Louise Hill v East Kent Hospitals University NHS Foundation Trust [2025] EWHC 1241 (KB)

[2025] EWHC 1241 (KB)Case No KB-2025-000068
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 22/05/2025
Before
Annabel Darlow KC(Sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge)
Between
LOUISE HILLClaimantEAST KENT HOSPITALS UNIVERSITY NHS FOUNDATION TRUSTDefendant
Michael Mylonas KC (instructed by Fieldfisher LLP) for ClaimantLaura Johnson KC (instructed by Clyde & Co LLP) for DefendantHearing Hearing dates: 9 May 2025
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 22 May 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................Annabel Darlow KC (Sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge)

Annabel Darlow KC (Sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) :

[1]The Claimant in this personal injury claim seeks a further interim payment order in the sum of £500,000. The funds are sought primarily to support her move to a home which has already been purchased in her name. The Claimant has previously received interim payments totalling £1,566,000, which were paid by the Defendant on a voluntary basis over several tranches:(i) 6 December 2019 - £10,000;(ii) 17 February 2020 - £96,000;(iii) 4 November 2021 - £1,100,000;(iv) 21 November 2022 - £60,000;(v) 23 March 2023 - £150,000;(vi) 17 February 2025 - £150,000. If the application for a further interim payment of £500,000 was approved by the court, the total interim payments will amount to £2,066,000.[2]The Defendant supports the Claimant’s wish to live in her own home. However, it disputes aspects of the Claimant’s Provisional Schedule of Loss and raises a number of concerns, including as to the past management of the Claimant’s financial affairs.

Brief Factual and Procedural Background

[3]The claim arises from the treatment of the Claimant, Miss Louise Hill, for multiple sclerosis (‘MS’), by the Defendant, the East Kent Hospitals University NHS Foundation Trust. The Claimant was born on 4 August 1969 and is now aged 55. The Claimant was diagnosed with MS in 2011, when aged 42. In 2012, she was further diagnosed with relapsing remitting MS. As part of her treatment by the Defendant, she was commenced on Tysabri infusions in 2012. Whilst entirely appropriate for the treatment of MS, there is a recognised risk that these can lead to the development of damage to the brain tissue in the form of progressive multifocal leukoencephalopathy (‘PML’).[4]The Claimant received serial MR Imaging, to safeguard against this risk. Careful review of the Imaging is required to identify any changes which might indicate the beginning of PML, so that the infusions may be ceased before lasting injury is caused. In 2017, there was a failure by the Defendant to appropriately interpret the MR imaging and to identify an abnormality disclosed in the imaging. Further Tysabri infusions were administered, when they should have been ceased. As a result, the Claimant developed PML that caused left-sided paralysis. In January 2018, she was admitted to the Defendant’s hospital. Her condition worsened and she developed seizures. On 8 March 2018, she was discharged back to her own home. The configuration of her home and the limited provision of care resulted in her developing bed sores and she was re-admitted to hospital after six weeks. On 23 July 2018, the Claimant was discharged to Strode Park Nursing Home with a publicly funded package of care, where she has remained as an inpatient until the present day.[5]A letter of claim was sent in February 2019 and on 6 November 2019, liability was admitted by the Defendant. Proceedings were issued on 9 January 2025 and on 4 February 2025, an agreed Order for Judgment was sent to the Court for approval and sealing; this was done on 9 May 2025. The trial is anticipated to be listed in March 2027. Miss Hill does not have capacity and has a litigation friend, her sister, Naomi Chapman.[6]The Claimant’s case was transferred to Fieldfisher LLP from her previous legal representatives, in February 2024. The witness statement of Ms Nathan, a Partner at Fieldfisher, indicates that the most recent voluntary payment, of £150,000 in February 2025, was used to pay off a number of outstanding payments and affirms that the Claimant’s financial affairs have hitherto been poorly managed. An application for the appointment of two Professional Deputies, Anna Bond and Robin Tubbs, was made to the Court of Protection; this application is pending approval.[7]In 2022, a property, ‘the Gables’ was purchased for the Claimant and adapted to meet her needs. The further interim payment is sought to fund a package of care and support so that she may move into this property. On behalf of the Claimant, it is maintained that Strode Park is inappropriate for her needs; her accommodation is a single small room with little privacy and inadequate space for her chair or other equipment. She has little individual attention from staff. The accommodation and care at the home are agreed by the expert witnesses to be inadequate for her needs. The conditions at Strode Park are also said to be inconducive to fostering a normal parental relationship between the Claimant and her daughter. The Claimant’s daughter, Elsie, now aged 15, spends half her time at the Gables with the Claimant’s father and lives for the remainder of the year with her own father.[8]The provisional Schedule of Loss (‘the Schedule’) prepared on behalf of the Claimant includes past losses and future losses up to a final assessment of damages hearing, anticipated to take place in March 2027. The provisional Schedule total is £2,964,703.86; the Claimant observes that a reduction of between 0 and 30% to the component figures would equate to a conservative assessment of loss of £2,476,750.73.[9]The Defendant estimates the provisional loss at £1,912,500 and contends that a reasonable proportion of this sum, at 90%, would be £1,721,250. If accepted, this would permit an additional interim payment of £155,250.

The Legal Framework

[10]CPR Part 25.1(l) provides for the court’s powers to make an order for interim payment on account of any sum (except costs) which the court may hold the defendant liable to pay. CPR Part 25.3 provides that an application for an interim remedy must be supported by evidence.

(g) …

[11]The court may only make an interim payment order where one of the conditions enumerated in Part 25.23 is satisfied. In the present case, reliance is placed upon Rule 25.23(b); ‘the claimant has obtained judgment against that defendant for damages to be assessed, or for another sum of money (other than costs) to be assessed’.[12]CPR Part 25.20(1) provides that: The court must not order an interim payment of more than a reasonable proportion of the likely amount of the final judgment.[13]In XSI (A Child Proceeding by her Mother and Litigation Friend XS2) v West Hertfordshire Hospitals NHS Trust [2024] EWHC 1865, Master Stevens distilled the essential factors to be considered by the Court when determining an application for an interim payment order (at [11]) from the judgment of Whipple J (as she then was), in AC (a minor suing by his litigation friend MC) v St Georges Healthcare NHS Trust [2015] EWHC 3644 (at [7]):
“ (1)CPR Rule 25.7(4) places a cap on the maximum amount which it is open to the Court to order by way of interim payment, being no more than a reasonable proportion of the likely amount of the final judgment. (2) In determining the likely amount of the final judgement, the Court should make its assessment on a conservative basis; having done so, the reasonable proportion awarded may be a high proportion of the figure. (3) This reflects the objective of an award of an interim payment, which is to ensure that the Claimant is not kept out of money to which he is entitled, whilst avoiding any risk of an overpayment. (4) The likely amount of a final judgement is that which will be awarded as a capital sum, not the capitalised value of a periodical payment order (‘PPO’). (5) The Court must be careful not to fetter the discretion of the trial judge to deal with future losses by way of periodical payments rather than a capital award. (6) The Court must also be careful not to establish a status quo in the claimant’s way of life which might have the effect of inhibiting the trial judge’s freedom of decision, a danger described in Campbell v Mylchreest as creating “an unlevel playing field”. (7) Accordingly the first stage is to make the assessment in relation to heads of loss which the trial judge is bound to award as a capital sum, leaving out of accounts heads of future loss which the trial judge might wish to deal with by a PPO.

(c) interest on these sums”

[14]For the purposes of an interim payment order, the Court need not normally have regard to what the Claimant intends to do with the funds thereby transferred.[15]The Claimant relies upon limb one of the test set out in Eeles v Cobham Hire Services (2009) EWCA Civ 204, in which the Court of Appeal considered the correct approach to the making of an interim payment in a personal injury claim. The task of the judge at the first stage is to assess the likely amount of the final judgment, leaving out of account the heads of future loss which the trial judge might wish to deal with by periodical payment order. The assessment should be carried out on a conservative basis.[16]As observed by Mrs Justice Yip in PAL v Davison and others [2021] EWHC 1108 (QB), a judge should not embark upon a mini-trial at the interim payment stage, or seek to determine issues more properly left to the trial judge. Whereas taking a conservative approach to the assessment does not necessarily mean adopting the defendant’s figures, the court must keep in mind the possibility that the defendant’s assertions may be accepted at trial and the risks of allocating too much to the lump sum element, thereby fettering the freedom of the trial judge to allocate damages as he or she sees fit (at [24]).[17]Mrs Justice Yip considered the question as to whether the calculation at the first stage of Eeles involved assessing the likely special damages to trial or only the date of the interim payment application. She concluded that the starting point, notwithstanding the judgment of Popplewell J in Smith v Bailey (2014) EWHC 2569 (QB) remained, strictly speaking, the special damages ‘to date’. However there would be many instances where it would be entirely appropriate in making the conservative assessment at the first stage to bring in special damages which have not yet accrued but which will do so before trial. The clear principles underpinning Eeles were that the court’s task was to estimate the likely amount of the lump sum element of final judgment, not to keep the claimant out of his or her money, but to avoid the risk of overpayment and of fettering the trial judge’s freedom to make an appropriate periodical payment order. Examples of special damages yet to accrue which could confidently be assessed by the court as forming part of the lump sum, included the provision of gratuitous care.[18]The determination of a ‘reasonable proportion’ of the likely amount of the final judgment has been considered in a number of authorities. In Harry Brown v Guy’s & St Thomas’ NHS Foundation Trust (2011) Med LR 387 and AC v St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust (2015) EWHC 3644 (QB), 90% of the capitalised sum was said to be a reasonable proportion, on the basis that the approach to the capitalised sum had been cautious.

Assessment of the claim under Eeles 1

[19]The Claimant relies upon the following supporting documents: a) An Accommodation report of Steve Woodley b) A Care Report of Kerry Tomlinson; c) A Preliminary Schedule of Loss; d) A witness statement from Shivi Nathan, a partner at Fieldfisher; e) The second report of Dr Gilmore, a Consultant Neurologist, dated October 2024[20]The Defendant does not rely at this stage upon any expert witness instructed on its behalf but has chosen to advance submissions based in part upon the first report of Dr Gilmore, dated April 2021. It is suggested that the court adopts a broad-brush approach to determination of the likely figure.

Pain, suffering and loss of amenity (PSLA)

[21]The Claimant seeks a figure of £318,003, plus interest of £12,720. The figure is taken from the upper end of the Moderately Severe category in the Judicial College Guidelines for the Assessment of General Damages in Personal Injury, 17th Edition, together with an appropriate inflationary update.[22]The Defendant contends that the Court’s approach in due course to the assessment of damages must be in accordance with the approach set out in Reaney v University Hospital of North Staffordshire NHS Trust [2016] PIQR Q3, namely a three-stage process requiring an assessment of the Claimant’s pre-negligence needs; an assessment of her post-negligence needs, followed by an examination of whether the needs are quantitatively or qualitatively different. The figure should therefore be reduced to take into account the impact of the Claimant’s underlying MS and her shortened life expectancy and the Defendant proposes that the appropriate figure for PSLA would be £275,000.[23]The evidence of Dr Gilmore indicates that in his opinion, it is likely that the Claimant has entered the Secondary Progressive phase of MS and will likely accrue further disability as a consequence. Her right lower limb function will likely deteriorate but this is unlikely to translate to a change in disability; she will likely experience a deterioration in right upper limb neurology that will impact on her functional ability but there is considerable uncertainty as to when this will occur and at what rate; she will likely slowly accrue further cognitive deficits over time and there is likely to be a reduction in life expectancy of approximately 20 years. Dr Gilmore observes that the Claimant is already profoundly disabled, with substantial care needs.[24]It is noted that Dr Gilmore last examined the Claimant in June 2019 and his more recent assessments have been conducted remotely, including an interview on 2 October 2024 over Teams. At paragraph 301 of his first report, Dr Gilmore states; ‘In any case, Miss Hill had substantial disability even before she developed symptoms relating to PML, with impaired mobility [walking with a stick, with a history of falls], bladder and bowel dysfunction [requiring ISC], significant cognitive deficits, some problems with upper limb dexterity and she was unable to work’.[25]In the absence of expert evidence relied upon by the Defendant, the evidence available to the court on this issue is limited and incomplete and will inevitably be revised and updated closer to the anticipated trial date. Nonetheless, the court must adopt a cautious approach and cannot safely discount the possibility that the trial judge would make a reduction to the PSLA figure following the procedure in Reaney. I will therefore adopt the Defendant’s conservative valuation of £275,000.

Past Care

[26]The Claimant seeks £818,374, comprised as follows: a) £233,717, which was paid to professional agencies, CKK and BIS (subject to a suggested discount of 5%). b) £156,269 is in respect of gratuitous care to April 2025 (subject to a suggested discount of 10%. c) £369,818, which is sought in respect of agency care required from April 2025 to trial in March 2027 (subject to a discount of 10%). d) £45,273.62, in respect of Strode Park Care Home fees paid by the Claimant.[27]The Defendant accepts that the Claimant has reasonable prospects of recovering about £300,00 of past professional care costs at (a) and (d) above; i.e. the approximate total of £45,273.62 + £247,700, which is the figure accounted for by invoices for commercial support workers on the Defendant’s calculation (the Claimant’s calculation is £233,717.38, which appears inconsistent with the calculations underpinning the total figure provided by the Claimant of £818,374). The figure for past care costs at (a) and (d) is therefore assessed at £292,973.62, or £278,324.94 following a 5% discount.[28]As to the gratuitous care figure, the Claimant derives this from the detailed assessment of Miss Tomlinson, reflected in her updated report of February 2025. The Defendant asserts that the hours of care claimed are high given that the Claimant was in hospital and residential care, and that only two hours credit has been allocated for the needs she would have had in any event. However, no detailed figures have been advanced in their response.[29]On the basis of the limited available evidence, a determination of the final approach to be taken by the trial judge is difficult, but the indication of the grounds on which the figure will be contested by the Defendant would justify a deeper discount than the 15% currently proposed by the Claimant. A more cautious discount of 40% results in a gratuitous care figure of £93,761.40.[30]The agency care figures relate to the period between April 2025 and March 2027. In principle, the court is prepared to proceed on the basis that future costs to the notional date of trial should be taken into account in Eeles 1 and the Defendant has not submitted that a contrary approach should be adopted. The Defendant observes that this figure is predicated upon the assumption that the Claimant would move into the Gables on 28 April 2025; a date already in the past but one which in any event the Defendant suggests is unrealistic. The Defendant submits that the Gables would need to be prepared for the Claimant’s arrival, since only basic adaptations appear to have been carried out to the property at present; a best interests decision making process will need to be followed and support workers recruited and trained. The Claimant, on the other hand, has indicated that the move from Strode Park may be accomplished within two to four weeks of the necessary funds becoming available and the property is ready to accommodate Miss Hill.[31]In the opinion of the Court, there is considerable force in the Defendant’s submissions that the timeframe for the move relied upon by the Claimant is unrealistic. However, six months may be an unduly pessimistic estimate given that those assisting the Claimant have now had some time to prepare for the move, and the Court will therefore proceed on the basis that the Claimant is likely to be accommodated at the Gables from 1 September 2025 onwards. This would imply a reduction in the Claimant’s figure of £369,818 to £297,000 (prior to discount of 10%, equating to £267,300). The court notes that this assessment as to date may impact upon other calculations relied upon by the Claimant based upon an earlier move date but it is not anticipated that the result will be unduly significant in the overall evaluation.[32]The total figure conservatively assessed for Past Care (including care to the notional trial date) is thus £639,386.

Administrative Assistance

[33]The figure sought by the Claimant is £33,091, which reflects the hours dedicated by the Claimant’s family to managing her affairs and dealing with the property purchase, adaptations and maintenance thereafter. However, as advanced by the Defendant, the Claimant has had a professional case manager for a number of years and the activities relied upon to support this claim appear, at least arguably, to fall within the remit of work that might reasonably be expected to have been conducted by the case manager. Further, Mr Hill, the Claimant’s father, has been living in the Gables for a period of time, apparently without cost to himself. The resolution of this issue may require detailed evaluation by the trial judge of disputed evidence not yet before the court. In light of the issues raised by the Defendant, including the quality and reasonableness of the financial management provided to the Claimant, which might, if accepted, extinguish this component of the claim and the limited evidence available at this stage, it appears to the court that a cautious approach mandates that the court does not add anything further at this stage for administrative assistance.

Case Management

[34]The Claimant seeks £226,135, comprising £172,555 for past invoiced costs and £53,580 to the date of the hearing. The Defendant expresses serious concerns as to the past management costs and their reasonableness and allows £180,000. Nevertheless, the majority of the costs sought have already been paid by the Claimant and significant case management costs will in all likelihood be incurred in arranging for the Claimant to move into the Gables and thereafter. On a cautious approach, therefore, the figure allowed for case management, both past and to trial, is £172,555 plus £53,580 (discounted by 30%, i.e. £37,506) totalling £210,061.

Past Travel

[35]The costs of visits by the Claimant’s parents, sister and daughter to visit her have been itemised in detail in the Schedule and have been discounted by a conservative 25%. This appears to be a reasonable approach and there appears to be only modest available scope to challenge the number of trips or their reasonableness. The figures allowed is thus £33,798.

Therapies and other Medical Investigations/Reviews

[36]The dispute between the Claimant and Defendant is relatively narrow; the Claimant seeks assessment of a figure of £124,978 for therapies, of which £87,280 relate to past costs and £37,698 to future costs. The Defendant relies upon Reaney and contends that some of the past therapy costs may not be recoverable and there may be issues as to future costs, both as to the extent of necessary therapy necessary and the amount that might be tolerated by the Claimant at any given time. It is noted however that the future therapy costs are based by the Claimant upon the reasonable assumption that the ongoing therapies, as detailed in the Schedule, will continue until trial, on a pro-rated cost basis. Further, the Defendant has not identified any aspect of the available expert medical evidence, or presented medical evidence of its own, to indicate that a quantifiable proportion of the cost of the therapies administered is reasonably attributable to the Claimant’s pre-existing condition. The figure I am content to allow for therapies, reflecting a discount for a conservative valuation, is £110,000.[37]For Medical Investigations, £33,922 is sought by the Claimant for past invoiced Medical Investigations and £22,800 for projected. The projected costs, to cover October 2023 to March 2027, are based on a 50% average of the previous average monthly spend. The Defendant suggests that this approach is flawed and the previous costs include one-off investigations which will not be repeated in the future. The Court agrees that more precise information could have been provided by the Claimant as to the costs in fact incurred from October 2023 to date and projected costs. Nevertheless, a significant reduction has already been applied by the Claimant. The figure allowed is £22,522.

Accommodation

[38]The issue of the quantification of costs in respect of accommodation engages the question of how the guidance set out in Swift v Carpenter (2020) EWCA Civ 1295, as to the correct approach to damages for the additional capital cost of accommodation, are to be applied in a case involving a short life expectancy, of which this case is an example. Irwin LJ noted that the average span of a personal injury claim was around 43 years of future life and a paradigm case based upon a much shorter life expectancy produced a much greater reversionary interest. He observed that, ‘different considerations and arguments could be applied to that category of case. I make no further comment on that and should not be understood to express a view on it.’ (at [171]). Nevertheless, the overarching principles remain clear: at [205]; ‘The principles of law by which this court is bound can be summarised in two propositions: firstly, that a claimant injured by the fault of another is entitled to fair and reasonable, but not excessive, compensation. Secondly, as a corollary of that fundamental principle, in relation to the head of claim with which we are concerned, the award of damages should seek so far as possible to avoid a ‘windfall’ to a claimant, or more realistically to his or her own estate.[39]The life expectation of the Claimant is 12.24 years. A rigid application of the Swift guidance (on the calculations presented by the Claimant), would imply a reversionary interest of £459,546.49; this would represent 55% of the £835,000 purchase price of the Gables and a net damages figure of £375,453.51. It is at least arguable that such a consequence may not in due course be considered by the trial judge to be reflective of the underlying principle that an award should constitute full and fair compensation and would result in a considerable shortfall between the purchase price of the house and the award allocated for accommodation.[40]The accommodation costs relied on by the Claimant are calculated by reference to the application of the Swift guidance to the cost of the property. However, the Claimant contends that, had she been able to find a property for the lower purchase price as originally recommended by the Claimant’s expert, she would then have recovered in full the £491,000 costs of modification. In the circumstances pertaining at the time of the purchase, including the prevailing unsatisfactory conditions at Strode Park, the purchase of a more expensive property is said to be justifiable. The Claimant further seeks the purchase costs of the property, past running costs and running costs to trial, which, after discounts for conservative value, results in their overall figure of £863,760.20.[41]Whilst recognising that the Claimant will recover a sum towards her accommodation costs, the Defendant raises a number of issues in respect of the Claimant’s inclusion of the full capital cost of the Gables, namely that the Claimant is believed to have jointly owned a former home but there is an absence of information thereon; the discretion of the trial judge should not be fettered, and the Gables was substantially more expensive than the original assessment. The claim includes adaptation costs that have not been carried out and those adaptations that were carried out were not in accordance with the recommendations of the Accommodation expert and may in any event have been paid for by a grant. The necessity of an extension to an already sizeable property (at an estimated cost of £146,000) may be challenged at trial. As to past running costs, the Defendant disputes their recoverability, on the grounds that the accommodation was not in use by the Claimant. The predicted future costs are predicated upon an immediate move by the Claimant, which is unlikely for the reasons discussed earlier. The Defendant’s counter figure is £700,000.[42]The proposal advanced by the Claimant is an attempt to value the accommodation claim on an alternative basis, which takes into account the potential difficulties raised by the determination of the appropriate figure for a short life expectancy case within the framework of the Swift guidance, whilst seeking to mitigate the consequent shortfall by including a sizeable figure for modification costs, the majority of which will not in reality be expended upon the property. In due course, as ventilated by the Claimant, it may well be that discussion between the parties prompts an acceptable alternative approach to evaluation, but no such agreement has yet been reached.[43]In attempting to reach a conclusion as to the likely figure to be determined by trial judge, I am conscious that the correct approach to the determination of accommodation costs in a short life expectancy case has not been the subject of the necessary detailed or developed legal argument for the purposes of this application. Furthermore, evidence which the court may well require to reach a final conclusion is absent, as identified in the Defendant’s submissions. Whilst recognising that the Claimant has attempted a constructive solution, there is no clear justification for the inclusion of the notional value of alterations which were recommended on the basis of the purchase of a different, smaller property, even discounted at 20%, and the trial judge will wish to consider with care each of the Defendant’s contentions, summarised above. Taking as I must a conservative approach and recognising the significant limitations under which the court operates at this stage, the figure I am prepared to allow is £700,000.

Aids & Equipment

[44]The figure sought is £49,302.51, the component costs of which are itemised in the Schedule and stated to cover costs to December 2023, together with estimated costs derived from a schedule served in 2024. The estimated figures relate to £16,210 of costs. A cautious approach would require applying a 10% discount to the pre-December 2023 items and a 20% discount to the estimated items: (£29,783.25 + £12,968) - £42,751.

Miscellaneous

[45]The Claimant seeks £48,151.66, which includes a projected figure until trial date and figures contained in a spreadsheet that is not before the court. The Defendant counters with £10,000, contending that the heading includes costs that are capable of being contested. A conservative discount of 40% appears appropriate, given the limited information available to the court; £28,891.

Deputyship Costs

[46]The Claimant seeks £128,056, of which incurred costs are an estimated £27,110 and projected Year 1 and 2 costs are £64,949 and £39,269 respectively. The projected date for receipt of a Deputyship Order is August 2025. In support of the application, they rely upon a written estimate provided by Ms Bond.[47]The Defendant’s position is that £70,000 should be assessed, basing this on the contention that some of the assumptions made by Ms Bond in drawing up her estimate are incorrect, including the assumption that there will be a need to oversee the purchase of a property, which has already been completed and to oversee substantial interim payments, the majority of which have already been spent. The property requires only modest further adaptation. There is considerable force in those points, but the court agrees that there will be considerable Deputyship costs. To reflect a cautious approach, the sum will be £70,000.

Summary of my Decision under Eeles 1

[48]My findings and the original contentions of the parties are presented in the table below: Item C- conservative D Court PSLA 281,115.10 275,000 275,000 Care 687,696 500,000 639,386 Admin Assistance 33,090.93 0 0 Case mgt 220,777 180,000 210,061 Past Travel 33,798 25,000 33,798 Therapies 121,208.21 100,000 110,000 Medical investigations 22,522.05 17,500 22,522 Accommodation 863,760.20 700,000 700,000 Aids & Equipment 46,837.38 35,000 42,751 Miscellaneous 46,395.16 10,000 28,891 Deputyship costs 119,550.70 70,000 70,000 TOTAL 2,476,750.73 1,912,500 2,132,409[49]The total reached is £2,132,409, the assessment of which is explained above. Having adopted throughout a conservative approach to the numbers, I conclude that a suitable proportion for that figure to be determined as no more than reasonable, should be 90%. The calculation of the available figure is thus £1,919,168.10.

Conclusion

[50]Earlier interim awards have already been made in the sum of £1,566,000. The court is therefore satisfied that, applying the first stage of Eeles, an interim payment of £353,168 should be made to the Claimant.[51]The court is extremely grateful for the assistance of Mr Michael Mylonas KC on behalf of the Claimant and Ms Laura Johnson KC on behalf of the Defendant, together with their respective legal teams.