“There is no statutory definition of car cruising or street cruising as far as I am aware, but it involves (to adopt the wording of the draft injunction in the Wolverhampton case) gatherings of two or more people where some of those present engage in motor racing, motor stunts or other dangerous or obstructive driving. Street cruises attract participants who, whether or not they are taking part in driving or riding, support and encourage others to do so, play loud music, rev their engines, show off their cars, and engage in other similar antisocial activities. These activities are highly dangerous, having caused serious injury and, in come cases, fatalities. The activities taking place at these cruises are frequently unlawful.”
“Persons unknown being drivers, riders or passengers in or on motor vehicle(s) who participate between the hours of 3:00pm and 7:00am in a gathering of 2 or more persons within the Black Country area shown on plan A (attached) at which such defendants engage in motor racing or motor stunts or other dangerous or obstructive driving.”
“This Amended Order shall come into effect immediately and be deemed served on the Defendants at 23.59 on the date upon which, in each case, the final step in paragraph 11 of the Combined Directions Order have been complied with.”
“On29 July 2023 around 10.10pm the Defendant was driving a vehicle, SEAT LEON KP58 MWV, at speeds of approximately 80 mph and was racing other vehicles on Kenrick Way, West Bromwich, West Midlands.”
“2. I deny breaching the Injunction.… 5. On the night in question, the29th July 2023 , I accept I was driving on Kenrick Way in West Bromwich. 6. I had been to my friend’s house in Rednal, Birmingham, to collect his two dogs to take care of them for a week while he went on holiday. 7. The dogs were in the car when I was pulled over by police. 8. I then drove down the M5 from Rednal to West Bromwich to meet some friends to go for a drive and get some food. 9. I was not aware of an injunction being in place. 10. At no point did I see any signs which indicated the road was in a High Court injunction zone. It was pitch black at the time.”
"people who … are capable of being identified and served with the proceedings, if necessary by alternative service such as can reasonably be expected to bring the proceedings to their attention."
“Proceedings for contempt of court are punitive. In cases which arise from disobedience to an order made by the court prohibiting a particular act, proof of the alleged contempt involves establishing the commission of that prohibited act together with the requisite guilty mind. To amount to contempt the disobedience must be wilful or deliberate rather than accidental and unintentional, and so, consistently with that principle, contempt cannot be established, for example, against an individual who, unaware of the existence of the order, acts contrary to its terms. What however is not required is proof that in committing the prohibited act he intended to be contumacious or that he was motivated by a desire to defy the court. “Mens rea, or an intention on the part of the person proceeded against to omit or commit the act, the omission or commission of which constitutes disobedience of the injunctive order, must be established … Mens rea in this context does not mean a wilful intention to disobey the court's order, but an intention to do the act which constitutes the disobedience with knowledge of the terms of the order, although not necessarily an understanding that the act is prohibited.” (Per Lord Donaldson MR in Re Supply of Ready Mixed Concrete[1992] 2 QB 213 at 230, and 239, respectively.)” “Mens rea, or an intention on the part of the person proceeded against to omit or commit the act, the omission or commission of which constitutes disobedience of the injunctive order, must be established … Mens rea in this context does not mean a wilful intention to disobey the court's order, but an intention to do the act which constitutes the disobedience with knowledge of the terms of the order, although not necessarily an understanding that the act is prohibited.” (Per Lord Donaldson MR in Re Supply of Ready Mixed Concrete[1992] 2 QB 213 at 230, and 239, respectively.)”
“13. The ingredients of civil contempt are not laid down by statute but established by common law authorities. In this case, both parties have relied on the following summary by Proudman J, DBE in FW Farnsworth Ltd v Lacy[2013] EWHC 3487 (Ch) [20], approved by this Court in Cuadrilla Bowland Ltd v Persons Unknown[2020] EWCA Civ 9 ,[2020] 4 WLR 29 [25]: "A person is guilty of contempt by breach of an order only if all the following factors are proved to the relevant standard: (a) having received notice of the order the contemnor did an act prohibited by the order or failed to do an act required by the order within the time set by the order; (b) he intended to do the act or failed to do the act as the case may be; (c) he had knowledge of all the facts which would make the carrying out of the prohibited act or the omission to do the required act a breach of the order. The act constituting the breach must be deliberate rather than merely inadvertent, but an intention to commit a breach is not necessary, although intention or lack of intention to flout the court's order is relevant to penalty."” "A person is guilty of contempt by breach of an order only if all the following factors are proved to the relevant standard: (a) having received notice of the order the contemnor did an act prohibited by the order or failed to do an act required by the order within the time set by the order; (b) he intended to do the act or failed to do the act as the case may be; (c) he had knowledge of all the facts which would make the carrying out of the prohibited act or the omission to do the required act a breach of the order. The act constituting the breach must be deliberate rather than merely inadvertent, but an intention to commit a breach is not necessary, although intention or lack of intention to flout the court's order is relevant to penalty."”
“27. In some cases, the need to secure compliance with a lawful injunction order will justify the Court granting permission to serve the injunction order by means other than personal service. In Cuciurean, the Court of Appeal held that if an order for alternative service has been made, and its terms complied with, then the respondent will have been given sufficient notice of the injunction order to sustain a contempt application. Thereafter, if s/he is found, to the necessary standard, to have breached the terms of the order, the defendant will be held to be in contempt of court. 28. But that is not an end of the matter. If such 'deemed' notice is unfair on the facts of any individual case, there are two safeguards. i) First, in an appropriate case, a respondent can apply to set aside the alternative service order. As the Court of Appeal noted in Cuciurean, on any application for an order for alternative service, the Court must be satisfied that such an order is justified by evidence and an appropriate order to make. Fundamentally, the Court will not grant an order for alternative service unless satisfied that the proposed method of service is such as can reasonably be expected to bring the order to the attention of the defendant: Cameron -v- Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd[2019] 1 WLR 1471 [21] per Lord Sumption; and Ineos Upstream Ltd -v- Persons Unknown[2019] 4 WLR 100 [34 (3)] per Longmore LJ. Too liberal an approach to alternative service orders increases the risk that respondents to injunction orders will not actually receive notice of what the Court has ordered them to do. In turn, that risks generating costly satellite contempt applications that serve little purpose. ii) Second, if the Court is satisfied on the evidence that, despite the alternative service order, the respondent was not aware of the terms of the injunction, then applying Cuciurean – and consistent with ECtHR jurisprudence (see further [94]-[97] below) – that will be highly relevant to the penalty (if any) that the Court would impose for the breach: see [58] and [62] per Warby LJ.” i) First, in an appropriate case, a respondent can apply to set aside the alternative service order. As the Court of Appeal noted in Cuciurean, on any application for an order for alternative service, the Court must be satisfied that such an order is justified by evidence and an appropriate order to make. Fundamentally, the Court will not grant an order for alternative service unless satisfied that the proposed method of service is such as can reasonably be expected to bring the order to the attention of the defendant: Cameron -v- Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd[2019] 1 WLR 1471 [21] per Lord Sumption; and Ineos Upstream Ltd -v- Persons Unknown[2019] 4 WLR 100 [34 (3)] per Longmore LJ. Too liberal an approach to alternative service orders increases the risk that respondents to injunction orders will not actually receive notice of what the Court has ordered them to do. In turn, that risks generating costly satellite contempt applications that serve little purpose. ii) Second, if the Court is satisfied on the evidence that, despite the alternative service order, the respondent was not aware of the terms of the injunction, then applying Cuciurean – and consistent with ECtHR jurisprudence (see further [94]-[97] below) – that will be highly relevant to the penalty (if any) that the Court would impose for the breach: see [58] and [62] per Warby LJ.”
“(ii) Such an injunction (a "newcomer injunction") will be effective to bind anyone who has notice of it while it remains in force, even though that person had no intention and had made no threat to do the act prohibited at the time when the injunction was granted and was therefore someone against whom, at that time, the applicant had no cause of action. It is inherently an order with effect contra mundum, and is not to be justified on the basis that those who disobey it automatically become defendants.”
“I can confirm that the signage continues to be displayed, both at fixed locations and at regular intervals on digital signage, as described above, throughout the Black Country area.”
“D20.81 … The requirement to prove mitigation should not be confused with the resolution of a factual dispute as to the circumstances of the offence in a Newton hearing (see D20.8 et seq.). The cases appear to draw a distinction between 'true Newton' situations, where the dispute is about the immediate circumstances of the offence, and what have been described as 'reverse Newton' situations. In the latter, the dispute is about extraneous matters about which the prosecution witnesses are unlikely to have any knowledge. Since these matters would not have formed part of the prosecution case, or be within the prosecution's knowledge, and may well be within the peculiar knowledge of the offender, the rule is that the onus of satisfying the judge rests on the defence.”
“… There seems to us to be a marked difference in principle between the Newton situation (where the issue goes directly to the facts and circumstances of the crime itself as presented respectively by the prosecution and defence), and consideration of extraneous facts put forward in mitigation, which will usually be within the exclusive knowledge of the defendant or appellant himself, and will have been raised by him entirely on his own initiative. We agree with the view of the editors of Archbold, and we consider that if his extraneous mitigation is of doubtful validity, he should have to make it good, and that the prosecution should not be obliged to disprove it… As a result we hold that, in relation to extraneous matters of mitigation raised by a defendant or appellant, a civil burden of proof rests on the defendant or appellant, though of course in the general run of cases the sentencing judge will readily accept the accuracy of defending counsel‘s statements in this context.”