“I was in the slow lane or lane 1 of 3. I looked ahead and in the third lane (or fast lane) I saw that two cars had collided with each other. I didn’t see the impact between these two cars. These two cars were stationary. I was concentrating on the traffic in my lane and so I can’t really saw [sic, say] anything about the traffic flow up ahead of me. It was more or less at that point that I became aware of a motorcycle rider who was slightly ahead of me and also travelling in lane 3 or the fast lane. I was travelling at just under 50 miles per hour and I believe that the motorcycle was going slightly faster than me. He wasn’t “zooming away”
“it seems that he was going too fast and did not react in time to traffic stopping ahead of him.”
“I saw Volkswagen Passat in front of Volkswagen Polo. I have no clue how that car was involved in that accident and I don’t know the driver”
“At the scene my working hypothesis was that, the motorcycle struck the rear of the Zafira with the rider striking the rear of the car. The Zafira struck the rear nearside of the Polo…”
“Damage pattern indicates that this was not a standard rear end collision. The front of the bike has not collided with the rear of the Zafira. The textile marks to rear of Safira indicate rider himself has impacted with rear of the car. Motorcycle was in 4th gear.”
“8. First, and stating the obvious, it is for the claimant to establish on the balance of probabilities that the defendant was negligent. The standard of care is that of the reasonably careful driver, armed with common sense and experience of the way pedestrians, particularly (in this case) children, are likely to behave: Moore v Pointer [1975] RTR, per Buckley LJ. If a real risk of a danger emerging would have been reasonably apparent to such a driver, then reasonable precautions must be taken; if the danger was no more than a mere possibility, which would not have occurred to such a driver, then there is no obligation to take extraordinary precautions: Foskett v Mistry [1984] 1 RTR 1, per May LJ. The defendant is not to be judged by the standards of an ideal driver, nor with the benefit of "20/20 hindsight": Stewart v Glaze[2009] EWHC 704 , per Coulson J at [5]. 9. Second, however, drivers must always bear in mind that a motorcar is potentially a dangerous weapon: Lunt v Khelifa[2002] EWCA Civ 801 , per Latham LJ at [20]. 10. Third, drivers are taken to know the principles of the Highway Code… …. 13. Fifth, in another decision of the Court of Appeal, Lambert v Clayton[2009] EWCA Civ 237 , [Smith LJ] also cautioned trial judges against making findings of fact of unwarranted precision when that was not justified by the evidence, on the basis that treating what could in truth be no more than "guesstimates" as if they were secure findings of fact could easily lead to an unjust result either way [35-38]. At [39] she said this: "If there are inherent uncertainties about the facts, as there were here, it is dangerous to make precise findings. This may well mean that the party who bears the burden of proof is in difficulties. But that is one of the purposes behind a burden of proof; that if the case cannot be demonstrated on the balance of probabilities, it will fail." 14. Sixth, trial judges should also exercise caution in relation to the evidence of accident reconstruction experts. Lambert itself was a case in which the trial judge had relied heavily on the evidence of accident reconstruction experts and the calculations which they had produced. In Stewart v Glaze (ante) Coulson J, in §2.2 of his judgment at [8-10], warned of the danger of: (i) such experts giving opinions on matters beyond their expertise and acting as advocates seeking to usurp the role of the judge; (ii) elevating their admissible evidence about reaction times, stopping distances and the like into a “fixed framework or formula, against which the defendant's actions are then to be rigidly judged with a mathematical precision”
“In my judgment, it is the primary factual evidence which is of the greatest importance in a case of this kind. The expert evidence comprises a useful way in which that factual evidence, and the inferences to be drawn from it, can be tested.”
“Stopping distances. Drive at a speed that will allow you to stop well within the distance you can see to be clear. You should • leave enough space between you and the vehicle in front so that you can pull up safely if it suddenly slows down or stops. The safe rule is never to get closer than the overall stopping distance (see Typical Stopping Distances diagram) • allow at least a two-second gap between you and the vehicle in front on roads carrying faster-moving traffic … • remember, large vehicles and motorcycles need a greater distance to stop”
“The distances shown are a general guide. The distance will depend on your attention (thinking distance), the road surface, the weather conditions and the condition of your vehicle at the time.”
“Adapt your driving to the appropriate type and condition of road you are on. In particular • do not treat speed limits as a target … • take the road and traffic conditions into account. Be prepared for unexpected or difficult situations, for example, the road being blocked beyond a blind bend. Be prepared to adjust your speed as a precaution …”
“Traffic on motorways usually travels faster than on other roads, so you have less time to react. It is especially important to use your mirrors earlier and look much further ahead than you would on other roads.”
“Where any person suffers damage as the result partly of his own fault and partly of the fault of any other person or persons, a claim in respect of that damage shall not be defeated by reason of the fault of the person suffering the damage, but the damages recoverable in respect thereof shall be reduced to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant's share in the responsibility for the damage.”
“…the apportionment of responsibility is inevitably a somewhat rough and ready exercise (a feature reflected in the judicial preference for round figures), and … a variety of possible answers can legitimately be given. That is consistent with the requirement under section 1(1) to arrive at a result which the court considers “just and equitable”