A Local Authority v CD & Ors [2026] EWHC 980 (Fam)

This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court.[2026] EWHC 980 (Fam)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 31 March 2026
Before
MR JUSTICE PEEL
Between
A LOCAL AUTHORITYApplicantCD (the mother)RespondentsEF (the father)RespondentG (a child by her Children’s Guardian)Respondent
Katie Phillips KC and Eléonore Berthelsen (instructed by solicitors for Local Authority) for the ApplicantThe Respondent parents in person for in personJo Brown KC and Stephen Lue (instructed by the solicitor for child) for the Respondent childHearing Hearing date: 23 March 2026
Approved Judgment.............................MR JUSTICE PEELPeel J:

Introduction

[1]These are applications to determine whether the names and identities of various professionals should continue to be withheld from the parents in the context of ongoing public law care proceedings. Anonymity is sought on the basis that the parents, and an alternative ideological group of which they are members, pose a risk of serious psychological and physical harm to the relevant professionals.[2]The nature of the applications before me do not strictly fall within the definitions of Withholding Order, Reporting Restrictions Order or Anonymity Order set out at paragraph 2 of PMC v Cwm Taf Morgannwg University Health Board [2025] EWCA Civ 1126, which was concerned with the anonymisation of parties who could otherwise have been publicly identified. I shall, however, use the term “Withholding Order” which seems to me the most apposite description.[3]Whatever the terminology, they are highly unusual applications and there is little or no directly comparable jurisprudence.[4]The positions of the parties are as follows:a. The Guardian seeks to withhold from the parents the identity of themselves and the Children’s Solicitor.b. The Local Authority supports the Guardian’s application, and, in addition, seeks to withhold from the parents the identities of the Local Authority social work professionals involved in this case, specifically:(i) the allocated social worker,(ii) the team manager,(iii) the service manager, and(iv) operational staff and supporting professionals (including contact supervisors).c. The parents are not legally represented in these proceedings but have attended. In submissions, they concentrated more on the general situation and their wish for G to be returned to their care, rather than the specific issue in relation to the anonymity of the relevant professionals. They have made clear their general refusal to recognise the jurisdiction and authority of the state, including the courts and Local Authority. That said, they saw no reason why there should be anonymity, and submitted that they do not represent a threat.[5]For the sake of convenience, where I refer to “the relevant professionals” I am referring to those for whom anonymity is sought in these proceedings.[6]At an earlier, interim stage in these proceedings, Judd J ordered that the identities of counsel instructed on behalf of the Guardian and counsel instructed on behalf of the local authority be withheld. At the hearing before me, I was not invited to maintain the anonymity of those legal professionals.[7]The hearing in relation to this application took place remotely and was conducted on submissions only.[8]Present at the hearing was an associate of the parents, who had been given the link by the parents and joined. I agreed he could remain on the link as a McKenzie friend. I explained to him, and to the parents, that any dissemination of information discussed or provided within the proceedings might constitute contempt of court.[9]Finally, I observe that the parents sent a number of sets of documents in hard copy by post to the Royal Courts of Justice for the attention of judges who have had involvement in the case. These documents are lengthy and phrased in quantum grammar.

Background facts

[10]The background facts can be stated in relatively brief terms for the purposes of this application.[11]The broader care proceedings relate to an eleven year old girl, G. Her parents have links to a group known as the Federal Postal Court/the Court of the People. The father is an appointed Sheriff and Coroner of the group. The group follow an alternative belief system which rejects the authority of the UK Government and the British legal system. The parents and the group as a whole reject the authority of the state, including the courts and local authorities. They view public bodies, including child protection services in particular, as a guise for child trafficking and abduction. The ideology purports to confer legal powers on its members. Four members, including the father, attempted to kidnap a Coroner in 2023. In 2024, the father was sentenced to imprisonment for 30 months for conspiracy to kidnap and conspiracy to falsely imprison the Coroner. He was released on licence on 17 October 2025. Licence conditions include not to attend court buildings without prior approval. The attempted kidnap event involved significant planning and preparation. Threats had previously been directed at the Coroner, made by way of “judicial notices” issued by the group. Similar “judicial notices” have been sent to the local authority during these proceedings.[12]Concerns were raised regarding the welfare of G prior to the kidnapping attempt in April 2023. A was the subject of a referral from her primary school in March 2020. A further referral was made by her school in January 2022 in relation to various matters, including concerns about the parents’ presentation and the removal of G from the school to home educate her. No subsequent actions were taken by the local authority following those referrals. In January 2023 a referral was made by Elective Home Education (“EHE”) due to concerns that G was not being educated in accordance with the curriculum. The mother had informed EHE that she was teaching G quantum language and following the theories of the late Daniel Wynn Miller, a conspiracy theorist and part of the sovereign citizen movement . The assessment was closed prior to completion as the parents did not engage. In January 2024, the parents declined the offer of a place for G at a new primary school. Consequently, G was referred to the Child Missing from Education Monitoring and Enforcement team, and a School Attendance Order was made. Following two social work visits to the home, a strategy meeting was held in April 2024 and a section 47 assessment was completed in May 2024. Thereafter, G was the subject of a child protection plan.[13]Care proceedings were issued on 19 June 2025. The interim threshold relied on by the Local Authority included risk of emotional harm as a result of G’s absence from formal education, the parents’ ideological beliefs, the father’s 2024 conviction, the parents’ refusal to engage with the Local Authority and threatening communications sent by the parents to the Local Authority. An interim care order was made on 14 July 2025, and G was placed in foster care where she has remained. The parents have had no contact with G since her removal. They have not accepted the Local Authority’s invitations to engage on the matter of contact. Nor have they engaged with the proceedings, including participating in the parental assessment process. The parents are entitled to public funding. They have, however, declined to access legal representation in this way, and have appeared in person.[14]Since July 2025, a notable volume of correspondence has been received by the Local Authority from the parents in connection with these proceedings. Although some documents have been issued in the father’s name, the majority appear to have come from the mother. These documents adopt a pseudo-legal style, and make allegations of various criminal offences including kidnapping and child trafficking. The documents routinely identify specific individuals including the allocated social worker and legal representatives.

Withholding orders made in these proceedings

[15]On 14 July 2025, the parents did not attend a court hearing in the public law proceedings and were not represented. At that hearing, counsel for the Local Authority, the solicitor for the child and the Guardian sought an order withholding various identities from the parents anonymity order. By this stage, the case had been transferred to a second Guardian and a second solicitor due to concerns about risks posed by the group to which the parents belong. The order made by HHJ Atkinson did not include a formal Withholding Order, but a recital set out that the lawyers acting for the Guardian and Local Authority should be referred to as counsel and solicitor only.[16]At the next hearing on 6 August 2025, the father did not attend from prison remotely. The mother attended accompanied by a large group of people seeking entry to the court. A new Guardian had been appointed, the third in the case. The Guardian sought anonymity within the proceedings, as did the solicitor for the child. No formal application had been made. A Withholding Order was made by HHJ Atkinson, withholding from the parents the names and details of the advocate for the Local Authority, the solicitor for the child and the children’s Guardian.[17]A further court hearing took place on 11 September 2025 (by when a formal application had been issued by the Guardian); the father attended remotely, and the mother did not attend. The Guardian and solicitor for the child sought a Withholding Order. Counsel for the Local Authority sought the same for themself, but no application was made on behalf of the social worker and team manager as their identities were already known to the group. HHJ Atkinson transferred the issue of the Withholding Order to High Court Judge level. In the interim, HHJ Atkinson ordered that the names, addresses and contact details of the Children’s Guardian, solicitor for the child and advocate for the local authority should not be disclosed to the parents. The order permitted the Guardian, social worker and team manager to attend all hearings remotely with their camera switched off.[18]On 13 January 2026, a hearing took place before Judd J. The parents attended the hearing remotely. The case was not fully ready to be heard. The court listed a further hearing to determine the anonymity issues before, as it turned out, me. In the interim, a Withholding Order was made to the effect that the names, addresses and contact details of Cafcass staff, social workers and legal professionals involved were not be disclosed to the parents.[19]The applications before me seek the continuation of the Withholding Order in respect of the identities of the social workers, the Guardian and solicitor for the child.

Evidence relevant to this application

[20]Goss J made the following comments in relation to the father in his sentencing remarks on 28 October 2024:
“There are clearly some good sides to your character. However, you were and apparently remain fully committed to furthering the unlawful ends of Mark Kishon Christopher. In your evidence you claimed he had saved your life. You take limited or no responsibility for your actions, have no appreciation of the impact of your offences and felt completely justified offending as you did, though in your address in mitigation you have apologised for causing your victims to feel as they did and do. You have no insight and there is said to be a high likelihood of you committing further offences. I take appropriate account of your lack of relevant recent previous convictions and your personal circumstances.”
[21]An Offender Assessment System (OASys) report on the father was prepared by the Probation Service in August 2025. This was prepared to evaluate the risks associated with the father during probation and described the general ideology of the group and of the father: “[The father] explained that he went to [the] Coroners Court on that day to carry out a warrant and he has authority as he works under the London shield and the UK shield. He states that this warrant was issued by Mr Christopher to close the court as they were practising Necromancy (which is the magic of communicating with the dead for hidden knowledge) which they consider to be a crime. When I asked where the evidence is, he was unable to give me a definitive answer, but kept referring me back to the USB stick he had given me, saying that everything I need is on that stick. [The father] said that part of their job is to send out judicial notices to a variety of addresses and it is their choice if they act upon the information they provide. These addressees, of which there are many, include members of the royal family, judges, the navy, MI5, MI6, head's of government departments in the UK as well as the Chief Rabbi of Israel, President of India, Iraq, Palestine and Qatar to name a few. Of those on the addressee list was also [the Coroner] and [the father] informed me that letters had been sent to him previously explaining their intention. He further explained that when we are born the placenta from the birth is weighed and the weight in gold is put into an account that is secret which we are not aware of. [The father] states that the word children means 'purchase birth' and therefore we are sold at birth via our birth certificate and this is an agreement for us to be a shipping product. He states that the birth certificate number is the bond where the money is kept and we are actually 'berthed, not birthed' hence the shipping reference. He then stated that after 7 years from the date your birth certificate is produced, you are classed as dead and 'lost at sea' and the state is the beneficiary and takes the money. He made references to the fact that coroners can sign death certificates for 'bodies lost at sea'. He had produced a significant document around necromancy that he had produced himself, largely with quotes from Wikipedia and Google searches. Therefore they needed to close the court down for their part in this believed practise… He said that the day before they went to a similar building in Sheffield, but they were not able to get past the security and therefore they were not able to complete their duties”.[22]The report set out concerns regarding the father’s failure to recognise the impact of his criminal acts and his continued attachment to the ideology of the group: “There is also continued evidence of pro-criminal attitudes that are of concern as [the father] appears to continue to hold concerning beliefs and wishes to continue to carry on with such 'work' despite the fact that he has been found guilty of serious criminal charges. This is evidenced throughout the PSR and his attitude toward supervision, of which he is unwilling to engage in as he told me he believes he has not done anything wrong and by engaging with myself it would be a way of admitting he has. Therefore he does not accept any responsibility for his offending. It is also of note that on the SAQ in September 2024, [the father] stated "I have no problems, I am a living breathing human and will carry on with my work to stop child trafficking, I am a good person and have no problems"; this gives further rise for concern”.[23]The report identified that the father posed a high risk of harm towards the victim and staff working in public departments. The nature of the risk was described as emotional, psychological and physical harm. The report identified various factors which might increase the level of risk posed by the father, including a failure to engage with social services and the exposure of his daughter to the group’s ideology.[24]The Local Authority, which has provided a statement dated 30 January 2026, has been informed by the Probation Service that the father presents as compliant and polite. However, their view of his presentation was that it was superficial, veiling his persistent attachment to the ideology of the People’s Court. The Probation Service concluded that the father continues to hold grievances towards government authorities and institutions. Later, in correspondence with the Probation Officer in December 2025, the Local Authority was informed that the father had named a Local Authority professional and alleged that she had “made up lies” about him.[25]The mother has made one statement in these proceedings, in which she named multiple individuals including members of the social work team and judges involved in this case. Her statement was written both in standard English and quantum grammar, the language of the group. In response to the Local Authority’s interim threshold document for removal of the child, she asked:
“How has the judicial notice’s / book been harmful to my daughter?”
. She has sent multiple correspondence and pseudo-legal style notices alleging fraud, child trafficking and kidnap. She refers to herself as the captain of the child trafficking task force. The bundle of papers before me contains a screenshot of a TikTok which purports to invite the public to a court hearing on 27 February 2026 at 11 am and posting a Zoom link. The post cites G’s name and the case number for these proceedings, and refers to her being removed by “public servants of [the Local Authority’s] Children Service and Police”. The Local Authority recently received a letter from the mother dated 13 March 2026 which appears to suggest that a broadcast took place on social media on 27 February 2026 concerning G being in local authority care. The broadcast is characterised as some sort of court hearing by “the Arbitration court”, at which 3 “judges” and 22 “members of the Jury” were present, and at which it was ruled that “[G] is to be safely returned”. This is described as a default judgment, and the silence and non-participation of the persons who did not attend as “acquiescence”.[26]CAFCASS conducted a risk assessment dated 7 August 2025 following the appointment of the third Guardian in this case. That assessment identified high risks of(i) physical violence towards their staff members, and(ii) that the group or the parents would be able to obtain their home addresses. Numerous safeguards were put in place to protect the Guardian, including remote attendance at hearings with the camera off, and use of a pseudonym. The assessment noted:
“Professionals involved—particularly those named in court documents or in direct contact—may face risks including harassment, emotional distress, or breaches of confidentiality, due to the group’s history and potential for retaliatory or intrusive behaviour”
. The assessment also identified that the group or the parents may know the name of the child’s solicitor, as their name had been told to the child who might have passed it on.[27]The Assistant Director of CAFCASS has provided a statement dated 4 February 2026 setting out the degree and nature of the risks posed to the professionals in this case. He stated that CAFCASS is bound under the Health and Safety Act 1974 to ensure the provision of a safe and healthy workplace. He noted that the personal details of social workers and CAFCASS employees are easily sourced through the internet. He said that the risk assessment conducted by CAFCASS continued to identify a high degree of risk from the parents/the group towards the professionals involved in this case. He warned that should anonymity be lifted, CAFCASS may be unable to find a new Guardian to appoint.[28]The present Guardian has expressly stated that they will stand down if a Withholding Order is not made.[29]The Guardian and Local Authority jointly submit that if the social work professionals, Guardian and child’s solicitor are identified to the parents, confirmation of their identities may lead to conduct by the parents likely to cause harm. The parents may continue to send offensive communications to the Local Authority and/or to the Guardian and the child’s solicitor. The parents or the group may spread or publish misinformation regarding the relevant professionals. The parents or group may engage in stalking, harassment and intimidation of the social work team, Guardian or child’s solicitor. The social work team, Guardian and child’s solicitor may be subjected to attacks at the hands of the parents or the group. The social work team, Guardian and child’s solicitor would be at risk of reputational damage, psychological harm in the form of distress and anxiety, and physical harm.

The Law

[30]The principle of open justice is a fundamental pillar of the common law. Open justice requires that the administration of justice take place in public to ensure the impartiality and soundness of judicial decision-making, and thereby to engender the confidence and respect of the parties and the wider citizenry.[31]In Scott v. Scott [1913] AC 417, Lord Atkinson said: “[t]he hearing of a case in public may be, and often is, no doubt, painful, humiliating, or [a] deterrent both to parties and witnesses, and in many cases, especially those of a criminal nature, the details may be so indecent as to tend to injure public morals, but all this is tolerated and endured, because it is felt that in public trial is to be found, on the whole, the best security for the pure, impartial and efficient administration of justice, the best means for winning for it public confidence and respect”.[32]Baroness Hale in R (C) v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] UKSC 2described the principle in this way: “1. The principle of open justice is one of the most precious in our law. It is there to reassure the public and the parties that our courts are indeed doing justice according to law. In fact, there are two aspects to this principle. The first is that justice should be done in open court, so that the people interested in the case, the wider public and the media can know what is going on. The court should not hear and take into account evidence and arguments that they have not heard or seen. The second is that the names of the people whose cases are being decided, and others involved in the hearing, should be public knowledge.”.[33]Nevertheless, it is established law that the courts have the power to withhold the identities of parties or witnesses where it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so. In A v BBC [2014] UKSC 25, examples were explored in Lord Reed’s judgment: “39. Other cases may raise different considerations. In some cases, for example, anonymity may be necessary in view of risks to the safety of a party or a witness. The point can be illustrated by the case of A v Scottish Minsters 2008 SLT 412, where a prisoner serving a sentence for sexual offences was permitted to bring proceedings, challenging the notification requirements applicable to sexual offenders, without disclosing his identity publicly, because of the danger to his safety if the nature of his offending became known to his fellow prisoners. The same approach was followed when the case subsequently came before the Inner House. In other cases the health of a vulnerable person may be at risk. An example is the case of HM Advocate v M [2007] HCJ 2, 2007 SLT 462, where the court made a section 11 order to prevent the publication of the identity of a woman who was due to be the principal witness at the trial of a person charged with having recklessly infected her with HIV. There was evidence before the court that the woman’s mental health would be endangered if her identity became publicly known. There was also a risk that the woman would otherwise be unable to give evidence, in which event the prosecution could not proceed… These are only a few examples. 40. Some of these examples may arguably go beyond the categories envisaged in some of the older authorities. As Lord Loreburn observed however in Scott v Scott at p 446, it would be impossible to enumerate or anticipate all possible contingencies. Furthermore, in this area as in others the common law is capable of development. The application of the principle of open justice may change in response to changes in society and in the administration of justice…”.[34]Important, too, is the principle that the court has an overarching duty ensure the proper administration of justice. As was noted in Wolverhampton City Council v London Gypsies and Travellers & Ors [2023] UKSC 47 at para 18:
“…it is also relevant…to note that, as a court of inherent jurisdiction, the High Court possesses the power, and bears the responsibility, to act so as to maintain the rule of law.”
. Integral within that is the power to ensure the proper administration of justice.[35]In family proceedings, the principle of open justice applies subject to certain qualifications which seek to protect the privacy of children. Those qualifications are set out in statute and procedural rules.[36]Section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 states: “12 Publication of information relating to proceedings in private. (1)The publication of information relating to proceedings before any court sitting in private shall not of itself be contempt of court except in the following cases, that is to say— (a). where the proceedings—(i) relate to the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court with respect to minors;(ii) are brought under the Children Act 1989 or the Adoption and Children Act 2002; or(iii) otherwise relate wholly or mainly to the maintenance or upbringing of a minor; (b) where the proceedings are brought under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, or under any provision of the Mental Health Act 1983 authorising an application or reference to be made to the First-tier Tribunal, the Mental Health Review Tribunal for Wales or the county court; (c)…; (d)…; (e) where the court (having power to do so) expressly prohibits the publication of all information relating to the proceedings or of information of the description which is published. (2 )Without prejudice to the foregoing subsection, the publication of the text or a summary of the whole or part of an order made by a court sitting in private shall not of itself be contempt of court except where the court (having power to do so) expressly prohibits the publication. (3) In this section references to a court include references to a judge and to a tribunal and to any person exercising the functions of a court, a judge or a tribunal; and references to a court sitting in private include references to a court sitting in camera or in chambers. (4)Nothing in this section shall be construed as implying that any publication is punishable as contempt of court which would not be so punishable apart from this section (and in particular where the publication is not so punishable by reason of being authorised by rules of court)”.[37]Pursuant to rule 27.10 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 (“FPR”), all family proceedings ‘will be held in private’, except where the rules provide otherwise or where the court directs otherwise.[38]Section 97(2) of the Children Act 1989 protects the privacy of children involved in certain proceedings. Sub-section 2 provides as follows: “97 Privacy for children involved in certain proceedings (1)… (2) No person shall publish to the public at large or any section of the public any material which is intended, or likely, to identify—(a) any child as being involved in any proceedings before the High Court or the Family court in which any power under this Act or the Adoption and Children Act 2002 may be exercised by the court with respect to that or any other child; or(b) an address or school as being that of a child involved in any such proceedings.”. (a) any child as being involved in any proceedings before the High Court or the Family court in which any power under this Act or the Adoption and Children Act 2002 may be exercised by the court with respect to that or any other child; or (b) an address or school as being that of a child involved in any such proceedings.”.[39]The prohibition under s.97(2) ends once the proceedings have been concluded: Clayton v Clayton [2006] EWCA Civ 878, [2006] Fam 83.[40]These provisions provide for(i) family proceedings to take place in private,(ii) non-identification of the child and(iii) non-publication of information disclosed in the proceedings. The last of these has been relaxed by the Transparency Order provisions contained at PD12R of the Family Procedure Rules 2010.[41]None of these statutory or procedural provisions permit the withholding of the identities of relevant professional parties in children proceedings from parties, in this case the parents.[42]Nevertheless, it is clear, in my judgement, that such power exists, albeit it is to be found in the court’s inherent jurisdiction rather than in statute or rules. It is to be exercised sparingly, and only where the interests of justice so demand.[43]In Abbassi and another v Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust; Haastrup v King’s College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust [2025] UKSC 15 at paragraph 83 it was said that: “As was explained in Wolverhampton at paras 16-22 and 145-148, the court possesses an inherent and unlimited equitable power to grant injunctions, subject to any statutory constraints. That power is confirmed and restated in section 37(1) of the Senior Courts Act. It is possible, in particular, for injunctions to be granted against non-parties, and to be granted contra mundum, as was explained in the Wolverhampton case at paras 23-26. However, although the equitable jurisdiction is theoretically unlimited, the court exercises the power to grant an injunction in accordance with recognised principles and with any restrictions established by judicial precedent and rules of court.”.[44]One obvious example of the exercise of this power is the practice in serious medical treatment cases to anonymise the identities of clinicians and other treating staff until a short period after the conclusion of proceedings. In Abbassi it was noted at para 157 that “the fact that the internet is awash with harassment and vilification is no reason why anyone should be expected to put up with it, if it reaches a level which constitutes an interference with their legal rights”. Of course, that is different factually from the instant case; the issue here is not restrictions on publicising the names of professionals, but withholding their identities from the parents. But in my judgement, by analogy the power to do so must exist.[45]I am fortified in that view by the court’s willingness to protect professionals in these sensitive and difficult cases from online abuse which would cause distress and anxiety. Thus, for example, in X v Y and Z [2021] EWHC 2139 (Fam), MacDonald J granted injunctive orders to protect, inter alia, the Guardian and social workers from online vilification by the father.[46]PMC v Cwm Taf Morgannwg University Health Board [2025] EWCA Civ 1126 concerned the grant of Anonymisation Orders (“AOs”), Withholding Orders (“WOs”) and Reporting Restriction Orders (“RROs”) in clinical negligence cases brought by children and protected parties. Sir Geoffrey Vos MR said: “83. It is clear from Scott v Scott, A v BBC, Wolverhampton and Abbasi SC and other authorities that there is an inherent power in the court derived from the common law to derogate from the principle of open justice in civil or family court proceedings by making, within court proceedings, both a WO and an RRO, where such an order is strictly necessary in the interests of justice. 85. In A v BBC…at [40] Lord Reed acknowledged (by reference to Earl Loreburn in Scott v Scott at 446) that examples went beyond the categories envisaged in the older authorities…The court had to evaluate the purpose of the open justice principle, the potential value of the information in question in advancing that purpose and, conversely, any risk of harm which its disclosure may cause to an effective judicial process or to the legitimate interests of others. 88. There are clear indications in the authorities that the common law power to derogate from the open justice principle in the course of proceedings can be deployed to protect the interests of vulnerable parties. 91. The court must start from the position that very substantial weight must be accorded to open justice. The balance starts with a very clear presumption in favour of open justice unless and until that is displaced and outweighed by a sufficiently countervailing justification. 108. The starting point for the process that should be followed, accepting the guidance from Dartford, is to be found, I think in [38]-[41] of Lord Reed’s judgment in A v. BBC (see [46] above). In those passages, Lord Reed made the following important points about the process: i) First, the interests of justice are not confined to the court’s reaching a just decision on the issue in dispute between the parties. ii) Secondly, the administration of justice is a continuing process. iii) Thirdly, the court can, therefore, take steps in current proceedings in order to ensure that the interests of justice will not be defeated in the future. iv) Fourthly, anonymity may be necessary in view of the risks posed in the circumstances of the case. Those identified in the case law to date include:(i) risks to the safety of a party or a witness,(ii) risks to the health of a vulnerable person, and(iii) risks of a person suffering commercial ruin. AOs may also be made to protect a party to proceedings from the painful and humiliating disclosure of personal information about them where there was no public interest in its being publicised. Not all categories can be envisaged in advance. v) Fifthly, the application of the principle of open justice may change in response to changes in society and in the administration of justice. vi) Sixthly, the court has to carry out a fact-specific balancing exercise. Central to the court’s evaluation will be the purpose of the open justice principle, the potential value of the information in question in advancing that purpose and, conversely, any risk of harm which its disclosure may cause to the maintenance of an effective judicial process or to the legitimate interests of others.”.[47]In Tickle v Herefordshire County Council [2022] EWHC 1017, Lieven J determined an application for a Reporting Restriction Order which sought to restrict reporting on concluded care proceedings and anonymise the social workers involved in the case. In refusing the application for anonymity, Lieven J noted: “76. There is a separate issue about whether I should order that employees of HCC should not be named. The power under the inherent jurisdiction and the statutory restrictions in s12 AJA are entirely focused around the best interests of the children. However, with the exception of the application in respect of the current social worker, Mr Chisholm did not rest his application on potential harm to the children, but rather on more generalised harm to the interests of HCC and its ability to recruit and retain staff…78. However, the powers of the Court to order anonymisation in relation to professionals need to be exercised with considerable care. Social workers are employees of a public authority conducting a very important function that has enormous implications on the lives of others. As such, they necessarily carry some public accountability and the principles of open justice can only be departed from with considerable caution.79. This is not a situation where the type of vilification and harassment which was raised in Abbasi … is in issue. The social workers here are not being made subject to a campaign of harassment of the type in issue in Abbasi. Therefore any interference in the social workers Article 8 rights is certainly not of the level considered in that case, and is no different to any individual who may be commented upon or criticised in a public broadcast... For those reasons I do not conclude that there is a justification for anonymity sufficient to justify the interference with Article 10 rights.”.[48]The Court of Appeal in Tickle v BBC [2025] EWCA Civ 42 overturned the first instance judge’s decision to anonymise a number of judges who had presided over hearings in that particularly tragic case which had generated a great deal of publicity. At paragraph 47, the Master of the Rolls cited with approval the dicta of Nicklin J in Various Claimants v Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority [2021] EWHC 2020 QB: 47. “The Claimants have not put forward any credible and specific evidence that one or more Claimants is at particular risk of any such threat. The civil justice system and the principles of open justice cannot be calibrated upon the risk of irrational actions of a handful of people engaging in what would likely to amount to criminal behaviour. If it did, most litigation in this country would have to be conducted behind closed doors and under a cloak of almost total anonymity. As a democracy, we put our faith and confidence in our belief that people will abide by the law. We deal with those who do not, not be cowering in the shadows, but by taking action against them as and when required.”. Although these comments were made in respect of judges, the general proposition that there is a need for specific evidence of threat is surely equally applicable to professionals involved in any given case.[49]I reiterate that the applications before me are distinct from the general run of authorities cited above, as I am not concerned with publication of the relevant professionals’ identities, but rather disclosure of those identities within the proceedings themselves to the parents who are parties. The question raised by these applications is the extent to which anonymity for the relevant professionals, who have their own rights to privacy and protection from harm, would disproportionately interfere with the rights of the parents and the child to a fair trial.[50]Authorities concerning withholding of professionals’ identities from parents are almost non-existent, which perhaps is indicative of the rarity (perhaps uniqueness) of the application before me. The authority with the most factual similarity is that of Re W (Children) [2002] EWCA Civ 1626. There, the Court of Appeal allowed an appeal against findings made in care proceedings where a social worker had been granted anonymity (including from the parents) by the lower court for the purpose of giving evidence about a relevant incident which she had seen. At paragraph 13, Thorpe LJ held:
“As a generalisation, I think it must be recognised that social workers up and down the country, day in day out, are on the receiving end of threats of violence and sometimes of actual violence from adults who are engaged in bitterly contested public law cases at the end of which the parents face permanent separation from their children, at least during their childhood and adolescence. Social workers generally must regard this as a professional hazard. I have not myself ever had experience of a local authority seeking anonymity for a professional worker in these circumstances. I am unaware of any previous ruling to this effect. Obviously the court must exercise a discretion and it is quite impossible to set any useful bounds on the exercise of that discretion. Perhaps it is enough to say that cases in which the court will afford anonymity to a professional social work witness will be exceptional”
[emphasis added].[51]In Re L (Care: Assessment: Fair Trial) [2002] EWHC 1379 Munby J (as he then was) observed that the distinctly intrusive nature of care proceedings heightens the importance of transparency as a guarantor of procedural fairness. His observations articulate why transparency in the broadest sense, which includes parties knowing the identities of those people who are instrumental in the process, is critical to the integrity of the system:149. Too often in public law proceedings both the level of disclosure and the extent of a parent's involvement in the crucial phases of the out of court decision-making processes fall short not just of the well-established requirements of domestic law -just how consistently are the principles so clearly articulated by Cazalet J in Re C, by Wall J in Re CB and JB and by Charles J in Re R actually observed in practice? - but also of the standards which are now demanded by articles 6 and 8 of the Convention. The present case is in many ways an all too characteristic example of an all too frequent phenomenon. Not the least important of the many important messages which, as it seems to me, we all need to absorb from what Charles J has so clearly told us in Re R is the need for change in the prevailing culture - a culture of reluctant and all too often inadequate disclosure.150. The fairness which articles 6 and 8 guarantee to every parent - and also, of course, to every child - in public law proceedings imposes, as Charles J recognised, a heavy burden on local authorities. But it must never be forgotten that, with the State's abandonment of the right to impose capital sentences, orders of the kind which judges of this Division are typically invited to make in public law proceedings are amongst the most drastic that any judge in any jurisdiction is ever empowered to make. It is a terrible thing to say to any parent - particularly, perhaps, to a mother - that he or she is to lose their child for ever.151. The State, in the form of the local authority, assumes a heavy burden when it seeks to take a child into care. Part of that burden is the need, in the interests not merely of the parent but also of the child, for a transparent and transparently fair procedure at all stages of the process - by which I mean the process both in and out of court. If the watchword of the Family Division is indeed openness - and it is and must be - then documents must be made openly available and crucial meetings at which a family's future is being decided must be conducted openly and with the parents, if they wish, either present or represented. Otherwise there is unacceptable scope for unfairness and injustice, not just to the parents but also to the children…”.[52]Finally, a common thread running through the authorities is the requirement to engage with the human rights of those affected. The court is for the purposes of the European Convention on Human Rights a public authority which must therefore act compatibly with the Convention: s6(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998. In this application I have considered the rights of all parties by reference both to common law principles and their rights under the Convention. In relation to the competing convention rights of the various parties, I have had regard to the intense balancing test laid down by Lord Steyn in Re S (A Child) [2005] 1 AC 593. For the parents, this application principally engages the principle of procedural fairness and their right to a fair trial under Article 6. There is an intersection with the parents’ right to family life under Article 8 given that these are public law proceedings under which their daughter has been removed (at this stage on an interim basis) from their care. Insofar as anonymity of the relevant professionals prevents the parents from publishing the names of those professionals, it engages their right to freedom of expression under the Convention, albeit to a limited extent in that ordinarily such publication is not in any event permitted under s12 of the AJA 1960 and s97(2) of the Children Act 1989. For the relevant professionals, this application principally engages their rights to physical integrity under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, and their right to private life under Article 8. Finally, in relation to A, she has an obvious interest in the fairness and transparency of these proceedings. Her right to a fair trial may well require the anonymity of some or all of the relevant professionals, who are tasked with investigating and (in the case of the Guardian and solicitor for G) representing her interests to the court and who might, in the absence of a Withholding Order, decline to do so. On the other hand, her right to family life may require that these proceedings be as accessible as possible so that her parents can engage fully.

Practicalities

[53]Counsel for the Local Authority confirmed that if the Withholding Order is granted(i) the parents can communicate with the legal team (whose identities they know) in the usual way and(ii) they can communicate with social workers via a generic email address or the generic landline telephone. Any meetings would take place by telephone or remotely.[54]Counsel for the Gurdian confirmed that any communication with the Guardian and the child’s lawyer can take place by(i) generic email addresses and/or(ii) a telephone number which will be provided to the parents. Any meetings would take place by telephone or remotely.

Evaluation and analysis

[55]This is a highly unusual application. The parents’ Article 6 rights to a fair trial are potentially affected. They will not know the identities of those who are participating in proceedings about their daughter. That would ordinarily be a basic entitlement. That said, they are not engaging meaningfully in proceedings. They are not taking part in assessments. They have not engaged lawyers. They attend remotely but have made it clear that they do not accept the lawful authority of the court or any other public body. The fact that they are not actively engaging makes the role of the Guardian all the more important. A’s right to a fair trial would be compromised if the Guardian were to step down and/or if her solicitor were to be impacted by the parents’ conduct. She has a right to be heard and represented fully and effectively. Her rights under the relevant UN Convention would be interfered with if she is deprived of a voice. The role of the Guardian is of particular importance in care proceedings, and as Munby J pointed out, orders made in public law cases are among the most drastic that judges are asked to make.[56]The exercise must normally be accompanied by the greatest degree of transparency to satisfy the rights of the parents and the child to a fair and open process. Moreover, care proceedings involve an obvious interference with the parents’ Article 8 rights to family life which heightens the significance of rigorous standards of fairness and transparency in the court’s process. But notwithstanding those important safeguards, the court retains a discretion to balance those rights against the rights and interests of the other parties, most importantly the child, in these proceedings and it seems to me in this case that not to make a Withholding Order is likely to lead to the Guardian, and the child’s solicitor, ceasing to act on G’s behalf which would deprive her of a voice in the proceedings. Other professionals are also likely to decline to be involved, leading to lack of continuity and likely delays. Where a balance is to be found between the child’s rights to a fair trial, and the parents’, in my judgement those of the child should prevail: Yousef v Netherlands [2003] 1 FLR 210.[57]I am satisfied on the evidence which I have recounted above that the parents and their group represent a clear risk to the relevant professionals. They continue to subscribe to the ideology of the group; that is apparent from the papers and also from their submissions to me. I am not satisfied that they have changed their mindset since the attack on the Coroner at all, or at least sufficiently to lead me to the conclusion that any potential risk has now dissipated. The physical attack on the Coroner, malicious communications, the comments of Goss J, the reports by the Probation Service, the warped world view, and failure to appreciate the effect of their actions all build up a picture which satisfied me that the relevant professionals are at risk from the parents and/or the wider group. How immediate and serious is the risk is hard to tell. As time passes, and the final hearing in public law proceedings approaches, it is likely to become more severe and more imminent. Further, even if the risk of harm is relatively low, the magnitude of potential harm is very high, as demonstrated by the attack on the Coroner. Finally, in my judgement, I should consider the objective degree of risk to the relevant professionals, and the subjective perception of risk by them. In my view, objectively the risk of harm is made out on the evidence and subjectively the relevant professionals are entitled to feel afraid and alarmed at the prospect of being identified to the parents. Albeit in a different context, the Bench Book for Coroners, under the section “Anonymity applications” in respect of anonymising witnesses, states at paragraph 15 that “It is relevant for the court to consider the subjective fears of the person concerned, whatever the degree of objective justification” which seems to me to be similarly applicable to the application before me. The relevant professionals would be likely, in my judgement, to feel a high degree of risk, fear and alarm, if they were to be required to identify themselves to the parents while making enquiries and appearing in court proceedings which could also include being cross examined directly by the parents. I note in this context the victim statements of the Coroner and others caught up in the attack on the Coroner’s Court which set out vividly the impact on them, emotionally and psychologically, of the terrifying events of that day. The weight of the criminal law, the licence conditions on the father, and the ability of the court to make orders against the parents are not sufficient in this case to ensure their protection, and mitigate their natural alarm to a tolerable level. I have no confidence that these parents, who do not consider themselves bound by the law of the land, would abide by that law. These risks in my judgement are magnified by(i) the fact the child is in the care of the Local Authority and(ii) the parents appear to think, wrongly, that the child is in some way looked after by the Guardian as well. And I bear in mind that at its heart, this case concerns the welfare of a child who is the subject of care proceedings.[58]I turn to consider each relevant professional/group of professionals in turn.[59]The evidence suggests that the identity of the Guardian remains unknown to the parents and the group. The Guardian highlighted the close link between themselves and G, whereby they are required to visit G at her current address. On account of their role and frequent engagement with G, the Guardian is likely to be specifically identified by the parents/group as one of the principal wrongdoers in these proceedings. The parents’ ideology regards professionals such as the Guardian as child traffickers and kidnappers. Those views, taken alongside the evidence of the previous kidnapping offence, the continued offensive communications and the degree of risk as assessed by the Probation Service, lead me to conclude that removal of the Guardian’s anonymity would pose a risk of psychological and/or physical harm. Subjectively, the Guardian would be in fear of harm to their physical and mental wellbeing. I am not satisfied that these risks can be adequately mitigated by steps falling short of anonymisation. Measures such as screens in court, or online attendance with cameras off, would be of no effect if the parents are told the Guardian’s name. The ability to be, and feel safe, at home cannot be easily ensured if the name is identified. As indicated above, I am not confident that protective court orders, and the general laws of the land, would deter the parents. It is important for the Guardian to feel able to speak to the parents without fear of being harassed at home or in the community. In the light of the severity of the risks in this case, including the previous criminal conduct, I am not satisfied that any measures short of a Withholding Order would adequately protect the Guardian’s rights under Articles 2, 3 and 8. This Guardian is the third to be appointed in the case and the evidence is that they will resign if a Withholding Order is not made. That of itself is indicative of the subjective fears of the Guardians in this case. The withdrawal of the Guardian from these proceedings would be deeply antithetic to G’s interests. Children’s Guardians perform a vital role by capturing the experience of the child and conveying their views to the court, as well as by providing expert advice to the court on the best option for that individual child. If the parents do not engage, that role is all the more important. Should anonymity be lifted, there is a significant likelihood that CAFCASS would be unable to appoint a fourth Guardian and, even if one can be appointed, delay would ensue. It is clear to me that G’s rights under Article 6 would be compromised by such developments.[60]The Local Authority have asked for the social work team to remain anonymised in these proceedings. That group includes: any(i) allocated social worker,(ii) team manager, and(iii) service manager, and(iv) operational staff, and supporting professionals (including contact supervisors). The evidence suggests that the identity of the allocated social worker, and perhaps some of the social work team, may already be known by the parents, and therefore possibly also by the group. Notwithstanding the breadth of the category of professional sought by the Local Authority to be protected by a Withholding Order, and the possibility (but not certainty) that the parents are aware of some identities, I am satisfied that there is specific and compelling evidence regarding the risks to the social work professionals. The evidence shows that the People’s Court, and the parents in their communications, do not appear to distinguish between the various social work professionals. I accept that anyone involved in G’s care, acting under the Local Authority, is likely to be identified as a child trafficker/kidnapper or otherwise bad actor by the group and/or by the parents. I note the stream of offensive communications, the comments made by the father to the probation staff in relation to the social worker and the language used by the mother to describe the social work professionals as traffickers and abductors. If the allocated social worker, or any other member of Children’s Services engaged on this case, were to step down, it seems likely to me that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to appoint replacement staff, who would be likely to fear that they would be at significant risk. Further, as the final hearing approaches, the level of risk to the Children’s Services staff is likely to escalate. Those risks are objectively verifiable and subjectively understandable. The potential harms are the same as those I have identified in relation to the Guardian. Again, I am not satisfied that these risks could be adequately addressed by other security measures. Some measures have already been taken by the Local Authority in response to the offensive communications, but if anonymity were removed, those communications would likely be targeted more directly and individually at the relevant social work professionals, possibly through the internet or post to the home addresses. I conclude on a similar basis to that which applies to the Guardian that other physical and legal measures such as screens or injunctions would not suffice to protect the social work professionals from increased risks of harm and interference with their Articles 2, 3 and 8 rights following their identification in these proceedings. I accept that these risks are sufficiently serious to justify overriding the principle of open justice, and the interference with the parents’ Article 6 rights. A’s right to a fair trial, and to a safe and supportive family life, requires that the social work professionals are fully supported to conduct their work with confidence and security. In Re W (supra), Thorpe LJ held that anonymisation of a social worker would be “exceptional”. I am satisfied by all the evidence in this case that the exceptionality test is met. The parents, and the group of which they are members, have set out in very clear terms their suspicion towards and rejection of the authority of public servants working in child protection. In a different context, their ideology led them to attempt to kidnap and punish an individual whom they regarded as participating in the dark art of necromancy, having previously attempted to enter a different court in Sheffield and undertake the same task. Taking both the established and continuing attachment to those views, and the previous conduct in this case into account, it is clear that these proceedings require exceptional treatment to protect the social work team.[61]Finally, I have decided that the Withholding Order should be made in respect of the child’s solicitor. The risks which I have outlined above apply to them as well. It may be that at present the risks are lower, as the solicitor is at one remove from the parents compared to the Guardian who would be expected to attempt to be in contact with them. However, the solicitor is closely linked to the Guardian and as the case progresses is likely to come further into the warped parental orbit. Solicitors at what may be a small local firm are inevitably likely to feel more exposed and at risk than, say, the Local Authority legal team. I note that the first solicitor for the child withdrew for this very reason. And again, even if the risk is relatively low at present, the magnitude of risk is such that the Articles 2, 3 and 8 rights of the solicitor would be gravely affected. An associated risk would be the impact on the child’s Article 6 rights if her solicitor stands down. By contrast, I doubt that the parents’ Article 6 rights would be seriously impinged by not knowing the identity of the individual. Communication by a bespoke email account can take place and in any event they are in practice not engaging.

Conclusions

[62]A Withholding Order shall be made in respect of the anonymity of the Guardian, solicitor for the child and the social work professionals. In my judgement these orders should last until six months after conclusion of the proceedings in accordance with the guidance given in Abassi. Of course, an application can be made to extend and prior thereto applications can be made to vary/discharge.[63]The care proceedings will continue at the local family court. Directions shall be made, and an IRH must be fixed, but in my judgement the allocated judge should hear the case as a s9 judge so that she has the power to vary or discharge this order as appropriate. Further, I anticipate that attendance at court for future hearings will be informed by the Potentially Violent Person Protocol.[64]So there is no doubt at all, an order shall be made that nothing contained within these proceedings can be published or disseminated by the parents and the McKenzie Friend, nor can A be identified. This includes documents within the proceedings, and this judgment, unless and until it is released on the National Archives. This order does no more that replicate what is already provided for by s12 of the AJA 1960 and s97(2) of the Children Act 1989.[65]I will provide for this judgment to be published in anonymised form. I appreciate that the highly unusual facts increase the possibility of jigsaw identification, but I consider that the exceptional relief which I have granted should be explained transparently.