“18 …in my view, a satisfactory reason for not raising a new allegation by the time of the CMC does not exonerate a party from raising it promptly, as soon as that can reasonably be done, and indeed making an application to amend shortly thereafter. The reason given by the defendants as to why the allegation of non-use was not raised shortly after1st March 2024 , and indeed not until seven months later, on2nd October 2024 , is that it would have been inappropriate to derail without prejudice negotiations, and mediation, which happened in that period. I do not accept that as a good reason. The point could have been raised in a manner emphasising that the defendants had no intention of antagonising relations between the parties, but that, in fairness, they were obliged to raise the allegation of non-use promptly, and that is why it was being done. The parties could, thereafter, have discussed and resolved whether a formal application should be made at that stage, or better left until after resolution of negotiations in the mediation. However, this is not the most serious difficulty facing the defendants’ application.”
“21. I am also not convinced that allowing the amendment would satisfy the cost/benefit test that applies in this court. There is nothing to stop the defendants from starting a new action for revocation of the [Wise Logo] Mark for non-use. In due course this court may or may not be sympathetic to an application for an expedited trial. At the conclusion of the trial in May, it may turn out that the allegation of non-use is of no practical benefit to the defendants. The [Wise Logo] Mark may be revoked. Alternatively, it may not be infringed. Alternatively, there may be a finding that there is to be an injunction for infringement of the Second Mark so that revocation of the [Wise Logo] Mark would not, in practice, make any difference to the ability of the defendants to trade. There may be other permutations I have not thought of, which would, in practice, make the allegation of non-use of the [Wise Logo] Mark of no real practical benefit to the defendants. 22. On the other hand, if, after the trial in May, the issue of non-use of the [Wise Logo] Mark could be of practical effect, the defendants would be entitled to apply to the court for a stay of any injunction and/or other relief sought, and, given all the circumstances including the findings in the judgment, the trial judge may or may not think that a stay is appropriate. Of course, I am not suggesting now one way or the other whether it would be appropriate, only that the potential benefit to the defendants of adding the allegation of non-use at this stage could turn out to be non-existent, and, even if that is not the case, it may be limited.”
“35. … Wise Payments now finds itself vexed not twice but thrice with a proliferation of proceedings brought by With Wise. It is Wise Payments’ position that the [2024 Proceedings are] an abuse of process and violates the rule in Henderson v Henderson. 36. First, the [2024 Proceedings] could have been raised far earlier. … 37. The bringing of the [2024 Proceedings] at this point in time is an abuse of process, causing unjust oppression to Wise Payments. The prejudice caused to Wise Payments by the [2024 Proceedings] can be seen by contrasting the possible outcomes with and without the [2024 Proceedings] in play.”
“24. As to Link UP Mitaka Limited trading as Thebigword v Language Empire Limited, Yasar Zaman[2018] EWHC 2728 (IPEC) , I accept the submission that this case draws a distinction between the "truly exceptional circumstances" required to lift the overall scale costs and mere "unreasonable conduct" which is sufficient to justify the lifting of the cap for one or more stages of the claim. 25. I have considered the summary of the case law on unreasonable conduct in relation to applications for the purposes ofCPR 63.26 (2) as summarized in paragraphs 9 – 059 – 9-061 of Fox, The Intellectual Property Enterprise Court: Practice and Procedure (3rd edition 2021). It is it seems to me possible to distil the following four points: a. The mere fact that an application fails is not in and of itself evidence that the applicant was unreasonable to bring it. b. The bringing of a truly groundless application may amount to unreasonable conduct. c. "Unreasonable conduct" under r.63.26(2) is not concerned with the behaviour or attitude of the parties generally, but rather with their behaviour in and towards the process of the court. d. Behaviour that only forms part of the general "cut and thrust" of litigation is unlikely to be regarded as unreasonable for the purposes of r.63.26(2).” a. The mere fact that an application fails is not in and of itself evidence that the applicant was unreasonable to bring it. b. The bringing of a truly groundless application may amount to unreasonable conduct. c. "Unreasonable conduct" under r.63.26(2) is not concerned with the behaviour or attitude of the parties generally, but rather with their behaviour in and towards the process of the court. d. Behaviour that only forms part of the general "cut and thrust" of litigation is unlikely to be regarded as unreasonable for the purposes of r.63.26(2).”