YL v A Local Authority & Ors [2026] EWHC 2156 (Fam)

[2026] EWHC 2156 (Fam)Case No MA25C0004
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION
Venue Manchester Civil Justice Centre
1 Bridge Street West
Venue ManchesterDate 6 August 2026
M60 9DJ
Before
MR S KARIM KC(sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge)
Between
YLApplicantA Local AuthorityRespondentsMLRespondentAMRespondentRe AM (Discharge of Care Order & Section 91(14) Order)
Amina Shafi (instructed by A Local Authority) for First RespondentFather was in person for in personMother was in person (remotely) for in personSandi Pope (instructed by CAFCASS Legal) for Children’s GuardianHearing Hearing dates: 28 to 31 July and 6 August 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down in private on 6 August 2026 and circulated thereafter and by release to the National Archives. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court..............................Mr S Karim KC:Introduction
[1]This application relates to AM who was born on 14 September 2019, and is now 6 years of age. His biological parents are YL (father) and ML (mother) (parents). The mother currently resides in Latvia with their three other children. A Local Authority is the relevant statutory body with responsibility (local authority). The Riga State City Municipal Orphans’ and Custody Court (Riga OCC) attended the hearing and has filed a position statement.[2]These proceedings have been a lengthy and constant feature in AM’s life, culminating in a Care Order made on 19 November 2021 made by Deputy Circuit Judge Jordan. Following a 5-day hearing, the Judge placed AM into the care of the local authority (for him to remain in foster care) with no direct contact with parents.[3]This application is to determine father’s application to discharge the Care Order made on 19 November 2021, and he also seeks a pathway towards direct contact and eventual reunification with AM. This is supported by mother, and in fact she has made her own application dated 1 September 2025 seeking direct contact and steps towards AM’s move to Latvia. By an order dated 1 May 2026 it was agreed that oral evidence would be heard from the father, mother, the allocated social worker and the Children’s Guardian. The local authority and the Children’s Guardian (Guardian) seek that the applications are refused, and that the Court should grant an order under section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989 (Act) prohibiting the parents from making a further application without the Court’s permission for a period of 12 months. The parents object to such an order.[4]On the evening prior to the commencement of this hearing, father made two applications:(1) seeking the attendance of clinical professionals (amongst others) to give oral evidence, and(2) Part 25 application for a clinical psychologist. I refused both applications giving an extempore judgment on the morning of the first day.[5]I heard oral evidence from the father, mother, allocated social worker and the children’s guardian. Father and mother separately cross-examined both. Written submissions were prepared by the parties. For completeness’s sake, both father and mother confirmed that they did not require the assistance of an interpreter.

Factual background

[6]The following is relevant, by way of a general overview:a. On 2 July 2020 an interim Care Order was granted and restated on 6 July 2020; the plan being that AM and his mother would be placed in a mother and baby unitb. On 6 August 2020, AM is placed with foster carers (where he remains to date)c. On 29 October 2020, Riga OCC lodge an application for the transfer of the proceedings to Latvia, which is refused by Deputy Circuit Judge Jordan on 3 December 2020d. At or around March 2021, the mother leaves the UK for Latvia; she is pregnant with another child at the timee. The care proceedings are concluded on 19 November 2021; it is decided that AM is to remain in long term foster care with permission granted for the local authority to withhold contact with the parentsf. Permission to appeal is refused by the Court of Appeal on 18 May 2022g. The father issues an application to discharge the Care Order on 1 February 2023, which is withdrawn on 7 August 2023h. A second application for transfer to Latvia is made on 1 March 2024i. In an order dated 8 July 2025, Riga OCC no longer seeks that AM is removed from this jurisdiction and is granted permission by the Court to withdraw the applicationj. At a case management hearing on 4 November 2025, the Court granted father’s application for permission to instruct a psychologist, albeit the identity is refused; Dr Calame (clinical psychologist) was instructed as a joint instruction.

Judgment of 19 November 2021

[7]It is important to consider various aspects of the judgment of 19 November 2021: [7] So having dealt with representation and parties, I briefly summarise what the case is about. The case is about whether or not these parents were within an abusive relationship and, as a consequence of which, AM was harmed, such that he needs therapy and treatment which cannot be provided by the parents. Also whether or not the Court, if it makes those findings, agrees with the proposed arrangements for AM under a care order, away from the parents. The parents both oppose that. They challenge the findings sought and extensive evidence has been heard. [9] So, in considering that, I move on to consider what is the threshold because, of course, again it is the case that it is only after the passing of the threshold, if so passed, that the Court can go on to consider the welfare test, the second limb, as to whether or not to make orders and if making the orders as such are appropriate. The final threshold is set out in a paper I have, which does actually have references within it, which is quite useful. The final threshold says: “The nature of the harm, likelihood of the harm alleged is:(i) ill treatment;(ii) neglect;(iii) impairment to the child’s physical, intellectual, emotional, social and behavioural development;(iv) impairment to the child’s physical and mental health;(v) impairment suffered from seeing or hearing the ill treatment of another.” [10] The facts relied on in that respect are that there is domestic abuse in the parents’ relationship, including coercive and controlling behaviour. AM has been exposed to this behaviour, causing him to suffer emotional harm and placing him at risk of physical harm. [11] Secondly, the father has been unable to manage his anger and becomes volatile when AM cries. Father has been observed to shout and rough handle AM, causing him to suffer, to be at risk of suffering physical and emotional harm. [12] Thirdly, the mother has fled the family home on at three occasions with AM as a result of domestic abuse perpetuated by the father, but on each occasion has returned home, exposing AM to further instability and the effects of domestic abuse. [13] Fourthly, the mother has remained in the relationship with the father, despite the impact this has on AM’s needs for safety and security. The mother disappeared on 26th May 2020 and was later found by the police in Birmingham in a distressed stated. The mother claimed to be planning to go to Latvia for haemorrhoid treatment, leaving AM in the sole care of his father, whom she has previously claimed to be abusive to their son. The mother’s actions place AM at risk of emotional and physical harm. [14] Fifth, the father minimises concerns about domestic abuse and has done throughout social work involvement. It has, therefore, not been possible to reduce the risk to AM and he continues to be at risk of significant emotional and physical harm. [15] Sixth, the parents have not worked openly and honestly and with the local authority service in order to minimise the risk to AM. It has therefore not been possible to reduce the risk to AM and he continues to be at risk of significant emotional and physical harm. [22] So far as the findings are concerned, on the primary issue as to whether or not there was domestic abuse within this relationship, I am satisfied, on balance of probabilities, that there was domestic abuse within the parents’ relationship, including coercive and controlling behaviour, exposing AM to the behaviour and causing him to suffer emotional harm and placing him at risk of physical harm. I am satisfied that the father is not able to manage his anger. An example of that specifically was the event where the father banged his leg or knee on the bed in the middle of the night and such was the anger of the father that it caused the mother to leave the home and go to her parents, where she could not stay and ended up in a refuge for two nights. This is hardly the response of somebody in a loving and caring relationship where somebody had hurt themselves. Therefore, I am satisfied on that account only, never mind others, that the father became volatile when AM cries, and I am satisfied, I believe it was on that occasion, that he roughly handled AM and the hereby suffered harm. [23] I am satisfied, on the evidence, that the mother has fled the home on three occasions. Her account that it had not occurred is inconsistent with the accounts given to the professionals consistently and thoroughly recorded throughout these proceedings. I am satisfied that, given my finding that the domestic abuse has continued significantly within this relationship the mother has remained in that relationship and does so, prioritising her relationship with the father over AM. I say that because it is clear that this mother, in my view, is the victim of domestic abuse and the local authority have sought to work with her to help her, and she has chosen, and says quite clearly she wishes to maintain her relationship with the father while looking after the children; notwithstanding that during the course of these proceedings, she abandoned this country to go to Latvia to give birth to [child]. [24] The disappearance to Birmingham was clear and her actions have caused harm, as have those of the father. The father’s denial of domestic abuse flies in the face of the findings that I make and is consistent with the psychological assessment of him and his narcissistic character if he does not do anything wrong. The parents have not worked openly and honestly to reduce the risk to AM. On the contrary, the father took the mother to the airport, so she could go off to Latvia to give birth, where she remains, and again not only did they not work openly and honestly with the local authority, they maintain that they do not need to attend any work, but that is a welfare issue. [25] It would not be very nuanced for me to spend hours going through the various logs that there are. There are clear and consistent evidence that matches together with regard to those events, reported through numerous professionals throughout the period and I am satisfied, on that basis, that that threshold is met as set out and I am satisfied to the appropriate standard and find accordingly. [26] The threshold having been met leads me on to the welfare assessment and in looking at the welfare assessment, I have to have regard to the evidence I have heard on that. Not only those professionals I have heard from, who have given evidence about the historic matters with regard to the findings, but the assessment of those professionals. I start with Mrs Winters, Psychotherapist. She was called. That was a case management decision of District Judge Stonier and, although there was reference by Mr Ameen to a request for a different expert, that was not pursued or if it was pursued it was refused and that, not to my knowledge, has not been successfully appealed. The psychotherapist describes AM as a 19 month old boy functioning at a much younger age, facing tremendous obstacles moving forward, in terms of making up for his significant gap. He requires dedication and a network around him and in sensitive and attuned parenting by the foster carers to begin to rebuild and move his development forward. He needs specialist focus and away from the parents who are reported to be in the regretful environment and their negative treatment of each other and AM will have a continuing impact on his capacity. [27] So the report is predicated on basis I have made those findings and she diagnosed him as to be seriously damaged as a consequence of that. In her evidence to me, she talks about her job involving consulting others in the network and her specialisation being different to that of health visitors but she looks for other things. She describes AM as being really crippled in terms of development and as having a chronic condition and he has no space to move forward. Her view is that during the assessment, she saw a child pathologically avoidant and had repeated concerns about him. She said to me that she was clear from the evidence that she saw in her assessment of him, she was not involved in assessing the parents, that the chronic nature of his condition and the severe difficulties he had in attachment, and she looked to the wider position. She was asked about why other people had not seen this and how one health visitor had referred the matter to her and she said that that was very common. People find it hard to know what they are looking for. “The health visitor’s role is different to mine”, she said. [28] She was very clear on the issue of relationship trauma and basically, as a consequence of in his early years, or months, being involved with parents who were as described, in a domestically violent relationship, and albeit the mother a victim, the father the perpetrator, that he will need intensive parenting and support and a serious package of care is needed. He will need to be settled and safe before commencing therapy and the future is not decided, there are a lot of variables. She says he is a hyper-vigilant child, very aware of adults and stressfulness and she recommends long term treatment in better than good enough parenting, intensive support and parenting, and her concern about the safeguarding issues surrounding AM and his presentation. [29] She was quite clear, because she was asked whether or not the trauma of separation could have resulted in this, and she said it would not, as a standalone experience. He is suffering from a very chronic condition and she went into more detail about this. She was quite clear that the help he needed was significant. [30] There was some discussion with her about when this is likely to have occurred and she was quite clear, at a very early stage. The exact words were quoted back to me, it had happened at the earliest age of this infant’s experiences. Again, tying in the jigsaw of events and looking at how those work together, the separation, she says in her experiences, has not caused the trauma. The historic domestic abuse which permeated this relationship throughout this child’s early life is the most likely cause and has resulted in this chronic condition this child suffers from.[8]It is worthy of note that when refusing permission to appeal on 18 May 2022, Peter Jackson LJ said: “…An appeal would have no chance of success. The Judge had a large body of professional evidence that G had been seriously harmed by your treatment of him. In particular, the psychotherapist Ms W stated that: "G is a highly traumatised child, globally developmentally delayed as a result of chronic neglect and domestic violence in his early infancy. He has been impaired in a sustained way by a denial of his needs and his feelings and his cognitive development has been shaped by trauma toward dysregulation and dissociative states. G's task of ordinary development and recovery from trauma is already so great and his life chances already so diminished, that any further experiences of hostility, trauma or violence will be catastrophic for the future development of this child. It is critical that G is kept safe from harm so that all efforts and network focus can be on his recovery and repair of his personality." The Judge was entitled to accept that evidence, which is shocking in relation to a child who was not yet two years old at the time of the assessment. It is a professional assessment and, like the unanimous body of professional assessments, cannot be described as speculation or conjecture. The allegation that the social worker misled the court was found by the Judge to be unsubstantiated and you give no reason to suggest that he was wrong. Far from being an unjustified breach of your rights, the Judge's order was necessary to protect G's right to a safe and secure childhood. The decisions to make a care order and to allow the local authority to suspend face to face contact during therapy were ones that were open to the Judge for the reasons he gave.” "G is a highly traumatised child, globally developmentally delayed as a result of chronic neglect and domestic violence in his early infancy. He has been impaired in a sustained way by a denial of his needs and his feelings and his cognitive development has been shaped by trauma toward dysregulation and dissociative states. G's task of ordinary development and recovery from trauma is already so great and his life chances already so diminished, that any further experiences of hostility, trauma or violence will be catastrophic for the future development of this child. It is critical that G is kept safe from harm so that all efforts and network focus can be on his recovery and repair of his personality."

Legal framework

[9]Section 39 of the Act states:
"39 Discharge and variation etc. of care orders and supervision orders. (1) A care order may be discharged by the court on the application of— (a) any person who has parental responsibility for the child; (b) the child himself; or (c) the local authority designated by the order. (2) –(3B) … (4) Where a care order is in force with respect to a child the court may, on the application of any person entitled to apply for the order to be discharged, substitute a supervision order for the care order. (5) When a court is considering whether to substitute one order for another under subsection (4) any provision of this Act which would otherwise require section 31(2) to be satisfied at the time when the proposed order is substituted or made shall be disregarded."
[10]Section 1 of the Act states:
"1 Welfare of the child. (1)When a court determines any question with respect to— (a) upbringing of a child; or (b) the administration of a child's property or the application of any income arising from it, the child's welfare shall be the court's paramount consideration. (2)-(2B) … (3) In the circumstances mentioned in subsection (4), a court shall have regard in particular to— (a) the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned (considered in the light of his age and understanding); (b) his physical, emotional and educational needs; (c) the likely effect on him of any change in his circumstances; (d) his age, sex, background and any characteristics of his which the court considers relevant; (e) any harm which he has suffered or is at risk of suffering; (f) how capable each of his parents, and any other person in relation to whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting his needs; (g) the range of powers available to the court under this Act in the proceedings in question. (4) The circumstances are that— (a) the court is considering whether to make, vary or discharge a section 8 order, and the making, variation or discharge of the order is opposed by any party to the proceedings; or (b) the court is considering whether to make, vary or discharge a special guardianship order or an order under Part IV. (5) Where a court is considering whether or not to make one or more orders under this Act with respect to a child, it shall not make the order or any of the orders unless it considers that doing so would be better for the child than making no order at all. (6)-(7) …"
[11]As opined by Peter Jackson LJ in TT (Children: Discharge of Care Order) [2021] EWCA Civ 742 at [31], when considering applications for discharge the relevant legal principles include “(1) The decision must be made in accordance with s. 1 of the Act, by which the child's welfare is the court's paramount consideration. The welfare evaluation is at large and the relevant factors in the welfare checklist must be considered and given appropriate weight. (2) Once the welfare evaluation has been carried out, the court will cross-check the outcome to ensure that it will be exercising its powers in such a way that any interference with Convention rights is necessary and proportionate. (3) The applicant must make out a case for the discharge of the care order by bringing forward evidence to show that this would be in the interests of the child. The findings of fact that underpinned the making of the care order will be relevant to the court's assessment but the weight to be given to them will vary from case to case. (4) The welfare evaluation is made at the time of the decision. The s. 31(2) threshold, applicable to the making of a care order, is of no relevance to an application for its discharge. The local authority does not have to re-prove the threshold and the applicant does not have to prove that it no longer applies. Any questions of harm and risk of harm form part of the overall welfare evaluation.”[12]Re A & T (Children) (Appeal: Duration of Section 91(14) Order) [2025] EWHC 3052 (Fam) relevantly outlines the following: “Legal Framework 32. Section 91(14) of the 1989 Act provides as follows: 'On disposing of any application for an order under this Act, the court may (whether or not it makes any other order in response to the application) order that no application for an order under this Act of any specified kind may be made with respect to the child concerned by any person named in the order without leave of the court.' 33. In 2022, the 1989 Act was amended by the 2021 Act with the insertion of a new section 91A entitled 'Section 91(14) orders: further provisions'. So far as material, this provides as follows: '(2) The circumstances in which the court may make a section 91(14) order include, among others, where the court is satisfied that the making of an application for an order under this Act of a specified kind by any person who is to be named in the section 91(14) order would put—(a) the child concerned, or(b) another individual ("the relevant individual"), at risk of harm. (3) In the case of a child or other individual who has reached the age of eighteen, the reference in subsection (2) to "harm" is to be read as a reference to ill-treatment or the impairment of physical or mental health. (4) Where a person who is named in a section 91(14) order applies for leave to make an application of a specified kind, the court must, in determining whether to grant leave, consider whether there has been a material change of circumstances since the order was made. (5) A section 91(14) order may be made by the court— (a) on an application made— (i) by the relevant individual; (ii) by or on behalf of the child concerned; (iii) by any other person who is a party to the application being disposed of by the court; (b) of its own motion.' 34. The principles governing the making of section 91(14) orders were set out by Butler-Sloss LJ in Re P (Section 91(14) Guidelines) [1999] 2 FLR 573 as follows: '(1) Section 91(14) should be read in conjunction with s 1(1) which makes the welfare of the child the paramount consideration. (2) The power to restrict applications to the court is discretionary and in the exercise of its discretion the court must weigh in the balance all the relevant circumstances. (3) An important consideration is that to impose a restriction is a statutory intrusion into the right of a party to bring proceedings before the court and to be heard in matters affecting his/her child. (4) The power is therefore to be used with great care and sparingly, the exception and not the rule. (5) It is generally to be seen as a weapon of last resort in cases of repeated and unreasonable applications. (6) In suitable circumstances (and on clear evidence), a court may impose the leave restriction in cases where the welfare of the child requires it, although there is no past history of making unreasonable applications. (7) In cases under para 6 above, the court will need to be satisfied first that the facts go beyond the commonly encountered need for a time to settle to a regime ordered by the court and the all too common situation where there is animosity between the adults in dispute or between the local authority and the family; and secondly that there is a serious risk that, without the imposition of the restriction, the child or the primary carers will be subject to unacceptable strain (8) A court may impose the restriction on making applications in the absence of a request from any of the parties, subject, of course, to the rules of natural justice such as an opportunity for the parties to be heard on the point. (9) A restriction may be imposed with or without limitation of time. (10) The degree of restriction should be proportionate to the harm it is intended to avoid. Therefore the court imposing the restriction should carefully consider the extent of the restriction to be imposed and specify, where appropriate, the type of application to be restrained and the duration of order.' 35. Re P was decided more than two decades before the enactment of the 2021 Act, but the ten principles identified by Butler-Sloss LJ have been substantially followed by the courts both before and since that Act came into force. 36. In Re A (A Child) (Supervised Contact: s.91(14) Orders) [2021] EWCA Civ 1749, King LJ held that although Re P guidelines 'have substantially withstood the test of time', it was instructive to place them in a modern context. She highlighted (at paras 34 to 36) that: 'In the [22 years since Re P was decided] the forensic landscape has changed out of all recognition. Amongst the many advances is the advent of the smart phone and of social media in all its forms. Of particular relevance in this context is the almost universal use of email as a means of instant communication. Another development of relevance is that as a result of the withdrawal of legal aid in the majority of private law cases, a large proportion of parents are unrepresented and therefore do not have, as the judge described it in the present case, the 'steadying influence' of legal advisors. One of the consequences of these changes which is seen not uncommonly in private law proceedings is that the other parties, and often the judge him or herself, can be (and often are) bombarded with emails from a parent, whether male or female, who is representing him or herself. Such behaviour may be the result of anxiety but in other cases, as in this case, it is part of a campaign of behaviour by one parent against the other which amounts to a deeply disturbing form of oppressive behaviour on their part. Regardless of the motivation, behaviour of this type, as exhibited by the mother in this case by way of an example, is deeply distressing to the parent who is the subject of such abuse and litigation at this level and is highly debilitating to each of the parties and to their children. All too often such communications are ill-considered and ill-judged with the consequence that every minor dispute or misunderstanding is met with an application to the judge. More importantly, the distress and anxiety caused to the other parent and to the children at the centre of such a raging dispute cannot be overestimated, nor can the damaging consequences where the focus of the litigation veers away from what, on any objective view, would and should be regarded as the real issues going to the welfare of the children concerned.' 37. King LJ also emphasised that the power to impose a section 91(14) restriction is not confined to cases of repeated applications, but may be justified after a single set of proceedings where the welfare of the child requires it. She went on to say (paras 40 to 42): 'Further, the guidelines do not say that a s91(14) order should only be made in exceptional circumstances, rather Guideline 4 says such an order should be the 'exception and not the rule'. That is of course right, there is no place in our child focused family justice system for any sort of 'two strikes and you are out' approach, but it seems to me that in the changed landscape described in paragraph 30 above there is considerable scope for the greater use of this protective filter in the interests of children. Those interests are served by the making of an order under s91(14) in an appropriate case not only to protect an individual child from the effects of endless unproductive applications and/or a campaign of harassment by the absent parent, but tangentially also to benefit all those other children whose cases are delayed as court lists are clogged up by the sort of applications made in this case, applications which should never have come before a judge. In my judgment in many cases, but particularly in those cases where the judge forms the view that the type of behaviour indulged in by one of the parents amounts to 'lawfare', that is to say the use of the court proceedings as a weapon of conflict, the court may feel significantly less reluctance than has been the case hitherto, before stepping in to provide by the making of an order under s91(14), protection for a parent from what is in effect, a form of coercive control on their former partner's part. The guidelines in Re P should now be applied with the above matters in mind and in my judgment the prolific use of social media and emails in the modern world may well mean that orders made under s91(14) need to be used more often in those cases where the litigation in question is causing either directly or indirectly, real harm.' 38. Re A was decided at a point when the 2021 Act had received royal assent but was not yet in force. King LJ, declined therefore to 'interpret or .. provide a commentary upon' the changes which it brought about. She did, however, note that: '[section 91A of the Children Act 1989] dovetails with the modern approach which I suggest should be taken to the making of s91(14) orders. In particular the provision at section 91A(2), if brought into effect, gives statutory effect to Guideline 6 of Re P … by permitting a s91(14) order to be made where the making of an application under the Children Act 1989 would put the parent or child at risk of physical or emotional harm.' 39. In F v M [2023] EWFC 5, Hayden J reaffirmed the principle that a section 91(14) order is a protective measure, not punitive. He held that an order lasting for several years may be necessary where one parent has used litigation as a form of coercive control or where ongoing proceedings have become harmful to the child's wellbeing; in appropriate cases such orders can be used to protect the child and primary carer from 'the stress and uncertainty of a misconceived or vexatious application'. He also described the section 91A provisions as 'transformative', holding (para 20) that: 'The section provides a powerful tool with which Judges can protect both children and the parent with whom they live, from corrosive, demoralising and controlling applications which have an insidious impact on their general welfare and wellbeing and can cause real emotional harm.' 40. Further guidance as to the making of section 91(14) orders following the implementation of the 2021 Act can be found in Practice Direction 12Q of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 (although, in considering the guidance it is necessary to bear in mind that, unlike the rules themselves, practice directions have no legislative force and carry no authority if they contain statements of the law which are wrong: see, for example, Re NY (A Child) [2019] UKSC 49 at para 38). Para 4.1 of PD12Q is concerned with the duration of orders and reinforces the tenth of the Re P principles by providing as follows: 'Sections 91(14) and 91A are silent on the duration of a section 91(14) order. The court therefore has a discretion as to the appropriate duration of the order. Any time limit imposed should be proportionate to the harm it is seeking to avoid. If the court decides to make a section 91(14) order, the court should explain its reasons for the duration ordered.'[13]In terms of duration, I also have regard to the comments at paragraph 49, namely that: The duration of a section 91(14) order is a critical issue which should not be dealt with cursorily. There is a substantial difference between an order of short duration which affords children a pause from litigation and one which endures for several years. In my judgment, the benefit to children of sparing them from the corrosive effect of being placed at the centre of litigation must be balanced against the disadvantage they may suffer from restricting their parents' ability to raise legitimate issues about their welfare before the courts. Even though a section 91(14) order is not an absolute barrier to making applications, it erects an additional hurdle for applicants to overcome. It is for this reason that it has been emphasised that the power is to be used with 'great care'.

Evidence

[14]I heard oral evidence from the following individuals who had all provided written evidence.

Social worker

[15]In oral evidence, and as set out in the witness statement dated 20 May 2026, the social worker invited the Court to dismiss the applications made by parents. In summary, she stated it that was in AM’s best interests and welfare to remain with current his foster carers, and for long-term plans to be made for his adoption with the current foster carers. She was crossed examined by the father at length and mother. Her reasons for inviting the Court to refuse the applications were various, but included inter alia that:a. She accepted the expert report of Dr Calame (clinical psychologist) and in fact has already commissioned the Life Therapy Story Work to commence as soon as practicable (as recommended); it was, therefore, important for AM to be in a supportive environment during this time, and not to be triggered resulting in emotional dysregulation or declineb. Prior to the completion of this work, there should be no change in the circumstances, save for the assessments advisedc. It was very concerning to her that the parents refuted the findings of fact made on 19 November 2021; rather attributing the trauma caused to AM to the separation rather than their actionsd. A parental assessment was concluded on 9 October 2024, which referred to the continued denial of any wrongdoing causing AM harm; she was concerned that the father had accused the local authority of being a “gangster organisation making money out of kidnapping children from their parents”; she also referred to the difficulties in working with fathere. To date, she was very concerned that father had not demonstrated sufficient sustained changed insight, despite undertaking several courses, such as CBT (the notes of which were provided by father in the course of the hearing) and advanced parenting skills (amongst others); as an example, she refers to an incident on 11 March 2026 when father’s behaviour was experienced by others as threatening and intimidatingf. As per paragraph 2.16 of Dr Calame’s report, which sets out the requirements of contact with family members, she agreed that AM required(1) a calm, predictable and non-threatening environment, and needed to be around people who(2) consistently affirmed rather than undermined his placementg. Father had not demonstrated these requirements in her view, especially considering his continued allegations that AM was sexually abused by the foster carersh. A return to the care of the parents (to include a move to Latvia to be cared for by his mother) would be “catastrophic” for AM in her viewi. There is a need for a period of calm for AM, and continued applications made by the parents is affecting AM’s welfare and long-term planning; the “Should be Placed for Adoption Panel” (SHOBPA) will not consider adoption with extant proceedings in situ.[16]I found the social worker to be a consistent and reliable witness. She demonstrated a clear understanding of AM’s needs.

Father

[17]The father has prepared a witness statement dated 25 July 2026 which was circa 193 pages long. In accordance with what he said in this statement, the father stated in oral evidence that he was open to support and help from the local authority to improve, which has not been provided. He felt “abandoned” by the local authority and cited they had “failed” AM and in fact “abused him”, and are now taking active steps to hide the abuse. He wishes for AM to move to Latvia to be cared for by his mother (with his siblings), and that it would be beneficial for him to have contact with his parents and family. There is no need, in his view for adoption, as his biological family are willing, available and able to care for him.[18]During cross examination by Ms Shafi and Ms Pope, the father said inter alia thata. He did not accept any of the findings of the Court dated 19 November 2021b. He was taken to the specific paragraphs of the judgment relating to the findings of fact; he did not accept that he has anger issues or there was domestic violence; he said that he was a victim of a “perpetrator and islamophobia” (referring to his mother-in-law); he referred to the evidence as being “fabricated”c. There was, in his view, strong evidence that AM’s harm and trauma arose after his separation from his parents and not contributed by himd. He considered that the foster carers are financially motivated, and have subjected AM to sexual abuse; he specifically said that because AM had bruises of his mouth/face in March or April 2021, this was suggestive, in his view, of a penis being inserted into this mouth; he has previously accused the previous social worker of being a child trafficker and that she had also sexually abused AM; his complaint to the police lead to no action and he has sought to reopen the allegation with them againe. He denied using AI to assist in the preparation of his documentation.[19]Overall, father presented in a manner entirely consistent with Deputy Circuit Judge Jordan’s findings, and the assessment of Dr Sally Watson (clinical psychologist) of 18 November 2020 who undertook a psychological assessment on father and concluded that:
“….the psychometric tests is consistent with an individual with narcissistic personality traits. He presented as entitled and arrogant, with a grandiose sense of self-importance, evident when discussing his accomplishments and community work, for which he wished to be admired. Father's defensive presentation results in a lack of empathy for AM and Mother and a compromised ability to meet AM's needs. Under particular circumstances, it is sometimes possible through therapy to shape such personality traits through the development of insight and empathy. However, this is a lengthy process and improvement in functioning is not guaranteed. Currently, Father's interest in and motivation for treatment is low. His responses suggest that he is happy with himself as he is, that he is not experiencing (or admitting) marked distress and that, as a result, he sees little need for changes in his behaviour. Father does not feel that treatment is warranted. I consider it highly unlikely that Father would be willing or able to discuss any aspects of himself or his behaviour that are in any way lacking or in need of improvement. Therefore, engaging Father in the therapeutic endeavour is likely to represent a formidable problem. As such, currently I do not consider that treatment or therapy for Father is currently indicated.”
[20]Whilst his desire for reunification with his son is admirable, in evidence, father was incapable of being self-critical and objective of his actions and behaviour. Despite the various courses that father says he has completed (including CBT), I found him to be fixated by the idea that the judgment of 19 November 2021 (and its specific findings of fact) were based on fabricated evidence; he could not accept in any way that he had contributed to the harm suffered to AM.

Mother

[21]The mother provided a comparatively short witness statement dated 24 July 2026. Her written position is nuanced, insofar as she says in the statement that, “I also fully support the recommendations made by the jointly instructed Clinical Psychologist, Dr Sherell Calame. I believe AM should receive the therapeutic support recommended in her report and that any reunification should take place gradually, carefully and under professional guidance. I do not seek an immediate return without preparation. My only wish is that AM has the opportunity to rebuild his relationship with his parents and his three younger brothers in a safe and structured way” The goal, as she states in this statement, is for reunification and discharge of the Care Order, i.e., a staged approach.[22]In oral evidence, she did not accept the judgment or findings made by the Court on 19 November 2021. She supported father’s position and positively stated that the Court had failed to protect AM, and that the trauma and harm that he suffered was because of the separation. She restated the allegation of sexual abuse made by father. When it was put to her by Ms Pope that part of the Life Story Work will need to outline (to AM) that he was removed because of domestic abuse/violence, and that this had caused him harm/trauma, she disagreed with this recommendation.[23]Whilst the mother began her evidence more nuanced to the father (as set out in her witness statement), she then demonstrated the same fixation in refusing to accept any responsibility for the harm suffered by AM and referring to fabricated evidence that resulted in the findings of fact.

Guardian

[24]The guardian relied on two CAFCASS case analysis reports dated 11 January 2025 and recently dated 15 June 2026. He agreed with the evidence of the social worker and the contents of the report by Dr Calame. In examination in chief, he said that a grant of either application (discharge of the Care Order or direct contact) would be “catastrophic” for AM; he said in oral evidence that it would be, “inconceivable and completely at odds with AM’s welfare and best interests”. He also highlighted that AM had been in care proceedings for approximately 230 weeks, which is having a negative impact on him and his life. In his view, the parents would significantly undermine the placement, and he has fundamental concerns about them being AM’s carers at this stage.[25]The guardian confirmed that he had seen AM 4 to 5 times since early 2025 and described him as a “complex little boy”. He said when he first met him, he had limited boundaries and demonstrated inappropriate physical proximity. In contrast to his recent visit in April or May 2026, his observations were of an average six-year-old boy, with better boundaries; he was able to have conversations; and he was able to demonstrate progress in every aspect. He described AM’s relationship with his foster carers as “very close”, and that AM knows that “they are not going to give up on him”. Considering the welfare checklist, the guardian said in oral evidence that:a. the foster carers can meet AM’s physical, emotional and educational needs; the parents cannotb. any change in his circumstances would be “absolutely catastrophic” for AMc. that a discharge of the Care Order and/or direct contact would result in a significant risk of harm to AM.[26]He also supported a section 91(14) order for the period of 12 months preventing the parents making an application without permission of the Court.[27]During extensive cross examination by father, the guardian was unable to assist in relation to the previous allegations relating to sexual abuse but did confirm that he had considered the various assessments completed by the Latvian authorities. In doing so, he observed that those assessments did not consider the relationship between father and mother, which had caused AM harm. He also accepted that he had a positive relationship with father and had cordial interactions with him, and on at least one occasion he saw father caring appropriately for his baby during a virtual meeting. He did not accept that the foster carers were financially motivated stating in turn that, in his view, they would care for AM “even without” monetary gain. Their priority, in his view, was that AM reached his “full potential”. The guardian was specifically asked by father what his recommendation would be if father accepted the judgment of 19 November 2021 and its findings, and whether in those circumstances, he would support father’s application. In his careful answer, the guardian said that he would expect the father to withdraw his application for discharge and for the commencement of contact. In response to this interaction, and during cross-examination, father accused Deputy Circuit Judge Jordan as of being racist.[28]I found the Guardian to be an exceptional witness. His evidence was clear, thoughtful, cogent, demonstrated a very good understanding of AM’s needs and insight into the parents. His evidence was also objective and fair, acknowledging the positives of the parents, when possible, but highlighting that they were unable to overcome their fixation with the past. Analysis and Conclusion Care order

Analysis and Conclusion

[29]I have carefully considered the entirety of the evidence before me including the written submissions. I note that the position statement of the Riga OCC does not positively support the applications of the parents. I have regard, in accordance with section 1 of the Act, of AM’s welfare as a paramount consideration and the welfare checklist.[30]The following is relevant.[31]First, as opined by the guardian in his report dated 15 June 2026, AM’s view has not been obtained regarding a possible return to his parents because his primary attachment relationship is to his foster carers, and he has not had contact with either parent since he was two years old. Having said that, the evidence is that AM is happy in the placement and settle there, as he is in school.[32]Second, AM has extensive emotional needs, which are set out in the jointly instructed report of Dr Calame dated 17 April 2026. Drawing the threads together, the report states:a. The state of mind assessment report dated 2 June 2021 refers to AM as being fearful and unable to express his needs verbally or non-verbally; he was reportedly unable to cry, show distress or seek comfort in caregivers; he was reported to be unable to regulate his feelings or to express his needs in ordinary waysb. That assessment stated, “AM is a highly traumatised child, globally developmentally delayed as a result of chronic neglect and domestic violence in his early infancy. He has been impaired in a sustained way by a denial of his needs and his feelings and his cognitive development has been shaped by trauma toward dysregulation and dissociative states.”c. AM’s therapy commenced in January 2022d. In contrast the current “assessment reviews” demonstrate that AM has made significant progress across the key areas of emotional, relational, and cognitive development previously affected by developmental trauma; episodes of emotional dysregulation, which was said to be frequent and intense previously, are now reported to be less frequente. The improvement is because of the intense therapeutic intervention provided to AM, however, it is said that he cannot begin developmental recovery without a high level of safety and security in his care; although he has made significant progress, there remains ongoing difficulty in his emotional and relational functioningf. Given the severity and complexity of the developmental trauma that AM has experienced he requires more than the standard Life Story Work that has been provided to him; he requires Therapeutic Life Story Work which is in an in-depth therapeutic process underpinned by psychodynamic, CBT and systemic principles which will enable him to continue processing the complex emotions associated with his early life experiencesg. Once AM has been supported in this Therapeutic Life Story Work, and he is able to tolerate without dysregulation, it may be appropriate to consider step-by-step indirect methods of visual contact with his parentsh. A prerequisite to considering re-establishing face-to-face contact with parents would be an updated psychological assessment of them to determine their capacity to understand the psychological impact of AM’s identifying needs and difficulties, their capacity to prioritise AM’s emotional needs during their interactions, to relate with him empathically, their capacity to work collaboratively with the professional network and caregivers and to approach AM based on his identified needs.[33]The process of healing from the significant trauma suffered by AM can only be progressed, based on expert evidence (which I accept), by the Therapeutic Life Story Work. That requires, as opined by the expert at paragraph 2.12, to actively support AM in developing a “coherent and integrated narrative of his early experiences”. The expert goes on to say in the same paragraph this work is “foundational in helping him make sense of his past, understanding his relationships, and build a stable and positive sense of identity which is a core element of recovery from developmental trauma which AM has not yet accessed”.[34]It is clear, in my view, that AM’s parents will be unable to support this work especially in respect of the narrative of his early life experiences and supporting the current placement. Over the span of five years, they have rejected the clear conclusions of the judgment dated 19 November 2021 citing reasons such as that the allegations and evidence were fabricated. It is also concerning that neither parent accepts that they had caused any harm or trauma, by reason of their actions, to AM. As stated by Peter Jackson LJ when refusing permission to appeal the decision of the 19 November 2021, there was a unanimous body of professional assessments before the Court when making the decision, which concluded they had.[35]This lack of insight by the parents extends to the consideration of this expert evidence. Despite its stark conclusions and recommendations, both parents seek an immediate discharge of the Care Order and contact, albeit that I accept that mother’s written evidence is far more nuanced. This demonstrates a lack of understanding of AM’s needs.[36]It is right to acknowledge that in some cases, previous findings of fact can be of variable relevance. However, by reason of the expert evidence and the recommendation of the Therapeutic Life Story Work, and the need of a coherent and integrated narrative of AM’s early life experiences, I determine that it is a central feature to his emotional needs and the progression of his trauma and condition. The totality of the evidence demonstrates that AM’s harm/trauma was caused by these parents and their interactions. As Ms Shafi and Ms Pope assert, the continued failure to acknowledge this has a bearing as to whether they can support his future therapeutic work, and indeed safely care for AM. In so far as necessary, I directly reject any assertion that the trauma and harm was caused by AM’s separation from his parents. This was a matter clearly dealt with by Deputy Circuit Judge Jordan in his judgment.[37]I also accept the assertion made by Ms Shafi and Ms Pope that the parents would undermine the current placement. It is difficult to see how the parents can support AM’s placement, with his foster carers, when they directly and positively assert that he has been sexually abused either by them or whilst in their care. This is a stark allegation unsupported by any police or safeguarding investigation. As outlined above, there were also allegations of child trafficking and further sexual abuse at the hands of the previous social worker. I should add that there is no evidence before the Court which directly states that AM has been abused by the foster carers and/or the previous social worker as alleged or at all.[38]Third, I have regard to AM’s age, sex and background and other any characteristics. I accept that AM has a distinct identity being of mixed Bangladeshi and Latvian decent. His religion is also relevant. His background is dictated to by his lived experience, i.e. that he suffered significant trauma in his early years when in the care of his parents. He has spent the last six years with his foster carers and had no contact (direct or indirect) with his parents since 2021.[39]Fourth and finally, I also consider the capability of each parent in meeting AM’s needs. I have regard to the fact that I have determined that neither parent can support his on-going therapeutic needs, but I have also considered the updated parenting assessments of 2024. Those assessments demonstrate that neither parent can accept the findings and that they are unable to understand AM’s needs now or in the future. I have also taken into account the assessments undertaken in Latvia, but these do not analyse AM’s needs, and fundamentally do not consider the findings of 19 November 2021 that caused the trauma.[40]Ms Pope in her written submissions, on behalf of the Guardian states that:
“The parents maintain a clear denial of any wrongdoing and deflects focus with multiple unsubstantiated allegations against all involved. The father makes serious allegations of sexual abuse against foster carers and a previous social work, he makes allegations of racism and bias against the previous judge, he alleges he is the victim of a hate crime and Islamophobia. He repeatedly makes threats to go to the press and to sue everyone involved. The Guardian described the fathers “commitment to the fight” and that this prevents him from being able to see and properly consider AM’s needs.”
[41]Having heard and read the totality of the evidence before me, I agree with the guardian’s summary. I accept the evidence of the social worker and the guardian, that the parents are unable to support AM’s therapeutic development and his complex needs at this stage. In my judgment, AM’s welfare and best interest dictate that the Care Order is not discharged.[42]By not discharging the Care Order, there is a continued interference with the Article 8 rights of AM, his parents and his siblings. For the reasons outlined by Deputy Circuit Judge Jordan that interference is justified, necessary and proportionate. That conclusion remains relevant now, and in fact the justification is bolstered by reason of the evidence I have read and heard.[43]In reaching this decision:(1) it is for father and mother to make out a case for discharge of the Care Order by bringing forward evidence to show that this would be in the interests of AM; for the reasons outlined above they have failed to do so, and(2) I acknowledge that my welfare evaluation is made now as opposed to in 2021; the harm that is referred to is the current harm as outlined by the expert, the social worker and guardian.[44]Accordingly, I refuse father’s application for discharge of the Care Order, which is also supported by mother.

Contact

[45]For the same reasons, I also reject mother’s application for direct contact, as supported by father. The expert evidence is clear that before any such contact is considered, the Therapeutic Life Story Work is to be completed, and then for psychological assessments of parents (as outlined above). The local authority and the guardian accept this recommendation. I also accept this evidence.[46]It is clear, in my view, that even before such contact is considered, he must undergo Therapeutic Life Story Work which will enable him to continue processing the complex emotions associated with his early life experiences. As stated by the expert, whose evidence I accept in its entirety, it is only after this work (and tolerates it), when it may be appropriate to consider step-by-step indirect methods of visual contact with his parents. However, a precondition is the need for updated psychological assessments of the parents to determine:a. their capacity to understand the psychological impact of AM’s identifying needs and difficulties,b. their capacity to prioritise AM’s emotional needs during their interactions, to relate with him empathically,c. their capacity to work collaboratively with the professional network and caregivers andd. to approach AM based on his identified needs.[47]I accept the evidence of the guardian that a discharge of the Care Order and/or reintroduction of contact would have a “catastrophic effect” on AM and would have an inimical effect on his welfare and best interests. In my judgment, the impact on AM of any change would be significant, and would on balance, lead to the previous chaotic and self-destructive behaviours; he is a vulnerable child who needs predictability and stability as set out by the expert. The discharge of the Care Order and reintroduction of contact would present a risk of harm to AM.[48]Having regard to the totality of the evidence before me, and having regard to section 1 of the Act, I refuse the application for direct contact and maintain the existing section 34(4) order dated 19 November 2021.

Section 91(14)

[49]The local authority seeks an order pursuant to section 91(14) of the Act against both the father and the mother for a period of 12 months from the date of an order. As outlined above, the effect of such an order would be that neither parent may without the Court’s permission make a further application under the Act. The justification for such an order is that(1) the parents have made a number of applications,(2) it would allow for permanence planning to take place and in particular the SHOBPA process to be completed without interruption,(3) any placement order proceedings can commence and be determined, and(4) the Therapeutic Life Story Work can begin. The local authority asserts that such an order would not prevent either parent from participating in or opposing any future application for a placement order and seek the duration of the order to be 12 months.[50]The guardian has suggested such an order, in fact, since April 2025. The guardian supports this application. The guardian highlights that AM has now spent circa 230 weeks of his life in litigation and that this is the third application made by father; two discharge of care applications and one appeal, and the second application made by the Latvian authorities. He says that AM has met with 3 different guardians, multiple social workers, and that the carers have suffered from the ongoing stress and exhaustion of these proceedings. Ms Pope in her written submissions on behalf of the guardian states that AM, and his carers, require a “period of calm”.[51]The parents refute the need for such an order.[52]Having dismissed father’s application, there is now automatic filter in place preventing father from for making a further s34 application for a period of 6 months without leave of the Court, by virtue of s91(17) of the Act.[53]To summarise the relevant legal principles for an order under section 91(14), in my judgment:(a) I adopt what is said by Hayden J in F v, M [2023] EWFC 5 at [20] when he said, 'The section provides a powerful tool with which Judges can protect both children and the parent with whom they live, from corrosive, demoralising and controlling applications which have an insidious impact on their general welfare and wellbeing and can cause real emotional harm.'(b) the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration(c) it would be open to the Court to exercise its discretionary power under section 91(14) if it is satisfied, on balance, that the child (or indeed another individual) would be at risk of harm(d) it is a draconian and protective measure of last resort, only to be used in exceptional circumstances(e) the duration must be proportionate to the harm that is being sought to be avoided.[54]PD12Q deals with orders made under section 91(4) of the Act and states relevantly that:
“2.2 The court has a discretion to determine the circumstances in which an order would be appropriate. These circumstances may be many and varied. They include circumstances where an application would put the child concerned, or another individual, at risk of harm (as provided in section 91A), such as psychological or emotional harm. The welfare of the child is paramount. 2.3 These circumstances can also include where one party has made repeated and unreasonable applications; where a period of respite is needed following litigation; where a period of time is needed for certain actions to be taken for the protection of the child or other person; or where a person’s conduct overall is such that an order is merited to protect the welfare of the child directly, or indirectly due to damaging effects on a parent carer. Such conduct could include harassment, or other oppressive or distressing behaviour beyond or within the proceedings including via social media and e-mail, and via third parties. Such conduct might also constitute domestic abuse.”
[55]Against this background, it is amongst other matters relevant to note that:a. the parents do not accept the findings of fact or judgment of 19 November 2021b. the father has made an allegation of racism and bias against Deputy Circuit Judge Jordan, and that he is a victim of a hate crime and islamophobiac. the parents assert that i. they did not cause any harm to AM, ii. the trauma/harm was caused after separation or by reason of the separation, iii. the previous social worker was a child trafficker and had sexually abused AM, iv. that the foster carers have sexually abused AM and have not cared for him properly v. that the local authority has failed AM, harmed him, relied on fabricated evidence and are actively seeking to cover up their failure.[56]On balance, it is more likely than not, that the parents will continue to make applications. There is nothing to suggest that they will not. Indeed, father confirmed in evidence that he would continue to make applications and appeal decisions to achieve his goal of reunification[57]That has a direct and significant consequence for AM in various ways:(1) it prevents determination about adoption, which I find is contrary to his welfare and best interests,(2) it exposes him to more professionals, and(3) contributes to the anxiety, stress and exhaustion of the foster carers, which in turn is contrary to AM’s welfare and best interests. This culminates, in my view, in a conclusion that future litigation by the parents would cause AM harm.[58]In my judgment, an order under 91(14) is needed to prevent harm; such an order is consistent with section 1 of the Act, and AM’s welfare, which is the paramount consideration. I do not take this decision lightly given the competing rights of parents, but I accept the evidence of the guardian that these proceedings, and ongoing proceedings are harmful to AM.[59]I have carefully considered the length of time needed for such an order. I determine that the duration of this order should be 12 months from the date of this judgment: this period will provide for the calm that is sought, for AM to commence the Therapeutic Life Story Work and allow for his long-term planning. This period strikes the right balance, in my view, between AM’s welfare, the necessity/justification of the order (to prevent harm) and the competing Article 6 rights of parents. As such, any interference with Article 6 rights, is justified, necessary and proportionate.[60]Finally, I also make a Reporting Restriction Order given father’s indication that he wishes to inform the press, and anonymise the social worker, guardian and the local authority to prevent jigsaw identification of AM.