“It is the claimant’s case that there is a careful and reliable description of the circumstances in which it is wholly likely that there was exposure to asbestos dust and fibre over a period of many years (from 1964/65 to 1972) throughout most of which period (from 1965 onwards) it was or ought to have been known that there was no safe level of exposure and that the risk was one of death and where the precautions to avoid that exposure were simple and inexpensive, so that there is a clear breach of the duties (at common law and under the first limb ofsection 63(1) Factories Act 1961 concerning dust that is “likely to be injurious”) requiring foresight of harm. Furthermore, it is the claimant’s case that each of the release of dust from friable lagging, the raising of visible dust that had collected on the floor and the production of “a cloud of dust” when lagging dust was knocked off clothes amounted to “any substantial quantity of dust of any kind” within the meaning of the second limb ofs.63(1) Factories Act 1961 . The defendant has not pleaded and cannot prove [any or] “all practical measures [were] taken to protect the persons employed against the inhalation of the dust” such that there is a clear breach of that statutory duty (not requiring foresight of harm)”