“At the time of the accident my sister was driving but I admitted it was me to try and protect her. We are from a religious family and due to her divorce and other issues with her ex-husband my sister was going through a very tough time. I felt as her brother it’s my job to protect her. I should have protected her by getting her to tell the truth. And I should have told the truth as well. I regret lying to the court and giving a false statement. This was very wrong. I want to say sorry to the court and I admit that I did wrong. I shouldn’t have lied to the court and I am guilty. And I will never do anything like this again. I hope the court can forgive me. I am very sorry.”
“77. … The evidence is clear that Ali, Akeel, Ms Tul-Zahara and Ms Kauser made dishonest representations about who was in the Breeze when the accident happened: Ali, Akeel and Kauser said that they were present and Ms Tul-Zahara that she wasn’t. Ali and Kauser each made a claim that they had suffered injuries as a result of the collision (albeit that claims were never pursued to the stage of issuing a claim form). They each stood by while Ejaz made claims on the basis that Ali was the driver and not Ms Tul-Zahara. Her evidence is that Ali and Kauser originally made the suggestion that they would say that they were in the Breeze and neither has gone into the witness box to deny it. 78. There can be no doubt that Ms Tul-Zahara, Ali, Akeel and Kauser conspired to put forward a false case that Ali was driving the Breeze and Akeel and Kauser were the passengers. I have rejected the evidence that the purpose of this was to prevent Ejaz from finding out that Ms Tul-Zahara was out with two men. Ali, Akeel and Kauser made witness statements in these proceedings supporting the case that Ali was the driver and describing an accident that they were not involved in. Ali and Kauser each started to make claims that they were injured in the accident, that the cars behind were at fault and a credit hire agreement (running to a very significant figure for a newer vehicle) was entered into. Ali went to hospital in relation to an injury which he knew he hadn’t suffered as a result of the accident. 79. Apart from Ms Tul-Zahara, none of the others has made a witness statement explaining what they say happened and the reason for their false evidence. They weren’t prepared to go into the witness box at the trial. In these circumstances there can be no doubt that they were parties to a conspiracy to make a false claim after the accident. 80. Were they all part of a conspiracy to cause a ‘slam-on’ collision with the purpose of enabling them to claim compensation from a following driver and with Ms Tul-Zahara (who was named as a driver of the Breeze on Ejaz’s insurance policy)? This is pleaded against them all in Ms Mosley’s amended additional claims. They have not responded to this allegation (apart from Ms Tul-Zahara whose defence I have rejected as set out above). Nor have they denied it in evidence. I am satisfied that each of these people was involved in a decision to cause a collision with a view to profit. Ali’s name was given at the scene as the driver, although he wasn’t in the Breeze. I have rejected the explanation that this was all hatched up after the accident. Ms Tul-Zahara’s evidence that her siblings had suggested to her that she tell her father that they were in the car was contradicted in oral evidence by Ms Tul-Zahara (who said that she had suggested it to them) and doesn’t fit with Ali’s name being given as [the] driver at the scene. Kauser went as far as to instruct solicitors in April 2016 to make a false claim on her behalf for personal injury (signing a conditional fee agreement in the process).”
“Permission to make a contempt application is required where the application is made in relation to— (a) interference with the due administration of justice, except in relation to existing High Court or county court proceedings; (b) an allegation of knowingly making a false statement in any affidavit, affirmation or other document verified by a statement of truth or in a disclosure statement.”
“As to the first of those points, the CPR does not define the word ‘existing’. It is, however, on its natural meaning a broad term which does not appear to be confined to pending proceedings. The exception for existing proceedings would therefore appear to have the purpose of distinguishing between an alleged contempt that relates to proceedings that have come into existence, and contempt that relates to intended proceedings (or indeed does not relate to any proceedings in particular). If that is correct, the question of whether the proceedings are still pending or have been finally determined is irrelevant. But even if that is not correct, the reference to existing proceedings must at least be wide enough to encompass the present situation in which there is an extant provision in the underlying proceedings for a damages enquiry, whether or not that enquiry has been actively pursued by the claimant.”
“In assessing whether the public interest requires that permission be granted, regard should be had to the strength of the evidence tending to show that the statement was false and known at the time to be false, the circumstances in which it came to be made, its significance, the use to which it was actually put and the maker’s understanding of the likely effect of the statement bearing in mind that the public interest lies in bringing home to the profession and through the profession to witnesses the dangers of knowingly making false statements.”
“Any such principle would risk becoming a licence to lie until the penultimate moment. Nor is there any rule that permission to apply to commit should be refused unless the statement in question has affected the outcome of a trial.”
“I recognise that there is a public interest in discouraging others from making false statements in the course of court proceedings and I have firmly in mind the guidance in Berry Piling (amongst others) … as to the importance of statements of truth. However, assuming for these purposes that her statements, or some of them, were knowingly or recklessly false, Louise has already been challenged about those statements during the trial and it would appear that they have played a significant part in persuading the Judge to dismiss her case and topronounce for the 2012 Will. For this she has already paid, as Whipple J put it in Newson-Smith ‘literally and heavily’. She was ordered to pay indemnity costs following the trial and it is common ground that she has suffered a significant amount of public and media interest. I do not consider that the public would take the view that she has ‘got away’ with her false statements or that she has not been adequately punished for them. I regard the Claimants’ submission that a refusal of permission would mean that ‘nothing’ has happened to Louise as a consequence of her alleged false statements, such that the administration of justice will be seriously damaged because others will be encouraged to regard the statement of truth as a mere formality, as neither accurate nor realistic.”
“In assessing proportionality, regard is to be had to the strength of the case against the respondents, the value of the claim in respect of which the allegedly false statement was made, the likely costs that will be incurred by each side in pursuing the contempt proceedings and the amount of court time likely to be involved in case managing and then hearing the application but bearing in mind the overriding objective - see Berry Piling, at [30(d)].”
“Whilst of course there is a public interest in pursuing people who have deliberately or even recklessly misled the court, that must be weighed in what is at best a marginal case by the proportionality of the exercise; proportionality is measured in a case like this largely by reference to the cost and time likely to be involved.”
“59. We say at once, however, that the deliberate or reckless making of a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth will usually be so inherently serious that nothing other than an order for committal to prison will be sufficient. That is so whether the contemnor is a claimant seeking to support a spurious or exaggerated claim, a lay witness seeking to provide evidence in support of such a claim, or an expert witness putting forward an opinion without an honest belief in its truth. In the case of an expert witness, the fact that he or she is acting corruptly and makes the relevant false statement for reward, will make the case even more serious; but it will be a serious contempt of court even if the expert witness acts from an indirect financial motive (such as a desire to obtain more work from a particular solicitor or claims manager), or without any financial motivation at all, and even if the expert witness stands to gain little financial reward by it. This is so because of the reliance placed on expert witnesses by the court, and because of the corresponding importance of the overriding duty which experts owe to the court … 60. Because this form of contempt of court undermines the administration of justice, it is always serious, even if the falsity of the relevant statement is identified at an early stage and does not in the end affect the outcome of the litigation. The fact that only a comparatively modest sum is claimed in the proceedings in which the false statement is made does not remove the seriousness of the contempt. The sum in issue in the proceedings is however relevant, because contempt of court by an expert witness will be even more serious if the relevant false statement supports a claim for a large sum, or a sum which is grossly exaggerated above the true value of any legitimate claim.”
“Those who make such false claims if caught should expect to go to prison. There is no other way to underline the gravity of the conduct. There is no other way to deter those who may be tempted to make such claims, and there is no other way to improve the administration of justice.”