ZZ (Recognition of Foreign Step-Parent Adoption), Re [2026] EWHC 2164 (Fam)

[2026] EWHC 2164 (Fam)Case No FD25P00471IN THE FAMILY COURT HIGH COURT OF JUSTICEFAMILY DIVISIONDate 12/08/2026
Before
MR JUSTICE POOLE
Re ZZ (Recognition of Foreign Step-Parent Adoption)
Between
AAApplicantMZZRespondentsZZ (by his Children’s Guardian)Respondent
The Applicant was unrepresentedTom Corke of Biscoes for First RespondentJamie Niven-Phillips of Cafcass Legal for Second RespondentHearing Hearing date: 23 July 2026
JUDGMENTThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 12 August 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court.

Introduction

[1]AA applies for recognition at common law of a step-parent adoption made in Thailand in January 2013. The child concerned is ZZ, now aged 16. The first respondent is his mother, MZZ. On 23 July 2026, I heard brief oral submissions supplementing written submissions and reserved my judgment.[2]MZZ is ZZ’s biological mother. At the time of ZZ’s birth, she was a Thai citizen living in Thailand. She has since gained British citizenship and she lives in England. ZZ’s biological father was a Malaysian man with whom MZZ had a relatively brief relationship. He is now deceased. Whilst she was pregnant with ZZ, MZZ began a relationship with AA. They married in Thailand in February 2011 and, from ZZ’s birth, AA has brought him up as his son. AA and MZZ have another child, YY, who is now aged 15. He and ZZ have been brought up as brothers.[3]No father was registered on ZZ’s birth certificate. AA and MZZ began an adoption process in Thailand which concluded with an adoption order approved in January 2013 and registered in February 2013. In July 2013, the family moved to England. Sadly, in 2025 the relationship between AA and MZZ broke down and they separated. There are disputes about how this came about and the conduct of each party to the relationship, but ZZ and YY now both live with AA. MZZ lives separately. Children Act applications will be heard in the Family Court.[4]The applicant applied as a litigant in person and applied for a “declaration recognising the full adoption of ZZ in Thailand 2013 under the Family Law Act 1986.” As discussed later in this judgment there are two distinct procedures: (i)for common law recognition of the Thai adoption, and (ii) for a declaration under the Family Law Act 1986 (“FLA 1986”) s57 that ZZ is for the purposes of the Adoption Act 1976 and the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (“ACA 2002”) s67, the adopted child of AA. Only ZZ can apply for a declaration under FLA 1986 s57. At the time of the hearing there was no such application by ZZ and so, on AA’s application, the court can only determine his application for recognition.[5]I have received written evidence from AA and MZZ, a Guardian’s report, and an expert repot from Ms Chunhakasikarn of Chun & Chun Law, Bangkok, Thailand.[6]The evidence is that ZZ’s biological father played no part in his upbringing. MZZ had some contact with him when she still lived in Thailand, and he met ZZ on one occasion, but he did not take the opportunity to involve himself in ZZ’s life in his early years. He had other children and a separate family life of his own. Whilst I do not have documentary confirmation of his death by way of a death certificate, the parties have provided convincing evidence that he did die a few years ago.[7]The reason why AA makes this application for recognition of the adoption order now is because he and MZZ are at odds as to child arrangements. He wishes to have standing as a parent to apply for orders and to oppose applications by MZZ. He wishes for him and ZZ to have the benefit of legal recognition of him as ZZ’s adoptive father. Thus far he has had de facto but not legal parental responsibility. He has brought up ZZ as his own son within the family. Now that the family has broken apart, legal recognition is required to maintain the relationship and standing that they each have with each other. AA does not want there to be any discrimination about the way ZZ and YY are treated during and in consequence of AA’s separation and divorce from MZZ. Furthermore, as I accept, AA’s evidence is that until his separation from MZZ and the prospect of children proceedings loomed, it never struck him that he needed to apply for recognition of the adoption. It is not something that ever came up in day to day life.[8]ZZ grew up believing that AA was his father. It was not until the summer of 2024 that ZZ learned the true identity of his biological father and that he had been adopted by AA.

The Legal Framework

[9]The Thai adoption was not completed under the rules of the Hague Convention of 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption. It was not a “Convention adoption”. “Overseas adoptions” are recognised in England and Wales. By the Adoption and Children Act 1983 (“ACA 2002”) s87:
“Overseas adoptions (1) In this Act, “overseas adoption”— (a) means an adoption of a description specified in an order made by the Secretary of State, being a description of adoptions effected under the law of any country or territory outside the British Islands, but (b) does not include a Convention adoption. (2) Regulations may prescribe the requirements that ought to be met by an adoption of any description effected after the commencement of the regulations for it to be an overseas adoption for the purposes of this Act.”
[10]The Adoption (Recognition of Overseas Adoptions) Order 2013 is the relevant Order under ACA 2002 s87(1)(a). Article 2 of the Order provides that “An adoption of a child is specified as an overseas adoption if it is an adoption effected under the law of a country or territory listed in the Schedule after the coming into force of this Order and is not a Convention adoption.” Thailand is listed in the Schedule to the Order, but the Order came into force on 3 January 2014 which was after ZZ’s adoption.[11]Hence ZZ’s adoption in Thailand is neither a Convention adoption nor an overseas adoption within the meaning of ACA s87, and the only available route for recognition is through the common law.[12]Recognition at common law of a foreign adoption was reviewed in Re Valentine’s Settlement, Valentine and ors v Valentine and ors [1965] Ch 831. The judgment was reviewed by Munby P in Re N (A Child) [2016] EWHC 3085 (Fam): “[122] ‘analysis of the reasoning in Re Valentine's Settlement indicates the existence of four, and only four, criteria: i) The adoptive parents must have been domiciled in the foreign country at the time of the foreign adoption. ii) The child must have been legally adopted in accordance with the requirements of the foreign law. iii) The foreign adoption must in substance have the same essential characteristics as an English adoption. As MacDonald J put it [paragraphs 115, 117 of QS v RS and T (No. 3) [2016] EWHC 2470 (Fam)], Did the concept of adoption in the foreign jurisdiction substantially conform with the English concept of adoption? iv) There must be no reason in public policy for refusing recognition.’[13]Munby P also held that there was no justification in importing two additional criteria, as had variously been suggested in other first instance judgments, namely best interests, and similarity of the adoption process between the foreign adoption and domestic adoption.[14]As to the necessity for all four of the Re Valentine’s Settlement criteria to be met, Munby P expressly agreed (albeit in an obiter section of his judgment) with MacDonald J’s analysis in QS v RS and T (above) where he held: “[100] I am satisfied that in determining an application for the recognition of a foreign adoption at common law and an application for a declaration pursuant to the Family Law Act 1986 s 57 the court must ensure that it acts in a manner that is compatible with the Art 8 right of the mother, the father and T to respect for family life. Further, within this context, and after much anxious deliberation, I am satisfied that the strict application of the rule as to status conditions in Re Valentine's Settlement to the very particular circumstances of this case, with a concomitant refusal to recognise the adoption lawfully constituted in Nepal in terms which substantially conform with the English concept of adoption by reason of the failure to comply with status conditions as to domicile or habitual residence applicable in this country, would result in an interference in the Art 8 right to respect for family life of the mother, father and T that cannot be said to be either necessary or proportionate. … [104] …my conclusion does not amount to a decision that the rule in Re Valentine's Settlement is incompatible with Art 8 of the ECHR per se. Rather, it amounts simply to a decision that the application of that common law rule in the very particular circumstances of this case would breach the Art 8 rights of the parents and T."[15]MacDonald J adopted the same analysis in KN and BN v RN and TN [2023] EWHC 712 (Fam). In that case he observed:
“65. The existence of family life for the purposes of Art 8 is a matter of fact dependent on the existence of close personal ties between the child and others (K v United Kingdom (1986) 50 DR 199). In EM (Lebanon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department ALF intervening [2009] 1 All ER 539 at [37] Lord Bingham observed as follows regarding the models of family life that may come within the ambit of Art 8: “Families differ widely, in their composition and in the mutual relations which exist between the members, and marked changes are likely to occur over time within the same family. Thus, there is no pre-determined model of family or family life to which art 8 must be applied. The article requires respect to be shown for the right to such family life as is or may be enjoyed by the particular Applicant or Applicants before the court, always bearing in mind (since any family must have at least two members, and may have many more) the participation of other members who share in the life of that family. In this context, as in most Convention contexts, the facts of the particular case are crucial.” 66. In Kurochkin v Ukraine (2010) Application No. 42276/08 at [37] the ECtHR held that an adoptive parent and an adopted child are as a rule of the same nature as the family relations protected by Art 8 of the Convention and such a relationship, arising from a lawful and genuine adoption, may be deemed sufficient to attract such respect as may be due for family life under Art 8 of the Convention. … 68. Finally with respect to the question of the existence of family life for the purposes of Art 8, in respect of siblings, the existence of family life between a child and his or her siblings is consonant with the use of the word ‘everyone’ in Art 8 of the ECHR, including family life as between half siblings (see Marckx v Belgium (1979) 2 EHRR 330).”
[16]I was referred to two cases in which this approach has been endorsed obiter, namely by Knowles J in Re G (Recognition of a Nigerian Adoption [2024] EWHC 2769 (Fam) and by Harrison J in Re X (Recognition of Nigerian Adoption) [2026] EWHC 638 (Fam). I also note that in Re D [2022] EWHC 3602 (Fam), Newton J adopted the same approach in an obiter section of his judgment.

Application of Re Valentine’s Settlement

[17]In the present case AA has given very helpful written evidence which I accept as reliable in relation to the adoption process. Nevertheless, I have to scrutinise his claims as to domicile. AA says that in 2011 he held a multi-entry visa for Thailand. He applied for a spousal visa with a view to residing in Thailand. At the time he was travelling extensively for his work. He was issued a 30-day Thai Marriage Visa in June 2011 and a Full Marriage Visa for one year in July 2011 and again in June 2012. Thus, at the time of the registration of the adoption in February 2013, AA had a Full Thai Marriage Visa but valid only to 22 June 2013.[18]AA was born in the UK. He worked globally with a focus on South-East Asia, working for a Norwegian company. He and MZZ met in Malaysia, where AA had an apartment, in October 2010. Two to three months later they moved to Thailand. After a year or so they built what he describes as a “new permanent family home” in Thailand. At the time of the adoption this remained their home and AA claims that by then he had abandoned his UK domicile of origin and had acquired domicile of choice in Thailand. He planned to retire there, he says.[19]In fact, he, MZZ, and the children permanently relocated to England on 11 July 2013, approximately five months after the registration of the adoption. The reason for the relocation was connected with AA’s career. In September 2012, he had terminated his employment with the Norwegian company. To maintain income, he accepted a role with another Norwegian company (“N2”) under a three month trial period. He resigned from N2 during the trial period, on 31 December 2012. He still had a home in the UK, which was subject to a mortgage, which was a former matrimonial home from his previous marriage. He needed income and in late 2012/early 2013, contacted the Managing Director of GD a company for which he had previously worked. He accepted a role as Head of Global Sales and Marketing with GD beginning on 18 February 2013 “as a short-term bridge, subject to probation”. In late 2012, AA applied for UK visitor visas for MZZ and ZZ. He then applied for visas for them to relocate to England and those visas were granted in April and May 2013. The role with GD became permanent and the family relocated to England in July 2013. MZZ and ZZ later became British citizens and hold British passports. YY was born in the UK and is also a British citizen.[20]The following principles of law, derived from Dicey, Morris and Collins on The Conflict of Laws (2006), were summarised by Arden LJ in Barlow Blowes International Ltd & Ors v Henwood [2008] EWCA Civ 577 at [8]:
“(i) A person is, in general, domiciled in the country in which he is considered by English law to have his permanent home. A person may sometimes be domiciled in a country although he does not have his permanent home in it. (ii) No person can be without a domicile. (iii) No person can at the same time for the same purpose have more than one domicile. (iv) An existing domicile is presumed to continue until it is proved that a new domicile has been acquired. (v) Every person receives at birth a domicile of origin. (vi) Every independent person can acquire a domicile of choice by the combination of residence and an intention of permanent or indefinite residence, but not otherwise. (vii) Any circumstance that is evidence of a person's residence, or of his intention to reside permanently or indefinitely in a country, must be considered in determining whether he has acquired a domicile of choice. (viii) In determining whether a person intends to reside permanently or indefinitely, the court may have regard to the motive for which residence was taken up, the fact that residence was not freely chosen, and the fact that residence was precarious. (ix) A person abandons a domicile of choice in a country by ceasing to reside there and by ceasing to intend to reside there permanently, or indefinitely, and not otherwise. (x) When a domicile of choice is abandoned, a new domicile of choice may be acquired, but, if it is not acquired, the domicile of origin revives.”
' considered by English law to have his permanent home. A person

may sometimes be domiciled in a country although he does not have

[21]Arden LJ noted that domicile of origin is “tenacious”. Others have described it as adherent. She held that for a person to acquire domicile of choice the country of choice must be his ultimate home where he would wish to spend his last days.[22]I am not satisfied that AA had acquired domicile of choice in Thailand by January or February 2013 when the adoption was respectively approved and registered. He had set up a home there with MZZ and the children, but he had led a peripatetic lifestyle for a number of years, he worked globally, and he was still searching for permanent work including for companies based out of Thailand. Notwithstanding his evidence that he had decided to live the remainder of his days in Thailand, I find that he had clearly not closed his mind to moving away from Thailand – that is what the family did only a few months after the adoption. He was open to acquiring a role which would require him and the family to relocate to England. He was liable to move where the work took him. He still had significant ties in England including a mortgaged property. Domicile of origin is adherent and I do not accept that he had shed his domicile of origin in England and acquired domicile of choice in Thailand or anywhere else.[23]The expert evidence of Ms Chunhakasikarn firmly establishes that AA’s adoption of ZZ proceeded with due process and in accordance with the law in Thailand at the relevant time. It was a legal adoption meeting the requirements of Thai law. AA was not required to be domiciled in Thailand at the time of the adoption, only to be resident there, which he was. It does not appear that ZZ’s biological father gave formal consent to the adoption but, since no father was named on ZZ’s birth certificate, the lack of his consent did not invalidate the adoption under Thai law.[24]As Ms Chunhakasikarn has advised, the Thai adoption did not fully sever ZZ’s ties with his biological father. The biological father lost his parental power and the adoptive parent became the child’s legal custodian, but, she advises, “the adoption would not completely terminate the pre-existing parent-child relationship … as the adopted child still has rights and duties to its family or origin … such as the obligation of the adopted child to support the family of origin… Moreover, the family of origin and the adopted child are still entitled to each other’s inheritance.” Furthermore, she advises, a “Thai adoption can be revoked … when the adopted child reaches the maturity age of 20”, with the consent of the adoptive parent, or if one party causes criminal harm to the other, or fails to provide maintenance, deserts them, is sentenced to imprisonment for more than three years, or some other reason for forfeiture of the adoption is established.[25]I am mindful that Thai adoptions are now “overseas adoptions” and therefore automatically recognised and that I have no evidence that the effect of an adoption of the kind made in the present case has changed over time since AA’s adoption. However, I have to apply the common law and the principles from Re Valentine’s Settlement. There are important differences in substance between AA’s adoption in Thailand and an English adoption. As the Supreme Court recently affirmed in In the matter of X and Y (Children: Adoption[26]In this case I can identify no public policy reason for refusing recognition. The expert evidence suggests to me that the process and laws governing Thai adoptions did not change materially between the date of ZZ’s adoption and 3 January 2014 from when Thai adoptions were deemed to be overseas adoptions under the ACA 2002 and the 2013 Order. Hence, the adoption would have been recognised in this jurisdiction had it taken place in exactly the same circumstances with the same process, but twelve months later. ZZ has been brought up by AA as his son for 16 years. All parties are British citizens now so there is no benefit for their immigration status in the adoption being recognised. No-one has acted in bad faith or unlawfully in respect of the adoption or the parties’ entry to the UK. I have considered whether it would be contrary to public policy now to recognise the step-parent adoption because AA and MZZ are divorced and no longer living together and will soon divorce. However, in my judgement, AA’s purpose in making this application is legitimate. He seeks to have standing as a parent in the Children Act proceedings. Furthermore, MZZ supports the application. I do not believe he is abusing the opportunity to apply for any ulterior or inappropriate purpose.[27]Hence, two of the four Re Valentine’s Settlement criteria are satisfied in this case but two are not. I turn therefore to the relevant rights to a family and private life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights which are engaged. Would the application of the rule in Re Valentine’s Settlement in this case result in a breach of the Article 8 right to respect for family life of AA and/or ZZ?

Article 8

[28]In the context of applications for parental orders under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, it is now well established that the statutory provisions therein should be “read down” to ensure that protected rights under Article 8 are not impaired. Such rights must be “practical and effective” not “theoretical and illusory”. In Re X (A Child) (Surrogacy: Time limit) [2014] EWHC 3135 (Fam), Munby P held that the court has jurisdiction to make a parental order under s54 notwithstanding non-compliance with one of the statutory conditions - that the application must be made within six months of the child’s birth. He referred to Theis J’s “crucially important” decision in A v P (Surrogacy: Parental[29]I am concerned not with reading down a statutory provision but with recognition of a foreign adoption at common law. Nevertheless, the dicta as to Article 8 noted above are highly relevant to the present issue. With those remarks in mind, I make the following observations relevant to the present case.a. I note that there is no other means of achieving legal recognition of the parental relationship between AA and ZZ. AA would be denied a remedy if the adoption is not recognised and ZZ would not be able to apply for a declaration of legitimacy under FLA 1986 s57. AA cannot make a joint application for an adoption in this jurisdiction because he and MZZ have separated and are divorcing. For the same reason he cannot apply for a step-parent adoption here. Nor can he make a sole application because ZZ has a mother who is perfectly capable of looking after him and exercising parental responsibility, and who would object to any termination of her parental responsibility. The court would not dispense with her consent.b. ZZ has grown up with AA as his father. From his birth until now AA has been his de facto father and he will continue to be so. Indeed, until two years ago ZZ believed that AA was his biological father. Their family life has been lived as father and son since ZZ was born.c. As a matter of fact, all ties with ZZ’s biological father have long since been severed and his biological father is deceased. He had no relationship at all with his biological father whilst he was alive. His biological father played no role in ZZ’s life.d. As the guardian’s report clearly demonstrates, ZZ has a close relationship not only with his father but also with his father’s extended family. He also has a close relationship with his brother, YY who is the biological son of AA and MZZ. ZZ has grown up with YY as his brother. Recognition of the adoption would recognise and cement that fraternal relationship and AA’s place within the wider family.e. AA is very clear that he wants the adoption to be recognised. He wants AA to become his legal father in this jurisdiction. He is of an age and understanding where he is aware of his legal status within the family.f. MZZ also supports the application. Until their separation, she and AA brought up ZZ together as husband and wife.g. Relying on the guardian’s report, it is evident that refusing the application would “have a substantial impact on [ZZ] in that it would prevent alignment between his experience of [AA] as his father and their legal relationship.” It would be detrimental to ZZ to refuse the application. It would undermine his sense of his own identity as a son to AA and a brother to YY. It would adversely affect his sense of himself as having an equal position with YY in relation to their parents, AA and MZZ, and within the wider family.h. Whilst the existence of family life does not require all the family to live together (see para. 65 of KN and BN v RN and TN (above)), in fact ZZ continues to co-habit with AA. Whatever circumstances have led to this point, the applicant currently acts as ZZ’s primary, parental carer.i. Allowing for the revocability of the Thai adoption order, it was intended to be a lifelong order. As experienced by ZZ and his family, it has been treated as a lifelong order. It has given ZZ a family and identity that was intended to continue beyond his childhood.j. For ZZ and for the other members of his family, his identity and family life have not been theoretical and illusory: they have been very real, fundamental aspects of his life and their lives.[30]A refusal to recognise the Thai adoption would therefore constitute a very significant interference with both ZZ’s and AA’s rights to a private life and a family life. That family life is firmly established on the basis of a father-son relationship which has subsisted since ZZ’s birth. ZZ is recognised as AA’s son by the immediate family, the wider family, and the communities in which they live. As such, ZZ is also recognised as YY’s brother. Recognition of the Thai adoption would allow ZZ to apply for a declaration under the Family Law Act 1986 that he is the adopted child of AA for the purposes of the law of England and Wales. He would then be treated in law as a child of AA and MZZ which is what he has always been in fact. To refuse recognition would be to deprive him of the opportunity to acquire that legal status reflecting the reality of his identity and relationship to AA (and to YY).[31]I am mindful that there is no endorsement of the approach taken by MacDonald J in QS v RS and T and KN and BN v RNand TN at appellate level. Moreover, the support for MacDonald J’s approach by Munby P, Knowles J, Newton J, and Harrison J was, in each case, obiter. Nevertheless, the consistent first instance endorsements, including by the then President of the Family Division, carry significant weight and MacDonald J’s analysis in both cases is compelling. I adopt it.[32]Considering all the circumstances of this particular case, I am fully satisfied that it would be a disproportionate interference with the Article 8 rights of both AA and ZZ to refuse the application. The interference would be in accordance with the law because, as MacDonald J observed at para. 94 of KN and BN v RN and TN (above), the rule in Re Valentine’s Settlement is well established, but it would be disproportionate:a. Article 8 protects the private and family life of ZZ and of AA.b. For the reasons set out above, refusal of recognition would be a very significant interference with ZZ’s Article 8 rights. Hence, any justifications for that interference would have to be sufficiently strong in order for such interference to be proportionate.c. There is no means by which AA could now adopt ZZ hence the interference would not be remediable by any other means.d. The strict application of the rule in Re Valentine’s Settlement can serve to protect against giving effect to a foreign adoption that is far removed from the nature of adoption in this jurisdiction, or to protect against abuse of the adoption system. There is advantage in having clear common law rules which lead to predictable outcomes. However, in this case, notwithstanding the fact that two of the conditions from Re Valentine’s Settlement are not met, there would be no adverse consequences from the court recognising the adoption: i. The adoption was clearly entered into in good faith and for the benefit of the child concerned. ii. The adoption was a step-parent adoption and so was not intended to and did not sever all ties with ZZ’s biological family – his biological mother remained as his maternal carer, married to AA. iii. Whilst AA was not domiciled in Thailand at the time of the adoption, this was a step-parent adoption, MZZ was domiciled in Thailand, and AA and MZZ lived together in Thailand as husband and wife at the time. iv. Whilst the Thai adoption did not sever all legal ties and all the rights and responsibilities of the birth father, he is now dead (on the evidence presented to this court) and, during his lifetime, chose not to have any involvement with ZZ. The rights and obligations which were retained after the Thai adoption were concerned with inheritance not the exercise of what is referred to in Thailand as “parental power” and would here be called parental responsibility. Parental responsibility was terminated by the Thai adoption and given to AA, with MZZ retaining her parental responsibility. Hence, recognition of the Thai adoption would not have any significant adverse effect on the biological father or his family. v. This form of Thai adoption would now be automatically recognised within this jurisdiction as an overseas adoption.e. The child, his biological mother, his adoptive father, and the guardian all support the applicant for recognition.

Conclusion on Recognition at Common Law

[33]Accordingly, on the facts of this particular case, I am satisfied that the strict application of the rule in Re Valentine’s Settlement would constitute a disproportionate interference with ZZ’s, and AA’s, Article 8 rights to respect for private and family life. It would result in the court acting in a way that is incompatible with their Convention rights which would be unlawful under the Human Rights Act 1998 s 6.[34]I am satisfied that I have the power to recognise the Thai adoption at common law and I do so.

Application for a Declaration under FLA 1986 s57

[35]After the hearing, having belatedly noted that AA had sought a declaration under the FLA 1986 I sought the parties’ submissions by email on how to proceed. I was very helpfully referred to the judgment of Cobb J in In the matter of G (children) [2014] EWHC 2605 (Fam). He has walked the same road and has provided a route map which I shall use to navigate the way forward in the present case.[36]The parties encouraged the court to find a way to proceed expeditiously to a declaration under FLA 1986 s57. There is some difficult in doing so.a. Following the reasoning of Cobb J in In the matter of G (above), the court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction when there is an accessible and well-established statutory regime available.b. FLA 1986 s57 provides:
“Declarations as to adoptions effected overseas. (1) Any person whose status as an adopted child of any person depends on whether he has been adopted by that person by either - (a) a Convention adoption, or an overseas adoption, within the meaning of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, or (b) an adoption recognised by the law of England and Wales and effected under the law of any country outside the British Islands, may apply to the High Court or the family court for one (or for one or, in the alternative, the other) of the declarations mentioned in subsection (2) below. (2) The said declarations are - (a) a declaration that the applicant is for the purposes of section 39 of the Adoption Act 1976 or section 67 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 the adopted child of that person; (b) a declaration that the applicant is not for the purposes of that section the adopted child of that person. (3) A court shall have jurisdiction to entertain an application under subsection (1) above if, and only if, the applicant - (a) is domiciled in England and Wales on the date of the application, or (b) has been habitually resident in England and Wales throughout the period of one year ending with that date. (4) Until the Adoption Act 1976 comes into force - (a) subsection (1) above shall have effect as if for the reference to section 72(2) of that Act there were substituted a reference to section 4(3) of the Adoption Act 1968; and (b) subsection (2) above shall have effect as if for the reference to section 39 of that Act there were substituted a reference to Part II of Schedule I to the Children Act 1975.” c. Thus, only ZZ can make an application for a declaration as to the adoption under s57, not AA. ZZ has not made any such application but, I am now told, wishes to do so. d. ZZ might very well meet the condition at FLA 1986 s57(3)(a) but would certainly meet the condition at FLA 1986 s57(3)(b). My decision on recognition would therefore mean that ZZ could apply for a declaration on the basis of the court’s recognition and his habitual residence. e. FLA 1986 s58(1) provides: “(1) Where on an application to a court for a declaration under this Part the truth of the proposition to be declared is proved to the satisfaction of the court, the court shall make that declaration unless to do so would manifestly be contrary to public policy.” f. An application for a declaration under FLA 1986 s57 must be made on form C65 by way of the FPR Part 19 procedure. The applicant would have to set out the grounds on which the applicant relies for his assertion that he is entitled to seek the declaration and file the written evidence on which he intends to rely. The respondent would be AA (FPR r8.20). In accordance with FPR r19.5 the respondent would have to file an acknowledgement of service within 14 days of service of the application form. g. Being a child, ZZ would need a litigation friend to make an application for a declaration: FPR r16.5. AA would be the respondent to the application and cannot therefore act as litigation friend. h. FPR r8.21 provides that the applicant would have to send a copy of the application and all accompanying documents to the Attorney General at least one month before the making of the application. The Attorney General may decide to intervene in the proceedings. This follows, but goes further than, FLA 1986 s59 which provides at s59(1): and (2). “(1) On an application to a court for a declaration under this Part the court may at any stage of the proceedings, of its own motion or on the application of any party to the proceedings, direct that all necessary papers in the matter be sent to the Attorney General. (2) The Attorney General, whether or not he is sent papers in relation to tan application to a court for a declaration under this Part, may - (a) intervene in the proceedings on that application … (b) argue before the court any question in relation to the application which the court considers it necessary to have fully argued.”
As Cobb J noted the mandatory obligation under FPR 2010 and the discretionary regime under the FLA 1986 “do not appear to fit well together.” He noted two reasons for the requirement of notice to the Attorney General: (i) To prevent the proceedings being brought to achieve a benefit or status to which the applicant would not otherwise be entitled (such as British Citizenship); (ii) To ensure that orders or declarations in relation to adoption are not made which would be contrary to public policy.[37]Not only has ZZ not yet made an application but no advance notice of an application under FLA 1986 s57 has been given to the Attorney General.[38]Cobb J reminded himself of his powers:
“i) Rule 6.36 of the FPR 2010 appears to give me wide powers to dispense with service of any document which is to be served in proceedings (this applies to the service of documents except where a different provision appears in the rules, “or the court otherwise directs”); ii) I have wide general powers of management of cases (notably rule 4.1(o) to “take any … step or make any … order for the purpose of managing the case and furthering the overriding objective”); iii) Linked to (ii) above, I can specifically make an order to remedy an error in any procedure (“such as a failure to comply with a rule or Practice Direction”) – see rule 4.7 FPR 2010; iv) I should have regard to the overriding objective to deal with the application “justly” and “proportionately” (rule 1(1)/ (2) FPR 2010); v) The 1986 Act (specifically section 59(2)) appears to contemplate that the application for a declaration may have been issued and actually be before the court for determination without the papers having been previously sent to him (i.e. “whether or not he is sent papers in relation to an application to a court for a declaration under this Part”: see above).”
[39]Whilst Cobb J noted that the circumstances in which it would be appropriate to waive compliance with r 8.21 were rare, in the case before him he directed that the application, which had recently been issued, should be sent to the Attorney General and that if he did not indicate a wish to intervene by a fixed date, the final order making a declaration under FLA 1986 s57 would be made.[40]In the present case, it is clear that ZZ has standing to make an application under FLA 1986 s57. He has been habitually resident in England and Wales for several years (I do not have to determine if he is domiciled here). The Thai adoption is, by this judgment and subsequent order, recognised in this jurisdiction at common law. I can see no public policy grounds under which the court would refuse to make the declaration. ZZ is already a British citizen: the declaration would not give him any additional immigration benefit or status. The Thai adoption would have been an overseas adoption which would have been automatically recognised had it taken place a year later. The adoption was entered into in good faith for the benefit of ZZ and the application for a declaration would not be made for any illegitimate or inappropriate purpose.[41]However, in my judgment, whilst ensuring that procedural requirements should be just and proportionate to the particular circumstances of this case, I should respect the integrity of the process for making what is a profound declaration under FLA 1986 s57. As it happens, after completing the first draft of this judgment I was informed that a C65 form has been completed but no application issued. It appears that ZZ has a litigation friend who is not AA. I do not dispense with the requirement for a formal application to be made by ZZ in accordance with FPR Part 19. The application should be issued but I also shall not dispense with the requirement on ZZ to give notice of the application and evidence in support (which can include a copy of this judgment which I shall permit him to provide to the Attorney General together with a schedule of the names of the persons anonymised herein) one month before issuing proceedings. I shall dispense with the requirement for an Acknowledgement of Service because I know that the respondent, AA, consents to such an application, and I shall direct that upon the application being issued it shall be referred to me within 14 days for my determination on the papers. If there is no intervention by the Attorney General, then I shall be very likely to make the declaration sought in ZZ’s application.[42]An order shall be drawn accordingly.

Order

Setting Aside [2026] UKSC 13, a valid adoption in England and Wales cannot be revoked. It is final and permanent. That is an important difference of substance from ZZ’s Thai adoption. I am not satisfied that the third Re Valentine’s Settlement criterion is met. The Thai adoption is not substantially the same in effect as an adoption in this jurisdiction in which all legal ties with the birth parent are severed and which, if validly made, cannot be revoked. Order: Death of Applicant) [2011] EWHC 1738 (Fam), [2012] 2 FLR 145. Theis J had referred to Article 8 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 and said, "The concept of identity includes the legal recognition of relationships between children and parents. In ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 4, [2011] 2 All ER 783 Baroness Hale of Richmond considered that the courts in this jurisdiction and decision makers had to have regard to the key principles of the UNCRC 1989, both in respect of Art 8 of the European Convention and in its application to decisions by authorities in this jurisdiction (see paras [22]– [25]). If the consequences of a purposive construction of s 54(4) of the HFEA 2008 are that the child's identity with his biological father is preserved and the child's identity is linked to both Mr and Mrs A the court may consider itself bound to arrive at such a conclusion on the combined reading of Art 8 of the European Convention and Art 8 of the UNCRC 1989." Munby P found Theis J’s reasoning in her judgment to be “powerful and compelling”. He said, further at para. 61: “Theis J focussed on that aspect of Article 8 which protects "family life", but Article 8 also protects "private life", and 'identity', on which she appropriately laid stress, is an important aspect of "private life". So, any application for a parental order implicates both the child's right to "family life" and also the child's right to "private life". The distinction does not matter in the circumstances of the present case (see further below), but I make the point because it is, I suppose, possible to conceive of a case where, on the facts, it might be more difficult or even impossible to demonstrate the existence of "family life."