“Within 6 months of the Operative Date, Simple Skips and Mr Stiles will: 6.1 Clear the Compound Area of the Site…; and 6.2 Remove 40 bulker lorry loads of waste from the area of the Site known as Mound 1, such removal to be evidence only by a certificate of its removal signed at the time of removal by either Reginald Hyde, Dean Hyde or Alfred Hyde on behalf of the Schyde Parties, and not otherwise taken into account”
“Any party wishing to add to or further amend the list of issues must make an application supported by evidence.”
“i) The court construes the relevant words of a contract in its documentary, factual and commercial context, assessed in the light of (a) the natural and ordinary meaning of the provision being construed, (b) any other relevant provisions of the contract being construed, (c) the overall purpose of the provision being construed and the contract in which it is contained, (d) the facts and circumstances known or assumed by the parties at the time that the document was executed, and (e) commercial common sense, but (f) disregarding subjective evidence of any party's intentions – see Arnold v Britton …per Lord Neuberger PSC at paragraph 15 and the earlier cases he refers to in that paragraph; ii) A court can only consider facts or circumstances known or reasonably available to both parties that existed at the time that the contract or order was made - see Arnold v. Britton … per Lord Neuberger PSC at paragraph 21; iii) In arriving at the true meaning and effect of a contract, the departure point in most cases will be the language used by the parties because (a) the parties have control over the language they use in a contract; and (b) the parties must have been specifically focussing on the issue covered by the disputed clause or clauses when agreeing the wording of that provision – see Arnold v Britton …per Lord Neuberger PSC at paragraph 17; iv) Where the parties have used unambiguous language, the court must apply it – see Rainy Sky SA v. Kookmin Bank … per Lord Clarke JSC at paragraph 23; v) Where the language used by the parties is unclear the court can properly depart from its natural meaning where the context suggests that an alternative meaning more accurately reflects what a reasonable person with the parties' actual and presumed knowledge would conclude the parties had meant by the language they used but that does not justify the court searching for drafting infelicities in order to facilitate a departure from the natural meaning of the language used – see Arnold v. Britton … per Lord Neuberger PSC at paragraph 18; vi) If there are two possible constructions, the court is entitled to prefer the construction which is consistent with business common sense and to reject the other – see Rainy Sky SA v. Kookmin Bank …per Lord Clarke JSC at paragraph 21 - but commercial common sense is relevant only to the extent of how matters would have been perceived by reasonable people in the position of the parties, as at the date that the contract was made – see Arnold v. Britton …per Lord Neuberger PSC at paragraph 19; vii) In striking a balance between the indications given by the language and those arising contextually, the court must consider the quality of drafting of the clause and the agreement in which it appears – see Wood v. Capita Insurance Services Limited … per Lord Hodge JSC at paragraph 11. Sophisticated, complex agreements drafted by skilled professionals are likely to be interpreted principally by textual analysis unless a provision lacks clarity or is apparently illogical or incoherent–see Wood v. Capita Insurance Services Limited …per Lord Hodge JSC at paragraph 13…; and viii) A court should not reject the natural meaning of a provision as correct simply because it appears to be a very imprudent term for one of the parties to have agreed, even ignoring the benefit of wisdom of hindsight, because it is not the function of a court when interpreting an agreement to relieve a party from a bad bargain - see Arnold v. Britton …per Lord Neuberger PSC at paragraph 20 and Wood v. Capita Insurance Services Limited …per Lord Hodge JSC at paragraph 11.”
“I believe that if a topographical survey were undertaken today there would be significantly more than 4,265 cubic metres of what remains on Mound 2 to remove to ground level”
“Calculated to a base model of the existing ground base Fill volume: 1220m 3”
“…The civil standard of proof always means more likely than not. The only higher degree of probability required by the law is the criminal standard. But, as Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead explained in In re H (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof)[1996] AC 563 , 586 , some things are inherently more likely than others. It would need more cogent evidence to satisfy one that the creature seen walking in Regent's Park was more likely than not to have been a lioness than to be satisfied to the same standard of probability that it was an Alsatian. On this basis, cogent evidence is generally required to satisfy a civil tribunal that a person has been fraudulent or behaved in some other reprehensible manner. But the question is always whether the tribunal thinks it more probable than not.”