“68. In relation to the libel claim, the claimant submits the defendant's plea to the claim of serious harm is defective. The claimant's plea of serious harm relies on an inferential case based on the extent of publication, the nature and identity of the publishees, and the gravity of the meanings of the statements complained of. The defendant has advanced a bare denial at paragraph 33 of the draft Amended Defence, and it is unclear what the reference in that paragraph to "any of the matters relied upon by the Claimant" is intended to signify. 69. The claimant acknowledges that in Sivananthan v Vasikaran[2022] EWHC 2938 (KB) at [53] Collins Rice J observed that (i) "a purely inferential case,, while in principle available, is not an alternative to an evidential process for establishing serious harm – it must be an evidential process for establishing serious harm"; and (ii) the "components of an inferential case must themselves be sufficiently evidenced and/or inherently probable to be capable of adding up to something which discharges a claimant's burden". However, the claimant notes that in this case the defendant has not chosen to make a non-admission, putting the claimant to proof on this issue, but has pleaded a denial which he has to make good. In any event, the claimant submits that in view of the gravity of the allegations, and the defendant's admissions regarding the claimant's reputation in this jurisdiction, and as to the extent of publication, he has no real prospect of success on this issue. 70. In relation to the truth defence, the claimant's position is that it is manifestly non-compliant with the stringent pleading requirements applicable where a defendant seeks to defend as true allegations of serious criminality. In particular, the claimant submits: i) Many of the particulars do not refer to the claimant at all. Paragraphs 15-19 of the draft Amended Defence plead information regarding the claimant's and defendant's family, but make no reference to the claimant. At paragraph 20 it is said the claimant "will never admit these matters", but there is no pleading of what, if anything, the claimant is alleged to have known. ii) There are no particulars capable of giving rise to a case that the claimant was dishonest which is the crux of the meanings. iii) Certain elements of the pleaded meanings are not addressed at all in the particulars. Paragraph 22 of the draft Amended Defence purports to contain the plea of truth in relation to the allegation of fraud. It is unclear whether that is a separate matter to the allegation of stealing land and valuables. If it is, no particulars of the alleged fraud are provided. Nor are there any particulars in relation to the stealing of "valuables" such as, what has been stolen, by whom, when and from what location. iv) Where factual matters are pleaded, the particulars are largely devoid of details enabling the claimant to understand what is being referred to. The claimant made a request for further information, but the responses proved insufficient to allow the claimant to understand the case he is required to meet. Paragraph 22 of the draft Amended Defence is in the passive voice: no particulars are given of, for example, who is said to have transferred the land into companies controlled by the claimant, when they are alleged to have done so, or of any alleged involvement or knowledge of the claimant. In relation to paragraph 28 of the draft Amended Defence and the further information provide, the defendant has not pleaded any link between the claimant and the alleged threats by other family members. v) The same particulars are relied upon to prove the truth of substantively different allegations. And it is not appropriate for serious allegations to be dealt with, as the defendant has done in paragraphs 31-32 of the draft Amended Defence in a sweep up clause. 71. The claimant submits the deficiencies in the defendant's pleading are comparable to those in Ashcroft v Foley, [34], in which case the Court of Appeal held the pleading was defective. 72. The claimant acknowledges the observation of Tugendhat J in Kim v Park at [40] (see paragraph 36 above) but submits this is not a case in which the court should give the defendant a further opportunity to remedy the defects. First, Ms Overman submits that the claimant has already given the defendant the opportunity that in Kim v Park it was suggested the court would normally give a party. The fact that the claimant has done so should not count against him on this application. Secondly, such an opportunity should only be given if there is reason to believe the defendant will be in a position to put the defect right. The claimant submits there is no basis for concluding that he could plead a proper truth defence, particularly in relation to the allegation of criminality, noting that he has never been convicted of any offence in any jurisdiction and nor are there any investigative findings against him. The claimant submits that there is nothing in the defendant's witness statement (or either version of his defence) to show that he would be able to replead his case in such a way as to remedy the defects. Thirdly, the claimant draws attention to the observation of Pill LJ and Sharp J in Ashcroft v Foley, [43], that there "must come a point at which repeated attempts at amendment, necessary because of the defendants' wish to keep the pleading as general as they can, become an abuse of the process of the court". The claimant submits an opportunity has already been provided and so the point has been reached at which no further opportunity should be given.”
“The Defence was clearly and comprehensively defective. The draft Amended Defence is a marked improvement on the Defence, but as I have identified it is inadequately particularised. I will give the defendant a further opportunity to amend the draft Amended Defence and remedy the defects that I have identified.”
“Whether the matter is raised on an application to strike out underCPR r 3.4 , or on an application for summary judgment under Part 24, or on an application for permission to amend, the court will not allow a party to pursue a case that has no real prospect of success, because to do is unfair to the other party and leads to nothing but a waste of costs and valuable court time… every case must be pleaded in sufficient detail to enable the other party to understand the case it has to meet. If a party seeking to amend is unable or unwilling to provide proper particulars of any allegation, it is not right to require the other party to deal with it as best he can.”
“40. …it is important to bear in mind that the overriding objective applies and the question of whether permission to amend should be given must be considered in the light of the need to conduct litigation fairly and justly and at proportionate cost. 41. For the amendments to be allowed the Appellants need to show that they have a real as opposed to fanciful prospect of success which is one that is more than merely arguable and carries some degree of conviction… A claim does not have such a prospect where (a) it is possible to say with confidence that the factual basis for the claim is fanciful because it is entirely without substance; (b) the claimant does not have material to support at least a prima facie case that the allegations are correct; and/or (c) the claim has pleaded insufficient facts in support of their case to entitle the Court to draw the necessary inferences… 42. The court is entitled to reject a version of the facts which is implausible, self-contradictory or not supported by the contemporaneous documents and it is appropriate for the court to consider whether the proposed pleading is coherent and contains the properly particularised elements of the cause of action relied upon…”
“where the defendant denies an allegation:- (a) he must state his reasons for doing so; and (b) if he intends to put forward a different version of events from that given by the claimant, he must state his own version.”
‘Statements of case should be confined to the information necessary to inform the other party of the nature of the case they have to meet. Such information should be set out concisely and in a manner proportionate to the subject matter of the claim’; and b. Para 4.3: ‘Where a Defendant relies on the defence undersection 2 of the Defamation Act 2013 that the imputation conveyed by the statement complained of is substantially true, they must:- (1) specify the imputation they contend is substantially true; and (2) give details of the matters on which they rely in support of that contention.’
“25. Where there is a general allegation of wrongdoing, it will ordinarily need to be supported by examples, which should be sufficiently particularised for the claimant to know what are the issues to be tried. As Ashurst J put it in a well known passage in J’Anson v Stuart (1787) 1 TR 748, 752: ‘When [the defendant] took upon himself to justify generally the charge of swindling, he must be prepared with the facts which constitute the charge in order to maintain his plea: then he ought to state those facts specifically, to give the plaintiff an opportunity of denying them; for the plaintiff cannot come to the trial prepared to justify his whole life.’ In so far as it may be appropriate to test these principles of English law against the values broadly expressed in the Convention, the words of Ashurst J can be justified by reference to the right to a fair trial guaranteed under Article 6. … 60. At paragraphs 7.48 and 7.49, a very general allegation is made that over 20 years ago the Claimant (and someone called Jimmy Holmes) regularly imported cannabis from Spain and Holland in collaboration with criminal gangs run by a Terry Adams or a family known as ‘the Wrights’. If true, the allegation would be a legitimate plea in support of the first defamatory meaning. But how is the Claimant to deal with it in its present form? If the Defendant can give no better particulars than this, there would be no chance of establishing it at trial. If more information is available, it should be given now. Thus, the paragraph cannot be permitted to stand in its present form. 61. Similar considerations apply to the historic allegations raised in paragraph 7.50. The Claimant is said to have “kidnapped and tortured” a drug trafficker called James Masterson with a view to his revealing the whereabouts of more than£1m in cash. Again, a quite legitimate plea so far as it goes. But, since the Claimant “cannot come to the trial prepared to justify his whole life”, he is entitled to greater specificity. If he was convicted of such an offence, then that conviction would be likely to prove conclusive in accordance with the provisions originally brought into effect bys.13 of the Civil Evidence Act 1968 , following the well known case of Hinds v Sparks. If not, however, this very serious allegation would have to be proved on its own merits (to the civil standard). This could only be done by calling evidence from the alleged victim or from someone else who witnessed the criminal activity in whole or in part. Some indication of the time(s) and place(s) would have to be provided and the Claimant is entitled to be given such specificity as the Defendant can disclose (subject, for the time being at least, to any considerations of source protection). It cannot stand as it is. 62. The same paragraph also makes the remarkably casual allegation that the Claimant murdered a nightclub doorman in the Mile End Road by slitting his throat. Who was he? When did it happen? If there is no recorded conviction to prove the Defendant’s case, it will have to call evidence to establish the charge. The Claimant is entitled to know of what the relevant witness or witnesses will accuse him. In one sense, of course, the Claimant can deal with the allegation. Most of us could go into the witness box and say with confidence that we have never murdered any doorman. It is not like a parking offence, which might slip someone’s memory. But that is not the point. The burden is upon the Defendant and it is not permitted simply to put an allegation as vague as this to the Claimant and, by what Mr Tomlinson calls a ‘nudge and a wink’, invite the tribunal of fact to disbelieve his denial (“He would say that, wouldn’t he?”). He must know the case to be adduced by the Defendant. It is clear from inter alia the decision in McDonald’s that grave allegations of criminal misconduct should not be pleaded on this basis, which amounts to no more than bare assertion. How can the pleader suppose that sufficient evidence is available to prove the murder, or that it will become available before trial, without being in a position to supply at this stage further particulars as to its nature? Further information about the murder in question (assuming it occurred) must be available. It would not have gone unreported.”
“42. We are surprised at the failure of the defendants to particularise their pleadings sufficiently. The defence is now in a fifth incarnation. We assume, in the absence of a different explanation, that there were tactical reasons for keeping it as general as possible. We are also somewhat surprised at the tolerance of the claimant towards the making of repeat applications and, with respect, to the judge for permitting them. When invited to make submissions about this, Mr Warby accepted that attempts at amendment will not normally be shut out in circumstances such as these though he added that the closer the case comes to trial the more difficult itis to obtain an amendment. At [38] and in other parts of his judgment, the judge has kept open the opportunity for the defendants to make still further amendments. That being so, we do not consider that this court at present should take a tougher line in that respect. 43. However, repeated satellite litigation on pleadings for tactical reasons is not, in our view, the best use of court resources and we would expect that to be recognised in this as in other areas of the law. There must come a point at which repeated attempts at amendment, necessary because of the defendants’ wish to keep the pleading as general as they can, become an abuse of the process of the court. … 49 … Particulars provided in support of a plea of justification must be both sufficient and pleaded with proper particularity. The former requirement is met if the (properly pleaded) particulars are capable of proving the truth of the defamatory meaning sought to be justified. The latter requirement is a factor to be judged not by the number of particulars provided, but by the pleading of a succinct and clear summary of the essential (and relevant) facts relied on, enabling a claimant to know the precise nature of the case against him, and providing him with sufficient detail so he can meet it. … … 56. Mr Epstein submitted that the judge's reference to the ‘indictment’ requirement was inapposite particularly in modern times, because it created an inappropriately high threshold for pleading defences of justification and fair comment; and the judge thus adopted a wrong approach to what was required of the defendants in this case. That argument it seems to us is based on a misunderstanding of a phrase, the meaning and use of which is well understood in the context of the pleading requirements in libel actions, and which is used to encapsulate an important principle. 57. The judge's reference was to an observation by Alderson B in Hickinbotham v Leach which was made in the course of argument but then expressly approved by the Court of Appeal in Zierenberg v Labouchere[1893] 2 QB 183 , 187 and 190 and again in Wootton v Sievier[1913] 3 KB 499 at 503 where Kennedy LJ (with whom Cozens-Hardy MR agreed) said this: ‘The degree of fulness and precision which ought to be required in an action for libel from a defendant, who has pleaded a justification and has been ordered to give particulars under that plea, is not infrequently a matter which admits of reasonable debate. Certain general propositions are now, I think, not open to controversy. In every case in which the defence raises an imputation of misconduct against him, a plaintiff ought to be enabled to go to trial with knowledge not merely of the general case he has to meet, but also of the acts which it is alleged that he has committed and upon which the defendant intends to rely as justifying the imputation. This rule of justice is not limited in its application to actions of libel, although, of course, it includes them (see per Kay L.J., Zierenberg v. Labouchere[1893] 2 QB 183 , 190]) and its propriety is most evident in a libel case where the defendant has chosen to put the character of the plaintiff in serious jeopardy by the heinousness of the charges which are asserted or involved in the defendant's plea of justification. In such a case, at all events, the pronouncement of Alderson B in Hickinbotham v. Leach [(1842) 10M&W 361, 364], approved of and explained in reference to the modern system of pleading by Lord Esher M.R. in Zierenberg v. Labouchere [[1893] 2 QB 183 , 187], is not one whit too strong: "The plea ought to state the charge with the same precision as in an indictment."’ 58. The ‘precision of an indictment’ rule if it can be so described, does no more than require a defendant to comply with the well-established principle that in pleading a defence of justification he must identify the acts which the claimant is said to have committed and which are relied on to justify whichever imputation they are directed to support. 59. This principle has particular resonance when the charges are serious ones, as they are here. In referring to the rule in our opinion the judge did not therefore set the pleading bar too high. He did no more than require the defendants to comply with principles which are not only well-established but which entirely accord with the modern approach to pleading. It is, in our view, consistent with the approach to an indictment in the criminal courts and the reference to an indictment is not inappropriate. In R v Landy and Others[1981] 72 Cr App R 237 , at 244, Lawton LJ stated the rationale for the need for particulars in an indictment: ‘. . . first to enable the defendants and the trial judge to know precisely and on the face of the indictment itself the nature of the prosecution's case, and secondly to stop the prosecution shifting their ground during the course of the case without the leave of the trial judge and the making of an amendment.’ … 70. … Some of the matters alleged, if not properly anchored to the meaning, might otherwise be merely prejudicial rather than relevant … … 93. The second observation I wish to make is this. I agree with Pill L.J. and Sharp J. that it is not in the event necessary for the court to decide whether a pleading of fraud in the context of justification should be subject to the same stringent requirements as it is in other contexts. But my strong preliminary view is that it should. I can see no obvious reason why a pleading which asserts the truth of a allegation of fraud should be subject to less stringent rules than the plea of fraud itself. However, it is a point of some importance on which we heard only limited argument, so it would not be appropriate to determine that question in this appeal.”
“15. I am guided by well-established authority in assessing whether a defence is capable of establishing the substantial truth of defamatory allegations of fact. Particulars in support of a defence must be both sufficient and pleaded with proper particularity. Sufficiency means they are capable of proving the truth of the defamatory meaning. Particularity is judged not by the number of particulars cited, but by the pleading of a succinct and clear summary of the essential facts relied on, enabling a claimant to know the precise nature of the case against them, and giving them enough detail so they can meet it. (Ashcroft v Foley[2012] EWCA Civ 423 , paragraph 49). 16. I am also directed to the well-established ‘Musa King’ principles - the distillation of law set out at paragraph 32 of Musa King v Telegraph Group Ltd[2003] EWHC 1312 . The principles pre-date the 2013 Act, and that case concerned weaker allegations of fact than the present case, but the framework is clear and relevant: 1) There is a rule of general application in defamation (dubbed the ‘repetition rule’ by Hirst LJ in Shah) whereby a defendant who has repeated an allegation of a defamatory nature about the claimant can only succeed in justifying it by proving the truth of the underlying allegation — not merely the fact that the allegation has been made. 2) More specifically, where the nature of the plea is one of ‘reasonable grounds to suspect’, it is necessary to plead (and ultimately prove) the primary facts and matters giving rise to reasonable grounds of suspicion objectively judged. 3) It is impermissible to plead as a primary fact the proposition that some person or persons (e.g. law enforcement authorities) announced, suspected or believed the claimant to be guilty. 4) A defendant may (e.g. in reliance upon theCivil Evidence Act 1995 ) adduce hearsay evidence to establish a primary fact — but that in no way undermines the rule that the statements (still less beliefs) of any individual cannot themselves serve as primary facts. 5) Generally, it is necessary to plead allegations of fact tending to show that it was some conduct on the claimant's part that gave rise to the grounds of suspicion (the so-called ‘conduct rule’). 6) It has recently been acknowledged, however, by the Court of Appeal in Chase at [50]-[51] that this is not an absolute rule, and that for example ‘strong circumstantial evidence’ can itself contribute to reasonable grounds for suspicion. 7) It is not permitted to rely upon post-publication events in order to establish the existence of reasonable grounds, since (by way of analogy with fair comment) the issue has to be judged as at the time of publication. 8) A defendant may not confine the issue of reasonable grounds to particular facts of his own choosing, since the issue requires to be determined against the overall factual position as it stood at the material time (including any true explanation the claimant may have given for the apparently suspicious circumstances pleaded by the defendant). 9) Unlike the rule applying in fair comment cases, the defendant may rely upon facts subsisting at the time of publication even if he was unaware of them at that time. 10) A defendant may not plead particulars in such a way as to have the effect of transferring the burden to the claimant of having to disprove them. … 60. Where a defence of substantial truth is raised to an allegation that a claimant has definitely done something (a ‘Chase level 1’ allegation), then the authorities, including the Musa King principles, are clear that primary facts must be pleaded with enough specificity capable of establishing that truth. The allegation to be established as true here is that Ms Riley did, in objective fact, engage in, support and encourage a campaign of online abuse and harassment of Rose. For the reasons given, I cannot agree that Ms Riley’s tweets and/or alleged omissions could sustain a defence of the truth of those allegations. Her own online speech does not arguably constitute a campaign of harassment (or, perhaps, any nature of ‘campaign’: no specific particulars of a campaign are pleaded) and omissions in relation to others’ speech, deliberate or otherwise, are not pleaded in a way capable of constituting relevant primary facts about Ms Riley’s conduct and its consequences.”
“4. The first three sentences of paragraph 6 of the amended particulars of claim are admitted. It is denied that every tweet contains what is described as ‘a common theme’. It is admitted that many contain one or more of the following assertions: that the Claimant is corrupt; that his family wealth has been derived from serious crime; that the Defendant and his father were victims of the Claimant, and the Claimant’s father’s serious criminal conduct. Those assertions are true.”
“8. It is denied as alleged in paragraph 10 of the amended particulars of claim that the acts of the Defendant relied on by the Claimant amount to harassment. The matters of which complaint are made are substantially true and the Defendant’s course of conduct was pursued for the purposes of preventing or detecting crime and in the particular circumstances the pursuit of the course of conduct was reasonable. The Defendant relies on the defences to a claim in harassment provided by s 1(3)(a) and 1(3)(c) Protection fromHarassment Act 1997 .”
“(1) A person must not pursue a course of conduct - (a) which amounts to harassment of another, and (b) which he knows or ought to know amounts to harassment of the other. … (3) Subsection (1) or (1A) does not apply to a course of conduct if the person who pursued it shows - (a) that it was pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime …”
“10. The Defendant repeats the matters set out in paragraphs 14-33 of this defence and in particular: the forgery of a power of attorney in respect of the Defendant’s father; the theft of land in Kamra Village, Attock; the theft of 64 Fellows Road in Hampstead; the theft of jewellery from a safe deposit box in the HPL Bank in locker No 1114 situated in Habib Bank Ltd Attock City Branch (Branch Code No 0662) Punjab Pakistan; the vandalism of the Defendant’s car in London; the laundering of monies derived from people smuggling; the illegal dealing in and supply of arms. Further, as an advisor to the prime minister the Claimant had a particular duty to help stamp out corruption and wrong doing and to help and not hinder the investigation of either in particular in relation to his own family.”
“18. As to the key deficiencies identified at [97] and [99] of Steyn J’s judgment … regarding the absence of particularisation as to whether and how C had knowledge of: (i) illegal activity and/or human trafficking; and (ii) whether and how family money derived from it, C is entitled to more than the single line now pleaded at [20] of the June 2023 Draft, to the effect that he was present at unspecified family meetings where unspecified matters were discussed. There is also vanishingly little particularisation regarding the alleged illegal arms trading (at [18]).”
“18. … The [CPR] provide a framework within which to balance the interest of both sides. That balance is inevitably disturbed if an unrepresented litigant is entitled to greater indulgence in complying with them than his represented opponent. Any advantage enjoyed by a litigant in person imposes a corresponding disadvantage on the other side, which may be significant if it affects the latter’s legal rights, under the Limitation Acts for example. Unless the rules and practice directions are particularly inaccessible or obscure, it is reasonable to expect a litigant in person to familiarise himself with the rules which apply to any step which he is about to take.”
“96. At paragraphs 15-19 of the draft Amended Defence, the defendant has pleaded that the claimant's family's wealth was derived from human trafficking, in or around 1980, of people from Pakistan to the regime in Libya, and thereafter from the illegal supply of weapons to the Libyan regime, and subsequently to other countries including Chad. He has also pleaded (AmDef, para 20), that the claimant will never admit these matters but will suggest his wealth is derived from his and his father's investments in hotels and property. 97. However, there is no pleading in respect of a number of elements of the meanings above. First, there is no assertion in the draft Amended Defence as to the identity of the family members who are alleged to have engaged in human trafficking, whether the claimant has knowledge of this activity (and, if so, how), who directly derived money from this activity, how and by whom any such money has been passed on to the claimant, and whether the claimant knows that such money was derived from human trafficking (and, if so, how). 98. Secondly, there is no direct pleading as to the claimant's father's alleged involvement in illegal arms trading. It may be implicit, but it is a very serious allegation which, if it is made, should be made clearly and expressly. The pleading makes no express allegation that the claimant was involved, but there is a vague reference to "other members of the family", all of whom are alleged to have been heavily involved in the illegal arms trading business. That is unfair: if, as I surmise, there is in fact no allegation the claimant ever participated in illegal arms trading or human trafficking that ought to be made clear in the defence. 99. Thirdly, although it appears to be the defendant's case that the claimant knows about his father's and/or family's involvement in illegal arms trading, the draft Amended Defence does not say so, nor provide any particulars as to how or why the claimant is alleged to have such knowledge. There is no assertion in the draft Amended Defence as to who directly derived money from illegal arms trading, how and by whom any such money has been passed on to the claimant, and whether the claimant knows that such money was derived from illegal arms trading (and, if so, how). 100. Finally, the draft Amended Defence does not give particulars of any occasions on which the claimant is alleged to have been dishonest about the provenance of his wealth, including setting out what the claimant has said that is allegedly dishonest.”
“ii) The defendant states the claimant (and his father) have failed to give the National Accountability Inquiry, which was authorised to probe allegations against the claimant on15 January 2018 , ‘a satisfactory explanation of the money trail of offshore companies and all the properties and business located in the United Kingdom’ and of their surge of wealth (Defence, Tweet 9, Tweet 16, Tweet 63, Tweet 185). In particular, he alleges a failure to provide a satisfactory explanation for allegedly suspicious transactions in respect of two UK based companies, Martin Kemp Design Limited and HPM Developments Limited, in respect of which the claimant is alleged to have changed the records, and resigned, after the National Accountability Inquiry began.”
“19. (Response to C Skeleton Argument 19) D disagrees. In C’s own admission he has inherited all his wealth from his father. 234 documents include conviction, articles and land registry documents identify C money trail and C failure to identify or comprehend from any of the statements in 6 videos or 234 documents save for the10th May 2016 report by Murtaza Ali Shah (D/262) is absurd. The Truth Trackers Report By murdered investigatory journalist Arshad Sharif and tweets (D/190,D/191,D/192,D/193,D/194,D/195,D/196,D/197,D/198,D/199) documents served provide substantial prima facie evidence. D would like to bring the courts attention to an article by Islamabad Insider : How Zulfi Bukhari hounded Arshad Sharif on Imran Khans orders5 September 2023 . Islamabad Insider is a media website reporting on Pakistan’s current affairs. D evidences and witnesses (who are also C victims of misuse of power) supporting his claims need to be considered and allowed to be presented at a trial.”
“115. The pleading is clearly inadequate to support a plea of truth in respect of the meanings above. First, the passive tense is used: the [defendant] has not alleged that the claimant effected the transfers of these two properties out of the defendant's father's name into companies he controls. Secondly, no particulars are given of when, or how, any such transfers occurred without the defendant's father's consent. There is no explanation in the draft Amended Defence of what ‘valuables’ belonging to the defendant's father the claimant is alleged to have stolen, or when or from where he is said to have done so; or of the allegation of "fraud". Nor is there any basis asserted for the allegation of stealing the ‘defendant's assets’, as opposed to his father's, provided.”
“28. The Defendant's father had land and property in England and in Pakistan. Some of the land was leasehold land held through companies some was freehold. Transfers were effected out of the name of the Defendant's father into companies controlled by the Claimant without the Defendant's father's consent both in Pakistan and in England. [29] The Defendant's father owned land at 64, Fellows Road, Hampstead NW3 in London under Land Registry Title No NGL 729297. That property was transferred without his knowledge or consent in 1995 into a company controlled by the Claimant's father and subsequently into a company owned or controlled by the Claimant. That can only have been done by forging the consent of the Defendant's father to a change of ownership.”
“128. The defendant's particulars of his plea of truth in respect of these meanings are at paragraph 28 of the draft Amended Defence. The defendant states that following his mother's appearance on television in Pakistan in June 2018, ‘exposing the behaviour of the Claimant and his family’, the defendant has been threated, the defendant's mother and father were threatened, and the defendant's car was vandalised in England. The defendant asserts that the only reasonable inference is that the claimant was responsible for these threats/acts being carried out by others. He also asserts this inference is ‘supported by what the Defendant has been told by the Claimant's sister and cousin’. 129. In response to the request for further information, the defendant has alleged that the claimant's sister, Masooma Bukhari’s home phone number twice after his mother's interview was aired. He states that she left a message on the answering machine, in Urdu, ‘threatening that I will face the consequences’. The claimant's first cousins have sent voice notes and text messages of a threatening nature. 130. The draft Amended Defence gives no particulars of any threats to himself by ‘thugs’, any ‘attack’ on the defendant's London home, or any threats made by ‘gangsters’ against the defendant's parents, such as when and where each incident is alleged to have occurred, and a description of what occurred (e.g. how many people were involved, what they said and/or did). No particulars of what the claimant's first cousin is alleged to have said are given in the draft Amended Defence, and the pleading also gives no explanation for the assertion that the only reasonable inference is that the claimant was responsible. However, I note that other than seeking information as to what the claimant's first cousin is alleged to have said, the claimant did not seek further information in respect of these matters.”
“125. The defendant has given particulars in support of his defence of truth in respect of the allegation that ‘the claimant is corrupt’ at paragraph 32 of the draft Amended Defence. He asserts that the claimant occupied a prominent position in a government of Pakistan which was ostensibly committed to rooting out corruption and imposing high standards of probity, and yet the claimant (i) resisted any attempt to explain where his family money came from, (ii) prevented governmental and judicial agencies investigating the defendant's allegations about ‘his personal ill doing’, and (iii) (mis)used his position to facilitate wrongdoing in relation to the defendant and his father. 126. As currently pleaded, paragraph 32 is opaque, and therefore defective. In light of the defendant's Defence and statement it is apparent that (i) is a reference to the claimant's alleged dishonesty, and lack of openness with the National Accountability Bureau, in relation to the source of his initial fortune allegedly being derived from illegal activity, and the trail of funds. It is also apparent that (iii) concerns the allegation that the claimant protected his uncle and cousin, and prevented the defendant and the defendant's father from obtaining justice, when the claimant's uncle and cousin stole the Kamra village land and valuables from the defendant's father. However, it is not clear to me what the defendant is referring to in the point I have identified as (ii). If he wishes to maintain reliance on it, it will need to be particularised so that the claimant can understand what the allegations and ‘personal ill doing’ are, and what steps the claimant is alleged to have taken, when and where, to prevent any governmental or judicial bodies (which should be identified) from investigating.”
“[32] The Claimant occupied a prominent position within the government of Pakistan which was ostensibly committed to rooting out corruption and imposing high standards of probity in the administration and in society. He resisted any attempt to explain where his family money came from. He prevented government and judicial agencies from investigating the Defendant's allegations about his personal ill doing. He used his position to help facilitate wrongdoing by him in relation to the Defendant and his father. All of this was incompatible with his duties to the government and prime minister of Pakistan and its people.”
“[43] The Claimant occupied a prominent position within the government of Pakistan which was ostensibly committed to rooting out corruption and imposing high standards of probity in the administration and in society. His father had been a minister in the government of Pakistan, his uncle and cousins S Ijaz Bukhari and Syed Yawer Abbas Bukhari were members of Parliament for a party in alliance with that of the prime minister. He resisted any attempt to explain where the family money came from. He prevented government and judicial agencies from investigating the Defendant's allegations about his personal ill doing. He used his position to help facilitate wrong doing by him in relation to the Defendant and his father. All of this was incompatible with his duties to the government and prime minister of Pakistan and its people.”
‘the Claimant manages illegal activities for Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan.’
“133. The defendant has not given any particulars in support of his defence of truth in relation to this meaning. It is not encompassed in the ‘sweep up’ paragraph 31, as the meaning is not that ‘the Claimant is corrupt’, albeit there is a degree of crossover between those meanings. In any event, the particulars given in paragraph 32 of the draft Amended Defence make no reference to the claimant managing any illegal activities for the (former) Prime Minister of Pakistan. This part of the defendant's pleadingis, therefore, also defective.”
“This is a serious allegation and if it is to be maintained it must be properly particularised …”
“[45] The Claimant and Imran Khan were involved in and are being investigated for corrupt practices in relation to tendering and contracting for the Rawalpindi Ring Road scheme. Very large sums of money improperly flowed to political supporters of Imran Khan. This matter is being investigated by the relevant authorities in Pakistan and the Claimant was heavily involved in facilitating corrupt practices to the benefit of both the Claimant and Imran Khan. [46] The Claimant and Imran Khan are being investigated by the relevant authorities in Pakistan in relation to the so called Tosha Khana gift case in which the Claimant facilitated corrupt practices and substantial payments to prominent supporters of Imran Khan.”
“83. The defendant's reliance on s.1(3)(a) of the 1997 Act is inadequately pleaded. No proper basis for asserting that he published the statements that he did ‘for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime" has been pleaded. In particular, in the context of the harassment claim (and the draft Amended Defence more broadly), the defendant has not particularised the alleged crime or crimes that he was seeking to prevent or detect by publishing any of the tweets and videos. Nor has he specified whether his purpose was the prevention or the detection of such alleged crimes.”