“11. The confinement set out below which is in place for Mustafa is necessary, the least restrictive and is a proportionate response to the risk of harm which may arise: a) all doors leading to the main road to be kept locked and key to be kept out of Mustafa’s access to prevent Mustafa absconding; b) the kitchen door to be locked during night times; c) 1:1 care support at all times within home and in the community; d) the placement is permitted to provide 2:1 support as assessed by the placement to be necessary, to include when he is in the community; e) all kitchen tools and sharp tools to be kept out of reach and to be used only under supervision; f) care support for administration of medicines to safeguard his health; g) constant supervision to ensure the child's personal care needs are met in a safe manner; 12. There is reasonable cause to believe that, if the Inherent Jurisdiction is not exercised with respect to Mustafa, that he is likely to suffer significant harm. 13. In depriving Mustafa of his liberty, the local authority and staff members at [the School] are directed to use the minimum degree of force or restraint required. The use of such force and restraint is lawful and in Mustafa’s best interests provided always that the measures are: a) the least restrictive of the child’s rights and freedoms; b) proportionate to the anticipated harm; c) the least required to ensure the child’s safety and that of others; and d) respectful of the child’s dignity.” a) all doors leading to the main road to be kept locked and key to be kept out of Mustafa’s access to prevent Mustafa absconding; b) the kitchen door to be locked during night times; c) 1:1 care support at all times within home and in the community; d) the placement is permitted to provide 2:1 support as assessed by the placement to be necessary, to include when he is in the community; e) all kitchen tools and sharp tools to be kept out of reach and to be used only under supervision; f) care support for administration of medicines to safeguard his health; g) constant supervision to ensure the child's personal care needs are met in a safe manner; a) the least restrictive of the child’s rights and freedoms; b) proportionate to the anticipated harm; c) the least required to ensure the child’s safety and that of others; and d) respectful of the child’s dignity.”
“In summary: (a) The Concrete Situation for Mustafa — he resides at a specialist residential school where he has lived continuously since late 2021. The placement is stable, settled and long-standing. It is his home and educational environment. He attends school, accesses community activities, maintains peer relationships, participates in leisure activities and enjoys regular family contact. The evidence demonstrates a young person who is integrated into his placement rather than isolated within it. (b) Mustafa has consistently described himself as happy living at the School. During the Local Authority's assessment undertaken following the Court's directions, Mustafa stated that he “likes living at [the School]”, spoke positively about staff and peers and identified a wide range of activities that he enjoys. He has never expressed a wish to leave the placement and has never asked to move elsewhere. (c) The effect of the arrangements on Mustafa is overwhelmingly positive. He has made significant progress in education, independent living skills, social development, emotional regulation and physical health. He enjoys a full programme of educational, recreational and community-based activities. He has meaningful family contact and returns to the placement after home visits without difficulty. (d) It is accepted that certain restrictions remain in place, including locked external doors, 1:1 supervision, monitoring around food, staff administration of medication and supervision in the community. However. the manner in which the arrangements are implemented is also relevant. Staff seek to provide a nurturing environment. The placement operates a restraint reduction plan, regularly reviews incidents and actively seeks to reduce restrictions where possible. Physical intervention is used only as a last resort where there is a risk of harm and staff increasingly utilise less restrictive strategies such as de-escalation, predictability and allowing Mustafa time and space to regulate. (e) Valid Consent— The Local Authority submits that this is the critical feature of the present case. The question is whether he possesses a sufficient level of awareness and understanding to know whether he is happy or unhappy with his living arrangements and to communicate that view. Mustafa clearly meets that threshold. (f) He is able to identify what he likes about the School, describe his relationships with staff and peers, discuss activities that he enjoys and articulate his future aspirations. He has expressed views regarding family contact and has specifically requested additional overnight stays with his family. (g) Importantly, Mustafa is not merely acquiescent. He routinely expresses preferences, disagrees with decisions, negotiates with adults and communicates dissatisfaction when he does not agree with something. (h) The significance of Mustafa's repeated and consistent statements that he likes living at the School cannot be understated. (i) The arrangements are protective and supportive in nature. They are directed towards enabling Mustafa to access education, maintain his health, participate safely in community activities, enjoy family relationships and develop independence skills. (j) Mustafa understands, in broad terms, why staff provide support. He understands that staff help him with medication, diet, healthcare, community activities and emotional regulation. He also understands why intervention may be required when there is a risk of harm. (k) There is no evidence that medication is being used in a manner that suppresses Mustafa's ability to express wishes and feelings. (l) Normality of Mustafa’s Circumstance — Mustafa is a looked after child with profound and enduring disabilities. His care arrangements must be assessed in the context of those disabilities and his very significant support needs. (m) The restrictions identified by the Local Authority are not arbitrary restrictions imposed upon an unwilling child. They are the practical measures required to enable Mustafa to live safely in a residential educational setting given his learning disability, limited awareness of danger, emotional dysregulation and history of absconding. (n) Viewed through the lens of Mustafa's own circumstances, the arrangements represent ordinary and necessary features of the specialist care package that he requires.”
“13. At his LAC [looked after child] review in July 2026, Mustafa is described as being happy and settled in his placement at [the School] and making progress in some areas of his development. 14. Mustafa has an EHCP [education, health and care plan] and attends upper school, with 1:1 support. Mustafa is showing progress in reading, writing and numbers. Mustafa has been interacting well with his peers and is on a reward programme to ensure punctuality at school. 15. Mustafa’s independent living skills are noted to be improving, with Mustafa learning to prepare simple meals, keep his room tidy and complete some laundry tasks with support although at times can be resistant to the latter. 16. Mustafa is enjoying an active lifestyle and is following a bespoke high protein diet, such that he is maintaining a healthy weight (see LAC review minutes in February 2026). 17. However, Mustafa continues to require a high level of structure, routine, supervision and support at the School. 18. Mustafa continues to struggle with changes in routines, staff or around meals and family time, which can lead to anxiety and difficulties for Mustafa in regulating his emotions. At such times, Mustafa can struggle to process verbal information and can engage in destructive behaviours and aggression towards staff... Mustafa has been observed to engage in self-harming habits when distressed and can need time and space to regulate and reflect. 19. It is understood that there have been 48 recorded incidents since July 2025. Mustafa’s behaviour continues to necessitate the use of RPI on occasion, which he finds difficult. 20. However, the LA, in light of recent case law, do not see that the current arrangements result in restrictions or coercion but rather are there to protect Mustafa and that he accepts the restrictions. 21. The Guardian visited with Mustafa, along with his solicitor on [a day in] June 2026. Mustafa had returned to his accommodation from the school block. He was able to confirm that he recognized both from a visit the previous year. Some brief discussion occurred around a judge making decisions about his current living conditions, which Mustafa showed an interest in, and his having some knowledge of ‘police court’. It was clear that whilst Mustafa was not competent to instruct separately, he was clearly expressing his wishes and feelings. Part of the discussion was also had in the absence of the presence of members of staff. 22. Mustafa was asked a number of questions about how he felt about his circumstances and whilst he responded almost immediately in a positive manner, raising some concern as to whether he was processing information, it would appear that he was content with the current restrictions. Given that those instructed and the Guardian have worked with Mustafa for some time, albeit sporadically, we are aware that he does have the capacity to express what he does not like. A further reassurance was feedback received from the IRO [Independent Reviewing Officer] who attended the recent LAC review and ‘In relation to restrictive physical intervention/restraint’, Mustafa was asked how he feels when staff need to hold him to stop him hurting others or himself. At this review, he said he felt ‘fine’ about it and appeared to understand that it happens to keep people safe. [I] reminded him that at the previous review he had said he did not like restraint.”
“Mustafa becomes physically aggressive and starts displaying physical aggression and destruction of properties when he struggles to regulate his emotion. This increases risk of harm for himself and for staff. He continues to require physical restraints (two persons holding each of his arms) to keep him and others safe.”
“23. The court is to have regard to the recent decision [in AGNI]. This case effectively aligns more closely with the interpretation of Article 5(1) of the Human Rights Convention. 24. ‘In that context the starting point must be to identify to what an individual is or is not consenting, and that inevitably requires consideration of the objective element, regarding the circumstances of the confinement’: [Supreme Court at para [52]]. Thus, the specific situation of the individual concerned, and the assessment is multifactorial, with account taken of a whole range of factors including the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in question. 25. In short, the objective and subjective elements are at play, and regard should be given to whether an individual can validly consent to the restrictions. Here Mustafa appears content with his arrangements and was able to communicate this to a number of professionals, including during his recent LAC review and also during the visit with his Guardian and Solicitor. 26. The Guardian has given very careful thought to the restrictions to the DOL order originally sought by the LA, and whether valid consent could be gleaned from Mustafa, but overall, the Guardian agrees with the LA, that the majority of the restrictions do not amount to coercion and that Mustafa does consent to them and understands the reasons are to keep him safe. 27. …[H]aving regard to the frequency of the need for restraint the Guardian is mindful that… Mustafa, while he does not like these restrictions, appears to have accepted them as part of his overall care arrangement. However, it remains difficult to know whether this is compliance by Mustafa rather than valid consent. 28. The Guardian believes that the frequency of restraint represents a regular pattern of the use of physical intervention to manage Mustafa’s behaviour of approximately every 9-10 days. This regular pattern, combined with the increase in the duration and intensity of the incidents, may lean to a necessity to renew the DOL Order. 29. To this end the Guardian believes that there is a need for DOL restriction when reasonable restraint is required to keep Mustafa safe.”
“Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.” (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.”
“(i) The starting point in assessing whether someone has been deprived of liberty within the meaning of article 5 is the specific situation of the individual concerned, and the assessment is multifactorial, with account taken of a whole range of factors including the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in question… The judgments of the European court show that no single factor is determinative. (ii) In addition to the objective element of confinement in a restricted space for a significant period, an individual will only be considered to be deprived of liberty if, as an additional subjective element, they have not validly consented to the confinement in question... Valid consent is therefore a powerful factor in the assessment. It is an autonomous concept and not to be equated with the concepts of consent for the purpose of waiver of rights under the Convention or of legal capacity in domestic law. The fact that an individual lacks legal capacity to decide on their living and care arrangements does not necessarily mean that they are de facto unable to understand and consent to those arrangements in a manner that prevents those arrangements from becoming a deprivation of liberty... On the contrary, an individual without legal capacity under domestic law, but who is conscious of their environment and has a basic understanding of their living circumstances so that they can express their view about their situation, who manifests their acceptance of the situation they are in, should have their opinion respected when an assessment is made of whether they are deprived of liberty under article 5. (iii) Although the objective and subjective elements of deprivation of liberty are often considered sequentially by the European court in its assessment of an applicant’s specific situation, there is an overlap. The requirement to take account of the ‘type’ and ‘effects and manner of implementation’ of the measure in question means that the assessment of the objective element can take account of the specific context and circumstances of restrictive measures that are different from the paradigm of confinement in a cell. (iv) The approach of the European court means that the effect of restrictions on an individual, including their compliance and the lack of objection if they are capable of objecting or giving tacit agreement, is relevant in assessing the objective element of confinement. The relative normality of the placement is also a relevant factor in this assessment. Similarly, in situations that are far from the paradigm of confinement in a cell, the purpose for which a measure has been taken is a factor to be considered. (v) The European court has recognised that the process of assessing whether there has been a deprivation of liberty is no easy task in some contexts and may give rise to difficulties, especially in borderline or marginal cases. Equally, it may sometimes be difficult to ascertain the true feelings or preferences of vulnerable individuals who do not have mental capacity to decide on their living arrangements. The approach should be practical and realistic. Where there is serious doubt, no inference of valid consent should be drawn.” 38. In making that determination, the Supreme Court applied the House of Lords’ 1966 Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent)[1966] 1 WLR 1234 to overrule the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Surrey County Council v P; Cheshire West and Chester Council v P[2014] UKSC 19 ,[2014] AC 896 , which held that “lack of mental capacity of an individual to consent to their care arrangements equates to lack of ‘valid consent’… In other words, an individual without such mental capacity is treated as unable to give valid consent to confinement.”