“[0003] A commercial vehicle is typically made up of three major components for description purposes, namely multi-component suspension assemblies, a chassis and a body. Each suspension assembly itself is made up of a number of suspension components such as axle housings, beams, springs, damping components and bearings. Under loading conditions, these suspension components will move relative to each other and also relative to the chassis or body.”
“112. It is the purpose of an inclinometer to generate a reference plane (internally within the device), be that vertical or horizontal, and then measure the degree of difference between that plane and the body to which the instrument is attached.”
“[0014] The system may include a reference device capable of measuring the angle of inclination of the vehicle chassis or body. A knowledge of the angle of inclination of the vehicle chassis or body may be used to adjust the value of the angles measured by the transducers to allow use of the system on ground that is not level (ie on an incline).”
“The spring damper assembly and struts which are components of the suspension assembly have bearings at each end allowing constrained movement of the hub.”
“[0013] The transducer may be a static device. The transducer is or incorporates an inclinometer or accelerometer. The transducer may be mountable close to a vehicle axle. The suspension component is a component of a rubber suspension assembly, a trailing arm-type suspension assembly, a leaf-spring suspension assembly or a coiled spring damper suspension assembly.”
“There are, we think, four steps which require to be taken in answering the jury question [as to obviousness]. The first is to identify the inventive concept embodied in the patent in suit. Thereafter, the court has to assume the mantle of the normally skilled but unimaginative addressee in the art at the priority date and to impute to him what was, at that date, common general knowledge in the art in question. The third step is to identify what, if any, differences exist between the matter cited as being “known or used” and the alleged invention. Finally, the court has to ask itself whether, viewed without any knowledge of the alleged invention, those differences constitute steps which would have been obvious to the skilled man or whether they require any degree of invention.”
“It is the ‘inventive concept’ of the claim in question which must be considered, not some generalised concept to be derived from the specification as a whole. Different claims can, and generally will, have different inventive concepts. The first stage of identification of the concept is likely to be a question of construction: what does the claim mean? It might be thought that there is no second stage – the concept is what the claim covers and that is that. But that is too wooden and not what courts applying Windsurfing stage one have done. It is too wooden because if one merely construes the claim one does not distinguish between portions which matter and portions which, although limitations on the ambit of the claim, do not. One is trying to identify the essence of the claim in this exercise.”
“[19] I would only add an extra word about step 2 – identifying the inventive concept. It originally comes from Oliver L.J.’s formulation of the approach in Windsurfing International Inc v Tabur Marine (Great Britain) Ltd [1985] R.P.C. 59 at 73. Strictly, the only thing that matters is what is claimed – as Lord Hoffmann said in Conor Medsystems Inc v Angiotech Pharmaceuticals Inc[2008] UKHL 49 ; [2008] R.P.C. 28 at [19]: “The patentee is entitled to have the question of obviousness determined by reference to his claim and not to some vague paraphrase based upon the extent of his disclosure in the description.” [20] The “inventive concept” can be a distraction or helpful. It is a distraction almost as soon as there is an argument as to what it is. It is helpful when the parties are agreed as to what it is. In this case, for instance, although the claim has a numerical limitation defining what is meant by “sustained release”, as a practical matter both sides proceeded on the basis that it was for a sustained release formulation of fluvastatin. [21] The first three steps merely orientate the tribunal properly. Step 4 is the key, statutory step.” “The patentee is entitled to have the question of obviousness determined by reference to his claim and not to some vague paraphrase based upon the extent of his disclosure in the description.”
“Preferably the accelerometer is arranged fixedly in relation to a hub of said vehicle and the change in camber and/or caster is detected.”
“[56] Mr Hobbs submitted that when considering obviousness the court was not concerned with commercial considerations such as the perceived “mindset” in favour of the use of bags, only technical matters were relevant. To support that submission he referred us to the judgment of Slade L.J. in Hallen Co. v. Brabantia (U.K.) Ltd [1991] R.P.C. 195 at page 213 line 31: “If the plea of obviousness is to succeed, the court has to be satisfied that it would have appeared to the hypothetical technician, skilled in the art but lacking in inventive capacity, worthwhile to coat the helix of a self-pulling corkscrew with a friction-reducing material for purpose (a) or purpose (b) above or both of them. As cases such as Technograph and Beecham show, he is not to be expected to take steps or try processes which he would not regard as worthwhile. In using the word ‘worthwhile’, we mean worthwhile as a possible means of achieving or assisting in practice the objective which he has in view. This, we infer, was what the judge had in mind in saying that the word ‘obvious’ in section 3 is directed to whether or not an advance is ‘technically or practically obvious’. We do not think that the hypothetical technician must also be taken as applying his mind to the commercial consequences which might follow if the step or process in question were found in practice to achieve or assist the objective which he had in view. As Oliver L.J. said in the Windsurfing case, [1985] R.P.C. 59 at page 72, ‘What has to be determined is whether what is now claimed as inventive would have been obvious, not whether it would have appeared commercially worthwhile to exploit it’. We thus agree with the judge that the word ‘obvious’ in section 3 is not directed to whether an advance is ‘commercially obvious’. We do not think that he misdirected himself in the relevant passage of his judgment.”
“A Prejudice in favour of bags [156] In paragraphs 30–47, I have recorded my findings with regard to the hypothetical skilled addressee and the common general knowledge to be attributed to the addressee at the relevant time. I wish however to add this. Common general knowledge has both positive and negative aspects. I have so far considered under this topic, as is customary, only positive aspects of the knowledge with which the skilled addressee is to be imbued. In my view in certain cases (and I believe this to be one of them), negative aspects of knowledge must in approximation to reality, play their part. At the priority date of the patent, I believe that such as the “mindset” within the vacuum cleaner industry, no notional, right-thinking addressee would ever have considered the viability of purifying dirt-laden air from a vacuum cleaning operation, other than by means of using a bag or bag and final filter. For present purposes, the addressee is nonetheless deemed to have been presented with (in effect) three items of prior art wherein it is proposed to clean dirt-laden air by means not of bags but by cyclonic action alone. He is also assumed to take some interest in them however inimical the proposals may be to his likely way of thinking at the time. In terms of its impact on the issue of obviousness, I believe that this negative thinking which as Mr Kitchin suggested amounted to prejudice, would at least have caused the addressee to regard modification to any of these prior art proposals with considerable reserve if not overt scepticism. This likelihood must, I consider, be given due weight. In my view of the matter, I cannot think that any of the cited prior art would ex facie be likely to have lead the addressee at the relevant date with any enthusiasm to effect the often substantial changes which would bring these proposals within a claim of the patent: see para. 153. My view in this regard is bolstered (but not precipitated) by Mr Dyson's evidence of what actually happened when he tried to interest the industry in Dyson I.”
“When measuring the downloading of the vehicle during standstill the accelerometer has accuracy in the range around one g where a deviation of 1 mmmilli g is detectable”