‘The registration holder is entitled to choose the level of generality at which his design is to be considered. If he chooses too general a level, his design may be invalidated by prior art. If he chooses too specific a level he may not be protected against similar designs.’
“[4] So this case is all about, and only about, Apple’s registered design and the Samsung products. The registered design is not the same as the design of the iPad. It is quite a lot different. For instance the iPad is a lot thinner, and has noticeably different curves on its sides. There may be other differences – even though I own one, I have not made a detailed comparison. Whether the iPad would fall within the scope of protection of the registered design is completely irrelevant. We are not deciding that one way or the other. This case must be decided as if the iPad never existed.”
“[181] I here adapt the four-stages prescribed by the General Court in H&M Hennes for assessing the individual character of a Community design to the comparison of an RCD with an accused design, adding other matters relevant to the present case. The court must: (1) Decide the sector to which the products in which the designs are intended to be incorporated or to which they are intended to be applied belong; (2) Identify the informed user and having done so decide (a) the degree of the informed user’s awareness of the prior art and (b) the level of attention paid by the informed user in the comparison, direct if possible, of the designs; (3) Decide the designer’s degree of freedom in developing his design; (4) Assess the outcome of the comparison between the RCD and the contested design, taking into account (a) the sector in question, (b) the designer’s degree of freedom, and (c) the overall impressions produced by the designs on the informed user, who will have in mind any earlier design which has been made available to the public. [182] To this I would add: (5) Features of the designs which are solely dictated by technical function are to be ignored in the comparison. (6) The informed user may in some cases discriminate between elements of the respective designs, attaching different degrees of importance to similarities or differences. This can depend on the practical significance of the relevant part of the product, the extent to which it would be seen in use, or on other matters.” (1) Decide the sector to which the products in which the designs are intended to be incorporated or to which they are intended to be applied belong; (2) Identify the informed user and having done so decide (a) the degree of the informed user’s awareness of the prior art and (b) the level of attention paid by the informed user in the comparison, direct if possible, of the designs; (3) Decide the designer’s degree of freedom in developing his design; (4) Assess the outcome of the comparison between the RCD and the contested design, taking into account (a) the sector in question, (b) the designer’s degree of freedom, and (c) the overall impressions produced by the designs on the informed user, who will have in mind any earlier design which has been made available to the public. (5) Features of the designs which are solely dictated by technical function are to be ignored in the comparison. (6) The informed user may in some cases discriminate between elements of the respective designs, attaching different degrees of importance to similarities or differences. This can depend on the practical significance of the relevant part of the product, the extent to which it would be seen in use, or on other matters.”
“[33] The designs are assessed from the perspective of the informed user. The identity and attributes of the informed user have been discussed by the Court of Justice of the European Union in PepsiCo Inc v Grupo Promer Mon-Graphic SA (C-281/10 P) [2012] F.S.R. 5 at paragraphs 53 to 59 and also in Grupo Promer v OHIM (T-9/07) [2010] E.C.D.R. 7, (in the General Court from which PepsiCo was an appeal) and in Shenzhen Taiden v OHIM (T-153/08), judgment of22 June 2010 . [34] Samsung submitted that the following summary characterises the informed user. I accept it and have added cross-references to the cases mentioned: He (or she) is a user of the product in which the design is intended to be incorporated, not a designer, technical expert, manufacturer or seller (PepsiCo paragraph 54 referring to Grupo Promer paragraph 62; Shenzhen paragraph 46). However, unlike the average consumer of trade mark law, he is particularly observant (PepsiCo paragraph 53); He has knowledge of the design corpus and of the design features normally included in the designs existing in the sector concerned (PepsiCo paragraph 59 and also paragraph 54 referring to Grupo Promer paragraph 62); He is interested in the products concerned and shows a relatively high degree of attention when he uses them (PepsiCo paragraph 59); He conducts a direct comparison of the designs in issue unless there are specific circumstances or the devices have certain characteristics which make it impractical or uncommon to do so (PepsiCo paragraph 55). [35] I would add that the informed user neither (a) merely perceives the designs as a whole and does not analyse details, nor (b) observes in detail minimal differences which may exist (PepsiCo paragraph 59).”
“[24] … I considered the designer's degree of freedom in Dyson Ltd v Vax Ltd[2010] EWHC 1923 (Pat) ,[2010] FSR 39 at [32]-[37], where I concluded that design freedom may be constrained by (i) the technical function of the product or an element thereof, (ii) the need to incorporate features common to such products and/or (iii) economic considerations. I also concluded that both a departure from the existing design corpus and the production of a wide variety of subsequent designs were evidence of design freedom. Apart from emphasising that the degree of freedom to be considered was that of the designer of the registered design, the Court of Appeal appears to have agreed with this:[2011] EWCA Civ 1206 ,[2012] FSR 4 at [18]-[20].”
“A right in a registered design shall not subsist in features of appearance of a product which are solely dictated by the product’s technical function.”
“[166] It has been held by what was then the OHIM Board of Appeal that art.8(1) of the Design Regulation deprives a feature of protection solely where the need to achieve the product’s technical function was the only relevant factor when the feature in question was selected to be part of the overall design. If aesthetic consideration played any part, art.8(1) does not bite. This is to be assessed objectively from the standpoint of a reasonable observer. See Lindner Recyclingtech GmbH v Franssons Verkstäder AB (R 690/2007-3) [2010] ECDR 1, at [28] to [36]. [167] Lindner was followed by Arnold J in Dyson Ltd v Vax Ltd[2010] EWHC 1923 (Pat) ;[2010] FSR 39 , at [31] and apparently also approved by the Court of Appeal in Samsung Electronics (UK) Ltd v Apple Inc[2012] EWCA Civ 1339 ;[2013] FSR 9 , at [31]. [168] Since art.8(1), where it applies, deprives a feature of design protection, I think that such features are to be ignored in the assessment of overall impression under art.10(1). This is to be contrasted with the approach to the related question of designer freedom under art.10(2). As discussed below, assessment of the latter is not binary, but more flexible, with greater or lesser weight being attached to similarities or differences in appearance, as may be appropriate.”
“[42] The parties were divided as to the correct date as at the overall impression of the allegedly infringing design should be compared with the overall impression of the registered design. [43] Counsel for Vax contended that the comparison should be made as at the date of the alleged infringement. He submitted that this followed from the fact that art.9(1) of the Designs Directive was expressed in the present tense and from the fact that design freedom could change over time. He accepted that this meant that the scope of protection of the registered design could change over time and could either diminish or increase, but argued that there was no reason why should this not be the case. He also submitted that, if art.9(1) were interpreted as requiring the comparison to be made as at the date of registration of the registered design, then there would be a conflict with art.5(1). [44] Counsel for Dyson contended that the comparison should be made as at the date of registration of the registered design for four reasons. First, he submitted that it was immaterial that art.9(1) was expressed in the present tense, since art.9(2) must be referring to the degree of freedom of the designer of the registered design which pointed to a comparison as at that date. Secondly, he pointed out that recital (13) referred to the existing design corpus, which must be the design corpus which existed at the date of registration, and that recital (13) had been treated in the authorities as relevant to infringement as well as validity. Thirdly, he submitted that otherwise the scope of protection could be eroded by subsequent designs which adopted the striking features of the registered design one by one. Fourthly, he submitted that the comparison with art.5(1) supported this conclusion, since if the scope of the monopoly could get broader over time a prior art design which was not close enough to invalidate the registered design under art.5(1) could later infringe it. [45] In my judgment the reasons given by counsel for Dyson for making the comparison as at the date of the registered design, and having regard to the existing design corpus as at that date, are convincing.”
“14. Registration of design where application for protection in convention country has been made. (1) An application for registration of a design or designs in respect of which protection has been applied for in a convention country may be made in accordance with the provisions of this Act by the person by whom the application for protection was made or his personal representative or assignee: Provided that no application shall be made by virtue of this section after the expiration of six months from the date of the application for protection in a convention country or, where more than one such application for protection has been made, from the date of the first application. (2) Where an application for registration of a design or designs is made by virtue of this section, the application shall be treated, for the purpose of determining whether (and to what extent) that or any other design is new or has individual character, as made on the date of the application for protection in the convention country or, if more than one such application was made, on the date of the first such application.”
“i) For the reasons I have given above, the test is ‘different’ not ‘clearly different.’ ii) The notional informed user is ‘fairly familiar’ with design issues, as discussed above. iii) Next is not a proposition of law but a statement about the way people (and thus the notional informed user) perceive things. It is simply that if a new design is markedly different from anything that has gone before, it is likely to have a greater overall visual impact than if it is ‘surrounded by kindred prior art.’ (Judge Fysh's pithy phrase in Woodhouse UK plc v Architectural Lighting Systems[2006] RPC 1 , para 58). It follows that the ‘overall impression’ created by such a design will be more significant and the room for differences which do not create a substantially different overall impression is greater. So protection for a striking novel product will be correspondingly greater than for a product which is incrementally different from the prior art, though different enough to have its own individual character and thus be validly registered. iv) On the other hand it does not follow, in a case of markedly new design (or indeed any design) that it is sufficient to ask ‘is the alleged infringement closer to the registered design or to the prior art’, if the former infringement, if the latter not. The tests remains ‘is the overall impression different?’ v) It is legitimate to compare the registered design and the alleged infringement with a reasonable degree of care. The court must ‘don the spectacles of the informed user’ to adapt the hackneyed but convenient metaphor of patent law. The possibility of imperfect recollection has a limited part to play in this exercise. vi) The court must identify the ‘overall impression’ of the registered design with care. True it is that it is difficult to put into language, and it is helpful to use pictures as part of the identification, but the exercise must be done. vii) In this exercise the level of generality to which the court must descend is important. Here, for instance, it would be too general to say that the overall impression of the registered design is ‘a canister fitted with a trigger spray device on the top.’ The appropriate level of generality is that which would be taken by the notional informed user. viii) The court should then do the same exercise for the alleged infringement. ix) Finally the court should ask whether the overall impression of each is different. This is almost the equivalent to asking whether they are the same – the difference is nuanced, probably, involving a question of onus and no more.”
“[170] Designs which are strikingly new in every way will be unusual. More often some features will be commonly found in the design corpus, others not. In such a case the correct approach is to give little or no weight to common features. In Grupo Promer Mon Graphic SA v OHIM (Case T-9/07 ) EU:T:2010:96; [2010] ECDR 7, the General Court said at [72]: ‘… in so far as similarities between the designs at issue relate to common features…, those similarities will have only minor importance in the overall impression produced by those designs on the informed user.’” ‘… in so far as similarities between the designs at issue relate to common features…, those similarities will have only minor importance in the overall impression produced by those designs on the informed user.’”
“2. A disclosure shall not be taken into consideration for the purpose of applying Articles 5 and 6 and if a design for which protection is claimed under a registered Community design has been made available to the public: (a) by the designer, his successor in title, … (b) during the 12-month period preceding the date of filing of the application or, if a priority is claimed, the date of priority.”
“[24] In relation, first, to the applicability of art.7(2) of Regulation 6/2002 to this case, it should be noted that the objective of that provision is to offer a creator or his successor in title the opportunity to market a design, for a period of 12 months, before having to proceed with the formalities of filing. [25] Thus, during that period, the creator or his successor in title may ascertain that the design concerned is a commercial success before incurring the costs relating to registration, without fear that the disclosure that takes place at that time may be successfully raised during any invalidity proceedings brought after the possible registration of the design concerned.”