‘If there is arguably a significant change in the circumstances there would be merit in the authority taking a fresh decision on that basis, particularly if the previous application is out of their hands because it is under appeal. If the fresh application is successful, it might render the appeal otiose and thus avoid the time and expense of the appeal being determined. If it is unsuccessful, why should the applicant be prejudiced by having had to withdraw his appeal which might otherwise have succeeded.’
‘although Tower Hamlets could concede the issue and express this as withdrawing their decision, they could not thereby unilaterally prevent Mrs Deugi from continuing her appeal, if an order in her favour would be of enduring benefit to her. I understood Mr Underwood eventually to accept this. In Chadwick LJ's words, Mrs Deugi ought not to be deprived of some benefit or advantage to which she would have been entitled if the original decision had been taken in accordance with the law. Conceding the issue alone would only lead to quashing the decision. But Mrs Deugi was asking the judge to vary the decision, and she maintained that a varied decision such as she obtained from the judge would give her an enduring benefit. As I have said, Mr Underwood was not instructed to argue that the appeal is entirely academic.’
‘The most important ground on which the courtexercises its inherent jurisdiction to stay proceedings is that of abuse of process. Thispower will be exercised where the proceedings are shown to be frivolous, vexatious orharassing or to be manifestly groundless or in which there is clearly no cause of actionin law or in equity. The applicant for a stay on this ground must show not merely that theclaimant might not, or probably would not, succeed, but that he could not possiblysucceed on the basis of the pleadings and the facts of the case.’
‘In the instant case neither party can have any interest at all in the outcome of theappeal. Their joint tenancy of property B which was the subject matter of the dispute nolonger exists. Thus, even if the House thought that the judge and the Court of Appeal hadbeen wrong to decline jurisdiction, there would be no order which could now be made togive effect to that view. It has always been a fundamental feature of our judicial systemthat the courts decide disputes between the parties before them; they do not pronounceon abstract questions of law when there is no dispute to be resolved.’
‘The court does not beat the air in vain. Although the court has a discretion to determine an academic claim where there is public interest in doing so, the normal principle is that the court does not decide hypothetical questions…It may have become otiose or pointless to grant a remedy because the relevant detriment to the claimant has been removed or because nothing in practice will change of the remedy is granted.’
‘After the judge had dismissed the appeal, the Appellant obtained accommodation by way of a secure tenancy in the private sector. If that were to provide stable and settled accommodation, in which she can stay for some time, it may render the question whether she became intentionally homeless in November 2007 a point of only theoretical interest. Unfortunately, although the Appellant's solicitors told the court of this development promptly, they did not give the same information to the Council, in breach of the elementary rule that a party must not write to the court without copying the letter to the other side. The solicitors have apologised, and the person who was responsible had left their employment some time ago. The facts only became known to the Council shortly before the hearing of the appeal. It then contended that the appeal was academic, and ought not to be pursued. However, on enquiry, [Counsel for the Council] told us that the Council was not, and could not be, in a position to ensure that, if the Appellant were to become homeless again, and were to apply to it or to any other relevant housing authority, the Council's finding, in its original and review decisions, that it was satisfied that she had become intentionally homeless in November 2007 would not be taken into account. On the Appellant's part, we were told that the accommodation cannot be relied on to be stable, and that there is a risk that she may again become homeless. In those circumstances it seems to me that the point is not necessarily academic, though it affects the order that the court should make on the appeal.’