Donovan Sappleton v R1 & Anor [2026] EWHC 1783 (Fam)

[2026] EWHC 1783 (Fam)Case No ZW22P01272
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 14/07/2026
Before
THE HONOURABLE MRS JUSTICE LIEVEN
Between
Donovan SappletonApplicantR1RespondentsR2Respondent
for The Applicant did not appear and was not representedMr Joshua Hitchens instructed by Janes Solicitors LLP appeared for First Respondent for The Second Respondent did not appear and was not representedHearing Hearing dates: Friday 5 th June 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 14:30 on 14 July 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail..............................THE HONOURABLE MRS JUSTICE LIEVENThis judgment was delivered in private. The judge has not given leave for this version of the judgment to be published. Nobody may be identified by name or location. The anonymity of everyone other than the lawyers must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court.
[1]This is the second judgment relating to Mr Sappleton’s (S) application for permission to bring committal proceedings in respect of R1 (R1) and her father, R2 (R2), the First and Second Respondents. The first judgment is Mr Sappleton v R1 & R2 [2026] EWHC 1782 (Fam)[2]At this hearing, S did not attend and was not represented. R1 was represented by Mr Hitchens, and R2 did not attend and was not represented.[3]The issues raised in this judgment are;a. Whether I should make an Extended Civil Restraint Order (ECRO) against S;b. Whether I should make a third party costs order in favour of the Legal Aid Agency;c. Whether I should publish the judgment with S’s name not redacted.[4]I was satisfied that S had had proper notice of the hearing and had been served. He had been at the previous hearing when the date today was fixed. Service of the applications was made by email. Although there was no express order permitting service by email, there is no doubt that S had received the documents because he served a Response on the court and on R1’s solicitors by email. He acknowledged receipt of the documents by email. I therefore took the view that it was appropriate to proceed despite the fact that he had not attended.

Extended Civil Restraint Order (ECRO)

[5]The power to make an ECRO lies in FPR r4.8, which says that the circumstances, procedure and consequences are set out in Practice Direction 4B. PD 4B section 3 relates to ECROs. A court may make an ECRO where a party “has persistently made applications which are totally without merit”.[6]The benefit of an ECRO, rather than simply a limited Civil Restraint Order, is that it applies to “any court concerning any matter involving or relating or touching upon or leading to the proceedings in which the order is made”, see paragraph 3.2 PD4B.[7]I have no hesitation in making the ECRO against S. As I set out in the previous judgment he has made applications to the High Court for permission to appeal on four occasions all of which have been certified as being Totally Without Merit (TWM). Further it is entirely clear from the present application for committal that he refuses to accept HHJ Atkinson’s findings and has no insight either into his own conduct or the impact that it has on R1, who is the mother of the child.[8]S’s persistent unmeritorious applications have caused enormous distress to R1 and have continued a course of conduct using the Justice System as a means of coercive control. That is wholly unacceptable. I also note that these persistent applications take up a large amount of precious court time, and have involved the LAA in considerable public expense in providing Legal Aid to R1.[9]In my view it is overwhelmingly in the interests of justice that a filter be placed, through the mechanism of the ECRO, before S can make any further applications to the Court.

Third Party Costs order

[10]Mr Hitchens asks me to make a third party costs order in favour of the LAA. R1 is legally aided and I could simply make a costs order in her favour. However, for the reasons that I set out below, the reality of the Legal Aid scheme in this type of case is that it is extremely unlikely that such an order would be enforced. The effect would therefore be that S (and others undertaking similar conduct) can make such applications with impunity, knowing that they are highly unlikely to be made to pay the costs incurred. Further, the LAA and thus the public purse is very unlikely to recover its costs. Mr Hitchens has persuaded me that there is a wider public interest in terms of preventing, or at least disincentivising, abusive partners from making this type of application as part of a pattern of vexatious litigation and ultimately further abuse.[11]Rule 28.1 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 provides that the Court may at any time make such order as to costs as it thinks fit. FPR r.28.2 provides that CPR r.46 applies to Family costs proceedings. CPR r.46.2(1) makes clear that the Court may make a costs order in favour of a non-party. CPR r.46.2(1) goes on to provide that where the Court is considering making a costs order in favour of, or against a non-party then that non-party must:
“(a) be added as a party to the proceedings for the purposes of costs only; and (b) be given a reasonable opportunity to attend a hearing at which the court will consider the matter further. (2) This rule does not apply – (a) where the court is considering whether to – (i) make an order against the Lord Chancellor in proceedings in which the Lord Chancellor has provided legal aid to a party to the proceedings; (ii) make a wasted costs order (as defined in rule 46.8); and (b) in proceedings to which rule 46.1 applies (pre-commencement disclosure and orders for disclosure against a person who is not a party).” (a) where the court is considering whether to – (i) make an order against the Lord Chancellor in proceedings in which the Lord Chancellor has provided legal aid to a party to the proceedings; (ii) make a wasted costs order (as defined in rule 46.8); and (b) in proceedings to which rule 46.1 applies (pre-commencement disclosure and orders for disclosure against a person who is not a party).”
[12]Mr Hitchens informed the Court that his solicitors had been in discussion with the LAA in advance of the application. The LAA had requested that R1 make an application for a third party costs order.[13]These proceedings are for committal and therefore are subject to criminal rather than civil legal aid regulations. The effect of this is as follows. If the Court makes a costs order against S then he is obliged to pay R1’s solicitors the reasonable costs of the proceedings. However, the LAA pays R1’s solicitors those costs in any event. The solicitors may then seek to recover the costs against S, however there are two barriers to this happening in practice. Firstly, there is no LAA funding for enforcing a costs order, so the solicitors are doing this entirely at their own risk. Given S’s history it seems probable that recovering any costs order from him will be difficult and will itself incur considerable expense. I understand that there are already costs orders in favour of R1 that S has not paid.[14]Secondly, there is no financial incentive on solicitors in this situation to recover costs from the non-legally aided party. This is because the amount of costs that can be recovered is no greater than that paid by the LAA. In these circumstances there is no reason why R1 and her solicitors would prioritise seeking to enforce the costs order from these proceedings.[15]However, if there is a costs order in favour of the LAA then they have a direct financial incentive in recovery and can make their own decision as to whether to seek to enforce the order against S.[16]In my view there are strong reasons why a third party costs order should be made in this case. Firstly, without such an order it seems extremely unlikely that S will in practice pay any costs incurred by his own application.[17]Secondly, S’s application has caused significant public money to be incurred by the LAA supporting R1 in defending the application. The LAA should have the opportunity to seek to recover those sums. There is no reason why the taxpayer should shoulder the costs of S’s unmeritorious application and abuse of the Court system.[18]Thirdly, in my judgement, S has used these proceedings to coerce, control and intimidate R1. This is part of a pattern of behaviour. The Family Justice System needs to get better at preventing this type of conduct, and not allowing abusers to use the system to perpetuate their abuse of former partners. One way of disincentivising such conduct is by making costs orders that have some prospect of being enforced.[19]The proposed approach creates parity between Applicants and Respondents. Where a Respondent to a contempt application is found in contempt, they shall be both liable for the Applicant's costs on an indemnity basis and, if legally aided, may also be subject to a Recovery of a Defence Costs Order, meaning that the publicly funded costs of defending them can be recovered from them. It is unclear why an unsuccessful Respondent should be liable for the Legal Aid Agency's costs, but an unsuccessful Applicant should not be.[20]In terms of the quantum of any such order I determined that the best course is for the LAA to decide whether it wishes to make an application for effectively indemnity costs pursuant to FPR28.1 and CPR44.3(8). If it does make such an application I can deal with it on the papers.

Publication of the judgment

[21]The issue here is not whether the judgment should be published, but the form of any anonymisation. Mr Hitchens submits that the Respondent should not be named, and this is uncontentious. She is the child’s mother and naming her would very easily lead to the identification of the child. Further, given that I have concluded that the Applicant’s purpose in making the application was to cause the Respondent harassment and distress, it would plainly be wrong to name her in a public judgment.[22]However, Mr Hitchens submits that the Applicant should be named.[23]It is trite that the open justice principle is fundamental to the rule of law and operation of the Justice system (See Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417). At §63 onwards of Application by Guardian News and Media Ltd and others in Her Majesty's Treasury v Mohammed Jabar Ahmed and others (FC) [2010] UKSC 1, the Supreme Court set out the reasons why it is important that individuals can be named in reports of proceedings.[24]Mr Hitchens submits that the Applicant should be named for the following reasons:(a) Firstly, if the Applicant is made subject to an Extended Civil Restraint Order, then he will be publicly named on the list of ECROs maintained by HMCTS. It would be perverse for him to be published on the ECRO list, but his name to be omitted from the judgment.(b) Secondly, these are criminal proceedings within the meaning of Article 6 of the ECHR and as such, any derogations from the principle of open justice must be proportionate and carefully scrutinised. It is difficult to see what justification there could be for anonymising the Applicant in an unsuccessful contempt application.(c) Thirdly, where somebody brings criminal proceedings against another, he does so in the knowledge that those are public proceedings and shall result in a public judgment. It is only in the most exceptional case that a Court should allow the Applicant in a contempt application to be anonymised.(d) Fourthly, S is already publicly identified as having brought unmeritorious proceedings in the past (See ET claim: Sappleton v London Fire Commissioner Case No. 2302517/2017V and 2303650/2018/V).[25]In my view it is appropriate for S to be named. He chose to bring these proceedings, and there is an important public interest both generally in open justice, and specifically where wholly unmeritorious applications are made in individuals not being able to avoid responsibility through anonymisation. I have considered the indubitable fact that by naming S there is some possibility of the child being identified through jigsaw identification. However, balancing Article 10 rights against Article 8, and considering the importance of open justice under Article 6, in my view the public interest in naming S outweighs the risk of the child being identified.