GI v K [2026] EWHC 480 (Fam)

Case No FA-2025-000278[2026] EWHC 480 (Fam)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION
FAMILY APPEAL
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 23/01/2026
Before
THE HONORABLE MRS JUSTICE LIEVEN
Between
GIAppellantKRespondent
Justin Slater (instructed by Goodman Ray) for AppellantThe Respondent appeared in person for in personHearing Hearing dates: 12 December 2025
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 11.30am on 23 January 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail..............................THE HONORABLE MRS JUSTICE LIEVENThis judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.
[1]This is an appeal by GI, the Mother (M), against the decision of HHJ Ahmed (the Judge) made in an order dated 24 October 2025 after a hearing on 24-25 June and 31 July 2025. The Respondent is the Father (F). The Judge produced a judgment dated 18 August and a clarificatory email dated 5 September. The case concerns the parties’ daughter, B, now aged 4.[2]The M was represented before me by Mr Slater of counsel and the F appeared in person. At the hearing before the Judge the M was represented by Ms Traugott, who drafted the application and skeleton argument for appeal. The F was represented at that hearing by Ms Gillan.[3]The issue before the Judge was the living and shared care arrangements for B. The Judge held that B should continue to live with the F, with overnight contact with the M every second weekend and on Wednesdays from 4-7 pm. Holidays were to be shared.[4]The background to the matter was that the parents commenced a relationship in 2019. B was born in September 2021. The parents separated on 15 May 2024, after an incident when the M took an overdose in the bath. The F removed B from the house, apparently leaving the M in the bath, and without calling the emergency services. The M spent 24 hours in hospital and then went to live with the maternal grandmother in London. B has lived with the F in the family home since then.[5]The M applied for a Child Arrangements Order and Specific Issue Order on 24 May 2024. There was an urgent hearing where the order was that the M could have contact every Saturday and Sunday supervised by the maternal great-grandmother and have daily video contact.[6]At an urgent hearing on 25 June 2024 unsupervised direct contact with the M was ordered on a two week pattern from 10am on Saturday until 4pm on Sunday on week one and from 10am until 4pm on Saturday on week 2. Daily video calls continued.[7]The M made allegations of domestic abuse against the F. Those allegations included that there had been an incident of non-fatal strangulation in 2023, when the F assaulted her in front of the child. The M said that in May 2024 she had discovered that the F had a previous conviction for Grievous Bodily Harm (GBH) having stabbed a previous partner and received a prison sentence, when he was 17 years old, so many years before. He had not told the M of this conviction. On 15 May 2024 the F had accused the M of being unfaithful and refused to allow her to spend time with or hold the child. The M had called the police who attended and she told them she had been planning to leave the F, with the assistance of Women’s Aid. The police then told the F that the M had discovered about his previous conviction. After the police left the F became verbally aggressive towards the M and took the child from her. It was this incident that led to the M taking an overdose.[8]The M alleged that the F was coercively controlling and that this behaviour continued post separation, through his control over her seeing the child, or making decisions about the child. He would not share medical information or information from the school. She said that the F had obtained a new passport for the child without her agreement, falsely claiming that the old one was lost.[9]The F also made allegations of domestic abuse against the M.[10]On 7 January 2025 there was a hearing where disclosure was ordered from the police and hospital, and permission was given for cross examination at the final hearing on the domestic abuse allegations. Each party raised four allegations against the other.[11]The hearing of 24 and 25 June 2025 was listed as a “rolled-up” hearing to determine, inter alia, the M’s allegations of domestic abuse. I note that this would be more properly described as a “composite hearing”, dealing with facts and welfare. A rolled up hearing being one where permission (where required) and the substantive merits of the case are considered together.[12]On the first day of the hearing the Judge determined that the M would not be permitted to advance her allegations of domestic abuse. Ms Traugott strongly opposed this decision, and I believe that the Judge gave a ruling on this issue early in the hearing, but there is no transcript of that ruling.[13]An issue arose during the course of the hearing, because during that week B did not go to nursery as the F did not wish her to take part in PRIDE week events at nursery. In his evidence, the F said that the M had agreed to remove the child from nursery for PRIDE celebrations when she started nursery in 2023. The M’s position was that she had not felt able to discuss the issue with the F when the child was enrolled and even if she had agreed at the time, she no longer wished for the child to be excluded from nursery during an important celebration of inclusivity.[14]The M gave her evidence on 31 July 2025 and on the same day the court heard submissions. The court handed down a short written judgment on 8 August 2025 that left the child in the Respondent’s sole care with contact every other weekend for the M and on Wednesdays after nursery/school. The Judge also ordered shared holidays.

The Judgment

[15]At J7 the Judge referred to the three “incidents in particular that feature in this case”, being “the bath incident, the strangling incident, and the knife incident”. The knife incident is the fact of the F’s conviction for GBH some 20 years earlier. The Judge said at J7 he did not “regard them as having great significance now.” That appears to refer to all three incidents.[16]At J8 he referred to the concerns that Ms Traugott raised about the Judges’ questioning of the M during the hearing. This forms the basis of Ground Two.[17]At J9 he referred to PD12J and said, rightly, that it is for the Judge to decide what allegations should be pursued. At J10- 14 he said; “10. Having regard to the list of factors to be considered under the guidelines, I decided a fact-finding hearing was not necessary. However, evidence received at the hearing has enabled me to make certain findings. That said, neither parent views domestic abuse as a barrier or requiring any restriction of contact.11. The section 7 report from Emma Lunnon observes that both parents can offer their child safe and appropriate care. This includes extended time with each parent to as much as half the holidays, which are agreed. That distils clearly the issues in the case.12. It was against that background that I asked what possible difference it would make if I were to consider the allegations. It seemed to me, and it remains the case that it does not make any difference. That said, I should not ignore evidence that emerged during the hearing relevant to those allegations as part of my overall consideration of the case for welfare purposes. Because there was constant reference to these incidents during the hearing and because Ms Traugott appeared to be relying heavily on them, I wanted to hear a little about the circumstances of the bath incident as well as the knife incident. The advocates were given the opportunity of asking questions on these issues although judicial control of the evidence was exercised.13. As to the bath incident, the mother accepts that that on 16 May 2024 mother took an overdose and laid in the bath. It is said that the father deliberately, calculatedly and callously left her to die. Reliance is placed on, amongst other things, his not calling the police or the ambulance. Denials form part of the evidential landscape and may carry considerable weight. His denials amount to strong evidence which convinced me, at least on a balance of probability (which is the standard of proof which I applied to consideration of any facts to be found or not found), that he had not just left the mother to die.14. I asked the mother whether she had thought about her children when she took an overdose. Objection was taken to that question. I still required an answer. The answer was in fact very satisfactory. The mother explained what caused her to take an overdose she said: ‘I felt lost, overwhelmed and insignificant. I was regarded as not being good enough to hold my own child. I was crying. I couldn’t even bathe. I accept the mother’s evidence about how she was thinking and how she felt during the bath incident. A person in that situation doesn’t think straight. The desperation overwhelms them and causes and enables them to attempt to take their own lives. At that time, they might not be able to focus on the welfare of their child or children. That blameworthiness and any culpability does not necessarily last. These views were supported, in their essence, by the Family Court Advisor.”[18]At J16

the Judge made very positive findings about the F, and said:

“He has had time become [sic] mature and measured and build a depthto his character. He has empathy and he projects an aura of innercalm. I was impressed by him and his evidence. I accept thatevidence. It was that that enabled me to make a finding that hedid not maliciously, or with any harmful intent, leave the motherin danger in the bath. I do not consider that he is any danger tothe mother or to the child.”
[19]At J19 he found that there was no evidence that the M was suffering from any mental illness.[20]At J20-21 he said that neither party “uses domestic abuse as a barrier to time spent with any parent”. The then referred to the social worker report dated September 2024 which recommended that B lived with the F.[21]He noted at J22 that both parents can offer B safe and appropriate care. He said at J22-24 “22. Each parent can offer B safe and appropriate care. B is settled, content, in the main care of the father where she has stability. Moving her home is likely to have a negative impact on her and is likely to unsettle her. The current arrangement is the least disruptive to her and best meets her welfare needs.23. B has a positive and loving relationship with both parents and extended families. The relationship between the parents themselves remains acrimonious.24. Any order that B lives with her and spends every other weekend with her father from Friday evening until Monday morning would be a very substantial change. No reason has been given by the mother to persuade me that such a change is justified. It would turn her world upside down entirely unnecessarily and not driven by any child-centred welfare concerns. I note the mother offers overnight on Wednesdays in addition.”[22]At J25 he made brief reference to the welfare checklist and then found that B should continue to live with the F, with contact with the M as set out above.[23]In the light of the judgment, the parties asked for clarification and in an email dated 6 September 2025 the Judge set out some clarifications. In the third paragraph he said; “The social worker of her report [sic] of 17 September 2024 recommends that [B] should remain in the care of her father but now suggests that there be equal time with each parent. I gave reasons for maintaining, broadly speaking, the current arrangements. These included that [B] is settled and content with her home being with the father and her spending substantial amounts of time with her mother. It is the least disruptive to her. A week on, week off arrangement would be a change that her welfare does not require. I dealt with this in paragraphs 22 and 24 of the Judgment. The recommendations contained in a section 7 report do not carry special weight. They are not a starting point. There is no assumption that they are to be followed unless there are good reasons why not. The familiar references to cogent reasons having to be given before departing from recommendations of a section 7 report are somewhat overstated. Cogent reasons should be given, but they are out of courtesy so that an expert who has been asked to assist the court can understand why their recommendations have not been followed. Here the current arrangements sufficiently meet the needs of the child. Should the mother move to Kent, it may be that different arrangements have to be made, including the possibility of a week on, week off arrangement if the parents so agree. However, I cannot provide for that eventuality now. The decision would require a consideration of the welfare checklist for which the information necessary is not available in advance of any such move to Kent.”

The social worker reports

[24]The Judge’s relatively extensive reference to the September 2024 report is slightly surprising because there were two subsequent reports by the social worker, Ms Lunnon. On 7 January 2025 the Court had ordered an addendum report which was produced on 24 February 2025. This recommended that B spent equal time with both parents. The report referred to the conflict between the parents, and the potential for that conflict to impact on B.[25]There was a further report on 16 June 2025 from Ms Lunnon. That set out a number of the M’s concerns about the F’s controlling behaviour over contact arrangements. This was a clear indicator of coercive control, with direct ongoing consequences on both the M and B. I set out a portion of the report:
“What has been clear throughout my involvement with this family, is that the co-parenting relationship between GI and K acrimonious and difficult and I can only reiterate the importance that [B] does not become caught up in long-standing litigation and disputes between her parents and they can begin to work towards a co-parenting relationship that is fair and has [B] at the forefront. This will include improved communication between them both, and not to spite each other by making arrangements unnecessarily complicated. When parents fail to maintain an amicable arrangement, it can significantly impact their child. The child may experience emotional and psychological distress, including sadness, anger, confusion, and anxiety. This emotional turmoil can lead to behavioural issues such as aggression or withdrawal and may negatively affect their academic performance and social relationships. The long-term effects can extend into adulthood, potentially causing difficulties in forming healthy relationships and carrying emotional scars that affect overall well-being. It is crucial for parents to seek support and work towards minimising conflict for the sake of their child's emotional and psychological health. Should, findings be made against the father in relation to controlling and coercive behaviour towards the mother, I would recommend that [B] resides in the care of GI and spends time with her father every other weekend from Friday evening until Monday morning where she will be returned to nursery, as has been the arrangement for GI. On the weeks that K does not see B, additional contact is proposed on a Wednesday evening. If the child arrangements were for B to live with GI, consideration would need to be given to a change of nursery provision to ensure she does not have a significant distance to travel each day if she were to spend most of her time with her mother. GI does not drive and therefore this would reduce the amount of time [B] spends on public transport.”

The law

[26]FPR rule 30.12(3) provides that an appeal may be allowed where the decision was wrong or unjust for procedural irregularity.[27]In Re F (Children) [2016] EWCA Civ 546, Munby P summarised the approach of an appellate court to decisions of the lower court as follows: “22. Like any judgment, the judgment of the Deputy Judge has to be read as a whole, and having regard to its context and structure. The task facing a judge is not to pass an examination, or to prepare a detailed legal or factual analysis of all the evidence and submissions he has heard. Essentially, the judicial task is twofold: to enable the parties to understand why they have won or lost; and to provide sufficient detail and analysis to enable an appellate court to decide whether or not the judgment is sustainable. The judge need not slavishly re-state either the facts, the arguments or the law. To adopt the striking metaphor of Mostyn J in SP v EB and KP [2014] EWHC 3964 (Fam), [2016] 1 FLR 228 para 29, there is no need for the judge to "incant mechanically" passages from the authorities, the evidence or the submissions, as if he were "a pilot going through the pre-flight checklist”.[28]The task of this court is to decide the appeal applying the principles set out in the speech of Lord Hoffmann in Piglowska v Piglowski [1999] 1 WLR 1360 (at 1372):
"The exigencies of daily court room life are such that reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better ex-pressed. This is particularly true of an unreserved judgment such as the judge gave in this case. These reasons should be read on the assumption that, unless he has demonstrated the contrary, the judge knew how he should perform his functions and which matters he should take into account. This is particularly true when the matters in question are so well known as those specified in section 25(2) [of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973]. An appellate court should resist the temptation to subvert the principle that they should not substitute their own discretion for that of the judge by a narrow textual analysis which enables them to claim that he misdirected himself."
[29]On appeal the court will only intervene on a determination of fact if that determination was plainly not open to the Judge on the evidence before him/her; or failed to give any weight to what was clearly a relevant issue; or gave an irrational amount of weight to an irrelevant issue.[30]Where there is a proposed challenge to the exercise of a discretion the correct approach of the appellate court was set out by the House of Lords in G v G (Minors: Custody Appeal) [1985] FLR 894. The appellate court should only intervene if it is satisfied that the judged exercised his/her discretion on a wrong principle, or the decision was so plainly wrong that s/he must have exercised the discretion wrongly.[31]Where there is a challenge to a case management decision the court’s powers to intervene are particularly limited see Re TG (A Child) 2013 EWCA Civ 5 at paragraph 36.[32]A part of the challenge in this case is to the failure of the Judge to give reasons for departing from the recommendation of the social worker that B should live with both parents, and that the court should consider the allegations of coercive control. In Re J (Residence: Expert Evidence) [2001] 2 FCR 44, Hale LJ said:
“It is of course well-established that, if there are professional witnesses who have been asked to advise the court by way of a section 7 report, the court should at least do those witnesses the courtesy of explaining clearly the reasons for departing from their recommendations (although it has always been acknowledged that the court has the power to do that).”
[33]In Re M (A Child) [2017] EWCA Civ 2356, the Court of Appeal overturned a first instance decision for a mother to relocate to Colombia on the basis that the judgment had not been adequately reasoned and there was no explanation for departing from the Cafcass recommendation, Peter Jackson LJ concluded that; “In a decision of this importance, the judge did not really reason her decision at all, nor faced with a sophisticated Cafcass evaluation did she give any adequate explanation for disagreeing with it”.

The Grounds and Conclusions

[34]Grounds One and Three closely interrelate. Ground One is that it was wrong of the Judge, on day one of the hearing, to decide that the M’s allegations of domestic abuse were not relevant to the child’s welfare. Ground Three is that the Judge gave insufficient reasons for departing from the recommendations of the social worker, not only in the letter of 10 June, but also in the report of 13 February 2025.[35]I shall consider these Grounds together. The allegations of domestic abuse in this case were extremely serious. They included non-fatal strangulation and a course of abuse that the M said led to her attempting to commit suicide. Very importantly there was evidence, referred to extensively by the social worker, that the alleged coercive control was continuing to have a significant impact on the M and on the difficulties with co-parenting.[36]The test for whether it is necessary to conduct a fact finding exercise is comprehensively set out in K v K [2022] 1 WLR 3713 and Re HN [2022] 1 WLR 2681. In K v K at [66] the Court of Appeal said; “At the risk of repeating what has been said at para 37 in In re H-N and at para 41 above, the main things that the court should consider in deciding whether to order a fact-finding hearing are:(a) the nature of the allegations and the extent to which those allegations are likely to be relevant to the making of the child arrangements order,(b) that the purpose of fact-finding is to allow assessment of the risk to the child and the impact of any abuse on the child,(c) whether fact-finding is necessary or whether other evidence suffices, and(d) whether fact-finding is proportionate.[37]The touchstone test is whether findings of fact are necessary for the welfare decisions for the child, or whether events and the dynamics of the parents’ situation have moved on to the point that the facts have become historic and critically of little or no relevance to the decisions the judge has to make about the child. Therefore, the seriousness of the allegations are not themselves likely to be the critical factor, the critical factor is the nexus between the facts alleged and the current welfare decision.[38]The decision as to whether or not to determine issues of fact, and what allegations to consider will be one that is very much for the Judge, and one where any appellate court should be slow to intervene.[39]It is always open to a Judge to reopen a case management decision, and there is a very wide discretion on such decisions, see Re TG. Therefore, there was nothing in principle wrong with the Judge deciding at the start of the hearing that he did not consider that it was necessary to conduct a fact finding hearing. However, what then happened in this case seems to me to be somewhat confused and very much more difficult to justify.[40]The Judge appears to have decided that the M’s allegations of domestic abuse were not relevant to the welfare outcome, because both parents were accepting that the other could have unsupervised contact and the M was not saying that her allegations made such contact unsafe, see J7, 10, 20 and 21. The Judge made some findings about the “bath incident”, however, he made no findings on the M’s allegations of coercive control, and the findings he made on the bath incident were limited to finding that the F did not “leave the M to die”, see J13.[41]I am extremely slow to intervene in a Judge’s findings on a matter such as this, but in my view he was plainly wrong to conclude that the M’s allegations of domestic abuse, including coercive control were not relevant to the decisions that he had to make about the child’s welfare. The M’s case on the abuse (of which coercive control was a part) was that the F had driven her to attempt to take her own life. It was that situation which had led her not to return to the family home after she came out of hospital, but instead to move some distance away to live with her mother. In effect it was that “choice” that put her at the enormous disadvantage (in the litigation) of no longer being the child’s primary carer.[42]Further, the M said that the F’s coercively controlling behaviour continued after separation, through their communications and the F’s refusal to fully involve her in decisions about the child’s life, an example being the dispute over PRIDE week. The allegations therefore plainly had an impact on the child’s welfare going forward.[43]Further, the Judge did not consider the impact of domestic abuse on the child and not just the M. This was a matter the social worker was plainly very concerned about in her report. However, the Judge does not appear to take into account that aspect of the case, when simply deciding that because neither parent opposed the other having care of the child the abuse allegations were not relevant. The Judge’s approach in this regard was in my view wrong. He undertook a wholly linear analysis that because the M did not oppose the F having overnight unsupervised contact the domestic abuse allegations were not relevant to the welfare outcome. This approach was in my view plainly wrong. If the M’s allegations were true then this was a matter that was highly relevant to a decision that the child should live with the F and only spend three days out of 14 with the M.[44]The social worker had set out in two careful and detailed documents why she recommended that the child live with both parents on an equal time basis, and why she thought the allegations, particularly of coercive control, needed to be considered. It was entirely open to the Judge to disagree with these recommendations. However, the Judge needed to explain, even if briefly, why he departed from those recommendations. Instead, the judgment makes virtually no reference to the two reports. He refers to “the section 7 report from Emma Lunnon” in J11, and says that distils the issues in the case, but it is not clear which of the reports he is referring to there, and it may be a reference to the 2024 report. At J21 he refers to the 17 September 2024 report, which recommended the child should remain with the father, but that had been superseded by the two 2025 reports, which recommended equal time and raised concerns about coercive control. The Judge completely fails to deal with those more up to date reports.[45]He did refer to the later reports in the email of 5 September 2025, but again gives no reasons for not accepting their recommendations, save the suggestion that the underlying reason is the inconvenience to the child of going from the M’s home to the nursery. However, he makes the surprising comment that if the M moved to Kent there might be a week on week off arrangement “if the parents so agree”, thus apparently leaving the F with a veto over the M spending more time with the child. Further, he has failed to grapple with the long term implications for the child of the order that he has made. In a case involving allegations of coercive control the Judge has left the F very largely in control of the arrangements for the child and thus with continuing effective control over the M with the very obvious potential for harm to the child[46]In my view both of these Grounds must succeed. The Judge has failed to explain to an adequate standard why the allegations of domestic abuse, particularly those of coercive control, are not directly relevant to the decision about who the child lives with. Further the Judge has failed to consider the social workers’ two 2025 reports and to set out why he is departing from their recommendation.[47]It may be, but I am speculating, that the Judge thought none of these matters outweighed the logistical problems of the child remaining in nursery near where the F lived if she was spending half the term time with the M, who I understand currently lives over an hour’s journey away. This is alluded to, but not made clear, in J24 and in the subsequent emails. However, firstly there are no adequate reasons if this was the overriding factor for the Judge. Secondly, the Judge does not weigh up those logistical problems, which would undoubtedly impact on the child, against the long term psychological and emotional impact of only being with her M 3 days out of 14 during term time. This is in addition to not considering the impact of the alleged coercive control on the child.[48]The F told me that the Judge did consider a number of these matters during the course of the hearing and commented upon them. However, I do not have a transcript of the entire hearing, and in any event it is for a Judge to set out their reasons in a judgment, certainly when it is a final hearing such as this, not in comments during the hearing.[49]For these reasons Grounds One and Three succeed.[50]Ground Two is that that the Judge was unfair in his questioning of the M. This Ground states that it was improper and unfair for the Judge to take over the questioning of the M, and to ask her about her overdose and whether she thought of the child at the time, see J14.[51]The conduct of the hearing was for the Judge, and it was entirely open to him to ask questions and to decide what matters were of particular interest to him.[52]I do not have a transcript of the hearing and I therefore cannot tell whether the Judge asked improper and insensitive questions. In any event, such an issue is in general more one of judicial conduct than fair process. There was nothing inherently irrelevant in the questions the Judge was asking, because the degree to which the M was concerned about the child at the time, could have been relevant to the welfare outcome. It is, of course, of the utmost importance that a Judge is sensitive in any questions they ask to the vulnerabilities of the witnesses before them, but I have not seen evidence that would support a finding that the process itself was unfair.[53]In my view without a full transcript and much more detailed allegations about what the Judge is supposed to have done wrong, there was no unfairness in the Judge asking the M questions about the bath incident.[54]Ground Three is therefore dismissed.[55]Ground Four is that the Judge was wrong to order that the child should be removed from school during PRIDE week when the M made it clear that she did not agree and that she wanted B to attend.[56]The Judge made a Specific Issue Order that; “The child shall not attend nursery or school during PRIDE week or for any other celebration of LGBTQ+ rights/inclusivity.”[57]The basis of this order appears to have been that the M had agreed, when B was originally placed in the nursery, to her not attending PRIDE celebrations. However, firstly, that was at a time the M said she was subject to the coercive control of the F. Secondly and in any event, the M had made it clear at the hearing that she no longer took that position. Therefore, it was plainly wrong to make that order without clear reasons as to why it was in the child’s best interests to do so.[58]The F’s only response on this point was that the M had originally agreed to the child not attending.[59]If that was the only issue in the case I might have decided not to remit the case, and merely have said the M should apply to vary order. However, in my view this Ground illustrates the wider problem with the Judge’s approach. He does not seem to have appreciated the interrelationship between the M’ allegations of domestic abuse and the ongoing decision making in respect of the child.[60]I therefore allow the appeal on Ground Four as well as Grounds One and Three. I will remit the matter to a Circuit Judge in Medway Family Court and refer it to Henke J as the Family Presiding Judge for the area to consider allocation.