“I look after the Ladieswear buying at Bruar and as such know all about your products. You are absolutely right in saying that it would be a good fit for our customers – and we are asked for it. You have done an amazing job building the brand and that is a great credit to you.”
“I am well aware of the strength of your brand and it would be silly of me not to try and look at how we may be able to work together.”
“I know it sounds like we are asking for it all but there will be there will also be benefits for you being stock [sic] at the House of Bruar. First and foremost is the brand exposure that we will give you is second to none and secondly the quantities that we will be able to achieve over time will be substantial – especially if we decide to include your brand in our mail order catalogue (of which we send out over 3,000,000 copies every year).”
“New riding boot (as Fairfax) in navy (dark blue) and tan (you were supposed to send me a swatch to choose the colour). We also want a sample of this boot in olive suede with dark brown oily leather. New over the knee boot (as Fairfax) in testa di moro.”
“213.- Design right. (1) Design right is a property right which subsists in accordance with this Part in an original design. (2) In this Part ‘design’ means the design of the shape or configuration (whether internal or external) of the whole or part of an article. … (4) A design is not ‘original’ for the purposes of this Part if it is commonplace in a qualifying country in the design field in question at the time of its creation; and ‘qualifying country’ has the meaning given in section 217(3) . … 226.- Primary infringement of design right (1) The owner of design right in a design has the exclusive right to reproduce the design for commercial purposes— (a) by making articles to that design, or (b) by making a design document recording the design for the purpose of enabling such articles to be made. (2) Reproduction of a design by making articles to the design means copying the design so as to produce articles exactly or substantially to that design, and references in this Part to making articles to a design shall be construed accordingly. (3) Design right is infringed by a person who without the licence of the design right owner does, or authorises another to do, anything which by virtue of this section is the exclusive right of the design right owner. (4) For the purposes of this section reproduction may be direct or indirect, and it is immaterial whether any intervening acts themselves infringe the design right.”
“87. Subsistence of UKUDR therefore requires: (i) that the design be “original”; (ii) that the designer or his/her employer is a “qualifying person”, or that articles made to the design were first marketed in a way which qualifies them for protection; (iii) that the design not be excluded from protection (“must fit, “must match” etc); (iv) that the design has been recorded in a design document or an article has been made to the design; and (v) that the term of the design has not expired. … 91. In addition to being original, to qualify for UKUDR, a design must also not be “commonplace in a qualifying country in the design field in question at the time of its creation”
“59. In Ocular Sciences Ltd v Aspect Vision Care Ltd (No.2) [1997] R.P.C. 289 Laddie J explained that the commonplace exclusion applies to ‘any design which is trite, trivial, common-or-garden, hackneyed or of the type which would excite no peculiar attention in those in the relevant art’. The analysis must be conducted by reference to material ‘shown to be current in the thinking of designers in the field at the time of creation of the designs’, per Jacob LJ in Lambretta Clothing Co Ltd v Teddy Smith (UK) Ltd[2004] EWCA Civ 886 ; [2005] R.P.C. 6 at [56]. 60. Following the amendment to s.213(2) , it is more difficult for the claimant to define the shape of a design at a higher level of abstraction than its physical manifestation in the relevant article. As explained by Arnold J in the Whitby case at [45], this makes it harder for the claimant to prove infringement, and also makes it harder for the defendant to prove that the design is commonplace. Nonetheless, the commonplace exclusion remains a useful crosscheck on the breadth of a claim to infringement—the more generalised the definition of the design relied upon, the more likely it is to encompass designs which would ‘excite no peculiar attention in those in the relevant art’.” 92. I was also referred to the useful summary of the task facing a defendant set out by HHJ Hacon in Action Storage Systems Ltd v G-Force Europe.Com Ltd[2016] EWHC 3151 (IPEC) ; [2017] F.S.R. 18 at [37]: “(1) A defendant alleging that a design is commonplace should plead the significant features of the design as he contends them to be, the prior art relied on in which those features are said to be found and the date from which each cited item of prior art was available to designers in the relevant design field. (2) Prior art which renders a design commonplace will not be obscure. The evidential burden rests on the defendant to show that it is not. (3) A design will be commonplace if it is shown to have been current in the thinking of designers in the field in question at the time of creation of the design, see Lambretta [2005] R.P.C. 6at [56]. Another way of looking at this is that a commonplace design will be one which is trite, trivial, common-or-garden, hackneyed or of the type which would excite no particular attention in those in the relevant design field, see Ocular Sciences Ltd v Aspect Vision Care Ltd (No.2) [1997] R.P.C. 289, at p.429, approved in Farmers Build Ltd (In Liquidation) v Carier Bulk Materials Handling Ltd [2000] E.C.D.R. 42; [1999] R.P.C. 461, at pp.477 and 479. A third way of characterising a commonplace design is that it will be ready to hand, not matter that has to be hunted for and found at the last minute, see Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Eurocell Building Plastics Ltd[2005] EWCA Civ 761 ; [2005] R.P.C. 36, at [60]. (4) The design field in question is that with which a notional designer of the article in issue is familiar, see Lambretta [2005] R.P.C. 6 at [45]. (5) A design made up of features which individually are commonplace is not necessarily itself commonplace. A new combination of run-of-the-mill features may not be commonplace. See Ocular Sciences [1997] R.P.C. 289 at p.429, approved by the Court of Appeal in Farmers Build [1999] R.P.C. 461 at p.476 and in Ultraframe[2005] EWCA Civ 761 at [64]. (6) If the designer of the accused article has expended sufficient skill and labour to make his design original (in the copyright sense) over a single piece of commonplace prior art, he is liable also to have succeeded in creating a design that is not rendered commonplace by that prior art.””
“The shorter life of the design right, the narrower scope of protection against copying and the prima facie protection given by it to designs of functional articles are indications that the reference to “commonplace” designs in section 213(4) should be interpreted narrowly rather than broadly. The fact is that very many designs of functional articles which fall within the definition of a “design” are likely to be “commonplace” if that term is construed broadly in the sense of “well known”.”
“51. … the denial of design right protection to commonplace designs does not mean that a design must be new to qualify for protection. A design which is new is fairly unlikely to be commonplace, but it is a mistake to conclude that, if a particular design has been used before and so is not new, therefore it is commonplace. It might be, but the conclusion does not necessarily follow. … 52. A consequence of the point made in the previous paragraph is that a design should not be denied design right protection merely because the defendant, in researching what is often referred to as the “prior art”, discovers an obscure article which is fairly similar to the design in which design right is claimed. That would not be enough to make the claimant's design commonplace.”
“53. In contrast to copyright, it is not an infringement of a UK unregistered design to reproduce ‘a substantial part’ of a design. The importance of this distinction may be illustrated by the facts of the present case. Apart from the features which Neptune has excluded, it relies upon the entirety of each of the articles of furniture which is said to embody the designs in issue, and does not rely upon parts or combinations of parts of such articles. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the differences as well as the similarities between Chichester and Shaker products. It will not be enough to show that a particular feature or combination of features (which in a copyright claim might constitute a substantial part) has been copied. Nor will it be enough to show that Neptune’s key features have been copied, since those features, whether alone or in combination, have not been pleaded as a design right.”
“(1) A design shall be protected by a right in a registered design to the extent that the design is new and has individual character. (2) For the purposes of subsection (1) above, a design is new if no identical design or no design whose features differ only in immaterial details has been made available to the public before the relevant date. (3) For the purposes of subsection (1) above, a design has individual character if the overall impression it produces on the informed user differs from the overall impression produced on such a user by any design which has been made available to the public before the relevant date.”
“Right given by registration. (1) The registration of a design under this Act gives the registered proprietor the exclusive right to use the design and any design which does not produce on the informed user a different overall impression. … (3) In determining for the purposes of subsection (1) above whether a design produces a different overall impression on the informed user, the degree of freedom of the author in creating his design shall be taken into consideration.”
"169. A registered Community design ("
“(i) He (or she) is a user of the product in which the design is intended to be incorporated, not a designer, technical expert, manufacturer or seller ( PepsiCo paragraph 54 referring to Grupo Promer EU:T:2010:96 paragraph 62; Shenzhen EU:T:2010:248 paragraph 46); (ii) However, unlike the average consumer of trade mark law, he is particularly observant (PepsiCo paragraph 53); (iii) He has knowledge of the design corpus and of the design features normally included in the designs existing in the sector concerned (PepsiCo paragraph 59 and also paragraph 54 referring to Grupo Promer EU:T:2010:96 paragraph 62); (iv) He is interested in the products concerned and shows a relatively high degree of attention when he uses them (PepsiCo paragraph 59); (v) He conducts a direct comparison of the designs in issue unless there are specific circumstances or the devices have certain characteristics which make it impractical or uncommon to do so (PepsiCo paragraph 55). I would add that the informed user neither (a) merely perceives the designs as a whole and does not analyse details, nor (b) observes in detail minimal differences which may exist (PepsiCo paragraph 59).”
“We commissioned a prior design search from RWS, a well-known patent and design search agency. … which undertook a comprehensive search of registered designs databases and other relevant literature. In addition, members of my firm (including me) undertook comprehensive Internet searches directed to searching for designs of Spanish riding boots of the appropriate period. In so doing we were aware from discussions with our client that designs of the particular kind of Spanish riding boot in issue originated from a town called Valverde …”