Blackburn with Darwen Borough Council v AD [2026] EWHC 2148 (Fam)
[2026] EWHC 2148 (Fam)Case No FD26C40333& PR26C50013
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION
Date 5 th August 2026
Sessions House,
Lancaster Road,
PRESTON PR1 2 PD
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE BURROWS(sitting as a Judge of the High Court and of the Family Court)
Between
BLACKBURN WITH DARWEN BOROUGH COUNCILApplicantADRespondentJohn Chukwuemeka (instructed by the Local Authority) for ApplicantKarl Berry (instructed by Farleys LLP, Blackburn) for child’s motherHannah Walsh (of Roland Robinson & Fentons LLP, Blackpool) for Children’s GuardianHearing Hearing dates: 5 th August 2026JUDGMENT
[1]This matter comes before the Court for further consideration of both ongoing care proceedings under Part IV of the Children Act 1989 and proceedings under the inherent jurisdiction concerning the deprivation of liberty of AD.[2]AD is now almost sixteen years old. He is a child whom the evidence demonstrates has experienced profound difficulties over a prolonged period. The Court has before it a substantial body of evidence, spanning many months, documenting repeated self-harm, overdoses, suicidal ideation, episodes of absconding, vulnerability to exploitation, interventions by police and ambulance services, admissions to hospital, previous detention under the Mental Health Act 1983, and now the breakdown of yet another carefully constructed placement.[3]What emerges from that evidence is a picture of a deeply vulnerable child who has, for years, been oscillating between crisis and temporary stabilisation, whilst professionals struggle to identify a regime capable of meeting his extraordinary needs.[4]Before turning to the issues arising today, I wish to say something about AD's mother.[5]It is impossible to read this material without recognising both the depth of her concern for her son and the burden she has carried over a very considerable period. The evidence demonstrates that she has repeatedly sought help, repeatedly advocated for AD and repeatedly attempted to keep him safe in circumstances which would have overwhelmed many parents. She has plainly reached the point at which she has felt unable to continue safely caring for him. But that does not demonstrate parental indifference. Quite the reverse. It demonstrates a parent confronting the painful reality that love alone cannot manage risks of the magnitude presented by this child.[6]I also wish to record the Court's appreciation for the work undertaken by the Local Authority. I do not doubt that there will be decisions within the history of this case with which individuals may disagree. However, standing back and looking at the evidence as a whole, it is clear that social workers and managers have been dealing with an extraordinarily difficult child protection and welfare situation. The Local Authority has searched for placements, reviewed risks, convened meetings, sought specialist provision, issued these proceedings and repeatedly returned to court for lawful authorisation of restrictions designed solely to keep AD alive. The Court should be slow to criticise professionals who have plainly been working at the limits of what any local authority could reasonably achieve.[7]The same unfortunately cannot be said with confidence about the response of the wider State.[8]This case raises once again an issue with which judges of the Family Division have become depressingly familiar. It is the phenomenon of the child who is plainly unwell, highly vulnerable, and at immediate risk of grave harm, but who falls between legal and organisational frameworks. Such children often become the subject of repeated court applications because the Court is the only institution left to whom desperate professionals can turn when every other system has reached the limits of its response.[9]AD's present circumstances illustrate that problem starkly.[10]The evidence before me records recent ingestion of glass, repeated ligaturing, overdoses, significant self-harm, numerous physical interventions, police involvement, ambulance involvement, hospital admission, and behaviour so dangerous that concerns have been raised regarding potentially fatal consequences. As I understand the position, AD’s current placement has now terminated because it considers itself unable safely to continue caring for him. He remains in hospital because there is presently no safe discharge plan. That hospital is a general hospital which has cleared an entire children’s ward to enable AD to reside there with security. The hospital needs those beds for other sick children. However, it is to their credit that they are not placing undue pressure on the council to remove AD. That is because they share the concern all of us have for his safety.[11]It became clear during the hearing, in fact, that AD is no longer receiving any treatment for his physical problems that cannot be administered outside a hospital. He is, however, on 24/7 3:1 supervision. There is also evidence that he has received sedative medication from the general hospital clinicians designed simply to address his challenging behaviour.[12]In other words, AD is presently in hospital but receiving no active treatment of his core mental disorder. He is being confined. Nothing else.[13]Those facts are extraordinary.[14]Yet simultaneously the Court is told that AD does not meet the criteria for detention under the Mental Health Act. Not once, but repeatedly.[15]I entirely accept that courts must not substitute themselves for psychiatrists. The Mental Health Act establishes a legal and clinical framework which Parliament has entrusted to appropriately qualified professionals. The question whether statutory criteria are met is not one for me.[16]However, whilst I cannot direct a Mental Health Act assessment to reach a particular conclusion, I can identify the consequences of the evidence before me.[17]The consequence is that a child who repeatedly self-harms, attempts overdose, ingests glass, ligatures, presents a risk of death by misadventure, requires constant supervision and has exhausted one highly specialised placement after another is nevertheless to be regarded as suitable for management in the community.[18]If that is indeed the professional conclusion, it requires careful explanation. After all, it is ultimately my responsibility to evaluate AD’s needs, and whether they are or are likely to be met.[19]The Court has now considered two statements from Dr Z, a consultant psychiatrist, together with the Mental Health Act assessment material.[20]The later evidence is undoubtedly more informative than the earlier material. It proposes a formulation centred upon autism, ADHD, developmental trauma, attachment difficulties and emotional dysregulation rather than psychosis, major depressive illness or another acute psychiatric disorder.[21]However, what the psychiatric evidence notably does not explain is how the therapeutic interventions arising from that formulation are actually to be delivered in practice to this child.[22]It is one thing to say that AD's risks arise principally from neurodevelopmental and attachment-related difficulties. It is another to explain who is responsible for treating those difficulties, where such treatment will be provided, what therapeutic regime is proposed, what professional will deliver it and by what mechanism those interventions are to be sustained given AD's presentation.[23]Reading this material as a whole, one is left with the uncomfortable impression that mental health services have been rather more successful in explaining why they cannot help than in explaining how they will help.[24]That is not, in my judgment, a satisfactory position.[25]Of particular concern is the repeated emphasis placed upon questions of consent, engagement and willingness to participate in services. The Court has before it evidence from one part of the system asserting that AD lacks Gillick competence in relation to these issues, whilst other evidence concludes the opposite.[26]Whatever the correct answer to that question, this child has plainly not been making decisions free from overwhelming vulnerabilities and risks. Repeated reliance upon a lack of engagement as an explanation for limited intervention sits uneasily alongside the extraordinarily serious risks documented by multiple professionals over an extended period.[27]I wish to make something else clear.[28]This Court's powers are limited. I cannot compel psychiatrists to reach clinical conclusions they do feel able to reach.[29]I cannot direct detention under the Mental Health Act.[30]I cannot create resources which do not exist.[31]I cannot require a public authority to conjure into existence a therapeutic placement, treatment programme or specialist service which it says is unavailable.[32]The inherent jurisdiction is not a magical source of solutions. It authorises this Court to scrutinise, to question, to require explanations and, where necessary, to authorise restrictions which interfere with Article 5 rights. Or, indeed to refuse to authorise them. It does not permit the Court to redesign the health and social care system.[33]That limitation creates a profound frustration.[34]That being said, my role in evaluating AD’s Article 5 rights does require me to consider the justification for his deprivation of liberty. In this case the justification is that he is “of unsound mind” (Article 5(1)(e)). I have no doubt that is correct. The problem is that his deprivation of liberty does not appear to be for the purpose of treating the underlying or core disorder. At the present time, he is being confined so that decisions can be made about what happens next.[35]Once again, this Court finds itself confronted by a case in which every professional agrees that a child faces extraordinary risks, every professional agrees he requires intensive support, yet there is no coherent agreement regarding who bears ultimate responsibility for ensuring that such support is delivered.[36]In those circumstances I am strongly of the view that the involvement of Lancashire and South Cumbria NHS Foundation Trust requires reconsideration. On the present evidence, the Court cannot properly scrutinise the arrangements for a child who remains subject to restrictions amounting to a deprivation of liberty without hearing directly from the public body responsible for psychiatric assessment and treatment.[37]The Court is satisfied that the active participation of Lancashire and South Cumbria NHS Foundation Trust is necessary to enable effective judicial scrutiny of the arrangements made for AD, particularly given his continuing deprivation of liberty, the repeated conclusions that he does not meet criteria for detention under the Mental Health Act, and the absence of any presently identified therapeutic pathway capable of meeting his needs.[38]I consider it necessary for the Trust to be a party to these proceedings.[39]I further consider that the present circumstances raise issues of sufficient public importance that this judgment should be made available, suitably anonymised, to the relevant public authorities.[40]AD is not an isolated problem to be solved.[41]AD is a child.[42]He is a child with serious needs, a frightened family, exhausted professionals and a future which remains alarmingly uncertain.[43]It would be easy to lose sight of the human being beneath the paperwork. The Court must not do so, and it will not do so.[44]Whatever frustrations may properly be directed towards systems and agencies, none should be directed towards AD himself. The evidence reveals a child overwhelmed by needs which he is presently incapable of managing and which adults have repeatedly struggled to understand.[45]The central question remains the same as it has throughout these proceedings: how can this young person be kept safe whilst receiving meaningful therapeutic help?[46]Disturbingly, despite many months of intervention and many hundreds of pages of evidence, the Court is still unable confidently to answer that question.[47]That, ultimately, is the tragedy of this case.[48]The immediate welfare imperative is to preserve AD's safety. The longer-term imperative is that those public authorities responsible for his care move beyond debates about thresholds, pathways, eligibility and organisational boundaries and identify an achievable therapeutic plan for this young man before further harm occurs. The order I make is intended to achieve that.[49]I direct that a copy of this judgment be provided to the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, the Children's Commissioner for England, the Chief Executive of Lancashire and South Cumbria NHS Foundation Trust, and the Chief Executive of Blackburn with Darwen Borough Council. Once anonymised, this judgment will be published on the National Archive.[50]This case raises issues extending well beyond the circumstances of one child and concerns the ability of public services collectively to respond to highly vulnerable children who do not fit neatly within existing statutory frameworks.[51]That is the judgment.