T v P [2026] EWHC 2242 (Fam)

[2026] EWHC 2242 (Fam)

Case No FD26P00397

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

FAMILY DIVISION

Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date 17 August 2026

Before

MR N GOODWIN KC

(SITTING AS A DEPUTY HIGH COURT JUDGE)

Between

TApplicant

PRespondent

Ben Woolstencroft (instructed by Goodman Ray) for Applicant

The Respondent appeared in person for in person

Hearing Hearing date: 13 August 2026

Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down on 17 August 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

.............................

Mr N Goodwin KC (sitting as deputy High Court Judge) :

[1]I am concerned with a two year old child, Y. His mother, P, is a Russian national; his father, T, a British national. Y holds British and Russian citizenship. Both parents have parental responsibility.

[2]The father applies for a declaration under the Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children (“the Hague Convention 1996”) that Y has been wrongfully retained by his mother in Russia after a short agreed holiday there and was habitually resident in the UK at the point of retention. Background

[3]The parties married in the Spring of 2023 after a seven year relationship. Until February 2026, Y had lived in England continuously since birth.

[4]The parents’ relationship became strained after Y’s birth, particularly during the period when the maternal grandmother lived with them for several months and then during the four-month period from the end of 2024 when they lived with the paternal grandparents whilst renovation work was completed on the family home. The father has expressed concerns about the mother’s mental health, describing extreme anxiety and a sustained preoccupation with Y’s health. These suggestions are strongly denied by the mother.

[5]In the Spring of 2024 the mother took Y to Russia for a month, with the father’s consent, for a post-birth medical assessment. In his statement, the father indicates that the trip was intended to be for a fortnight, but that the mother subsequently extended it for reasons that were unclear.

[6]In early March 2025 the mother travelled by herself to Moscow, indicating that she had to sign paperwork relating to her property there. The father considers “that this was part of a plan to move Y to Russia, with or without my consent”. The mother had taken Y’s passports with her. He took a week’s annual leave to look after Y in her absence.

[7]In late March 2025 the father says that the mother threatened to remove Y to Russia and hid his passports. This prompted him to apply for a prohibited steps order, which was made, first ex parte, then by consent at a return date hearing before HHJ Case sitting at the Family Court in Reading. The court declared that it had jurisdiction based on Y’s habitual residence in England and Wales.

[8]The father states that the mother reacted badly to service of the ex parte prohibited steps order. She began shouting and screaming, whilst holding Y and the father called the police. He says that she had “followed [him] into the office, where she repeatedly hit the door and shouted ‘he’s hitting me’, whilst [he] was on the phone to the operator”. When they attended, the mother alleged he had assaulted her. I note that the family court order from the return date hearing recites “upon neither parent alleging domestic abuse against the other”.

[9]From April 2025, the mother describes “an escalating pattern of pressure from [the father] and his parents across legal, financial and family-related matters”. There was a dispute about the paternal grandparents’ assertion that their £350,000 contribution to the purchase of the parents’ jointly owned property was on trust rather than a gift. The mother indicates that she felt pressurised to accept a deed of trust and worried that the paternal grandparents were trying to control her through the father. The father denies applying any pressure, maintaining that the deed only reflected formally the grandparents’ contribution.

[10]The mother left her employment after the April 2025 legal proceedings in order to care for Y full-time. The parents moved to rented accommodation in April 2025 whilst the renovation work on the family home was completed.

[11]In the summer of 2025 the mother contacted Women’s Aid requesting support, I understand because she felt increasingly isolated, her role as a mother was being increasingly undermined and she was “unable to make decisions freely within the marriage”. She received general guidance.

[12]The parties moved into their family home in late 2025.

[13]The prohibited steps order expired at the end of 2025, following which the father says he reluctantly agreed to all three of them travelling to Russia so Y could see his maternal great grandparents. In his statement he indicates that the mother told him she would not forgive him if the great grandparents were unable to meet Y before they died.

[14]On 01 February 2026 the parents travelled with Y to Russia. Return flights were pre-booked for 08 February 2026. Several hours before the departure home, the mother told the father that she would not be returning to the UK with Y. The father says that the mother told him she believed that the paternal grandparents were plotting to take Y away from her, that he was not safe around them and that he, the father, did not care about Y’s health and education.

[15]Since then, the father has travelled four times to Russia to see Y and has had daily video contact. He has tried to discuss with the mother Y’s voluntary return by offering protective measures and undertakings, set out in his solicitor’s letter dated 20 March 2026. These included a child arrangements ‘live with’ order to the mother, undertakings from the paternal grandparents that they would not spend time with Y without the mother’s agreement and the provision of the family home for her and Y whilst the father lived elsewhere. These proposals have not been accepted. The mother made clear to me in court that she was no longer open to a voluntary return.

[16]The mother commenced divorce and child arrangement proceedings in Russia in June 2026. A hearing took place at the end of June 2026. In July 2026 the local Russian court determined that Y would reside in the mother’s care. The translation of this decision is not easy to understand. It is expressed as a custody ruling “until the court’s decision enters into legal force”, which may mean it is an interim decision only. The decision does not engage with jurisdiction at all and does not purport to analyse Y’s connections with England. The father intends to appeal it. In her second statement the mother writes “I recognise that the question of jurisdiction under the 1996 Hague Convention is a matter for the UK Court to determine independently”.

[17]In June 2026 the father petitioned for divorce in England.

[18]In June 2026 the father’s C66 application for Y’s return to England and Wales under the inherent jurisdiction was issued. The father’s solicitor had notified the mother of the application the previous day. The mother responded by email to say she now resided in Moscow with Y “for our safety” because of “continued domestic abuse with additional financial coercion and control”.

[19]At the first hearing, that day, HHJ Smith invited the applicant “to make an application under the Hague Convention 1980 for the summary return of the child in Russia” and adjourned the case for four weeks. The court noted that Y became “a deemed ward of court” on issue of the father’s application, but directed that “the operation and effect of the deemed wardship is stayed pending the next hearing or further order”. All issues relating to jurisdiction, wardship, the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction and any return application were reserved to the next hearing.

[20]The case was further adjourned on 08 July 2026 to enable the mother to provide a statement in response, she having only been served on 06 July 2026. At the next hearing before Harris J. on 21 July 2026 the court directed the mother to file a statement “specifically addressing whether she accepts the court has jurisdiction under Article 7 of the Hague Convention 1996 with a view to making a declaration regarding the jurisdiction of the court on the next occasion”. The case was listed, fit for vacation business, on the first available date after 10 August 2026.

[21]Further to the recital in HHJ Smith’s order, the father has also initiated proceedings under the Hague Convention 1980 in the Russian Federation.

[22]In very many cases the issue of proceedings under the Hague Convention 1996 will add nothing to a parent’s attempts to secure the return of a child wrongfully removed from this jurisdiction. However the father points to the FCDO’s published guidance updated on 14 May 2026 “Parental child abduction: Russia”. This states “Parental child abduction cases in Russia may be difficult to resolve, even though there is an agreed international system in place to return children from Russia to the UK and the UK to Russia. Court orders for returning children are not effectively enforced in Russia”.

[23]The English Central Authority, ICACU, has also advised the father on 17 July 2026 that it has received no substantive responses from the Russian Central Authority for over two years, has experienced prolonged difficulty in obtaining meaningful co-operation and that little or no assistance through official Convention channels can realistically be expected. The ICACU case worker’s email states “However, although ICACU continues to attempt communications with the Russian Central Authority, I feel it is important that I should make you aware that we have been struggling for some time to obtain any meaningful co-operation or communications from the Russian Central Authority. Realistically, you should be prepared for little to no assistance from the Central Authority, even in respect of acknowledgement or fulfilment of their administrative steps. We strongly doubt the successfulness any request to the Russian Federation is likely to be at present, via official channels, in the current climate” [sic].

[24]Accordingly the father seeks to invoke the inherent jurisdiction alongside the processes being pursued in Russia under the Hague Convention 1980. Legal principles

[25]Russia and the United Kingdom are both signatories to the Hague Convention 1996. Under Article 1: “The objects of the present Convention are –(a) to determine the State whose authorities have jurisdiction to take measures directed to the protection of the person or property of the child;

(b) to determine which law is to be applied by such authorities in exercising their jurisdiction;

(d) to provide for the recognition and enforcement of such measures of protection in all Contracting States;

(e) to establish such co-operation between the authorities of the Contracting States as may be necessary in order to achieve the purposes of this Convention”.

[26]Under Article 5:(1) The judicial or administrative authorities of the Contracting State of the habitual residence of the child have jurisdiction to take measures directed to the protection of the child’s person or property.

(2) Subject to Article 7, in case of a change of the child’s habitual residence to another Contracting State, the authorities of the State of the new habitual residence have jurisdiction.

[27]Article 7 provides as follows:(1) In case of wrongful removal or retention of the child, the authorities of the Contracting State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention keep their jurisdiction until the child has acquired a habitual residence in another State; and

a. each person, institution or other body having rights of custody has acquiesced in the removal or retention; or

b. the child has resided in that other State for a period of at least one years after the person, institution or other body having rights of custody has or should have had knowledge of the whereabouts of the child, no request for return lodged within that period is still pending, and the child is settled in his or her new environment.

(2) The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where – a. it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and b. at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention The rights of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) above, may arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of that State.

(3) So long as the authorities first mentioned in paragraph 1 keep their jurisdiction, the authorities of the Contracting State to which the child has been removed or in which he or she has been retained can take only such urgent measures under Article 11 as are necessary for the protection of the person or property of the child.

[28]Habitual residence requires some degree of integration by the child in a social and family environment. I have read carefully the decision of MacDonald J. in E v. D

[2022] EWHC 1216

which articulates the following principles of general application, drawn from the series of appellate authorities cited within it:(a) It is the child's habitual residence which is in question and hence the child's level of integration in a social and family environment which is under consideration by the court determining the question of habitual residence;

(b) In common with the other rules of jurisdiction, the meaning of habitual residence is shaped in the light of the best interests of the child, in particular on the criterion of proximity. Proximity in this context means the practical connection between the child and the country concerned;

(c) In assessing whether a child has lost a pre-existing habitual residence and gained a new one, the court must also weigh up the degree of connection which the child had with the State in which he resided before the move;

(d) The relevant question is whether a child has achieved some degree of integration in a social and family environment. It is not necessary for a child to be fully integrated before becoming habitually resident;

(e) It is the stability of a child's residence as opposed to its permanence which is relevant, though this is qualitative and not quantitative, in the sense that it is the integration of the child into the environment rather than a mere measurement of the time a child spends there;

(f) In circumstances where the social and family environment of an infant or young child is shared with those on whom she is dependent, it is necessary to assess the integration of that person or persons (usually the parent or parents) in the social and family environment of the country concerned;

(g) In respect of a pre-school child, the circumstances to be considered will include the geographic and family origins of the parents who effected the move;

(h) The requisite degree of integration can, in certain circumstances, develop quite quickly. It is possible to acquire a new habitual residence in a single day. There is no requirement that the child should have been resident in the country in question for a particular period of time. The deeper the child’s integration in the old state, probably the less fast his or her achievement of the requisite degree of integration in the new state. Likewise, the greater the amount of adult preplanning of the move, including pre-arrangements for the child’s day-to-day life in the new state, probably the faster his or her achievement of that requisite degree. In circumstances where all of the central members of the child’s life in the old state have moved with him or her, probably the faster his or her achievement of habitual residence. Conversely, where any of the central family members have remained behind and thus represent for the child a continuing link with the old state, probably the less fast his or her achievement of habitual residence;

(i) A child will usually, but not necessarily, have the same habitual residence as the parent(s) who care for him. The younger the child the more likely that proposition but this is not to eclipse the fact that the investigation is child focused;

(j) Parental intention is relevant to the assessment, but not determinative. There is no requirement that there be an intention on the part of one or both parents to reside in the country in question permanently or indefinitely. Parental intent is only one factor, along with all other relevant factors, that must be taken into account when determining the issue of habitual residence.

[29]The father also draws my attention to the observations of the Supreme Court in A v. A (Children: Habitual Residence)

[2013] UKSC 60

to the effect that habitual residence “is not lost by temporary absences” and in Re LC (Children) (Reunite International Child Abduction Centre Intervening)

[2014] UKSC 1

“If a person leaves his home country for a temporary purpose or in ambiguous circumstances, he may not lose his habitual residence there for some time, if at all, and correspondingly he will not acquire a new habitual residence until then or even later.”

[30]The father addressed the court in relation to repudiatory retention. The principle of repudiatory retention was described by the Supreme Court in Re C (Children)

[2018] UKSC 8

in the following terms:

“When the left-behind parent agrees to the child travelling abroad, he is exercising, not abandoning, his rights of custody. Those rights of custody include the right to be party to any arrangement as to which country the child is to live in. It is not accurate to say that he gives up a right to veto the child's movements abroad; he exercises that right by permitting such movement on terms. He has agreed to the travel only on terms that the stay is to be temporary and the child will be returned as agreed. So long as the travelling parent honours the temporary nature of the stay abroad, he is not infringing the left-behind parent's rights of custody. But once he repudiates the agreement, and keeps the child without the intention to return, and denying the temporary nature of the stay, his retention is no longer on the terms agreed. It amounts to a claim to unilateral decision where the child shall live. It repudiates the rights of custody of the left-behind parent, and becomes wrongful.”

[31]Within his speech in Re C, Lord Hughes addressed the salient features of a repudiatory retention:

“As with any matter of proof or evidence, it would be unwise to attempt any exhaustive definition. The question is whether the travelling parent has manifested a denial, or repudiation, of the rights of the left-behind parent. Some markers can, however, be put in place. (i) It is difficult if not impossible to imagine a repudiatory retention which does not involve a subjective intention on the part of the travelling parent not to return the child (or not to honour some other fundamental part of the arrangement). The spectre advanced of a parent being found to have committed a repudiatory retention innocently, for example by making an application for temporary permission to reside in the destination State, is illusory. (ii) A purely internal unmanifested thought on the part of the travelling parent ought properly to be regarded as at most a plan to commit a repudiatory retention and not itself to constitute such. If it is purely internal, it will probably not come to light in any event, but even supposing that subsequently it were to do so, there must be an objectively identifiable act or acts of repudiation before the retention can be said to be wrongful. That is so in the case of ordinary retention, and must be so also in the case of repudiatory retention. (iii) That does not mean that the repudiation must be communicated to the left-behind parent. To require that would be to put too great a premium on concealment and deception. Plainly, some acts may amount to a repudiatory retention, even if concealed from the left-behind parent. A simple example might be arranging for permanent official permission to reside in the destination State and giving an undertaking that the intention was to remain permanently. (iv) There must accordingly be some objectively identifiable act or statement, or combination of such, which manifests the denial, or repudiation, of the rights of custody of the left-behind parent. A declaration of intent to a third party might suffice, but a privately formed decision would not, without more, do so. (v) There is no occasion to re-visit the decision of the House of Lords in In re H; In re S (para 28 above) that wrongful retention must be an identifiable event and cannot be regarded as a continuing process because of the need to count forward the 12-month period stipulated in article 12. That does not mean that the exact date has to be identifiable. It may be possible to say no more than that wrongful retention had clearly occurred not later than (say) the end of a particular month. If there is such an identifiable point, it is not possible to adopt the submission made to the Court of Appeal, that the left-behind parent may elect to treat as the date of wrongful retention either the date of manifestation of repudiation or the due date for return. It may of course be permissible for the left-behind parent to plead his case in the alternative, but that is a different thing. When once the actual date of wrongful retention is ascertained, the article 12 period begins to run.”

The parties’ positions

[32]The father asks the court to declare that Y was habitually resident in this jurisdiction on 08 February 2026 when the mother declined to return with him from Russia at the conclusion of what was intended to be only a 6 day trip. The date of wrongful retention was on 08 February 2026. The father never consented to or acquiesced in his retention in Russia.

[33]Y had lived his whole life in England, as had both of his parents. He has extended maternal and paternal family in England and there have already been proceedings here, for a prohibited steps order, for which jurisdiction was established on the basis of his habitual residence.

[34]The mother invites the court to find that she did not decide to retain Y in Russia until a date at the end of May 2026, when she initiated proceedings in Russia. She and the father had agreed a “cooling off period” following which the father returned to England. Any wrongful retention would have to be assessed at that date.

[35]By then, she maintains, Y had become habitually resident in Russia. He had “developed meaningful social connections through age-appropriate developmental activities, including developmental classes and football”. He developed a strong relationship with mother’s step-father and had practical and financial support from other members of the maternal family. He holds a certificate of registration at a Moscow address, dated to the time he was in Russia in early February 2026, which enables him to access Russian health insurance.

[36]The mother submits that Y has a medical insurance policy dated late February 2026. He has had a neurological consultation, a dental assessment, a respiratory appointment, blood tests, an autism assessment and an emergency echocardiogram. In May 2026 he was accepted for a nursery placement, to commence in September 2026. The mother has resumed part-time work.

[37]For all these reasons, she contends that by the time she decided that Y should remain permanently in Russia, he had become habitually resident there and so there was no wrongful retention. Accordingly the English court has no jurisdiction and the Russian court, to which she has already applied, should be left to make decisions about Y’s long-term future. Analysis

[38]The first issue to determine is the timing of the retention. The father contends that this is 08 February 2026, when the mother refused to return to the UK with Y, albeit he harbours suspicions that the mother was merely putting into effect plans that she had previously made.

[39]The evidence establishes that the trip to Russia on 01 February 2026 was intended to be a short visit only – for 6 days. Return tickets were bought. The parties had not agreed to any longer period.

[40]The mother argues that she remained in Russia after 08 February 2026 with the father’s consent, or at least his acquiescence. She says she proposed a “cooling-off” period during which she and Y would remain in Russia whilst they considered their long-term options. She had not decided to keep Y there permanently and so there was no wrongful retention at the point they were due to fly home.

[41]The parties exchanged messages after the father returned to the UK. On 12 February 2026 he emailed the mother acknowledging “you have little intent to return home in the near future or perhaps at all with our son”. He sought to address her anxieties about returning to the UK (the paternal grandparents “taking” Y and the father initiating legal proceedings). He referred to the two options they had spoken about on the phone – the first that the father moved to Russia; the second that he allayed the mother’s concerns about a return to the UK by providing “personal and legal assurances”.

[42]The mother had rejected the latter option. The father made clear that the first option appeared to be “emotional leverage from your part on me… My work, financial responsibilities, home and ability to provide long term security for you and our son are all based in the UK and giving those up without certainty would create significant instability rather than solving problems. Relocating under those conditions (let along the political situation currently), would make it impossible for me to contribute consistently as a parent, maintain income or provide the education and healthcare support that we currently have in the UK”.

[43]At the conclusion of the email the father states unequivocally “Despite you maintaining you are not taking Y from me I want to be clear that I do not consent to our son being taken to another country and kept there against my wishes. He was born and has been raised in the UK where we had a life together and being able to maintain a close and regular relationship with both of his parents here is incredibly important to his wellbeing and me as his father. You therefore need to understand what you’re doing isn’t just hurting me emotionally but lawfully wrong.”

[44]During the hearing the mother produced some messages between the parents that had not previously been disclosed. The first was dated 16 February 2026. I do not have a complete run of messages so it is difficult to see the full context. There is the following exchange (although the absence of the immediately preceding message means that I cannot see exactly what the father is responding to): M: Answer this please. F: By just trying my hardest to get out to Russia. I can’t make someone come back who doesn’t want to but I’m just trying to concentrate on what we discussed on the phone and give you space and arrange to come out to see you and Y. M: You’ve decided to move out here? F: No, I’m just going to make every effort for now to be in yours and Y’s life whilst we sort this out. I’m just asking you to help me get out to you guys.

[45]There are text messages between the parents on 20 February 2026. The father made clear that it was “not feasible” for him to move to Russia. He refers to the mother’s previous request “for space” and for him to “stop pushing”, to which he had agreed. This is a reference to her request for time, in Moscow, to think things through. The father made clear “I was hoping you’d start the conversation when you felt ready and then we could then take steps in rebuilding our life in UK”. The mother responded to say “I’m so scared to go back to your and your parents’ control”.

[46]There are further messages on 23 February 2026. The father referred to the need for a calm conversation. However, he “need[ed] some clear direction first though on how I can make you feel comfortable to come back and then I can go about doing that. If you’ve equally decided that no matter what I do you aren’t coming back then I need to know that”.

[47]Insofar as the mother asserts that the father temporarily acquiesced in her retention of Y in Russia after 08 February 2026, such that wrongful retention should only be analysed from the point he insisted on Y’s return, I derive the following principles from In re H and others (Minors) (Abduction: Acquiescence)

[1998] 1 AC 72

:(a) Acquiescence in a wrongful retention depends on the actual state of mind of the wronged parent;

(b) The subjective intention of the wronged parent is a question of fact to determine in all the circumstances of the case;

(d) The contemporaneous words and actions of the wronged parent may well attract more weight than his bare assertions in evidence about his intention;

(e) There is one exception – where the words or actions of the wronged parent clearly and unequivocally show and have led the other parent to believe that the wronged parent is not asserting or going to assert his right to the summary return of the child and are inconsistent with such return, justice requires that the wronged parent be held to have acquiesced.

[48]The evidence in the present case allows me to reach a clear conclusion about the date of retention. Both parents had equal rights of custody in respect of Y. At no point did the father agree to Y’s permanent relocation to Russia. The February 2026 trip was only ever intended by him to last 6 days. Until the point of departure on 08 February 2026 his rights of custody were not infringed. At that point however, Y should have been returned to the UK.

[49]I reject the suggestion that the “cooling off” period reflected genuine equivocation by the mother about her future plans. Notwithstanding the discussions that took place between the parents after 08 February 2026 about the possibility the mother might return with Y, I find that she had formed the intention, at least by the departure date, that she would not do so. At that point, on 08 February 2026, the father’s rights of custody were repudiated and the mother’s retention of Y in Russia became wrongful.

[50]I do not find that the father acquiesced in the permanent retention of Y in Russia after 08 February 2026. He had little choice himself but to return to the UK when he did, having limited access to funds. All the contemporaneous correspondence shows that he sought to negotiate with the mother about her return, but at no point did he indicate any acceptance of Y’s permanent retention in Russia. During his discussion with her of the two “options” he reiterated that it was not feasible for him to move to Russia. He did not put forward his move to Russia as a realistic possibility or an option that he endorsed – rather he made clear the reason for rejecting it. It is clear from his perspective that their continuing discussions were about the preparatory steps that would need to be taken before the mother would be willing to return voluntarily; at no point did he signal that it would be acceptable for Y to remain with her in Russia permanently. His agreement to give the mother “space” and “to stop pushing” was not acquiescence in Y’s retention in Russia at all. It was intended to increase the possibility that the mother would change her mind and return Y to the UK voluntarily once she had more time to think things through.

[51]I am equally clear in rejecting any suggestion that the mother was still genuinely contemplating returning Y to England after refusing to go on the 08 February 2026 flight. My conclusion is that she had determined at the very latest on 08 February 2026 that nothing would persuade her to return. Any suggestions to the contrary were merely attempts by her to consolidate her position in Russia by stalling for time before eventually telling the father that her position was absolute. Her decision that Y would not get on the booked return flight is the clearest evidence of her decision. Even if she did not communicate to the father in more absolute terms that her decision was final, the “objectively identifiable act” (per Lord Hughes) was her failure to put Y on the flight. My overall firm conclusion on the evidence is that 08 February 2026 was the date of wrongful retention.

[52]There is some evidence that points towards an earlier intention on the part of the mother to retain Y wrongfully in Russia. His residence registration document in Moscow is dated early February 2026, when the parties were still visiting the maternal great grandparents in Siberia. The mother says there was an administrative requirement that Y had such a document, in order to access health insurance in Russia, which she was concerned about, given her perception that they had had difficulties in achieving follow-up medical care through the NHS. It is clear however that she had been able to arrange for Y to have medical care in Russia on his previous visit, so the imperative to arrange insurance for a short 6 day trip is highly questionable.

[53]I also note the father’s evidence that the mother travelled to Russia in February 2026 with her laptop, external hard drives, Y’s original birth certificate, his medical records and various “valuable personal belongings”. He queries whether this, in combination, signifies an intention not to return Y that predated their departure from England on 01 February 2026. On balance however I find that the mother’s wrongful retention crystallised on 08 February 2026.

[54]I turn to my analysis of habitual residence. There are a number of factors that weigh in favour of Y’s habitual residence remaining in the UK on 08 February 2026:(a) He was born in England and had lived his entire life there up to that date;

(b) His father is English;

(d) He and his parents lived together as a single family unit in the UK for the entirety of his life, albeit for some periods they lived with the paternal grandparents and the maternal grandmother lived with them;

(e) Both parents contributed to his care. His mother was his primary carer but his father was also involved in looking after him and meeting his needs after work, during the weekends and during his holidays;

(f) Y had only visited Russia on a single previous occasion – in March 2024;

(g) He has British citizenship;

(h) He was registered with a GP in the UK and attended appointments;

(i) His father worked in the UK;

(j) His mother worked in the UK;

(k) His paternal family lived in the UK and developed a bond with him;

(l) His maternal grandmother came to the UK to help with his care for a number of months;

(m) In April 2024 the Family Court sitting at Reading accepted that it had jurisdiction to make a prohibited steps order on the basis of Y’s habitual residence in England and Wales;

(n) His parents purchased their own family home on the outskirts of London in December 2024 and moved there in November 2025;

(o) Both parents contributed financially to the mortgage on the family home;

(p) The tickets to Russia in February 2026 were for return flights. This was only ever intended to be a short trip;

(q) On both parties’ case, both still intended, at the point of travelling to Russia, that they would return to the UK together with Y some 6 days later. As noted by the mother in her statement, “the purpose of the trip was for Y to spend time with my family, including elderly relatives who were unable to travel due to their health”;

(r) Moreover, both parents had always discussed their long-term future with Y as being in the UK. They discussed him being educated here;

(s) On the mother’s own case, she did not form any intention not to return on 08 February 2026 with Y before the date of the intended return flight. She was plainly not habitually resident herself in Russia on that date. The father also intended that all three would return to London then. For the avoidance of doubt, neither of Y’s carers had formed the intention to stay in Russia before the date of wrongful retention.

[55]There are a number of factors that might be said to support an argument that Y was habitually resident in Russia by 08 February 2026:(a) His mother is Russian;

(b) She owns property in Russia;

(d) He had previously visited Russia on one occasion and had attended some medical appointments there;

(e) The fact that he only visited on a single occasion before February 2026 was in part due to the prohibited steps order. I observe however that this was made by consent and followed the mother’s threat to remove him to Russia without the father’s consent;

(f) His mother began to be unhappy about her relationship with the father and perceived pressure and control from the paternal grandparents whilst the family was living in the UK. As his primary carer, his mother’s anxieties might be said to have undermined the stability of his life there. However I do note that neither parent has suggested Y was adversely affected by her unhappiness;

(g) Y moved with his parents between several properties before eventually settling into the family home they purchased;

(h) On arrival in Russia on 02 February 2026 he already had a relationship with his maternal grandmother, who had previously lived with him and his parents for several months in the UK;

(i) He held a certificate of registration at a Moscow address, dated to the time he was in Russia in February 2026, which enables him to access Russian health insurance.

[56]Whilst the mother points to various aspects of Y’s life since 08 February 2026 (see paragraph 35/36 above) that, she contends, indicate he has become, or is becoming, settled in Russia, those are immaterial to my decision, given the conclusion I have already reached about the date of wrongful retention.

[57]I have reached the clear conclusion, on balancing the factors on each side of the argument, that Y remained habitually resident in this jurisdiction at the time of the wrongful retention. Nothing about his circumstances up to that point support a conclusion that he had ceased to be habitually resident in the State in which he had previously spent the entirety of his life. Critically, his mother had not formed an intention to retain him in Russia until 08 February 2026 and I cannot identify anything within his circumstances at that point to suggest a degree of integration into a social and family life there that might justify a finding that his habitual residence had changed.

[58]It follows that the English court retains jurisdiction in respect of Y. I make a declaration that he remains habitually resident here and that he was wrongfully retained in Russia on 08 February 2026.

[59]Whilst I note that a Russian court has made a decision that Y should remain in his mother’s care, I cannot identify any jurisdictional reasoning within that decision. It remains the obligation of the English court to make a determination in relation to habitual residence and jurisdiction, which I have done.

[60]I give permission for this judgment to be translated and disclosed into any Russian proceedings, be they domestic proceedings or proceedings under the Hague Convention 1980.

[61]Although the father’s primary position is that the court should make a return order now, I intend to adjourn the case for further argument on that issue, with updating statements from each parent. There are to be statements filed and served by 4pm on 28 August 2026, limited to 8 sides of A4 double-spaced. These statements should not rehearse the history but should be limited to an update about Y’s circumstances and any evidence necessary for the court to make a return order. A hearing should be listed on the first available date after 07 September 2026, time-estimate ½ day. The decision about Y’s return will be made on submissions. Whilst I appreciate that the mother is intending to place Y in nursery in September 2026, a short period in nursery is unlikely to have much impact on the return decision and so there is no great imperative to have the hearing earlier than that. Mr N Goodwin KC sitting as a Deputy High Court judge