Mr and Mrs F v Nottinghamshire County Council & Ors [2026] EWHC 931 (Fam)

[2026] EWHC 931 (Fam)Case No NG26P00048
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION
AND IN THE FAMILY COURT SITTING AT NOTTINGHAM
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 22/04/2026
Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MCKENDRICK
Between
MR AND MRS FApplicantNOTTINGHAMSHIRE COUNTY COUNCILRespondentsTHE MOTHERRespondentTHE FATHERRespondentX AND Y (By their Guardian)Respondent
Nicholas Flatt of Sills and Betteridge LLP for ApplicantsJames Cleary instructed by Nottinghamshire County Council for first respondentJoanne Jarvis, Bhatia Best solicitors for second and third respondentsAnthony Finch instructed by Elliot Mather LLP for fourth and fifth respondentsHearing Hearing dates: 19, 23 January, 20 April 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 22 April 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MCKENDRICKThis judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court.

McKendrick J :

[1]These proceedings concern the welfare of X and Y (hereafter “the children”). The applicants are their current foster parents, anonymised in this judgment as Mr and Mrs F. The respondents to their application are: Nottinghamshire County Council (hereafter “NCC”); the mother; the father; and the children through their Guardian. The application is for an injunction pursuant to the Human Rights Act 1998 (hereafter “HRA”) to injunct NCC from removing the children from the care of the foster parents. It was issued pursuant to the High Court’s Inherent Jurisdiction. A child arrangements order application was also issued for the Children to live with them. No other initial relief was sought. Shortly thereafter Mr and Mrs F made an application with these proceedings for a special guardianship order. I initially heard this matter in the High Court sitting on circuit in Nottingham on 19 and 23 January 2026.[2]The children are the subject of care orders. The care orders were granted to NCC by a judge of the Family Court in 2022. They have been placed with the foster parents for over four years, since October 2021. All parties accepted that Article 8 ECHR right to respect for family life rights had been established through the long and meaningful relationship between the children and the foster parents. The children call Mrs and Mr F “mummy” and “daddy” respectively.[3]On 19 December 2025 reports were made to social workers employed by a neighbouring County Council that the foster mother’s birth son (Mr Z) had been historically sexually abused by Mr F. The ‘allegation’ was made through Mr Z’s partner to a social worker. It was said the foster father repeatedly sexually abused Mr Z when Mrs F was at work. The police and social workers sought to speak with Mr Z but he did not cooperate.[4]When the matter came before me on 19 January 2026, the careful directions made a little earlier by HH Rogers for evidence to be filed by a neighbouring local authority, had not been complied with and a Guardian and not yet been appointed. I therefore adjourned the matter to 23 January 2026 on the basis the parties complied with the safety plan in place. The safety plan prevents Mr F living at the family home and provides he may only have contact with the Children when supervised by the foster mother or two of their adult children (one of whom is a regulated professional). The plan provided for only a limited number of hours of contact each day.[5]At the hearing on 23 January 2026, the foster parents asked me to grant the injunction. This was opposed by NCC who sought for that application to be dismissed and for the children’s immediate removal from the foster parents’ home. The Guardian supported the children remaining in the home subject to the safety plan but sought more hours of supervised contact each day noting the children showed evidence of emotional distress. The birth parents supported the children remaining with the foster parents.[6]On balance I concluded the immediate removal of the Children was not required in circumstances where I received undertakings from Mr and Mrs F to comply with the safety plan. I made directions for further evidence. The court of its own motion directed third party disclosure orders to permit investigation of mobile phone communication and internet searches from the foster parents. I adjourned the application for the injunction to a further hearing on 18 February 2026. That hearing, however, was not effective because of delays with compliance with the directions for further evidence. Mr and Mrs F issued an application for a special guardianship order.[7]With clear evidence that Mr and Mrs F were adhering to the safety plan, the matter was adjourned for further consideration of the extent of NCC’s case against Mr and Mrs F to a remote hearing on 18 March 2026. Matters were regrettably further delayed to a further hearing on 20 April 2026. This delay is not the fault of NCC but of Cyfor, the technical expert company, directed to carry out the analysis of Mr and Mrs F’s devices.[8]My reasons for making these orders and directions and receiving undertakings was as follows:a. the allegations are of the utmost seriousness;b. the allegations must be the subject of a robust, detailed and prompt investigation by NCC;c. the Guardian’s welfare analysis on the emotional harm of immediate removal of the children is compelling;d. the parties have complied with the safety plan to date;e. the children remained with the foster mother since the allegations emerged over several weeks ago prior to an effective inter partes hearing;f. the court must balance different risks and harm: the certain emotional harm that would be caused by removal to live with alternative foster carers, as against the risk of harm caused by sexual abuse. The harm caused by sexual abuse is at the highest end but the court is not in a position to assess the likelihood of that harm at this stage;g. the evidence suggests the foster mother is a protective factor, NCC agreed with this proposition;h. the foster father was willing to reside out of the family home and comply with the safety plan;i. the court considers the risk assessment is difficult but the balance of harm dictates the status quo remains in place until fuller evidence in respect of the allegations is available.j. should the evidence in respect of the allegations evolve before the next hearing, NCC must consider what action to take and consider it in the light of the court’s observations below.[9]Given the seriousness of the allegations the court was not supportive of more than 3 hours contact between the children and the foster father on week days and 5 hours on weekends. The issue of more contact is left to NCC who can risk assess on the ground.[10]This position was largely agreed by all parties from January through to April 2026 and there has not, therefore, been any real need for a more detailed judgment. However, when reviewing counsels’ most helpful submissions in these proceedings, I was not always persuaded of their correctness. Much emphasis was placed on Court of Appeal authority in respect of the test for immediate removal when the court is considering an interim are order. It seemed, therefore, that notwithstanding the largely agreed backdrop, a short judgment surveying some of the legal issues to which these proceedings gives rise, may be helpful. What I say below is, however, obiter in circumstances where it is agreed the undertakings and safety plan obviate the need for determination of the application for an HRA injunction and the removal of the children from Mr and Mrs F’s home. Further clarity however may be helpful in respect of who the decision maker is in respect of removal of a child and what the appropriate test is.[11]The children are subject to care orders. As is well known this means NCC has parental responsibility for the children. It is shared with the Mother and the Father but NCC has the power to determine the extent of the Mother and Father’s parental responsibility, see Children Law and Practice, Hershman and McFarlane, Bloomsbury at paragraph F 583.[12]NCC has a duty to provide the Children with accommodation and care, see section 22 (6) Children Act 1989 (hereafter “CA89”). Section 22 C states inter alia: Ways in which looked after children are to be accommodated and maintained (1)This section applies where a local authority are looking after a child (“C”). (2)The local authority must make arrangements for C to live with a person who falls within subsection (3) (but subject to subsection (4)). (3)A person (“P”) falls within this subsection if— (a)P is a parent of C; (b)P is not a parent of C but has parental responsibility for C; or (c)in a case where C is in the care of the local authority and there was [F2a child arrangements order] in force with respect to C immediately before the care order was made, P was a person [F3named in the child arrangements order as a person with whom C was to live]. (4)Subsection (2) does not require the local authority to make arrangements of the kind mentioned in that subsection if doing so— (a)would not be consistent with C's welfare; or (b)would not be reasonably practicable. (5) If the local authority are unable to make arrangements under subsection (2), they must place C in the placement which is, in their opinion, the most appropriate placement available. (6)In subsection (5) “ placement ” means— (a)placement with an individual who is a relative, friend or other person connected with C and who is also a local authority foster parent; (b) placement with a local authority foster parent who does not fall within paragraph (a); (c)placement in a children's home in respect of which a person is registered under Part 2 of the Care Standards Act 2000 [or Part 1 of the Regulation and Inspection of Social Care (Wales) Act 2016]; or (d)subject to section 22D, placement in accordance with other arrangements which comply with any regulations made for the purposes of this section.”[13]This duty on the part of NCC is carried out further to the Care Planning Placement and Case Review (England) Regulations 2010 (hereafter “the 2010 Regulations”). The 2010 Regulations are a Statutory Instrument and therefore subordinate legislation. They were placed before Parliament by the then Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families on 25 March 2010 and came into force on 1 April 2011. The 2010 Regulations were approved by the negative resolution procedure. The 2010 Regulations are made pursuant to various sections of CA89, including section 22C (11) and Part 2 of Schedule of the CA89. By way of Regulation 3, they do not apply to any child who is looked after by a local authority and who has been placed for adoption under the ACA02.[14]It is clear pursuant to Regulation 2 of the 2010 Regulations that NCC is the “Responsible Authority” for the purposes of the Regulations as it holds a care order for the Children.[15]The Children are placed with Mr and Mrs F who are local authority foster parents, see paragraph 12F of Schedule of the CA89. Part 2 of Schedule 2 sets out further statutory detail on the local authority’s powers to accommodate children with foster carers. Mr and Mrs F do not exercise parental responsibility for the Children, see Children Law and Practice at paragraph F 681.[16]Regulation 14 (3) of the 2010 Regulations states (with emphasis added): Termination of placement by the responsible authority 14. —(1) Subject to paragraphs (3) and (5), the responsible authority may only terminate C's placement following a review of C's case in accordance with Part 6. (2) Subject to paragraphs (3) and (4), before terminating C's placement, the responsible authority must— (a)make other arrangements for C's accommodation, in accordance with section 22C, (b)inform the IRO, (c)so far as is reasonably practicable, give written notification of their intention to terminate the placement to— (i)all the persons to whom notification of the placement was given under regulation 13, (ii)the person with whom C is placed, (iii)where C is placed in the area of another local authority, that authority. (3) Where there is an immediate risk of significant harm to C, or to protect others from serious injury, the responsible authority must terminate C's placement, and in those circumstances— (a)paragraph (1) does not apply, and (b)they must comply with paragraph (2)(a) and (b) as soon as reasonably practicable. (4) If it is not reasonably practicable to notify any person in accordance with paragraph (2)(c), then the responsible authority must give written notification to that person, within ten working days of the date on which the placement is terminated, of the fact that the placement has been terminated. ……..[17]Mr Cleary on behalf of NCC and Mr Finch on behalf of the Children, most helpfully, refer me to Coventry City Council v PGO [2011] EWCA Civ 729; [2011] 2 FLR 936. In this case the Court of Appeal considered an application by a foster carer for an injunction to prevent a child in her care being removed (the foster carer wanted to be assessed to adopt the child). The main issue before the court is described at paragraph 1 (a) thus: When short-term foster parents suddenly give notice of intention to adopt their foster child and thus wish to prevent the local authority's imminent removal of him from their home into the home of prospective adopters pursuant to a placement order, does a county court judge have jurisdiction to make an injunction against the local authority's removal of him and, if so, what considerations inform the exercise of such jurisdiction?[18]It is important to note that in this case the foster cares (unlike these proceedings) had issued a notice of intention to adopt. Lord Wilson therefore set out the statutory scheme with reference to the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (hereafter “ACA02”) at paragraphs 23-24: 23. In the event, however, the matter is put beyond doubt by one of two sections of the Act of 2002 which in my view hold the key to the proper despatch of the substantive appeal. It is s.38 of the Act, to which the judge did not refer. It provides:
"(1) This section applies if the child's home is with local authority foster parents. … (4) If … (a) the child has had his home with the foster parents at all times during the period of one year ending with the removal, and (b) the foster parents have given notice of intention to adopt, the following persons may remove the child. (5) They are – … (c) a local authority … in the exercise of a power conferred by any enactment, other than section 20(8) of the [Children Act 1989]."
If a placement order has been made in favour of a local authority, their power to remove a child from the home of foster parents is conferred not by s.20(8) of the Act of 1989 but by the conjunction of s.3(1) of that Act and of s.25(2) of the Act of 2002. 24. Thus s.38 of the Act of 2002 expressly caters for the present situation: notwithstanding the service by foster parents of a notice of intention to adopt, the local authority retain their power to remove the child from their home, whether to the home of other foster parents or, in the event of their also having authority to place him for adoption, to the home of prospective adopters.”[19]Section 25 of the ACA02 is a reference to the fact the local authority retained parental responsibility notwithstanding placement with potential adopters.[20]Lord Wilson rejected the submission that the challenge to the removal decision should only be brought by way of an application for judicial review in the Administrative Court, see paragraph 28 of the judgment. He concluded it was possible to bring an injunction application in the County Court. However, it is important to note that he framed the application for an injunction, as an application for an injunction in aid of prospective proceedings. He sets this out with clarity art paragraph 32 with emphasis added:
“There is no reason in principle why a county court which has jurisdiction to make an injunction in restraint of placement pending the hearing of an application for leave to apply to revoke the placement order should lack jurisdiction to do so pending the hearing of an application for an adoption order. The only possible problem is temporal. An application for leave to apply to revoke can be made at any time and, if not already made at the time when the injunction is made, can be required to be made forthwith. The ability to make an application for an adoption order, by contrast, is subject to the requirement of prior notice set out in s.44(3) of the Act of 2002. In the present case the judge made the injunction almost ten weeks before the foster parents could make their application. Can the long-established jurisdiction to grant an injunction in aid of prospective proceedings extend to a delay of that length? In my view, for three reasons, the answer is yes. First, although the application for adoption orders could be made only on 22 May, the formal step preliminary thereto, mandated by statute, had been taken on 22 February 2011. Second, Rule 119 of the Rules of 2005, set out at [29] above, explained the jurisdiction, in the context of proceedings under the Act of 2002, as being only that the court may grant an injunction "before proceedings are started", provided only that "the matter is urgent" or that "it is otherwise desirable to do so in the interests of justice". Third, in that the foster parents would have been able on 22 February 2011 to invite the Administrative Court, even without notice, to make an injunction in restraint of Coventry's threatened placement of the children, it is but a small step to conclude that the county court in Coventry, to which is attached a specialist family judge such as Judge Bellamy, had an analogous jurisdiction even at that early stage – provided, of course, that the principles apt to the exercise of the jurisdiction were to be the same in both courts.”
[21]Lord Wilson went on to consider the legal basis for the application for the injunction was section 37, Senior Courts Act 1981 or section 69 of the County Courts Act 1984 (now superseded by section 31E (1) of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984). Lord Wilson (with the agreement of Lord Neuberger MR and Dame Janet Smith) held at paragraphs 36 and 37:
‘It is the submission of Mr MacDonald that the criteria which the judge should have applied to his clients’ application for an injunction are those set out in the decision of the House of Lords in American Cyanamid Co v EthiconLtd [1975] AC 396, [1975] 2 WLR 316; and that, had he done so, he would as he did, have made the injunction. In my view, however, the application, albeit able to be made to the county court as much as to the Administrative Court, represented a challenge of a public law character to the proposed exercise of Coventry’s powers and thus that its determination should allow for that important feature. Doubt as to the full application of the criteria in AmericanCyanamid to public law proceedings was swiftly raised by Lord Denning MR in Smith v Inner London Education Authority [1978] 1 All ER 411 at 418e. And in R v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex parte Monsanto plc [1999] QB 1161, [1999] 2 WLR 599 the Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division stated at 1172F and 608 respectively: ‘In our judgment, although American Cyanamid principles are to be applied in the present case, this must be in the context of the public law questions to which the judicial review proceedings give rise. Such proceedings are, generally speaking, intended to provide swift relief against abuse of executive power.’
Perhaps the nature of public law proceedings is too varied to have permitted any authoritative reformulation of the principles applicable to them. At all events I consider that, in determining whether to make the injunction, the judge should have posed to himself, and have sought to answer, an initial question as follows: (a) Is there a real prospect that the foster parents will establish that Coventry’s decision to remove the children from them notwithstanding that they now wish to adopt them is, by reference to public law principles, irrational, disproportionate otherwise unlawful or is otherwise in breach of their rights, or those of the adopters or, in this context overarchingly, of those of the children, under Art 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950? If the judge’s answer to question (a) had been negative, he should have refused to grant the injunction. But if, and only if, his answer to the question had been affirmative, he should have proceeded to address further questions which, without even purporting to be prescriptive, I suggest might have run along the following lines: (b) Have the foster parents brought the proceedings with reasonable promptness and, if not, how does their delay affect whether an injunction would now serve the interests of the children? (c) Although in form an application only for an interim injunction, might any injunction be likely to continue (or to be continued) for a substantial period of time and, if so, with what likely consequences? (d) Might any injunction jeopardise the candidacy of the proposed adopters? (e) But would the consequence of a refusal of an injunction be to disable the foster parents from applying to adopt the children? (f) Is the status quo in the present case that the children are living with the foster parents or is it that they are virtually at the end of an agreed programme of removal into the home of the adopters and so would an injunction therefore more properly be regarded as preserving, or as disrupting, the status quo? (g) Does the issue whether to grant the injunction affect any aspect of the welfare of the children not addressed by answers to the above questions?’[22]Counsels’ helpful written submissions also referred me to Re DE (Child under Care[23]Baker J set out a detailed consideration of the case law at paragraphs 28 to 33. He set out his conclusions at paragraph 34 to 36 (with emphasis added):
“To my mind, where a care order has been granted on the basis of a care plan providing that the child should remain at home, a local authority considering changing the plan and removing the child permanently from the family is obliged in law to follow the same approach. It must have regard to the fact that permanent placement outside the family is to be preferred only as a last resort where nothing else will do. Before making its decision, it must rigorously analyse all the realistic options, considering the arguments for and against each option. This is an essential process, not only as a matter of good practice, but also because the local authority will inevitably have to demonstrate its analysis in any court proceedings that follow the change of care plan, either on an application for the discharge of the care order or an application for placement order under the Adoption and Children Act 2002. This process of rigorous analysis of all realistic options should be an essential feature of all long-term planning for children. And, as indicated by Munby J in Re G, the local authority must fully involve the parents in its decision-making process. While this process is being carried out, the child should remain at home under the care order, unless his safety and welfare requires that he be removed immediately. This is the appropriate test when deciding whether the child should be removed under an interim care order, pending determination of an application under s.31 of the Children Act: Re L-A (Children) [2009] EWCA Civ 822. The same test should also apply when a local authority's decision to remove a child placed at home under a care order has led to an application by the parents to discharge the order and the court has to decide whether the child should be removed pending determination of the discharge application. As set out above, under s.33(4) of the 1989, the local authority may not exercise its powers under a care order to determine how a parent may exercise his or her parental responsibility for the child unless satisfied it is necessary to do so to safeguard or promote the child's welfare. For a local authority to remove a child in circumstances where its welfare did not require it would be manifestly unlawful and an unjustifiable interference with the family's Article 8 rights. In submissions before the district judge, and before this court, it was argued on behalf of the local authority that its removal of D from the family home was lawful simply by reason of the care order. That submission is fundamentally misconceived. The local authority's removal of the child would only be lawful if necessary to safeguard or promote his welfare. Any other removal, or threatened removal, of the child is prima facie unlawful and an interference of the Article 8 rights of the parents and child. In such circumstances, the parents are entitled to seek an injunction under s.8 of the HRA.”
[24]In Re BH (A Child: Human Rights Act: Injunction) [2017] EWFC 15 William Tyler KC, DHCJ, considered an application for an injunction under section 8 (1) of the HRA. The application was made by a great-aunt to prevent the removal of the child from her care who had been placed with her under a care order – pending consideration of her application to discharge the care order. The great-aunt had been refused authorisation as a foster carer.[25]Mr Tyler KC noted the learning of Baker J in DE. He noted at paragraphs 56 and 57 the distinction between the facts before Baker J in DE and the facts before him as follows:
“The facts of the case before Baker J in Re DE were that the threatened removal was to have been of a child from his natural parents (both of whom held parental responsibility for him), in whose care he had been placed pursuant to a care order, into foster care with carers who were (presumably) unknown to him. In those circumstances, as set out above, the learned judge was able to conclude that the removal, representing as it did an overt exercise of the local authority's qualified right to 'determine the extent to which a parent […] of the child […] may meet his parental responsibilities for him' (section 33(3), Children Act 1989), could be justified, and so lawful, only if satisfied that such action 'is necessary […] in order to safeguard or promote his welfare' (section 33(4), Children Act 1989). 'Any other removal', the learned judge concluded, 'is prima facie unlawful and an interference of the Article 8 rights of the parents and child'. The facts in the current case are different. The person from whose care the local authority threatens to remove the child, GA, is not a 'parent, guardian or special guardian' and does not hold parental responsibility for the child. Accordingly, absent explicit parental opposition, the local authority is not bound to crosscheck its decision against the requirement of s.33(4) of the Act.”
[26]At paragraph 60 Mr Tyler KC concluded:
“I can see no reason in logic or law to treat someone in the position of GA in any way differently to a parent. Perhaps more importantly, I can see no reason to treat a subject child differently depending simply on (a) whether the carer to whom s/he is securely attached (and with whom s/he undoubtedly has a ‘close personal relationship’ of ‘sufficient constancy and substance’ to warrant protection under ECHR) is a birth parent or some other family member, or (b) whether the application ultimately for adjudication is for the discharge of the care order directly (an application a parent is entitled to make) or its discharge indirectly (by virtue, for example, of a successful application, with leave, for a child arrangements order, as a non-holder of parental responsibility is required instead to make). It seems to me that, whether or not there is separately a requirement that a local authority justify its proposed action by reference to s.33(4), the removal of a child from a longstanding family carer is virtually certain to engage the Article 8 rights of both child and carer. Given that conclusion, nor can I see any reason to impose a less stringent test against which to judge a contemplated interim removal than that applicable in the case of removal from a parent.”
[27]Reference in the submissions was also made to the Administrative Court decision in R (Bewry) v. Norfolk County Council [2011] 1 FLR 945 where Holman J considered an application for judicial review of a decision to fail to consult a foster carer before a child was removed. This case pre-dated the 2010 Regulations. The child had been removed before the application for judicial review was issued and there was no question before the court of injunctive relief to restrain removal of the child. The Court held that whilst there was no general duty to consult a foster parent about the termination of a placement, that a foster carer may come within the definition in section 23 (3) (d) CA89. Holman J stated (paragraph 22): ‘…a foster parent, being a person, is someone who may, on the facts and in the circumstances of a particular case, fall within the para (d). In most cases, and certainly this case, the foster parent who has been, or is, currently actively involved in the life of a child is obviously somebody in relation to whom the local authority need at least to pause and consider whether he might be a person whose wishes and feelings the authority should consider to be relevant regarding the matter to be decided. That is not at all to say that in every, or any given, case the local authority should go on actually to consider that the foster parent’s wishes and feelings are relevant regarding the matter to be decided’.28. I have quoted the case law above because the test for removal of a child from his/her home remains relatively static irrespective if the removal is from birth parents or others or before or after a care order has been made, whether the carers do or do not have parental responsibility, subject to their being a relationship which gives rise to Article 8 ECHR protections. A care order, as can be seen above, does not provide a local authority the blanket right to remove a child unless his/her safety and welfare requires that s/he be removed immediately.29. Whilst I have set out this case in a little detail above, it is important to note that the test for the termination of a foster placement I am concerned with (and therefore the urgent removal of a child from foster carers) derives not from this case law but from Regulation 14 (3) of the 2010 Regulations, which, to repeat, states: “Where there is an immediate risk of significant harm to C, or to protect others from serious injury, the responsible authority must terminate C's placement.” There would appear to be little difference between this test and that as articulated in the case law which is a deep vein which runs through children public law. It is correct to interpret “terminate the placement” as meaning the same as “the removal of the child.” Termination of the placement requires the child to be accommodated elsewhere and therefore s/he must be removed. I am only concerned in this judgment with the termination of a foster placement. I note, however, the 2010 Regulations appear to cover other placements although, as I have noted above, do not include the category of children placed for adoption.30. Parliament, through Regulation 14, has set out the separate non-urgent route for termination of a placement. Importantly Parliament has determined that the decision maker to apply the test is the “responsible authority.” Parliament has determined that should the responsible authority conclude the urgent test of immediate risk of serious harm, the responsible authority is not under a discretion to terminate the placement, but rather Parliament has mandated it must act under its statutory duty and do so. Of course, in doing so, the responsible authority must act in accordance with the law and must not violate any relevant Article 8 ECHR rights in doing so.31. For my part, I do not read, Parliament to have stated that a responsible authority need apply to court to terminate a foster placement pursuant to Regulation 14 (3). Parliament has identified the test and the decision maker. Any such decision is of course subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts.32. That then leads to consideration of whether the appropriate route to injunct the exercise of the responsible authority’s duty to terminate the placement should be brought by way of an application for an injunction, pursuant to the HRA, or whether it should be brought by way of an application for judicial review, seeking an injunction as urgent interim relief. I have not heard full argument on this issue. It has not been necessary.33. Plainly an application can be made for a free standing injunction without an underlying cause of action, see Wolverhampton City Council v London Gypsies and Travellers [2024] AC 983 at paragraph 43. In any event an application pursuant to the HRA can be made for an injunction and just satisfaction including damages. Both applications would however require a properly pleaded case setting out the facts to justify the relief sought. 34. Applications for injunctions pursuant to the High Court’s Inherent Jurisdiction in the context of controlling a local authority’s exercise of their section 33 CA89 powers should be reviewed in accordance with administrative law principles, see MacDonald J in Rs S [2025] EWHC 2780 (Fam). A case in which the court was concerned with the rationality of the local authority’s exercise of his statutory power pursuant to section 33 CA89 to consent to the vaccination of an infant. MacDonald J held at paragraphs 26 and 28: “Viewed in this context, the issues arising for the court in determining the mother's application take on a distinctly public law flavour in circumstances where, in determining the merits of the order sought, the court is required to review the exercise by a local authority of a statutory power conferred on it by Parliament. I am satisfied therefore, that in determining whether to prevent the local authority from implementing the decision it has taken under the statutory power conferred on it by s.33 of the Children Act 1989, in this case to arrange the vaccination of P, the court has to consider that question in line with public law principles. …….. By parity of reasoning, and the court having already determined that it is in P's best interests for the local authority to share parental responsibility with the mother under an interim care order, which in turn confers on the local authority the statutory powers set out in s.33 of the 1989 Act, I am satisfied that before preventing the local authority from implementing the decision it has taken under the statutory power conferred on it by s.33, the court must be satisfied that the mother has demonstrated that the local authority's decision to arrange vaccinations for P is, by reference to public law principles, unreasonable, irrational or otherwise unlawful or is otherwise in breach of her rights, or those of P, under Art 8 of the ECHR.” 35. The application for an injunction in this case is a complex one. The injunction sought by Mr and Mrs F is a mandatory injunction. It is an administrative law order, injuncting NCC to continue to fund the foster care placement (and presumably the contract for remuneration) with Mr and Mrs F. It gives rise to important questions of resources. It is right to note that cross undertakings in damages may be appropriate (none were offered in these proceedings). This is an important distinction to be made compared with other placements and particularly children placed at home such as in DE (although there may now be fewer care order placements at home for well-known reasons). Not every HRA injunction application to prevent removal has the same factual framework and this must be carefully assessed by the court. 36. The application also gives rise to complex safeguarding questions and requires NCC to safeguard a placement in respect of which it has already determined meets the test for the imminent removal of the children. The court is being asked at an interim hearing, on the basis of limited evidence, to injunct a public body from complying with a duty imposed on it by Parliament. I repeat what is sought is a mandatory interim injunction. There is a strong public interest in not restraining public bodies from exercising the powers granted to them by Parliament. It does not seem to me that either the evidence or the ‘pleadings’ in this case came close to addressing these important constitutional issues. The too easy availability of HRA injunctions in the Family Court may not assist the court to address these important issues in a comprehensive manner. I also add for the avoidance of doubt the case law is clear the HRA injunctions do not need to be brought pursuant to the High Court’s Inherent Jurisdiction but can be determined in the Family Court. 37. There is much to be said for a challenge to a local authority’s decision to terminate a foster placement, pursuant to Regulation 14 (3) of the 2010 Regulations, being dealt with by way of judicial review. CPR Part 54 sets out clear rules and Chapters 16 and 17 of the Administrative Court Guide set out a thorough guide to very prompt decision making. The requirement of a statement of facts and grounds and summary grounds of resistance properly articulate the respective cases for the parties. The requirement for permission weeds out unnecessary cases early on. The very significant importance of the requirement for pre-action protocol correspondence can often satisfactorily deal with the issues, pre-issue and without the need and expense of litigation. The threat of costs following the event, in most cases, focuses minds. 38. There are also sound constitutional reasons for proceeding by way of an application for judicial review. Against the facts which give rise to this matter, Parliament has identified the decision maker, and by inference, set out the proper constitutional roles for the authority as the decision maker and the courts - through the exercise of their supervisory jurisdiction. The rule of law requires respect for this division of responsibilities. It is as important in family law as in other areas.

Conclusion

[39]Following detailed consideration of the evidence NCC determined not to seek findings of fact against Mr and Mrs F. The Children remained in the care of Mr and Mrs F and the safety plan came to an end. Mr Cleary filed a most helpful position statement setting out NCC’s case and reasoning. Prior to the hearing on 20 April 2026 the parties agreed further directions for the case to a final hearing to consider the special guardianship assessment. The matter was re-allocated to Circuit Judge level and proceeds in the Family Court at Nottingham, the application made pursuant to the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction being dismissed. It was not necessary to grant an injunction.

Order

Injunction under Human Rights Act 1998) [2014] EWFC 6; [2015] 1 FLR 1001. This is a decision of Baker J (as he then was) – sitting on appeal from the decision of a District Judge – in which he considered an application for an injunction under section 8 (1) of the HRA, to prevent the removal of a child from the care of their parents. The child was placed with the parents at their home under a care order, but the local authority subsequently sought to remove the child from their care.