London Underground Ltd v Roger Mighton [2020] EWHC 3099 (‘Mighton’) at [35].[29]The High Court will apply the provisions of CPR 3.11 and PD 3C by analogy when considering whether to make a CRO to protect the processes of the tribunals: Harrold at [30] and Mighton at [36] – [37].[30]CPR 3.11(2) states:
“A practice direction may set out— (a) the circumstances in which the court has the power to make a civil restraint order against a party to proceedings; (b) the procedure where a party applies for a civil restraint order against another party; and (c) the consequences of the court making a civil restraint order.”
[31]By CPR PD 3C, para. 3.1(2), an ECRO may be made by a Judge of the High Court “where a party has persistently issued claims or made applications which are totally without merit.”[32]By CPR PD 3C, para. 3.2(1), an ECRO made by a judge of the High Court restrains the individual subject to the order from issuing claims or making applications in the High Court or County Court “concerning any matter involving or relating to or touching upon or leading to the proceedings in which the order is made without first obtaining the permission of a judge identified in the order.”[33]By CPR PD 3C, para. 4.1(2), a GCRO may be made by a Judge of the High Court “where the party against whom the order is made persists in issuing claims or making applications which are totally without merit, in circumstances where an extended civil restraint order would not be sufficient or appropriate.”[34]By CPR PD 3C, para.

(b) :

“Unless the court otherwise orders, where the court makes a [GCRO], the party against whom the order is made – (1) will be restrained from issuing any claim or making any application … (b) in the High Court or County Court if the order has been made by a Judge of the High Court…” (b) in the High Court or County Court if the order has been made by a Judge of the High Court…”
[35]A GCRO is thus wider in scope than an ECRO. It can be “apt to cover a situation where [a litigant] adopts a scattergun approach to litigation on a number of different grievances without necessarily exhibiting such an obsessive approach to a single topic that an extended civil restraint order can necessarily be made against him/her”: Kumar at [60].[36]Whilst the court can extend the duration of an ECRO or GCRO, it must not be extended for a period of more than 3 years on any given occasion: CPR PD 3C, at para. 3.10 and 4.10.[37]The approach to considering whether to make a CRO and, if so, what form of CRO was considered in Nowak v The Nursing and Midwifery Council [2013] EWHC 1932 (QB) (‘Nowak’) at [63] – [70], and subsequently adopted in cases including Howell v Evans [2020] EWHC 2729 at [11], and Mighton at [41]. There are three questions for the court:(a) Has the litigant persistently issued claims or made applications which are totally without merit pursuant to CPR PD 3C, para. 1 (“the threshold requirement”)?(b) Does an objective assessment of the risk which the litigant poses demonstrate that he will, if unrestrained, issue further claims or make further applications which are an abuse of the court's process (“the exercise of discretion”)?(c) What order, if any, is just and proportionate to make to address the risk identified (“the appropriate order”)?[38]A claim or application is “totally without merit” if it is bound to fail: R (Wasif) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 82 (“Wasif”)at [12].[39]The concept of persistence was considered in Sartipy v Tigris Industries Inc [2019] EWCA Civ 225 (‘Sartipy’) by Males LJ. Relevant considerations to the index matter include: i) At [29]: a totally without merit claim and totally without merit individual applications within a claim can all be counted for the purposes of considering whether to make a CRO. ii) At [30]:
“although at least three claims or applications are the minimum required for the making of an CRO, the question remains whether the party has acted ‘persistently’... It may be easier to conclude that a party is persistently issuing claims or applications which are totally without merit if it seeks repeatedly to re-litigate issues which have been decided than if there are three or more unrelated applications many years apart…” iii) At [37]: “…the court is entitled to take into account any previous claims or applications which are totally without merit and is not limited to claims so certified at the time, albeit the court would need to ensure it knew sufficient about the earlier claim or application…”
[40]When considering what order, if any, is just and proportionate, the court should ask “what is the least restrictive form of order shown to be required”: Nowak at [70].[41]A previous certification that a claim or application was totally without merit is conclusive unless successfully appealed: Crimson Flower Productions Ltd v Glass Slipper Ltd [2020] EWHC 942 (Ch) (‘Crimson Flower’) at [27]. The Defendant’s Application 43. The Defendant’s Application - Strike out[42]I shall deal at the outset with the part of the application that seeks to strike out the CRO Application. Most applications for strike out are dealt with in advance of the substantive hearing of a claim. However, the Defendant’s Application was filed so shortly before the substantive hearing, indeed after the adjournment of the first substantive hearing, that it was not listed separately. I therefore heard rolled-up submissions. Cognisant of the fact that the defendant was a litigant in person, albeit one with undergraduate and postgraduate law degrees, I explained the test under CPR 3.4(2) and invited him to explain which limb or limbs he relied on and why.

The Defendant’s Application

[43]The defendant submitted that: i) The statement of case disclosed no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim within the meaning of CPR 3.4(2)(a). The thrust of his submission in this regard was that he did not accept the bundle of authorities relied on by the claimants applied to his case, as the facts of those cases were different. He attributed any adverse decisions in his ET claims to “problems” with the decisions of the EJs. ii) The statement of case was an abuse of the court’s process within the meaning of CPR 3.4(2)(b). He submitted that the CRO Application was abusive in that it was an attempt by the claimants to intimidate, suppress, and tire him out. He described it as another hurdle being thrown at him.[44]The claimants oppose the striking out of the CRO Application. They rely on their submissions on the CRO Application to argue that the defendant’s approach is entirely misconceived.[45]I can deal with the strike out application shortly. The statement of case clearly discloses reasonable grounds for bringing the claim. On the claimant’s factual case, assumed to be true for the purposes of a strike out application and in any event not in dispute, the ET has made multiple findings that the defendant’s claims were totally without merit. [See para. 52 below.] The High Court has jurisdiction to protect the ET and EAT (see Harrold and Mighton). Accordingly, the CRO Application comes nowhere close to engaging the CPR 3.4(2)(a). It is not bound to fail. The defendant’s submission about the cogency of the bundle of authorities is misconceived. An authority can provide relevant statements of principle of the approach to the making of CROs without being factually the same as the index case.[46]Furthermore, the bringing of the CRO Application is not an abuse of process for the purpose of CPR 3.4(2)(b). It is not abusive for litigants to pursue an application they are entitled to make on the facts of a case. To prevent the claimants of the opportunity of the CRO Application being heard would be to deprive the claimants of their right of access to justice. Equally, the fact that the CRO Application, if successful, would restrain some of the defendant’s litigation activity in the ET and/or EAT, does not make it an abuse of process. The courts have long recognised that a CRO is a legitimate means of moderating but not preventing an individual’s access to justice. Both limbs of the Defendant’s Application to strike out the CRO Application are wholly misconceived. The Defendant’s Application - Miscellaneous relief[47]The defendant confirmed during the hearing that he wished to pursue his application for the miscellaneous relief referred to in paragraph 9(ii) above. With respect to the defendant, his submissions in respect of this aspect of his application were legally incoherent. He submitted that the High Court had the authority to interfere with the decisions of the ET and EAT, and indicated he was relying on principles of equity. He did, however, tell the court he had studied law a long time ago and couldn’t remember much of it.[48]At the centre of this part of the Defendant’s Application is a challenge to the decisions of the ET or EAT. The relief he seeks appears to flow from the overturning of those decisions. The decisions of the ET and/or EAT he seeks to challenge are wholly unparticularised, as are the grounds upon which he alleges the decisions should be overturned. However, the difficulties with this aspect of the Defendant’s Application are far more fundamental. A challenge to a decision of the ET and/or EAT does not lie to the High Court. A challenge to a decision of the ET lies either by way of a request for reconsideration under what was rule 71 of the ET Rules 2013 (now rule 68 of the ET Rules 2024) and/or by appeal on a question of law to the EAT under s.21(1) of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996. The defendant himself is well-versed in the procedure, having sought to challenge a number of adverse decisions. Any appeal from the EAT lies to the Court of Appeal, but only if permission is granted, and not to the High Court. It will thus readily be appreciated that the defendant’s attempt to challenge the decisions of the ET and/or EAT in this forum is wholly misconceived.[49]Insofar as any of the relief sought by the defendant is not contingent on the overturning of decisions of the ET and/or EAT, the application is incoherent. It is procedurally defective in that a claim or counterclaim cannot be brought by N244 application notice. Moreover, there are no particulars of the claim(s) brought. It is impossible to discern the legal or factual basis of any claim. The defendant’s general submission that he relies on ‘principles of equity’ is hopelessly vague. The aspect of the defendant’s application that relates to the shopping list of miscellaneous relief he seeks is accordingly dismissed.[50]In short, all aspects of the Defendant’s Application are dismissed. The application was bound to fail, and it is appropriate to record the Defendant’s Application as being totally without merit. The CRO Application Issue 1: Has the litigant persistently issued claims or made applications which are totally without merit pursuant to CPR PD 3C, para. 1 (“the threshold requirement”)?

The CRO Application

[51]If the court strikes out a claim in the civil jurisdiction and considers it to be totally without merit, CPR 3.4(6)(a) requires the order to record that fact. A similar requirement arises under CPR 23.12(a) in respect of the dismissal of totally without merit applications. On making such a finding, the court must consider whether a civil restraint order should be made. The ET Rules 2013 contain no similar requirements to record totally without merit claims or applications. This is unsurprising given the lack of provision in the ET for the making of civil restraint orders. The Employment Appeal Tribunal Rules 1993 (‘the EAT Rules’) do, however provide at rule 3(7ZA) for a totally without merit finding to be made on paper, depriving an appellant of the entitlement to a hearing before a judge.[52]Notwithstanding the lack of obligation to record totally without merit findings in the ET, in respect of five of the defendant’s claims, EJs have made express findings that the claims were totally without merit. The findings are set out in the table below: Date Case No. Respondent Judge Decision 06.01.20 2201295/2019 CPS EJ Camp Claim dismissed on withdrawal and indicated in an addendum to the judgment as being totally without merit 04.03.24 1303503/2021 DBT EJ Gilroy KC Claim struck out and noted in the judgment as being totally without merit. 04.03.24 1301561/2022 DWP EJ Gilroy KC Claim struck out and noted in the judgment as being totally without merit. 04.03.24 1303609/2022 DLUHC EJ Gilroy KC Claim struck out and noted in the judgment as being totally without merit. 24.09.24 1303023/2023 CPS EJ Steward Claim struck out and noted in the judgment as being totally without merit.[53]The defendant does not accept that the aforementioned five claims were totally without merit. Indeed, he maintains that all of his litigation in the ET is meritorious. In his oral submissions, he told the court that he took the view that claims were only deemed to be totally without merit because his evidence had not been included in hearing bundles or he was not present at hearings.[54]In circumstances where none of the five ‘totally without merit’ decisions have been successfully appealed or otherwise set aside or varied, those findings are conclusive: Crimson Flower at [27]. It is not for this court to reopen or seek to go behind the decisions. As such, I accept the claimants’ submission that there are five express conclusions by EJs that the defendant’s ET claims are totally without merit.[55]The claimants go further and submit that there are four other clear instances in which the ET claims or applications were totally without merit despite not being so certified at the time. The claimants submit that the following claims or applications fall into this category: i) Claim number 1302989/2023 – as struck out by EJ Camp on 7 December 2023. EJ Camp concluded that this claim was a duplicate of claim 1303726/2021 and struck it out as an abuse of process. He further noted that the claim related to a job application made in 2021 and that it would therefore face “insurmountable time limits problems.” EJ Camp concluded that the claim has no reasonable prospects of success and that “to permit a claim that is bound to fail to continue would benefit no one, including the [defendant]”. ii) The request for reconsideration of the decision of 7 December 2023 in claim number 1302989/2023 – refused by EJ Camp on 8 December 2023. EJ Camp dismissed the defendant’s assertion that the ET had failed to provide adequate reasons for the striking out of the claim. iii) Appeal number EA-2023-001246-DXA – no further action taken on the appeal following the decision of Eady J, dated 25 May 2024, concluding the appeal raised no arguable question of law. The appeal was against the decision of EJ Wedderspoon of 25 October 2023 to refuse to postpone a preliminary hearing listed to commence on 30 October 2023 in the Group 2 claims against the SSJ under claim numbers 1302664/2021, 2203772/2021, 1302798/2021, 1302745/2021, and 1304341/2021. Eady J concluded that the ET’s decision that general medical records and a litigant’s own testimony did not provide a sufficient basis for adjourning a hearing did not amount to an error of law. She concluded that “the ET reached a decision that was entirely consistent with a proper exercise of discretion and no question of law arises…I am unable to see that this appeal raises any arguable question of law such as to engage the jurisdiction of the EAT”. iv) The request for reconsideration of the decision of 19 September 2019 to strike out claim 1301255/2018 against the CPS and claim number 1302344/2018 against the Home Office, refused by EJ Camp in October 2019 as recorded in a later decision of EJ Camp of 6 January 2020 in claim 2201295/2019 against the CPS. The judgment of EJ Camp of 6 January 2020, at para. 9, references previous claims and states:
“… Some of those hearings were before me, including a hearing in August 2019 following which I struck out the previous claim against the CPS (case number 1301255/2018) because it had no reasonable prospects of success. I also, in October 2019, dismissed a reconsideration application without a hearing under rule 72(1) because there was no reasonable prospect of the original decision being varied or revoked.”
[56]The defendant’s witness statement in response to the CRO Application makes critical comments about a number of the judges that he has encountered in the ET. The tenor of his evidence is that his claims and approach to litigation have always been meritorious, although he does not engage with each individual judicial decision referred to in the preceding paragraph. His criticisms of EJ Camp include allegations that the judge’s “expressions were nerve inducing” and the judge would “clasp his head at times”. The defendant complains that, although the judge didn’t shout at him, he was made to feel unwelcome and that the judge began to act partially by intervening. Neither Eady J nor EJ Choudry are discussed in detail by the defendant.[57]I remind myself that when considering whether claims or applications are totally without merit despite not being so certified at the time, the court needs to ensure it knows enough about the previous claim or application: Sartipy at [37]. For the following reasons, I am persuaded it is appropriate to find that the following further claims or applications were totally without merit: i) Claim number 1302989/2023 – as struck out by EJ Camp on 7 December 2023. The conclusion of EJ Camp was that this claim was a duplicate of claim number 1303726/2021. The defendant was warned by an order made on 10 November 2023 that EJ Camp proposed to strike out the claim on that basis as an abuse of process. The defendant failed to provide any evidence to refute the allegation that the claim was a duplicate. A duplicate claim is a clear abuse of process. Moreover, EJ Camp referenced the claim as being one ‘bound to fail’. Per Wasif, a claim that is bound to fail is one that is totally without merit. ii) Request for reconsideration of the decision of 7 December 2023 in claim number 1302989/2023 – refused by EJ Camp on 8 December 2023. This decision seeks reconsideration of the decision to strike out what I have concluded was a totally without merit claim. The court has a copy of the defendant’s application for reconsideration, contained in an email dated 7 December 2023. It is a scant document, and criticises the adequacy of the reasons in the strike out decision. The request for reconsideration was one that was bound to fail in circumstances where the original judgment did provide clear reasons (namely that the claim was a duplicate, there were limitation issues and the defendant’s failure to provide any objection to the proposed strike out). The defendant’s request for reconsideration provided no evidence or submissions addressing the alleged merits of the claim. I am thus persuaded that the request for reconsideration as presented was totally without merit.[58]I am not, however, persuaded it is appropriate for this court to conclude that the defendant’s appeal number EA-2023-001246-DXA is totally without merit. Firstly, the court does not have enough information about the appeal. Whilst the court has a mass of documentation, including emails from the defendant to the EAT, the court was not taken to the Notice of Appeal (which would have to be in, or substantially in, accordance with Form 1 in the Schedule to the EAT Rules). Secondly, Eady J could but did not certify the appeal as being totally without merit, pursuant to rule 3(7ZA) of the EAT Rules so as to deprive the defendant of his entitlement to an oral hearing. Had Eady J, as then President of the EAT and with sight of the full appeal paperwork, considered the appeal to be totally without merit, no doubt she would have so certified.[59]I am further not persuaded that it is appropriate to conclude that the request for reconsideration of the decision of EJ Camp of 19 September 2019 was totally without merit. The court has not been provided with a copy of the Defendant’s request for reconsideration or EJ Camp’s decision in October 2019 refusing that request. It is thus impossible for the court to be confident it knows enough about the request for consideration: Sartipy at [37]. The passing reference in EJ Camp’s judgment of 6 January 2020 in an entirely different claim does not particularise the basis of the request for consideration. I note EJ Camp only makes express reference to claim 1301255/2018 against the CPS and no reference to the claim against the Home Office. He simply states that the request for consideration (whose terms are unknown) was dismissed “because there was no reasonable prospect of the original decision being varied or revoked.” No reasonable prospect does not equate to an application that was bound to fail without knowing more about the basis upon which the request was made.[60]There are, nonetheless, five contemporaneous findings by EJs that the defendant’s claims were totally without merit, and a further claim and one request for reconsideration to which such a finding can be applied. The defendant’s pursuit of totally without merit claims or applications is persistent. The minimum threshold of three such findings is exceeded: per Sartipy at [30]. That would remain the case even if one relied simply on the five contemporaneous findings by the EJs. Moreover, the defendant’s activity has been sustained, with a high volume of claims over successive years, all alleging discrimination arising in the context of applications for jobs. The threshold requirement for a CRO is thus met. Issue 2: Does an objective assessment of the risk which the litigant poses demonstrate that he will, if unrestrained, issue further claims or make further applications which are an abuse of the court's process (“the exercise of discretion”)?[61]The claimants submit that there is a high risk that the defendant will, if unrestrained, continue to issue further totally without merit claims or make further applications in the ET and EAT. The claimants’ submissions in support can be summarised under the following headings: i) The manner in which the defendant has conducted litigation to date and, in particular, admissions he has made about not reading correspondence or tribunal documentation. ii) The defendant’s apparent utter but misplaced conviction that others, including the respondents, their representatives, and the judiciary, are corrupt. iii) Threats the defendant has made in writing to continue to pursue litigation. iv) The defendant’s apparent inability to accept ET judgments, repeatedly expressing the same conclusion. v) The nature of the defendant’s ‘campaign’ to bring multiple claims.[62]The claimants’ witness statements and Ms Hodgetts’ submissions referred the court to numerous documents said to support their aforementioned submissions. I will return to consider some of those documents shortly.[63]The defendant does not accept that there is a risk he will issue further claims or applications in the ET or EAT. In his oral submissions, he told the court that he has not read all of the decisions of the ET as they cause him bitterness, and he does not accept the decisions as the ET only listened to one side. The defendant submitted that he no longer plans to issue further claims in the ET as he has now obtained employment at the Office of the Public Guardian (‘OPG’), where he is happy. He also told the court that his first child is due to be born in May, and he does not want his pursuit of claims to take him away from spending time with his child. He did, however, tell the court he plans to fight the claims he has already issued and pursue them “until the very end”. He stated, “I feel unable to let [the claims] go until I get justice” and was not going to “let it slide”. He attributed a lot of the problems with his claims to the various respondents to the ET claims and the judiciary.[64]The claimants do not accept that the defendant’s promises to cease his pursuit of further claims in the ET can be relied on.[65]It would be disproportionate for this judgment to refer to all of the documentation relevant to an assessment of the future risk of further totally without merit litigation. Throughout his litigation in the ET, EAT and now within these proceedings, the defendant has sent inordinate numbers of emails, often with lengthy attachments, to the tribunal and court. His emails are invariably critical of the respondents to the ET claims and/or the judiciary. Such emails are undoubtably a significant burden on the tribunal’s, court’s and parties’ resources. They do however provide insight into the defendant’s state of mind and approach to his litigation. Examples over the last couple of years include: i) By email dated 29 April 2023 timed at 01:35, the defendant sent an email to the ET attaching multiple documents including one dated 28 April 2023. At para. 23 and 24 the defendant stated:
“23. (Let’s put a foot on corruption in the legal sphere, which is voluminous, turning the legal system into a dirty business where organisations/clients are subverting others honest claims for a pitiful price – even if it involves cheap trickery). 24. Now I am, due to the Rs’ actions, going to submit further cases of discrimination, harassment and or victimisation when in litigation (in these cases unique set of facts). It may be one way or several ways I frame these cases. This will give them a much-needed lesson.” ii) In an email letter of complaint to the ET, dated 18 May 2023, the defendant stated: “7. I cannot and do not accept the decision, challenge its legal validity, and expect proper reasons as to why the R should be given extensions despite their extremely organised and well-equipped state… 11…I will not stop until I get the restitution that I deserve and until this vile, disgusting, filthy and corrupt practice dies. 12. So please don’t underestimate my passion and fervency in my question for restitution and goal. I may have, metaphorically, half the brain to stand a chance given my situation health-wise, but I will continue till I have nothing left. I don’t fear the consequences thereof…” iii) In a document, dated 8 November 2023, seeking reconsideration of the decision of EJ Choudry of 29 August 2023, the defendant stated: “66. See what I mean about Judges achieving what they wish, influenced by whim or some form of allegiance to other than Justice, like the Executive. Because I was, when taking the matter to court, claiming any compensation from the ‘public purse’. So that I was unjustly enriching myself. 67. Basing his feelings that way because I brought more than one corrupt organisation to the ET at that time. Giving him the false impression I was just on a journey to pocket from the public purse… 133. I cannot tolerate injustice as per the Anankastic Personality Disorder. I become obsessed with a matter until I have set it aright. So my disability is the culprit. 134. This is evidence with the cases, throughout the years, being brought to the Courts… 137. So the Court needs to understand that I, and I do not say this is a problem I am facing have compulsive urges that bring me forcefully to proceedings.” iv) In a document, dated 15 November 2023, objecting to a case management order made by EJ Camp on 14 November 2023, the defendant wrote to EJ Camp in the following terms: “…So no matter how much nonsense your raise to startle me, due to your aversion of my stand up against hypocrite institutions that are draped in badges for being “disability-friendly”, I will keep coming back.

(s) , I will keep coming back…”

But yours or your friends trickery will not work. I will proceed against what I believe is a corrupt judiciary as well…” So if you’re worried about money, like you are Judge(s), I will keep coming back…” v) In an email to the ET, dated 21 November 2023, the defendant sought to postpone the hearing of the Group 3 claims:
“Any such Judge that thinks I am lying is just hypocrite, sitting in their chair throwing and dishing out orders because they wish to bully a LiP who is not well based on a delusion of deceit that they think I’m peddling. If this applies to you, O “judge” (I use the non-capital ‘J’ out of disrespect), and you think I am making things up, then shame on you. Your crookedness is visible by the bent orders that you shovel towards me asking me to do such and such. Trying to tire me out, trying to smother my efforts to please your master, the Executive… I will break, God willing, your evil scheme and I will follow you to every avenue (not literally) to overcome your evil intent. My ambition to bring down these crooked organisations to justice will continue and I will keep challenging you, bringing you to work and labour till the end…. I will not just lay down and give up. I will keep labouring no matter how harmful these matters have been, are and will become to me…” vi) In an email to EJ Camp, dated 1 December 2023, the defendant stated: “6. You are an obstacle to justice as far as I am concerned. 15. No matter how hard the judiciary wishes to suppress and smother my claims, and no matter which or who the R, corrupted by their agents that carry out day-to-day activities (in the domain of recruitment), want me to go. I will not.” vii) In an email to the ET, dated 1 February 2024, the defendant, complaining about EJ Camp stated: “So the judge should rest assured that I will not stop until justice is served… My opinions about how I have been treated throughout this period of litigation against corruption, have no bearing on the facts of the case. It backfires because it shows he is an emotional man, who gets offended which affect his behaviour as a judge. Using grounds unrelated to the facts of the case to kick the case out. But we all know that it’s just another shoddy and silly move to create a barrier. A barrier to the satisfaction of the executive, aided by the judiciary (so far only at ET level; hopefully to be contained to that level by either myself or some other actor with the same interests as I - to purge the state from corruption that exists). You see we have clear cut corruption and then there is hidden corruption. In this part of the world, the corruption is hidden. But it has been sensed and it will have its consequences. Perhaps not now, but at some later point… If he thinks I will disappear, he is wrong.” viii) In making a claim on 21 July 2024 against the SRA, the defendant described the circumstances leading to him making the job application as follows: “23. I had, at the time, other cases already in the ET and EAT (the latter I think) that required my attention. 24. These matters, bringing to me much stress and worsening of my mental state, I felt an uncontrollable urge to write the application I did.” ix) In making a claim on 18 August 2024 against HMCTS, the defendant stated in the details of his claim: “30. To give the complainant a feeling of fairness so that there would be little temptation to bring the matter to the ET. Which I hate doing, but have to give the level of ‘persecution’ I have enjoyed by this employer and others like it - which will never shatter my ambitions.” x) In an email, dated 28 January 2025, to the court and parties in the context of the CRO Application, the defendant objected to the notion that a CRO be considered and stated: “the court decide otherwise, I would have exhausted all measures domestically to explore bringing the United Kingdom before an international court. I am prepared to go this far… … I have been a victim of abuse by all peoples. Feeling persecuted and frustrated and suppressed because I refuse to allow the aggressors the chance to prevent my ambitions and dreams from materialising… I have been broken by the vile conduct by the lawyers, taking advantage of the abuse faced. Contrary to their codes of practice or standards in their professions. But I will pursue until they are: the C’s, their lawyers, and the lower courts are exposed for what they truly are.” xi) In an email sent to the court for my attention, dated 29 January 2025, the defendant stated: “… Even though the order issued in my absence is disputed, it is sensible to assume that I can continue to bring any new claims, should that be my intention (to the ET). At the present time, I have no intention although this can possibly change… The parties to the claim, outside (so far of) of these matters like the High Court, are absolutely complicit in injustices. I am aware that this disease in our legal system needs to be purged. The way to do it is to make it evident. I will use all legal efforts to get the restitution that I deserve. No matter how those actors dislike it.” xii) In an email to the EAT, dated 7 February 2025, the defendant referred to bundles of documents he had sent to the EAT and stated: “any attempt to stop this plea will require me to ask you to present all your reasons for the decision against me supported by any precedent you seek to rely on (I am referring to the Rs’ as the judge must be impartial and not interfere)… This could possibly mean that the case is then going to be, should there be identifiable illegal interference, submitted to the High Court, and so on and so forth. So let it be known, I will not be subject to abuse like I have been in the past by either the state (judiciary) or the Rs’. You should know that injustice only causes me even more energy in my quest to receive the restitution and justice that I, or anyone for that matter, should receive.” xiii) The defendant’s application of 29 March 2025 in these proceedings requested various orders. In requesting permission to rely on expert medical evidence, to be obtained at the claimants’ cost, he stated: “It would be unwise and risk an appeal should this not be ordered, making this stage in proceedings a possible waste of resources as the decision would be one that is not fully informed…”
He concluded:
“should the R objects to any of the three requests, they are free to write. Alternatively, they can stop trying to tire me out with bogus and sham CROs so that I can expose the dirty discrimination that runs in all of the depts. Sorry to have ended in such a way, it is difficult to control emotions when you have been the object of repeated injustice at the hands of the Rs and the judges (not all) of previous times, it creates a lot of bitterness indeed.”
[66]An assessment of the evidence as a whole presents a concerning picture. The defendant presents as someone convinced that he is subject to persecution and discrimination at the hands of the respondents to his ET claims. He also appears convinced that the legal representatives for the respondents and ET judiciary are corrupt. His beliefs are entirely without objective foundation. However, the defendant’s subjective, if irrational, mindset increases the risk he will engage in further totally without merit litigation.[67]Further, the defendant concedes in his correspondence that he is obsessed with obtaining what he believes is the justice he deserves, and that he has ‘compulsive’ or ‘uncontrollable’ urges. See, for example, para. 133 and 137 of his document of 8 November 2023, and his details of claim of 21 July 2024.[68]The defendant has also made repeated explicit threats to continue litigating until he receives the justice he perceives he is entitled to. See, for example, his communications of 29 April 2023, 18 May 2023, 15 November 2023, 21 November 2023, 1 December 2023, and 1 February 2024. His ongoing desire to litigate is borne out by the continued issuing of claims up to August 2024 and continued pursuit of his ongoing appeal in the EAT.[69]The real issue is whether the defendant’s oral submission that he has no intention to issue further ET claims is credible and reduces the otherwise high level of risk to an extent that makes it inappropriate to make a CRO. I am not persuaded that the defendant’s recent, more conciliatory position evidences a credible reduction in risk for the following reasons: i) Even if the defendant is genuine in his current belief that he does not plan to issue further ET claims, that is not to say he will not change his mind in the future. He accepted as recently as his email of 29 January 2025 that his intention could “possibly change.” The defendant’s conceded obsession and uncontrollable urges heightens the risk of a change of intention in the future. ii) On the defendant’s own case, he remains intent on pursuing the current ET claims “to the very end” and not being able to “let it slide.” His lack of objectivity and apparent inability to accept judicial decisions heightens the risk of him pursuing totally without merit appeals to the EAT within the extant claims. iii) There is no guarantee that the defendant will remain content in his current employment. If he lost or left his current employment, he is likely to revert to applying for other jobs. For unclear reasons, part of the defendant’s evidence includes copies of various internal emails generated in the course of his employment with OPG. It is apparent from those emails that his employment, which only commenced in January 2025 and which seems to be subject to a probationary period, is not without difficulties. For example, in emails of 3 February 2025, 6 March 2025, and 8 April 2025, he accepted, seemingly to his managers, to making errors in his work. In two emails of 6 March 2025, he requested not to work during Ramadan and wanted to take time off for a pilgrimage. In an email of 3 April 2025, following a meeting on 2 April 2025, the defendant took issue with his employer’s classification of his unsatisfactory conduct following an incident where he left his place of work. The defendant described himself as having had a meltdown and hitting breaking point. In the same email, the defendant asked to be permitted to work from home. In an email of 8 April 2025, the defendant apologised for “the meltdown-like situation earlier” and requested a reduced caseload. The documented difficulties with his employment at OPG increase the risk that the defendant may find himself again looking for new employment. iv) The absence of any new ET claims since August 2024 does not of itself demonstrate that the defendant is committed to not issuing future claims. Firstly, the ET has stayed his claims pending the outcome of the CRO Application. The defendant will therefore have been aware that, if he issued new claims, he would be unlikely to be able to progress them. Secondly, since January 2025, the defendant has been alive to the CRO Application. He will have appreciated that issuing further ET claims would undermine his opposition to a CRO. v) A number of the defendant’s actions in these proceedings display a worrying determination to litigate regardless of the merits. His email of 28 January 2025 refers to being prepared to bring “the United Kingdom before an international court…” His application of 29 March 2025 threatens an appeal should the court not accede to his requests. Moreover, his issuing of three application notices within these proceedings in short order, coupled with his extensive, lengthy emails to the court, are not indicative of someone who can show restraint.[70]For the aforementioned reasons and notwithstanding the defendant’s recent protestations that he does not plan to issue any new ET claims, I conclude that there is a significant risk that the defendant will, if unrestrained, seek to issue further totally without merit claims in the ET or new appeals in the EAT. Issue 3: What order, if any, is just and proportionate to make to address the risk identified (“the appropriate order”)?[71]The persistent nature of the defendant’s totally without merit claims and applications, coupled with the significant risk of further such claims or applications being filed if unrestrained, means that I am persuaded it is appropriate for the court to exercise its discretion to make a civil restraint order. The form of that order should be the least restrictive form shown to be required, per Nowak. The defendant’s activity to date has been largely confined to the ET and EAT. Notwithstanding my finding that the Defendant’s Application in these proceedings is totally without merit, I am satisfied that the restraint should be confined to the ET and EAT, at this stage. The High Court has jurisdiction to restrain activity in the ET and EAT, applying the principles of the CPR by analogy, per Harrold and Mighton.[72]The claimants do not seek to restrain all activity in the ET and EAT. By their draft order, they only seek to restrain new claims or appeals relating “to any job application made by you or asserted to be made by you, or in relation to any job application process whether or not you make an application in that process”. This is a reasonable concession on the part of the claimants. Their desired order would not restrain new claims in the ET or EAT other than those relating to job application processes, nor would it restrain the making of requests for reconsideration within extant ET claims. During the course of submissions, I clarified with the claimants’ counsel how she foresaw requests for reconsideration being handled. She confirmed she was content for requests for reconsideration to be determined without restriction by the ET. Given that the ET will be versed with knowledge of the original decision that will inform a request for reconsideration, the lesser burden on the court and tribunal system is to allow requests to be handled by an EJ. I do not therefore propose to extend a CRO to requests for re-consideration.[73]A CRO is appropriate but will be limited to the presenting or issuing of new claims in ET or appeals in the EAT arising from the job application process, as referred to in the claimants’ draft order. The more appropriate description for this nature of the CRO, by analogy with the three types of order available under CPR PD 3C, is an ECRO rather than a GCRO. The order will restrict the defendant from pursuing a limited genre of cases rather than being a general restraint on all species of claim.[74]The maximum duration of an ECRO on any given occasion is 3 years: CPR PD 3C para. 3.10. The court has the power to extend the duration in the future. The proportionate term of a CRO in this case is 3 years. The defendant’s litigation activity has persisted over many years, with new claims being issued each year from 2017 to 2024. His ongoing belief in persecution and corruption indicates that the risk of future claims will remain high for some time. Moreover, numerous claims in the ET are stayed pending the outcome of the CRO Application. Once the stays are lifted, the risk of unmeritorious litigation activity in the EAT will remain until those extant claims are finally disposed of.

Conclusion

[75]The CRO Application is granted in the substance of the draft ECRO order before the court. The precise terms of the order will be considered at the hearing on the handing down of this judgment.[76]The Defendant’s Application is dismissed as being totally without merit. HHJ Emma Kelly

order

i) An application, dated 29 March 2025, for permission to appoint a joint medical expert to be paid for by the claimants, for a further extension of time to submit documents, and for an increased time estimate for the hearing of the claim. ii) The Defendant’s Application (as defined above in para. 3(ii)). iii) An application, dated 7 April 2025, for an extension of time to file evidence.